The politics of contending piety: Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufi Movement and the struggle for Islamic activism in contemporary Indonesia by Makhasin, Luthfi
THE POLITICS OF CONTENDING PIETY 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufi Movement and the Struggle for Islamic 
Activism in Contemporary Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
LUTHFI MAKHASIN 
STUDENT ID: 4146662 
 
School of Culture, History and Language 
College of Asia and the Pacific 
The Australian National University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of 
The Australian National University 
December 2015 
 ii 
STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY 
 
 
This is to certify that this thesis is the result of my own work. Where I have the 
works of some scholars, due the acknowledgment has been made in the text. 
!!
Word count: 89,919 
 
 
Signed : ________________________Luthfi Makhasin 
Date : ________________________ 
 !!!! !
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT !!
This thesis is made possible through a scholarship and generous financial 
support from Endeavour Postgraduate Award, the then Department of Education 
and Training of the Australian Government.  
I am deeply indebted to my principal supervisor, Greg Fealy. He has taught 
me the importance of analytical rigor and critical thinking. He has been 
instrumental in helping to shape the direction of my fieldwork, clarifying and 
organising ideas, especially during the writing-up period. I am also deeply grateful 
to Professor James J. Fox, member of my advisory panel who has always been very 
attentive and helpful, and a tireless editor of my work. His guidance and support 
has decisively determined the completion of this work. Both Greg Fealy and 
Professor James J. Fox have also given me encouragement, moral and material 
support for the completion of this thesis. 
My great thanks are addressed to Joanne Bushby who helps me a lot to deal 
with administrative matters at the CHL. To former case managers of Austraining 
International, especially Arlin Coates and Trang Hoang, I express my thanks and 
gratitude. I also greatly benefited from editorial assistance provided by Thuy Pam. 
Without her editorial assistance this thesis would not have come up to its final 
form.  
I would like to mention few Indonesian friends in Canberra, Samsul Ma’arif 
Mujiharto, Syamsu Rijal and Najib Kailani, who help me to arrange few things 
before and during the submission date. I will always be grateful for their kindness 
and friendship. Yet, it is to my family that I owe my greatest debt, and it is to them 
that this thesis is dedicated. Only they know how much their emotional support has 
meant to me.  !!!!
 iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is about Islamic piety movement in contemporary Indonesia 
focusing on Naqshbandi-Haqqani (NH), a transnational Sufi movement with 
origins in the Middle East and a large following in the USA and Western Europe. It 
spread to Indonesia in the late 1990s and, since then, has attracted thousands of 
followers throughout the country. Although certainly not the largest, it is one of the 
most active Islamic groups propagating the Sufi message to the public. Its steady 
growth in the last 15 years reveals some important features of contemporary 
religious life in Indonesia. By employing social movement theories, this study 
attempts to illuminate the intricate relationship between piety and Islamic activism 
in contemporary Indonesia. 
This thesis reveals that Sufism still has a strong power to shape the nature 
of Muslim piety and influence public morality in Indonesia. The struggle for Islam 
is not targeting wide-ranging social reforms or the secular state, but it is primarily 
about the transformation of everyday life and small-scale changes affecting 
religious beliefs and rituals of individual Muslims. In a democratic context, this 
transformation contributes to the creation of a cosmopolitan pietism that potentially 
promotes a ‘civil Islam’ that is neither secular nor Islamist in nature. 
This study also demonstrates that cosmopolitan pietism is not a given 
condition because it is dependent on various external factors. Indonesian Muslims 
have been and will likely remain fragmented along different pious orientations. 
Sufism contributes to the growth of authoritarian pietism characterised by religious 
and political conservatism. This conservatism has uncompromising attitude toward 
secular virtues and unambiguous political stance over the political establishment.   !!!!!!!!!!!
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Chapter 1 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
 
“In the worlds of mass media and scholarship, much attention has been given to 
the global ‘resurgence of religion’, with special attention given to developments 
within the Muslim world. However, most of this attention and research has been 
given to militant and politically activist movements…There is little recognition 
that while membership in the militant groups may be in the thousands, there are 
many millions of Muslims who are not fundamentalists, who are active 
participants in Sufi tariqas around the world”(Voll 2007, 283) 
 
The conventional wisdom of modernist theories has assumed that religion 
would eventually fade and religious beliefs and rituals would likewise become 
irrelevant as people gradually embraced rational and secular worldviews. 
According to this line of argument, modern individuals would incline toward text-
dictated creeds and concomitantly avoid devotional and ritual practices in their 
daily religious life. They would also be increasingly self-reflective and rely on 
themselves and secular authority rather than other worldly entities and religious 
authority. Science and its underpinning institutions would eventually prevail over 
religion, while mystical beliefs and rituals would eventually have no place in the 
development of a state of self-consciousness in the modern world. This view is 
supposed to constitute a great divide and irreconcilable divergence between the 
religious and the secular world, and between the rational and the mystical 
worldview.  
However, such a secular view has been increasingly challenged because of 
its theoretical fallacies and empirical inaccuracies. Religion has not yet become 
obsolete in the modern world. Rather, it still provides solid and clear worldviews 
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that respond to feelings of anxiety and confusion. It remains important and is 
becoming more so as a source of moral value and identity. Under this trend, it is 
not surprising that the themes of religious revival and resurgence have gained 
currency among contemporary social theorists. Berger, for instance, suggested that 
religion has not disappeared yet because of the homeless-mind suffered by modern 
individuals. In Berger’s scheme, this ‘homeless-mind’ refers to a particular 
condition characterised by a strong distrust of rationalised and bureaucratised 
modern institutions (Berger 1967, 1969, Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1974). 
Indonesia is a good case study of religious revival and its far-reaching impacts on 
society. 
Indonesia has been experiencing an Islamic ‘spiritual revolution’.1 This 
Islamic spiritual revolution has to do particularly with the resurgence of religious 
beliefs, doctrines and rituals inspired by and associated with Sufism, religious 
teachings that embrace Islamic mysticism. 2  It is illustrated by the growing 
popularity of typical Sufi collective rituals such as istighotzah (communal God 
remembrance) and maulid (Prophet Muhammad’s birthday) celebrations.3 It is also 
exemplified by continuing veneration toward deceased Sufi masters, pious 
ancestors, and the shrines of Muslim saints as shown in the continuing tradition and 
growing popularity of pilgrimage journeys (ziarah) among Muslims throughout 
Indonesia.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This has been defined as a condition emphasizing “the subjective-life forms of the sacred, 
significance, and authority and the cultivation or sacralisation of unique subjective-lives” (Heelas 
and Woodhead 2005, 6). 
2 Schimmel defines Sufism simply as Islamic mysticism, referring to the consciousness of the One 
Reality and love of the Absolute that cannot be reached by ordinary means and be understood or 
explained by any normal mode of perception (1975, 3-4).  
3 The Sufi collective rituals have been highly visible, increasingly attracting a large number of 
people and deliberately being promoted through various media outlets since late 1990s. 
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Sufism has recently become popular not only among rural population but 
also among the urban middle-class in Jakarta and in other cities. It is not 
uncommon now to see people gathering every Thursday night at mosques as well 
as at luxurious residential houses in Jakarta to chant formulae for invoking God 
(dzikir). Self-development training with spirituality content, intensive religious 
training and tassawuf courses offered by individuals or urban Sufi groups in hotels 
or convention halls are also attractive and their programs are kept running by and 
for the Jakarta’s elites. 4  Moreover, Sufi pesantren remain intact and Sufi 
brotherhoods (tarekat) still have a strong popular appeal in urban and rural areas 
(Zulkifli 2002, Howell, Subandi, and Nelson 2001b, 33-60).5 
Sufism has obviously had a strong appeal to people from all walks of life. 
People are increasingly eager to become pious, virtuous and righteous in all aspects 
of their life by emulating the Prophet’s moral excellence, rituals and exemplary 
habits.6 Sufism has long been deeply embedded in the Indonesian social fabric. It 
has been, and still is, an integral part of popular Islamic beliefs and religious 
practices. Sufism has also contributed significantly in shaping diverse local Islamic 
traditions throughout Indonesia. Sufism was a primary vehicle through which 
Islamic missionary activities were brought to the archipelago a few centuries ago 
(Johns 1961, 14, Shihab 2001).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Howell used the term of ‘urban Sufi’ to describe Sufi-inspired spiritual expression that is 
becoming popular among urban upper middle class (2000, 17). These urban Sufi groups include 
Klub Kajian Agama Paramadina, Yayasan Tazkiyah Sejati and IIMaN. 
5 According to some sources, there are more than 190 Sufi pesantren, more than 20 different Sufi 
brotherhoods, and around 40-70 million Muslims with a Sufi inclination, mostly associated with the 
largest Muslim group in the country, Nahdlatul Ulama.  
6 They include various religious practices such as the remembrance of God (dzikr), dietary habits 
(fasting), temporary seclusion (khalwat), night praying (tahajud), and regular recitation of the 
Quran (tadarus) 
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In fact, there is still a large number of those embracing the so-called 
‘mystic-synthesis’ and Sufism as part of their Muslim identity (Ricklefs 2006, 2007, 
2008, 115). Sufi transnational networks played a significant role in promoting the 
growth and expansion of this intellectual trend in the 17th and 18th century (Azra 
1992, 2004). Although it has been under constant pressure from Islamic reformism 
since the early 20th century, Sufism manages to survive in modern times in 
Indonesia (Howell 2007a, 217-240). It is not completely surprising that Howell 
made a compelling argument that Sufism has become an integral part of a thriving 
Islamic revival in Indonesia (Howell 2001a, 701-729). 
This study is about Islamic piety movement in contemporary Indonesia. It 
focuses on Naqshbandi-Haqqani, a transnational Sufi movement based in the 
United States with social origins in Damascus, Syria. This study is, however, 
located in the broader context of the contemporary dynamics of emerging Islamic 
activism in Indonesia. The emergence of this Sufi group is a result of mixed factors: 
transnational influence, economic development and educational improvements, 
increasing religious literacy, new opportunities, media encroachment, and 
technological advancement.  
The study attempts to address the following questions, why have 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani and other neo-Sufi movements grown rapidly in size and 
influence in contemporary Indonesia? This specific question becomes a guide to 
raise further broad questions about the relationship between the global and the local 
in the Islamic transmission of ideas, how and in what way Sufism manages to 
survive in the modern secular context, and the socio-political significance of this 
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Islamic piety movement in boosting Islamic activism amid the growing influence 
of Salafism and Islamism in contemporary Indonesia.  
By focusing on Naqshbandi-Haqqani as the case study, I argue that Sufi 
resurgence in contemporary Indonesia represents a broader phenomenon in the 
Muslim world in which the search for Muslim piety goes hand in hand with the 
struggle for Islamic activism. Sufi resurgence is highly contested because it is 
taking place in the context of ongoing religious struggles and the socio-political 
dynamics of contemporary Indonesian society. This resurgence draws upon Sufi 
mystical teachings and the personalised religious authority of Sufi masters. It is 
partly a response to a perceived moral decline and the growing influence of 
Salafism and Islamism in Indonesia.  
The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani marks a broader shift in the contemporary 
religious landscape in Indonesia. This changing religious landscape is preoccupied 
with the cultivation of strict moral-ethical virtues at the level of the individual and 
society rather than broader socio-political reform at the state level. Sufism plays a 
significant role in delegitimising, and to some extent even weakening, the self-
righteous claims of Salafism and Islamism as the sole legitimate determinants of 
Muslim piety and Islamic activism in Indonesia.  
Before elaborating further and reviewing scholarly studies of Sufism in 
Indonesia, I wish to clarify two key concepts, ‘piety’ and ‘Islamic activism’, and 
various derivative terms that will be used in this study: Sufism, Salafism, Islamism, 
and post-Islamism. The conceptual framework defined by these key terms is 
pivotal to understanding the diverse religious expressions of Sufism in 
contemporary Indonesia. The two key concepts are related to one another, and 
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altogether they help to understand Sufism and its role in shaping Muslim piety and 
Islamic activism in Indonesia.  
The term piety is a theoretical concept derived from the Western scholarly 
tradition. The term piety denotes personalised religious excellence and willingness 
or whole-hearted commitment to pursue and implement that excellence in a broader 
social context. In Weber’s scheme, piety is exclusively related to Protestantism and 
this is broadly applied to rational thinking, economic motives, and the drive for 
worldly salvation in the context of market capitalism. This kind of piety has two 
related aspects, asceticism and activism (Weber 1992). Asceticism refers to 
personal qualities and moral virtue resulting from an avoidance of worldly 
pleasures, whereas activism involves active engagement to promote these personal 
qualities to address broader social concerns. This conception of piety is based on a 
strong criticism toward otherworldly mysticism and ritual-oriented piety, which are 
supposed to characterise non-Christian religions.  
Unlike Weber’s conception, Foucault (1997) argues that piety is par 
excellence a technology of the self which is designed to produce religious 
excellence or virtues. Being virtuous or pious can be effectively measured by 
contrast to those who are impious or lacking in virtue. To show piety publicly is to 
destroy it, and hence piety must be subtly insinuated and suggested by indirect 
comparisons with those lacking in religious virtue. Mahmood (2004) adopts this 
conception of piety to suggest that piety has nothing to do with economic-material 
motives and rational calculation but it is more about cultivation of ethical and 
moral virtues.  For her, piety is also neither subordinate nor resistant to religious 
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authority as commonly understood among liberal-secular thinkers because it 
involves the embodiment of religious discourse and ritual. 
Meanwhile, Turner regards piety as an active act and the state of becoming 
rather than of being. In his conception, piety is never taken for granted because it 
necessarily involves continuous efforts to be simultaneously pious on the one hand 
and socially engaged in dealing with broader problems of society on the other hand.  
He describes piety and the piety movement as follow:  
 
‘Piety tends to have a radical impact on the everyday world of believers by 
encouraging devotees to change their habits or in the language of modern 
sociology to transform their habitus or their dispositions and tastes towards the 
material world. Piety is about the construction of definite and distinctive life styles 
of new religious tastes and preferences. In short, piety or the pietisation of the 
everyday world combines new elements to create a religious habitus that stands in 
competition with other possible combinations in a competitive religious context’ 
(2008, 2).  
 
In Islamic terms, Muslim piety resembles the notion of being shaleh (pious 
Muslim) that incorporates a combination of belief, observance to shariah and ritual 
devotion. In this study, I frame Muslim piety in two main categories: Sufism and 
Salafism. Sufism is a Latinized derivation from the original Arabic term, safa 
(meaning purity), suf/wool (referring to those wearing woollen garments), ahl al-
suffa (the people of the bench/the pious and indigent companions of the Prophet 
who lived in his mosque), and ahl-al saffa (referring to those who occupy the first 
Rank/row in the mosque or in the eyes of God). From this term, there is another 
Arabic derivative tassawuf, meaning the science of Islamic spirituality. Another 
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important term is tariqah (Arabic  word meaning the path), which refers to the Sufi 
brotherhoods as developed by the great Sufi masters (Knysh 2000, 5).7  
Salafism is derived from the Arabic phrase salaf as-shalih (the pious 
ancestors) referring to the first three generations of Muslim community whose 
religious excellence is the role model for contemporary Muslims. 8  The 
contemporary term of Salafism has multiple meanings. It denotes religious thinking 
and reform ideas that strive to purify Muslim beliefs and worship in accordance 
with the Quran, the teachings of the Prophet, and the first three generations of 
Muslims. It is associated with religious conservatism and the political 
establishment that rules in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
In this study, I define both Sufism and Salafism as Islamic terms that 
basically refer to an idealised type of Muslim piety. There may be overlapping and 
some shared meanings between these two types of Muslim piety. But in order to 
make matters clear, Sufism and Salafism are two completely different Islamic 
modes of Muslim piety. Sufism denotes particular beliefs, doctrines and rituals, 
which are maintained by and embodied in the personified religious authority of a 
Sufi master based on the cumulative interpretation of Islamic tradition for 
generations. Sufi piety entails idealised moral-ethical virtues and personal 
characteristics such as the absence of an excessive worldly orientation (zuhud), !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Sufism and its derivative terms began to gain currency among the Muslim community in the 9th 
century/2nd century of Islamic calendar. These terms were commonly attributed to the Prophet and 
his companions who were dissatisfied with the outward observance of the shariah and engaged in 
self-imposed strictures 
8 The classical Salafism owes its origins Muhammad ibn Hanbal, Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taimiyah 
(1263-1328), and Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab (1703-1792). In modern times, Salafism has 
adopted the religious ideas of Jamaludin al Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Ridha (1865-
1935) who developed their renewal ideas in Cairo. Contemporary Salafism has been greatly 
influenced by Nashirudin al Albani, Muhammad Abdullah ibn Baz, and Muhammad Shaleh al 
Utsaimin. 
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wara’, patience (sabar), tawakkal, humbleness, forgiving (taubat), and 
contentment (ridha’). The cultivation of ethical-moral virtues is strongly based on 
mystical beliefs that the human being can achieve both the state of annihilation 
(fana) and subsistence (baqa’) through self-purification (tadzkiyah an-nafs).  
On the other hand, Salafism is a modern scholarly concept emphasizing 
literal scriptural interpretations and the purification of doctrine. It particularly 
refers to a distinct set of religious features such as the doctrine of takfir 
(excommunication), wala’ wal bara’ (loyalty and disavowal), hisba/amar ma’ruf 
nahi mungkar (commanding good and forbidding vices). It is also pejoratively 
associated with particular Muslim groups that do not hesitate to pursue their 
religious and political goals through acts of violence and physical threat against 
non-Muslims as well as other fellow Muslims. Most importantly, Salafism seeks 
total rejection of Sufism as part of a legitimate orthodox Muslim praxis.    
With regard to Islamic activism, I follow Wiktorowicz’s definition of this 
term. According to him, Islamic activism is ‘the mobilisation of contention to 
support Muslim causes’ (2004, 2). For Wiktorowicz, Islamic activism includes the 
types of contention that frequently emerge under the banner of Islam such as 
propagation movements, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and identities, 
explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state, inward-
looking groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts, and 
even terrorist groups that seeks violence action (2004, 2).  
While piety touches upon private and individual aspects of religious 
practice, Islamic activism is about collective action to implement Islamic ideals, to 
address broader social and religious concerns, and to be pious in every-day life. 
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The wide-ranging definition of Islamic activism can be categorised into five types 
of Islamic activism: purification (tadzkiyah), proselytization (dakwah), education 
(tarbiyah), political action (siyasah), and physical action (jihad). There are two 
major analytical frameworks for understanding Islamic activism: Islamism and 
post-Islamism, each of which refers to a difference of goals, orientation, strategy 
and locus of Islamic activism.  
Islamism is preoccupied with reviving and revitalising Islam in modern 
times through theological purification and political struggle. This theoretical 
framework departs from the assumption that Islam is inherently absolute due to the 
absence of the distinctive feature between religion and politics. It has two related 
principal features, religious revivalism and political ideology. As religious 
revivalism, Islamism generally adopts a Salafi theology characterised by its 
preoccupation with a return to the Quran, the Prophetic tradition (sunnah), rejection 
of Islamic jurisprudence (madzhab), and the right to independent interpretation or 
ijtihad (Roy 1994, 35-36). As a political ideology, Islamism is considered a 
complete and universal system that needs to be implemented through social and 
political actions. For an Islamist, Islam is a classical ideology that is similar to 
modern ideologies such as communism, capitalism, Marxism, and so forth. 
Islamists comprise revolutionaries and neo-fundamentalists; their political 
divergence derives from the difference on the issues of shariah and women (Roy 
1994, 36-39).9  
On the other hand, the term Post-Islamism has various different meanings 
but basically refers to the changing condition and project under which Islam plays a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Ideologically speaking, Islamism owes much to Hasan al Banna (1906-1949), the founder of 
Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, and Abul A’la Maududi (1903-1979), the 
ideological father of Jemmaat Islami, an Islamist party in Pakistan.      
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defining role. According to Bayat, post-Islamism refers to a condition where ‘the 
appeal, energy, symbols and sources of legitimacy of Islamism become exhausted, 
even among its once-ardent supporters’ (1996, 45). He also defines post-Islamism 
as a project, referring to ‘a conscious attempt to conceptualise and strategize the 
rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political, and 
intellectual domains’ (2005a, 76). Unlike Bayat, Kepel (2004) defined post-
Islamism as the departure of Islamism from the Jihadi and Salafi doctrines, whereas 
Roy proposes that post-Islamism is the privatization of Islam and ‘individual re-
appropriation of Islamic symbols, arguments, rhetoric, and norms’ (2004, 97-99).  
 
1.1 Sufism and Islamic Activism in Indonesia: A Literature Review  
Indonesia provides a good example of thriving religious life and Islamic 
activism under strong Sufi influence. There are five major analytical frameworks in 
scholarly studies of Sufism in Indonesia as: 1) syncretic-heterodox, 2) reformist-
orthodox, 3) an institution of traditional charisma, 4) as experiential religiosity or 5) 
commodified religiosity. These five analytical frameworks derive from diverse 
theoretical perspectives with different units of analysis and have consequently 
resulted in different conclusions about Sufism and its role in driving Islamic 
activism in Indonesia.  
First, Sufism can be considered as a form of syncretic-heterodox belief 
violating the basic tenets of Islamic doctrine. Sufism is seen as contrary to Islamic 
canonical teachings or shariah.  As a syncretic belief and practice, Sufism is 
considered a corrupted belief of an old-fashioned folk-religion and the cultural 
remnants of a rural peasant society without historical precedent within the Islamic 
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legal tradition.10 This popular syncretic analysis has been adopted especially by 
those who support modernist ideas of rationalisation and Islamic purification. 
Sufism or Islamic mysticism is regarded as culturally responsible for hindering 
material progress and economic development. As such, Sufism poses a serious 
constraint to modernisation (Geertz 1960).11 Hence, it was believed that once 
modernization was embraced, this syncretic belief would no longer have a place in 
the Muslim world.12  
Second, Sufism can be seen as a reformist-orthodox belief. In contrast to 
the syncretic-heterodox view, this analytical framework attempts to locate Sufism 
within Islamic orthodoxy through its compliance with mainstream Islamic tradition. 
This kind of analysis appreciates Sufism as a religious belief and ritual with far-
reaching impact on the religious and social life of Muslim society. This framework 
is put forward particularly by generations of religious and social scholars who have 
conducted their studies on historical texts and ethnographic research in various 
localities across Indonesia. This line of analysis comprises two main variants with 
the emphasis on Sufism either as a foundation for philosophical moral-ethics or as 
the basis for socio-religious reform. These studies indicate that Sufism in Indonesia 
has developed to conform with the shariah rules on the one hand and to relegate 
the wahdatul wujud belief (al-Attas 1970, Mulyati 1992, 2004, 2006, Lubis 1996, 
Shihab 2001, Fathurahman 2008, Widiyanto 2012), to cultivate moral excellence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Interestingly, this view is also shared by the contemporary purist Islam which considers it as a 
popular mystical belief that represents religious heterodoxy and even heresy (Djamaludin 2001, Jaiz 
2001, 2006) 
11 This view is also shared by the Salafi Muslims who considers it as a popular mystical belief that 
violates the purity of Oneness doctrine (tauhid) and leads people astray because of idolatry 
(Djamaludin 2001, Jaiz 2001, 2006). 
12 It came as no surprise that some prominent scholars such as Arthur Arberry (1956), Ernest 
Gellner (1985) confidently proclaimed that Islamic Sufism was a folk-religious tradition and would 
be obsolete as Muslim society embraced the modern path of economic development.  
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and ethical virtues (Bagir 2001, 2005, 2010, Rakhmat 1998, 1999, 2002), and to 
play a part in the Islamisation process and to stimulate social and economic change 
in the archipelago (Krauss 1990, 691-706, Bruinessen 1991, 251-269, Azra 1992, 
2004, Mu'tasim and Mulkhan 1998, Mufid 2006, Makhasin 2007). 
Third, Sufism, for those who put emphasis on its internal organising 
structure, is a type of personal cult and an institution of traditional charisma. This 
framework of analysis is particularly preoccupied with the strong relationship 
between the master and his disciples. In this regard, Sufi is a model of a 
charismatic institution in which the Sufi sheikh has a high degree of control and 
authority over his disciples. The vitality of the Sufi movement is therefore 
attributed either to the great personal charisma of the Sufi sheikh or murshid or the 
underpinning social institution established by this charismatic figure (Lombard 
1990, 707-715, Bruinessen 1992a, 2007a, 225-251, Zulkifli 2002).  
As an institution of traditional charisma, Sufism generates certain political 
attitudes toward existing power relations and the political establishment. This 
framework of analysis looks particularly at Sufism as either millenarian or as a 
pragmatist-conservative movement or as both. Sufism serves as an ideological 
apparatus which resonates with rural peasants’ worldview and social structure. In 
this sense, Sufism can provide a religious justification for political discontent and 
social protest. Sufism may offer millenarian expectations for resisting any 
encroaching foreign power and for establishing a divine order and preparing for the 
coming of the just ruler (Ratu Adil). Drewes (1925), Kartodirdjo (1966, 1984) and 
Darban (2004) are some classical studies on peasant rebellious movements that 
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were based on Sufism as an ideological source of millenarian expectations and 
revolutionary resistance against Western colonialism.  
As a pragmatist-conservative movement, Sufism can represent an Islamic 
political force favoring the maintenance of the social order, stability, and a pro-
status-quo position. Sufi activism is also portrayed as representing a sort of 
pragmatism that is able to utilize political patronage to gain economic benefits 
(Turmudi 1996, Sujuthi 2001, Sukamto 2006). Bruinessen, who has observed the 
upsurge of interest in Sufism in Indonesian politics, located this trend in the 
specific historical context of New Order politics. Sufism emerged because the New 
Order did not tolerate the public expression of political Islamism but certainly 
tolerated the private mystical expression of religiosity (Bruinessen 2007b). He was 
particularly interested in explaining the appearance of numerous ‘living saints’ 
within an orthodox Islamic group (NU) and their role in contesting the symbolic 
foundations of the powerful New Order state (Bruinessen 2007b, 92-112) 
Fourth, Sufism can be considered a form of experiential religiosity. Sufism 
encourages people to seek direct experience with God beyond a legal-minded 
emphasis of primary religious institutions. In her study on Sufi revival in Indonesia, 
Howell explores the notion of ‘experiential religiosity’, referring to the subjective 
spiritual experiences beyond discursive consciousness (Howell 2001a, 701-729). 
She is very much influenced by the notion of subjectified religion, referring to a 
state in which religion is constructed as a self-experience in dealing directly with 
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the Divine (Woodhead 2002, Heelas and Woodhead 2005).13 She applies this 
notion in her suggestion that Sufism is a form of religious expression that cannot be 
catered for by a minimal ritual regimen or by dry scripturalism (Howell 2007a, 
239). As Howell implicitly suggests, these rituals and traditional religious beliefs 
are a significant factor in attracting modern people to religion, which in turn 
contributes to the religious resurgence in the Muslim world. Yet, Howell points out 
various interrelated factors for this spiritual resurgence such as the legacy of New 
Order state’s religious regulation, socio-economic changes and shifts in Indonesia’s 
religious marketplace.14  
Fifth, there are also those who attribute the growing popularity of Islamic 
spirituality, especially among urbanites, as a sign of the ‘commodification’ in 
which Islam and its symbols are consumed as symbolic goods for newly self-
conscious Muslims in market capitalist settings.  In this framework, Sufism is a 
form of the so-called “Islamic chic” and urban spirituality. Its real meaning is 
reduced to a profane dimension like other consumer goods because it is mediated 
and, to some extent, even advertised through the media (Burhani 2001, Abaza 2004, 
173-202, Laffan 2006, 91-115, Howell 2008a, 40-62). Abaza, for instance, 
suggests that the Sufi resurgence is a result of a so-called ‘spiritual void’ among the 
urban population who have emerged prosperous in the midst of a succession of 
severe economic and political crises in Indonesia (Abaza 2004, 180). She sees this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Sufism is considered a secondary mediating institution for those who are disillusioned with 
modern institutions rather than as ‘primary’ religious institution (Heelas and Woodhead 2001, 63-72, 
Woodhead 2002). 
14 The emphasis on Sufism as a personal religious inclination is also shared by Bruinessen who 
states that ‘informal organisation as such [a Sufi order] offers spiritual and emotional outlets which 
is increasingly absent in the daily life. Besides that, Islamic de-politicization process drives the 
ummah to focus more on spiritual experience and cultivation of personal character rather than an 
aspiration for political Islam” (1992b, 13).  
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‘spiritual void’ as representing the “struggle for accommodative solutions”, an 
“emotional outlet of social gathering”, and “a way of fulfilling leisure time” (Abaza 
2004, 182-187).15 This framework of analysis resonates with the notion of a 
‘spiritual economy’ as postulated by Rudnyckyj in which Islam as a religion is not 
seen as ‘a retreat into mystification or means of resistance’ against market 
capitalism but on the contrary, is regarded as active involvement in market 
capitalism. This involvement is ‘conceived of and enacted as matters of religious 
piety and spiritual virtue’ (2009a, 105).  
Those scholarly studies have greatly contributed to understanding Sufism 
and its role in the making of religious life in Indonesia. The current scholarly works 
have provided an important contribution to the debates on the intricate relationship 
between religion (Islam) and modernity and have contributed to understanding the 
spiritual resurgence in contemporary Indonesia. Various scholarly works clearly 
show that Indonesia has been a Muslim country where Sufism has been playing a 
significant role in the creation of Muslim identity and religiosity (Johns 1961, 
Ricklefs 2006). Sufism represents changing religious inclinations at an individual 
level as well as broad cultural changes within the Islamic community in Indonesia.  
Such scholarly studies also affirms a fascination with  Sufism in Indonesia because 
of its endurance over generations, its claims of religious authenticity, its rich 
intellectual legacies, its transnational  nature, its flexibility and adaptability to 
changing cultural, social, political, and historical contexts. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 According to Abaza, accommodative solutions relate to attempts at the ‘re-ordering of the public 
space’ and favouring post-Islamist public order pursued by the urban middle-class, whereas 
emotional outlets have to do with the needs for intimate and comfortable social interactions that the 
spiritual performance conveys to the participating audience (2004, 182). Meanwhile, filling leisure 
time relates to the needs for spiritual exercise, retreat and recreational activities as a way of 
spending leisure time among urban professional class (Abaza 2004, 184). 
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However, current research seems to be ambiguous about the place of 
Sufism in the modern world. Sufism is rendered in the ‘middle’ which is neither 
modern nor traditional and neither a religious nor a secular phenomenon. For 
instance, the preoccupation with internal organisational structures results in a 
stereotyping that overestimates the role of Sufi sheikh as a powerful figure within 
the movement on the one hand and underestimates the role of ordinary Sufi 
disciples on the other hand. Considering Sufi organizations simply as charismatic 
figure-led institutions also implies that Sufism is institutionally hierarchical and 
authoritarian in nature, which undermines the importance of individual religious 
agency, autonomy, and rationality. By consequence, Sufism is allegedly rejected as 
obsolete or inappropriate in the modern era. Labelling Sufism as betwixt-and-
between therefore creates a situation in which scholarly studies about Sufism are 
always associated with something that is inherently mysterious, secret, hidden, and 
irrational.  
Furthermore, discussion of a ‘spiritual void,’ as suggested by Abaza, also 
indirectly implies that the growing popularity of spirituality is merely a symptom 
of commodification at best or psychological escapism at worst. Preoccupation with 
the economic dimension that such a framework implies does not take into account 
other aspects: the rich and plural nature of the Islamic body of knowledge, 
differences in personal preferences, and the broader underlying social dynamics in 
which consuming patterns takes place. A commodification framework does not 
sufficiently differentiate between means, methods and goals. As suggested by 
Hasan, commodification does not necessarily mean commercialisation and   profit 
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accumulation; rather it should be considered as a newly found method of Islamic 
proselytization (Hasan 2009, 242).  
Moreover, current scholarly works seem to downplay the contentious 
situation of Muslim politics in Indonesia.16 Many works tend to ignore religious 
dynamics and the intricate relationship between Islam, politics and the fragmented 
situation of diverse Islamic movements. The notion of Muslim piety in Sufi terms 
is always questioned, contested, negotiated, resisted, condemned, or even 
completely rejected in a plural Muslim society like Indonesia. While giving great 
appreciation to the spiritual resurgence within the context of Indonesia’s religious 
pluralism, Howell’s suggestion of ‘experiential religiosity’ for instance, seems to 
locate the resurgence simply in a vacuum of Muslim politics. In other words, she 
tends to overlook the social and cultural dynamics behind this phenomenon that are 
at the heart of everyday-life politics in Indonesian Muslim society. Some scholarly 
works on Sufism thus replicate the modernist biases of previous scholarly studies. 
Under the circumstances, the contemporary Sufi resurgence is considered a 
peculiar phenomenon with no resemblance to any other manifestations of Islamic 
activism.  
Most importantly, current scholarly work has yet to sufficiently address the 
intricate relationship between Muslim piety and Islamic activism. Current research 
needs to address such questions as why this religious phenomenon has emerged at 
this particular historical time, what religious, socio-political factors -- both global 
and local -- are involved in this resurgence in Indonesia. The question of Muslim 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Eickelman and Piscatori defines Muslim politics as contesting interpretations and the competition 
over religious symbols and institutions (1996, 24). 
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piety and Islamic activism in particular has been gaining currency and, to a large 
extent, is at the core of many scholarly studies dealing with Islamic resurgence in 
Indonesia. The question touches upon why Muslims adhere to their primordial 
identity and religious traditions and how they are actively engaged in addressing 
broader social-problems at the same time. In the wake of the threat of terrorism, 
such questions have prompted many scholarly studies that deal with Islam in 
Indonesia to look particularly at Muslim groups that adopt both Salafism as the 
benchmark of their Muslim piety and Islamism as a strategy to achieve their 
political goals. While there is growing literature on Sufism and the Sufi resurgence 
in Indonesia, as far as I am concerned, there has been little attention given to 
relating Sufism to the broader emergence of new Muslim piety and Islamic 
activism. Consequently, there is an imbalance in understanding the real religious 
and political dynamics of Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. 
 
1.2 Sufi Piety and Islamic Activism: A Theoretical Framework 
Ernst has suggested that the study of contemporary Sufism should take into 
account globalising trends (the commodification of religion in global capitalism), 
the secular state, modern thought (positivistic ideas and rationalization) and 
underlying institutions as well the Islamic fundamentalist challenge (Ernest 2003, 
302-303). Voll has also suggested that there is a need to ‘re-evaluate some basic 
analytical assumptions underlying the study of Sufism’. He has questioned in 
particular the relevance of the modernity/secularisation theory based upon the 
supposed dichotomies such traditional vs. modern, urban vs. rural, rational vs. 
irrational, literate vs. illiterate, and private vs. public (Voll 2007, 282).  He 
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specifically suggests adopting social movement theory as an analytical framework 
to understand the contemporary Sufi resurgence (2007:285).  
A perspective of social movement theory helps to fill a gap left by current 
scholarly studies on Sufism in Indonesia. This perspective can provide a relatively 
comprehensive analysis of Sufism both as an expression of piety and Islamic 
activism. 17 According to Yavuz, social movement approach overcomes the 
dichotomies between individual versus collective, private versus public, and 
internal (piety) versus external resources (socioeconomic opportunity spaces). He 
has further argued that this theoretical approach helps to understand the 
transformation of everyday life and how religious identities and lifestyles are 
performed and contested in public (2003, 24).  
Furthermore, there are four pre-conditions for collective action to be 
considered a social movement: solidarity (‘the ability of actors to recognize others, 
and be recognized, as belonging to the same social unit), conflict (opposition 
towards an opponent who makes claims to the same area or set of properties and 
utilities), collective identity (a process in which the actors or participants produce 
common or shared frames of knowledge that enable them to judge their 
environment according to these frames), and charismatic leadership (affective 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Social movement theory consists of two major theoretical strands: Resource Mobilisation (RM) 
and New Social Movement (NSM). Both approaches are applied to various collective actions taking 
place in the post-industrial society in Western countries. While the RM emphasizes the formal 
organisational structure of these collective actions, NSM approaches them as a relatively loose 
network tied to shared solidarity and symbols with common political, ideological and cultural 
causes. The NSM emphasizes the importance of solidarity and common identity in the formation of 
collective action, while the RM approach is more preoccupied with the economic-political 
concessions of rational actors. By and large, the NSM is seen as a response to the free market, 
bureaucratized-society, scientific and technological-imposed social interactions, and instrumental 
rationality (Touraine 1981, Habermas 1981, Offe 1985, Melucci 1989, Pakulski 1991) 
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identification with the extraordinary qualities of the leader and the enhancement of  
followers’ individual and collective identity) (Melucci 1989, 1996).   
Social movement theory also helps to comprehend the modus operandi of 
Sufism at three levels. At the micro-level, the social movement perspective is 
useful to comprehend the importance of personal piety as an embodied driving 
factor for action. This is about what Sufi followers believe in and strive for. At 
meso-level, social movement theory helps to understand how charismatic 
leadership, material, and network resources play a significant role in transforming 
personal piety and inter personal relations into collective action and meaningful 
Islamic activism. The popular appeal of Sufism relies not just on a charismatic 
leader but also on organised collective action. As such, it is not a spontaneous act 
but is deliberate action that is organised to achieve certain goals at certain times. 
While at the macro-level, social movement theory helps to understand the existence 
of the strains and opportunities that are important factors in the formation of Sufi 
activism. Strains refer to structural conditions that generate grievances and push 
people to become involved in collection action, whereas opportunities refer to pull 
factors that facilitate the formation of social movement. Emerging Sufi activism 
has particularly to do with a growing disillusionment with perceived moral decay 
and the inadequateness of shariah-oriented prescriptions to address this situation.    
In the light of social movement theoretical framework, Sufism therefore 
could be understood as having two principal dimensions, inner experience and 
outer appearance. Five elements of inner experience are belief, doctrine, value, 
ritual and charisma, whereas outer appearance consists of symbol, organisation, 
networks, resources, and group solidarity. 
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Inner experience also has to do with personal devotion and belief to certain 
doctrine, observance of certain rules and rituals, and subjective-emotive 
relationship between the master and disciples. Whereas, outer appearance is an 
objective condition and social contexts that situate the way Sufi disciples 
collectively organise and support themselves to deal with the state and society. The 
five elements of inner experience and outer appearance provide a comprehensive 
understanding of Sufism as a personal expression of piety and Islamic activism. 
From the perspective of this study, the social movement approach incorporates ten 
important elements of Sufism into a single explanatory framework to understand 
Sufi as a piety movement.  
This kind of theoretical framework is inclusive because inner experience 
and outer appearance with their respective composing elements are closely 
connected each other. By using this theoretical framework, Sufism is just a 
different side of the same coin of Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. Though Sufism 
is experiential religiosity in nature, it is not inherently mystical or mysterious. 
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Rather, it is always expressed by means of human feelings/emotion, ideas, cultural 
symbols, practices, and institutions. Sufism is not simply a charismatic religious 
institution that is attached to a self-appointed authority. It is a form of active piety 
that involves a lot of people with different interests and orientations. Furthermore, 
Sufi resurgence in contemporary Indonesia is not an isolated phenomenon but is 
closely related to broader Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. This study attempts at 
examining the nexus of Muslim identity, Islamic tradition, market commodification, 
involvement in the Islamic public sphere, and power relations all of which have not 
yet been satisfactorily addressed in current research. 
     
1.3 Aim of the Study 
This study aims to: 
1. Examine the transnational influence of global Sufi transmission, and local 
adaption in Indonesia.  
2. Examine socio-cultural and economic factors that drive Sufi resurgence in 
contemporary Indonesia. 
3. Explore the role charismatic leadership and ritual in maintaining collective 
solidarity within a Sufi group. 
4. Find out about the mobilising structure, internal conflict, schisms, and 
divergences among different followers in Indonesia. 
5. Explore the religious beliefs, doctrine and socio-political view of the 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its appeal among Muslims who are intent on 
embracing Sufi teachings in Indonesia. 
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6. Discern the distinct political activism and religious struggle of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani and its political significance in shaping contemporary Islamic 
activism in Indonesia.   
7. Examine controversies and polemics involving the Sufi community in 
particular and the Muslim community in general in relation to particular 
religious ideas, beliefs, and ritual.  
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Framing Sufi as piety movement, this study helps to better understand 
Indonesian Islam and the Muslim community in their own terms. I do hope that this 
study will add to the growing body of scholarly studies dealing with Sufism in 
particular and Islamic activism in general in Indonesia. Except few short 
commentaries and one study with limited scope on the early development of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani by Laily Hafidzah (2010), there are no other scholarly studies 
that have sufficiently paid attention to the Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement in 
Indonesia.  
There are many aspects that have not been dealt with and they are worthy of 
further investigation. This study focuses on the development of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani in Indonesia between 1997 and 2012. This study is only one of growing 
number of scholarly studies dealing with Naqshbandi-Haqqani in different contexts 
(Habibis 1985, Atay 1994, Bottcher 2000, Draper 2002, Stjernholm 2005, 2011, 
Schmidt 2004, 109-126, Damrel 2006, 115-126, Nielsen, Draper, and Yemelianova 
2006, 103-114).  
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The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani offers a clear vantage point to understand 
the intricate relationship between piety and activism behind the Islamic resurgence 
in Indonesia. As a relatively new Sufi movement in Indonesia, Naqshbandi-
Haqqani sheds light on how a transnational Sufi movement can gain acceptance 
and a relatively large following, and in the process adapt itself to the context of 
contemporary Indonesia. It is a transnational Sufi movement that, on the one hand, 
rigorously promotes traditional Islamic knowledge and, on the other hand, strongly 
opposes religious extremism. This study underscores the plural nature of 
Indonesian Muslim politics and how this may potentially shape a future religio-
political synthesis under a new democratic system in Indonesia. This study also 
may help to understand the emerging counter-movement to Salafism and Islamism 
which is vernacular in nature and is involved in the everyday politics of Indonesian 
Muslims.  
 
1.5 Research Method and Data Collection 
Data for this study were collected through bibliography research (books, 
journals, internet materials, magazines, newspapers, tabloids, and other forms of 
publication), interviews with Naqshbandi-Haqqanis leaders and disciples, email 
correspondence, and direct observation during fieldwork. This study is based on six 
months of fieldwork conducted between July 2010 and January 2011. During these 
six months of fieldwork, I visited 21 dzikr centers in 11 cities (Jakarta, Bandung, 
Jogjakarta, Solo, Pekanbaru, Batam, Pekalongan, Sukabumi, Tangerang, Depok, 
and Madiun). I attended and directly participated in various religious activities such 
as hadrah, maulid celebrations, dzikr, communal praying (sholat jamaah), and 
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ziarah. I also conducted interviews with 52 key-informants among the top leaders 
and the ordinary followers of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia.  
Unlike other Sufi movements that tend to be secretive, I greatly benefitted 
from the fact that Naqshbandi-Haqqani is one of the most accessible Sufi group 
with around 3000 sohbet (sermons) that are available on its various websites 
(sufilive.com and islamicsupremecouncil.org) and are regularly updated, 15 major 
books, hundreds of short treaties/articles, 7 principal websites and numerous 
secondary websites/blogs, an email-list, twitter, and facebook groups. Moreover, 
despite its emphasis on traditional Sufi practices, the Naqshbandi has also been 
well-known for its credentials as the most orthodox Sufi movement.  As part of a 
continuing process of fieldwork, since mid-2010, I have joined the e-mailing list, 
twitter, and facebook groups managed by the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples. I 
have also signed up to the e-social networks (Haqqani Soul), Internet TV/Radio 
(sufilive.com) and have closely monitored the four main websites as well as the 
various secondary websites related to Naqshbandi-Haqqani. I am fully aware, 
however, that Internet materials are not always reliable as a source of data. For that 
reason, I have always double-checked information on the internet with key-
informants whom I met during my fieldwork.  
 
1.6 Structure of Presentation 
This thesis is divided into 10 chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the research 
background to this study, research questions, a set of key conceptual frameworks, 
the review of current scholarly studies on Sufism in Indonesia, and methods of data 
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collection. This chapter also briefly explains the use of social movement theories 
and their application to understanding the Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement in 
Indonesia and concludes with a brief statement on the focus, aims and significance 
of this study.  
The next eight chapters of this thesis elaborate in detail on some important 
features of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. It begins with chapter 2 on the origins and 
historical trajectories that trace this Sufi movement to religious teachings laid down 
by spiritual masters in Central Asia back in the 14th century. This chapter is 
important to understand gradual process of institutional evolution, early changes 
and internal reform, external challenge, struggle, and survival related to different 
socio-historical contexts for more than 600 years and how this is used to establish 
claim of continuity to the Prophetic tradition. 
Chapter 3 deals with some socio-cultural and economic factors related to 
emerging Sufi religiosity in Indonesia. Socio-cultural factors have to do with 
impact of urbanisation and higher educational reform in Indonesia in the last 40 
years, whereas economic factors is related to market system and its impact in 
leading to commodification and changing pattern of consumption among 
Indonesian Muslims. Altogether, these factors contribute to and lay a foundation 
for emerging Sufi religiosity that in turn paves the way for transnational 
transmission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the late 1990s.  
Chapter 4 focuses on important feature of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, especially 
on the use of the Internet for preaching and guiding purposes. This chapter 
compares the use of the Internet in two different contexts, the USA and Indonesia.  
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This chapter shows how information technology has influence in determining the 
way Sufi teaching is transmitted in contemporary era. However, this chapter also 
demonstrates that while technology is helpful, it cannot generate intimate and 
emotive relationship that many disciples aspire to receive from their association.   
The next two chapters of this thesis examine the role of charisma, ritual and 
organising structure of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. Chapter 5 reveals that 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani is attractive because it provides an intimate environment and 
emotive relationship that fulfill religious needs of the disciples/followers. This 
intimate environment is based on close relationship between the master and 
disciples and regular ritual of communal gathering. Whereas chapter 6 explores 
organising structure and organisational dynamics of Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
movement in Indonesia. This chapter focuses particularly on leadership structure 
and organisational capacity to recruit new members and maintain the old ones.  
Chapter 7 deals with teaching, belief, and socio-political views of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani community. This chapter particularly deals with the influence 
of Akbari ideas in shaping millenarian-apocalyptic beliefs, strong adherence to 
Sunni orthodoxy, and its opposing view against overt political Islamism and 
Salafism. This chapter argues that Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings attempt to 
reconcile three different strands of Islamic teaching: mysticism, Islamic legalism 
and political Islamism.   
Chapter 8 deals with the public activities and Islamic propagation that 
involve Naqshbandi Haqqani in Indonesia. This chapter begins with political 
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factors driving this public activity and examine various method adopted to 
propagate Sufism to the broader audience.  
Related to that, chapter 9 examines opposition and controversies generated 
by Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia and how this Sufi group responds and 
addresses the problem. This chapter demonstrates that despite its growing 
popularity, Sufism as a teaching and mode of Islamic piety when it becomes public 
is always highly contested. This contestation plays a part in shaping the dynamics 
of contemporary religious life and diverse Islamic expression in Indonesia.  
Chapter 10 provides a brief conclusion that summarizes the most important 
points of discussion in this study, elaborating on the theoretical implications of 
these discussions and the empirical contribution to the growing scholarly literature 
on Naqshbandi-Haqqani, Sufism and general Islamic activism in Indonesia.  
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Chapter 2 
N A Q S H B A N D I- HAQQANI  AND TRANSNATIONAL  
S U F I  MOV EMENT  
The  Or ig in s  and  H i s to r i c a l  T ra j ec to r i e s   
 
‘Whether in Jakarta, Cairo or Chicago, a new umma is taking shape that is 
envisioned against the perceived challenge of (western) modernity, and which 
offers an "Islamic" solution by invoking the images of the past to bolster the 
arguments of the present. Just whether Sufism is an intrinsic element of the 
package, and if indeed their electronic silsilas and ijazas will be accepted by the 
broader public remains, for the moment, an open question’ (Laffan 2006, 112-113) 
 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani is a global Sufi movement with followers in 25 
different countries and four continents. This is one of a handful of Naqshbandi 
movements that have survived into the modern era. Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
represents continuity and change of long Sufi tradition and activism. Drawing from 
the rich resources of previous scholarly studies, written materials, and online 
sources, this chapter examines the historical origins and trajectories of the 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement. This chapter consists of seven sections. The first 
three sections deals with the historical origins of Naqshbandi Sufi group – the 
progenitor of Naqshbandi Haqqani offshoot – in Uzbekistan and its early 
development to the Muslim world in Indian subcontinent during Mughal Empire 
and Middle East during the Ottoman rule up to the post colonial era. The next two 
sections examine the flourishing of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Western Europe and 
North America between 1970s and 1990s. The sixth section deals with 
transnational transmission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia in the late 1990s. 
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Finally, this chapter concludes by re-elaborating the main argument proposed in 
this chapter.  
2.1 Origins and Early Transnational Expansion: Naqshbandi under Timurid 
and Mughal Empire  
Naqshbandi is geographically the most widespread Sufi movement in the 
Muslim world. Historically speaking, this Sufi movement has played an important 
role in shaping personal development and driving religious reform with a broad 
platform for social and political change in the Muslim world. Weismann (2007, 41) 
suggested that the Naqshbandi has endured throughout the modern era because it 
maintains and continues the spirit of both activism and orthodoxy embraced by its 
masters and followers over generations. The inclination for activism has to do with 
its concern toward broader socio-political affairs, whereas orthodoxy is related to 
its emphasis to uphold the implementation of shariah at the individual and 
collective levels.  
Naqshbandi’s followers can be found almost everywhere in the Muslim 
world with strongholds in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Dagestan, Turkey, 
and Syria. Naqshbandi and its many offshoots have attracted considerable scholarly 
attention.18 Through continuous internal religious reform and active socio-political 
engagement, it developed from a small religious group in the 14th century into a 
large Sufi group with a mass following across the Muslim world in the 20th century. 
For more than 600 years of its existence, Naqshbandi has survived and managed to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Since the pioneer work written by Hamid Algar (1976, 123-152), Naqshbandi has drawn  
scholarly interest in its many historical and geographical contexts. Three of the most prominent 
studies on Naqshbandi are edited books by Gaborieau et.al (1990) and Ozdalga (1999) and the 
special edition on Naqshbandi-Khalidi edited by Zarcone, et.al (2008) 
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adapt to changing socio-political circumstances in different socio-historical 
contexts.  
The development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani indeed began in the 1970s but its 
historical origins actually dated back in the 14th century. The Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
is a contemporary offshoot of the Naqshbandi, a religious group founded by a Sufi 
master living in Bukhara, in present-day Uzbekistan. The name of Naqshbandi 
refers to the eponymous founder, Bahauddin Naqshbandi (1318-1389), a Sufi 
master who lived in the village of Sharf as-Shirwan, Bukhara, in present-day 
Uzbekistan. As a spiritual teaching, Naqshbandi traces its origins back to the 
khwajaganiya (literally means ‘the path of the master’), a spiritual teaching laid 
down by Abdul Khaliq al-Ghujdawani (d. 1220) who lived few generations before 
Bahauddin Naqshbandi (Weismann 2007, 14).  
Abdul Khaliq was a Sufi master living in the small town of Ghijduwan, the 
oasis of Bukhara in current day Uzbekistan. Abdul Khaliq al-Ghujdawani was the 
first spiritual master to introduce the eight principles of spiritual training (kalimat-i 
qudsiyya or ‘the sacred words’ in Persian), meditational techniques, and the silent 
form of dzikr that have been maintained by later generations of masters up until 
now (Algar 1976, 133). Bahauddin Naqshbandi is considered the founder of the 
movement because he was the first master who managed to organise a distinct 
spiritual training characterised mainly by the practice of silent (sirr dzikr) rather 
than loud remembrance (jahr dzikr), which was common to the other native Sufi 
traditions in Central Asia at the time, such as Yasaviya and Kubrawiya.19 He 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 For details about Yasaviya and Kubrawiya, see De Weese (Weese 1988, 45-83, 1996, 180-207). 
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introduced three distinct techniques and principles of dzikir: wukuf qolbi, wukuf 
‘adadi, and wukuf zamani.  
At the beginning, Naqshbandi was strongly influenced by Malamati Sufi 
ideas that formed part of early Sufi tradition.20 According to Schimmel, the 
Malamati “deliberately tried to draw the contempt of the world upon themselves by 
committing unseemly, even unlawful actions, but they preserved perfect purity of 
thought and loved God without second thought” (Schimmel 1975, 86). The term, 
Malamati, refers particularly to the so-called “intoxicated” Sufi who allegedly 
favored personal mystic experience over formal religious observance and 
devotion. 21  Despite the early influence of Malamati teaching, Naqshbandi 
maintained its conformity to shariah provisions through continuous internal 
religious reform. For Naqshbandi, the Prophet Muhammad who channeled divine 
knowledge from the Angel Gabriel became the end of their chain of knowledge 
transmission (silsilah).22  
Through generations, the legacy of Abdul Khaliq al Ghujdawani and 
Bahauddin Naqshbandi were restored through literary works written by 
Muhammad Parsa (d. 1420), who compiled the teachings of the previous masters !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Malamati refers to one stream of the early Sufi movement that flourished in Nishapur, Khurasan 
in the northeast of present-day Iran, in the 9th century. For details about the Malamati, see 
Christopher Melchert (Melchert 2001, 237-247). 
21 In the Naqshbandi’s chain of transmission, the figure of Abu Yazid Bistami or Tayfur Abu Yazid 
al Bistami (804-878) in particular is regarded as a typical of Malamati and is thought to resemble 
Abu Manshur al Hallaj (858-922), a Persian mystic who was sentenced to death after being accused 
of committing heresy. A prominent Western Orientalist, Louis Massignon (1883-1962) wrote a 
doctoral dissertation on al Hallaj which then became a seminal work on Islamic mysticism. 
22 De Weese notes that silsilah was previously not so important among Naqshbandi in Central Asia. 
It became significant as a group identity marker only later in the context of the struggle for religious 
dominance (1993; 1996a:180-207; 1996b:173-88). It is therefore misleading to treat silsilah as 
historical evidence because it was not always the case that the successive persons in the silsilah had 
personally ever met. Weismann, for example, has pointed out that it was almost impossible that Abu 
Yaqub Yusuf al Hamadani ever made direct contact with Abdul Khaliq al Ghujdawani (Weismann 
2007, 25). 
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into various volumes: Risala-i Qudsiyya (The Treatise of Saintliness), Anis al-
Talibin wa-‘uddat al-salikin (The Companion of the Seekers and Provider of the 
Followers), and Fasl al-khitab li-wasl al-albab (The Conclusive Judgment in 
Uniting the Hearts) (Weismann 2007, 18). For generations, the teachings of the 
Naqshbandi Sufi movement have been carefully maintained and bequeathed 
through a chain of knowledge transmission (silsilah) centering on prominent 
masters with lasting personal influence.  In particular, there were three prominent 
masters with lasting influence to whom most of the later generations of 
Naqshbandi’s offshoots trace their silsilah: Ubaidillah Ahrar (1404-1490), Ahmad 
Faruqi as-Sirhindi (1564-1624), and Khalid al Baghdadi (1779-1827).  
Until the 15th century, the Naqshbandi was just a small group confined 
mainly to the people in Bukhara and Samarqand of the Timurid Empire.23 It was 
under the guidance of Ubaidillah Ahrar (1404-1490) that this Sufi teaching was 
transformed into a transnational religious movement with broad propagating and 
educational missions. Ubaidillah Ahrar rose to prominence as a figure of lasting 
influence because he was not only a spiritual guide but also a typical religious 
activist with strong economic means and vast social capital. Ahrar was the first 
who introduced and institutionalised sohbet (association with the sheikh) into the 
standard ritual practice of Naqshbandi. In fact, suhba or sohbet has become the 
second most important religious gathering after communal dzikir. During this ritual, 
master and disciples meet directly and regularly for transmitting Naqshbandi’s 
teachings. The ritual also functions to maintain emotional ties among disciples. In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Timurid is a Central Asian Sunni Muslim dynasty of Turkish-Mongol extraction founded by 
Tamerlane in the 14th century that ruled over Iran, modern Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and large parts 
of modern Pakistan, North India, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and the Caucasus. 
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short, sohbet is a distinct institutional innovation that enables a Naqshbandi’s 
masters to establish an intimate and close relationship with his disciples. 
As a religious activist, Ahrar was personally powerful because he 
controlled a vast territory of religious endowments throughout the Timurid 
regions–Bukhara, Samarqand, Herat, Taskhent, and even Kabul. This religious 
endowment enabled him to act as a landlord through which he managed to provide 
a system of social patronage and economic protection for his followers (Gross 1982, 
533-548, Paul 1991, Dale and Payind 1999, 218-233). His religious authority and 
social prestige placed him as de facto political leader in Herat, the capital of 
Timurid sultanate (Gross 1988). Moreover, his considerable political influence in 
the Timurid court was established through his close personal relationship with the 
then ruler, Sultan Abu Said (r. 1451-1468) and his successor Sultan Ahmad (r. 
1468-1494). In his position as a political advisor to the Timurid rulers, Ubaidillah 
Ahrar created the precedent for Naqshbandi’s conservative political stance favoring 
cooperation with the political establishment. He taught that approaching the state 
was a key method for successful Islamic propagation (Weismann, 2007:34).  
Combining religious authority, political patronage, and economic support, 
Ahrar was able to consolidate further the legacy of Bahauddin Naqshbandi beyond 
his homeland. His missionary zeal expanded his Sufi networks to the Ottoman 
lands, Western China, Afghanistan, Iran, the Indian subcontinent, and even the 
Hijaz (Weese 1988, 45, Copty 2003, 322). His principal strategy for expansion was 
to send his foreign disciples back to their countries as his representatives 
(Weismann 2007, 44). Although he sent many disciples to other regions, it was in 
the Indian subcontinent that the legacy of Ubaidillah Ahrar continued to expand.  
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Naqshbandi arrived in India with the help of Babur, the founder of the 
Mughal dynasty, in around 1520s. Babur was the grandson of Sultan Abu Said of 
Timurid, a loyal disciple of Ubaidillah Ahrar (Weismann 2007, 51). Babur himself 
was an ardent admirer of Ubaidillah Ahrar. In the historical context of India in the 
17th century onwards, Naqshbandi experienced a doctrinal change that emphasizes 
the importance of shariah observance as an integral part of Sufi rituals. This in turn 
contributed to socio-religious reforms not only in India but also in the broader 
Muslim world. 
Under the guidance of Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi (1564-1624), Naqshbandi in 
India developed to be a major religious movement with strong orthodox inclination. 
Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi had lasting influence because of his reputation as a prolific 
Muslim scholar who used his writings to deliver his own mystical visions into 
conformity with shariah provisions (Buehler 2003, 309-320, Abu-Manneh 2003a, 
303-308). Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi introduced the concept of wahdatus shuhud 
(unity of perception) which addressed a long-standing religious debate on the 
legitimate position of mystical experience vis-a-vis shariah observance (Schimmel 
1973, 199-203, Buehler 2003, 309-320). He taught his disciples that it was through 
shariah observance and not affiliation to a Sufi Order that someone is regarded a 
true Muslim. Buehler (2003, 311) has pointed out that Sirhindi tried to emphasize 
the primacy of nubuwat (Prophet-hood) rather than walayat (closeness to God) in 
the spiritual journey. Buehler (2003, 313) further stated that Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi 
turned the traditional teaching of Sufism upside-down because a state of closeness 
to God, which is the ultimate and sublime goal for other Sufis, is counted as the 
stage for beginners on the Mujaddadi-path.  
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Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi’s teachings were compiled in a book entitled 
Maktubat, containing the correspondence between Sheikh Ahmad Faruqi and his 
disciples. His shariah-minded approach in spreading Naqshbandi’s teachings was 
prompted by his strong criticism of the Mughal Emperor, Sultan Akbar (r. 1556-
1605), who adopted a syncretic form of Islam and Hinduism as official state policy. 
For this reason, he was hailed as the mujaddid at tsani (the reviver of the second 
Islamic millennium) and Imam-i Rabbani (the Divine master), titles that were then 
embedded into Naqshbandi’s silsilah (Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi). 
Through his teachings, Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi initiated a religious reform 
that paved the way for the tajdid (renewal) movement between the 17th and 19th 
centuries. In the Indian subcontinent, the tajdid movement focused on revitalizing 
Islamic tradition through the study of hadith as a basis for social reform. Shah 
Waliallah (1703-1762), a Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi disciple, for instance, played a 
pivotal role in revitalizing the Islamic intellectual tradition under the declining 
political power of the Mughal Empire in India (Hermansen 1986, 143-157, 1988, 
1-25, Voll 1980, 264-273). Shah Waliallah initiated reforms centered on the study 
of the Prophetic tradition (hadith).  
In India, Shah Waliallah was instrumental in transmitting Naqshbandi-
Mujaddadi’s orthodox ideas to his followers such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), 
an Indian modernist thinker and the founder of Aligarh Muslim University, and 
Siddiq Hasan Khan (d. 1889), the founder of Ahl i-Hadith movement. The 
influence of Shah Waliallah also spread to the Haramain, where most Muslim 
scholars from across the Muslim world studied in the 17th century. This confirms 
Voll’s suggestion that the study of hadith and shariah-minded Sufism that 
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flourished in India contributed to the moral reconstruction of Muslim society in 
later generations (1980, 268). 
Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi, as this Sufi movement became known after Ahmad 
Faruqi Sirhindi, was transmitted to the Muslim world mainly through social 
networks established by Indian Naqshbandi masters studying and living in the 
Haramain (Mecca and Medina). Under Ottoman rule, the Haramain was then a 
center of Islamic learning, especially in the study of the Prophetic tradition (hadith) 
and Sufism (Copty 2003, 322). Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi was embraced by 
prominent Muslim scholars of the Haramain like Murad al Bukhari (1640-1720) 
and Taj al-Din bin Zakariya (d. 1640). At the beginning, it was Adam ibn Ismail al 
Banuri (d. 1664)–the deputy of Ahmad Sirhindi–who became instrumental in 
disseminating Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi in Haramain (Copty 2003, 331).  
2.2 Opposing Western Colonialism and the Kemalist Secular State  
It was through the further effort of Khalid al-Baghdadi (1776-1827) that 
Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi’s reformist branch of Sufism became influential across the 
Middle East and particularly in the Ottoman lands in the 19th century. Khalid al-
Baghdadi was a Kurd born in Sulaimaniya, the capital city of the Baban sultanate 
in Northern Iraq. He received initiation into Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi from an Indian 
Naqshbandi’s master, Ghulam Ali of Delhi/Abdullah Dahlawi (1745-1825). After 
returning from Delhi in 1811, he began his career as a Sufi sheikh in his hometown, 
Sulaimaniya of the Baban Sultanate. In 1815, he moved to the capital city of 
Baghdad and established himself as a prominent Sufi master there. However, due 
to strong opposition from other Sufi movements and the local ruler, in 1822 he 
eventually fled to and then permanently settled in Damascus where he managed to 
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attract loyal disciples from among prominent religious families there. Khalid al 
Baghdadi revitalized Naqshbandi’s orthodox view in aligning Sufism and shariah. 
Some scholars associate the emergence of Sheikh Khalid and his Sufi 
movement with the rising resistance against European imperialism, especially in 
the Ottoman regions (Hourani 1981, 75-89, Algar 1976, 123-152, Weismann 2001, 
2007). Under the tutelage of Khalid al Baghdadi, the Naqshbandi movement 
expanded across the Muslim world: the Middle-East, Central Asia, Caucasia, North 
Africa, South and Southeast Asia. This rapid expansion had to do with the flexible 
and relatively autonomous organisational structure of the movement in which an 
appointed deputy (khalifa) can be a leader of his own. Khalid al Baghdadi 
reportedly sent his khalifa all over the Muslim world to disseminate Naqshbandi’s 
teachings. Through his efforts, Naqshbandi-Khalidi continued this distinct Sufi 
teaching and gave influence for later generations of Naqshbandi’s 
master/followers.24 
Khalid al Baghdadi not only maintained standard Naqshbandi rituals such 
as silent dzikr, sohbet, and tawajuh, but he also introduced the practice of rabithah 
(directing concentration on the master’s face) and khalwat/suluk (seclusion). 
Sheikh Khalid reportedly warned his khalifa to do rabithah solely to himself to 
maintain religious guidance and blessing. Similarly, Khalid al-Baghdadi also 
encouraged his disciples to perform seclusion (khalwat/suluk) as part of their 
spiritual exercise, a temporary retreat from daily-life. Both rabithah and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 According to Algar, during his life-time, Sheikh Khalid appointed more than 166 deputies 
(khalifa). 
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khalwat/suluk functioned as institutional innovations and as a method of 
communication to strengthen central religious authority.  
The Haramain was then the main channel from which most of Naqshbandi-
Khalidi’s offshoots trace back their lineages. Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s lodge in Jabal 
Abu Qubyas, Mecca, for instance, was the largest Sufi learning center in Mecca 
until its destruction in 1924 by the Saudi-Wahabi regime. Along with the Haramain, 
Damascus was also an important place for the dissemination of Naqshbandi-
Khalidi. One of the initiated deputies in Damascus who then spread this teaching to 
Dagestan was Sheikh Ismail Muhammad ash-Shirwani (1787-1839).25 Among 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani, Sheikh Ismail Muhammad ash-Shirwani (also known as 
Ismail Kurdameir) was a trusted deputy who received full authority from Sheikh 
Khalid al Baghdadi. The Dagestani branch of Naqshbandi-Khalidi survived 
political oppression under the Tsar, under communism and under the Kemalist 
regime. 
Through Sheikh Ismail Kurdameir, Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s reformist 
teachings provided a religio-political leadership in waging jihad resistance against 
the Russian encroachment in Dagestan for thirty years (Gammer 1994, 204-217, 
Kemper 2002, 41-71). Imam Shamil (1797-1871), the most prominent Muslim 
resistance leader against the Tsar regime in Dagestan, sought guidance from 
Naqshbandi-Khalidi masters.26 When the armed resistance was neutralised in 1877, 
Abu Ahmad ash-Sughuri (1792-1882)–the 36th in the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
silsilah–endorsed the concept of hijrah (migration) as a strategy to continue jihad !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 In late 1810s, Sheikh Ismail Muhammad ash-Shirwani/Ismail al Kurdameri) was active as khalifa 
of Naqshbandi-Khalidi in his homeland of Shirvan (Gammer 1994, 207). 
26 Muhammad Effendi al-Yaraghi and Jamaluddin al-Ghumuqi (the 34th and 35th in the Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s silsilah respectively) were the Sufi masters of Imam Shamil. 
 41 
(Kemper 2002, 51). Adopting this concept of hijrah, the Naqshbandi-Khalidi 
Dagestani lineage managed to continue Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s teachings beyond its 
homeland.  
According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources, Muhammad al-Madani (1835-
1913) migrated to Ottoman territory in 1890. In this new home, Muhammad al 
Madani, as a Sufi master of Naqshbandi-Khalidi, enjoyed political patronage given 
by the Ottoman rule. According to Gall (2005, 35), Naqshbandi had the first solid 
presence in Istanbul in the 15th century during the reign of Sultan Bayazid II (r. 
1481-1512). Yet it was during the reign of Sultan Abdul Majid (r. 1839-1861) that 
Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s orthodox outlook began to attract the highest echelon of the 
Ottoman establishment. Abu-Manneh has suggested that from the time of Sultan 
Abdul Majid on, Naqshbandi-Khalidi was politically influential in the Ottoman 
court.  
For instance, during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s effort (r. 1876-
1909), Naqshandi-Khalidi’s affiliated masters were then actively involved in 
orchestrating religious and political reform in the Ottoman lands (Weismann 2007, 
91). Under the state-sponsored modernisation program of Tanzimat,27 Naqshbandi-
Khalidi gave tacit support for the dismissal of Jannisaries and the ban of the 
Bekhtasi Sufi order on the accusation of embracing unorthodox Sufi 
teaching/practice (Abu-Manneh 1982, 26-27). Though coopting policy of the 
Ottoman rulers, Khalidi branch of Naqshbandi gain social legitimacy and political 
support that greatly help its survival through the modern era.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Tanzimat is the state-sponsored modernisation program introduced during the reign of Sultan 
Mahmud II (1839-1876). 
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It was under this political circumstance that Naqshbandi-Khalidi with its 
Daghestan’s origins survived and continued to flourish in the Ottoman lands. 
According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources, through the help of Sultan Abdul 
Hamid of the Ottoman, Muhammad al-Madani managed to establish a Dagestani 
migrant community in Rashadiya in current day Gunekoy, near Bursa, Turkey.28 
This Dagestani migrant community in Gunekoy became a refugee camp for 
Daghestani Muslims, who suffered from Russian military suppression in their 
homeland. Young Sharafudin (1875-1936) who would continue Muhammad al-
Madani’s silsilah as Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s master migrated to Turkey around 1900. 
Sharafudin was al-Madanis’ nephew and son-in-law. After Muhammad al Madani 
died in 1913, Sharafudin continued to live and guide the disciples of Naqshbandi-
Khalidi in Rashadiya, Gunekoy. His disciples reportedly included not only 
Dagestani migrants but also Turkish and Egyptian followers.  
When Sharafudin moved to Turkey, he took along with him his nephew, the 
young Abdullah Faiz (1891-1973) who was then only 9 years old. Abdullah Faiz 
served in the Ottoman army (c. 1913-1923), during which time he was involved in 
the Balkan wars (1912-13) and the First World War (Atay 1994, 51). He was 
reportedly seriously wounded during the Dardanelle military campaign against the 
Allied Forces. This seems to have been the turning point for his future career as a 
Sufi master. After this incident, Abdullah Faiz focused himself on mystical 
exercises. He reportedly conducted his seclusion under the guidance of his uncle 
and spiritual master, Sheikh Sharafudin. He continued to stay in the Dagestani 
migrant community in Rashadiya at least until the late 1930s.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 See, http://naqshbandi.org/chain/37.htm, accessed 24 September 2012.  
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Abdullah Faiz became a Sufi master under increasing hostility to Sufism in 
particular and Islam in general, following the emergence of the Young Turk 
Revolution that deposed Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1908. A strong supporter of the 
old regime, Naqshbandi-Khalidi was in a vulnerable position as the Kemalist 
government carried out its anti-Islamic campaign. The Kemalist regime completely 
banned all Sufi activities in 1925 following the rebellion by Sheikh Said, a Kurdish 
Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s Sufi master in 1925 (Olson and Tucker 1978, 195-211).29 
Under this political circumstance, Abdullah Faiz suffered badly under the new 
regime.   
In the 1930s, Abdullah Faiz and Sharafudin were imprisoned for refusing to 
support the Kemalist regime (Atay 1994, 51). Sharafudin himself was reportedly in 
jail for three months at the Eskisehir Prison in late 1935 along with Said Nursi’s 
followers. This mounting oppression forced both to flee to Egypt/Syria and 
Jordania. Interestingly, in Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources, this move was a result of 
the deteriorating personal relationship between Sheikh Sharafudin and Kemal 
Attaturk, especially after Sharafudin’s refusal to endorse the Kemal Attaturk’s 
military campaign against the Greeks during the Turkish independence war (1919-
1922) (Habibis 1985, 73, Atay 1994, 51).   
Unlike his uncle, Sharafudin, who went back to Turkey shortly before he 
died in 1936, Abdullah Faiz left Turkey permanently. At first, Abdullah Faiz 
Dagestani left for Egypt in the late 1930s to follow his daughter who had married 
one of Sheikh Sharafudin’s disciples. Around 1940, he eventually moved to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 The official ban on Sufi activity was based on Law No. 677 issued by the National General 
Assembly on 20 November 1925. 
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Damascus where he lived for the rest of his life (Habibis 1985, 75). He lived in 
Mount Qasyun of Salihiya district overlooking Damascus where he lived among 
Muslim migrants coming from Kazan who moved there to escape communist 
oppression in their home country (Habibis 1985, 73).  
Abdullah Faiz’s hijrah brought Naqshbandi-Khalidi back to its traditional 
homeland. Habibis (1985, 75) has suggested Abdullah Faiz Dagestani took a 
different path by not indulging himself in complicated intellectual discourse. 
Rather, he became preoccupied with simple things related mainly to the cultivation 
of moral and ethical virtues. It was perhaps because he was notable as an illiterate 
and not fluent in Arabic. Yet Abdullah Faiz still managed to attract some notable 
Muslim scholars and wealthy people from Damascus, Beirut and Amman. These 
included Sheikh Mukhtar Alaily (the then Secretary General of Religious Affairs of 
Lebanon), his brother, Abdullah Alaily, and their nephews, Muhammad Hisham 
Kabbani and Adnan Kabbani (Habibis 1985, 79). Draper has suggested that at one 
time Abdullah Faiz Dagestani, as he later known, had 40 deputies with Sheikh 
Nazim al-Haqqani as the most senior one (Draper 2002, 131).30  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Other senior deputies are Sheikh Hussein Ali of Aleppo and Sheikh Abbas of Mecca.  
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2.3 Facing Anti Sufi Salafism: Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the Making 
As Abdullah Faiz died on 30 September 1973, Sheikh Nazim continued to 
propagate the Sufi teaching of Naqshbandi and perform his role as a Sufi master 
under a completely different situation than his predecessors. Unlike the previous 
era when many Sufi groups in general and Naqshbandi-Khalidi in particular 
enjoyed political patronage of the Ottoman rule, the rise of the Saudi regime and 
expansion of Salafi influence throughout the Middle East had considerable impact 
because this new regime was hostile to any expression of the Sufi tradition. In the 
struggles for dominance in the 1920s Middle East, the Sufi community faced and 
eventually lost two battlegrounds altogether, suffering political and symbolic 
defeats.  
Politically, the collapse of the Ottoman rule meant the Sufi community had 
no longer a protecting patron as it enjoyed before, while symbolically, the rise of 
Saudi regime resulted in the loss of religious dominance that the Sufi community 
had maintained for hundreds of years. Physical destruction of many Sufi lodges in 
the Haramain in the 1920s resulted in disruption to informal social networks that 
the Sufi community had established through incoming pilgrims from across the 
Muslim world. Meanwhile, the growing influence of Salafism and political 
Islamism in the 1970s created hostile and violent environments that forced Sufi 
community to avoid overt propagation. The religious and political repercussions of 
these events across the region and the Muslim world established the socio-political 
milieu under which the Sufi community maintained its existence. The development 
of Naqshbandi-Haqqani therefore reflects continuity and change of the Sufi 
tradition to adapt to these dramatic socio-political changes in the Middle East.  
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The Sufi community survived through a combination of internal reform, 
institutional adaptation, cooperation with or underground resistance to various 
ruling regimes, and even accommodation to Salafi and Islamist propagation. These 
survival strategies managed to maintain their existence but sometimes at a price of 
losing their identity as a Sufi group. In Syria, Naqshbandi-Kuftariya for instance 
flourished through cooperation and political patronage given by the Assad regime 
since the 1960s (Stenberg 1997, 101-116). Naqshbandi-Kuftariya is named after 
Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro (1912-2004), the grand Mufti of Syria between 1964 and 
2004, who used his position to establish educational institutions and expand his 
propagating mission (Pinto 2003, 4-6). Different from Ahmad Kuftaro, Said 
Hawwa, a Naqshbandi-Khalidi disciple, joined with an Islamist group. He was an 
ideologue and leader of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood who believed that Sufi ideals 
could be achieved by political struggle (Weismann 1993, 601-623, 1997, 131-154, 
2001, 206-237, 2004, 303-318). 
In Lebanon, Jamiyyat al-Mashari al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya (Association 
of Islamic Philanthropic Projects or the Ahbash group) attracted followers 
especially among those who were against the Lebanese secular government and 
anti-Sufi groups (Hamzeh and Dekmejian 1996, 217-229, Kabha and Erlich 2006, 
519-538). The Jamiyyat al-Mashari al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya or the Ahbash group 
was founded by Abdullah al Harari (1920-2008).31  Harari was a Rifaiyya-Qadiri 
Sufi master living in Beirut. The name of Ahbash – Ahbash or Habashi is an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31  Like Naqshbandi-Kuftariya, Jamiyyat al-Mashari al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya expanded its 
propagating missions to the USA and established permanent home-base in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. 
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Arabic word referring to Ethiopia and was attributed to his origins coming from 
Ethiopia.  
Like other Sufi groups, Naqshbandi-Haqqani is a Sufi group which 
managed to survive under the dramatic socio-political changes in Syria and 
Lebanon. Compared to other Sufi groups, Naqshbandi-Haqqani remained relatively 
intact to maintain its identity as a Sufi group. However, Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
survives mainly through the personal creativity of its master, his marriage 
relationship, and family support. This combination of seemingly conventional 
strategies has worked relatively well to survive in the changing socio-political 
conditions in four different countries: Cyprus, Turkey, Syria and Lebanon.  
In Syria, the socialist preoccupation of the Assad’s Ba’athist regime posed a 
political challenge and was anathema to Islamic activism in general and Sufism in 
particular. The Wahabi-Salafi-inspired Islamic opposition of the Muslim 
Brotherhood against the secular government in Syria had become radicalized since 
the 1960s. This radicalization prompted a complete rejection of Sufism on the 
grounds that it was heretical and a deviation from Islamic orthodoxy. Sheikh 
Nazim found himself trapped in the middle of a battle between the Muslim 
brotherhood and Hafez al Assad’s socialist regime. In the wave of armed 
suppression against Islamic activism between 1960 and 1980, it was difficult for 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani to sustain.  
Furthermore, under a social environment where violence was increasingly 
widespread and radical Islamic political-mindedness were gaining currency, the 
Sufi message on spirituality did not resonate widely. It was made worse by the fact 
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that Sheikh Nazim was not a native Syrian. In this increasingly hostile environment, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani did not flourish well. According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
sources, he had been prevented from entering Syria since the late 1960s. This 
physical restriction led to his return to Cyprus from where he then focused his 
mission in Lebanon since the late 1960s. 
In Lebanon, Naqshbandi-Haqqani attracted followers in Beirut. At least 
until the mid-1970s, Beirut was a temporary safe haven for Sheikh Nazim’s 
preaching activity though he only managed to gain a small number of loyal 
disciples there. The city was unfortunately on the brink of a civil war between 
competing political factions. As the civil war and sectarian conflict began to unfold 
in Beirut in 1975, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was again forced to move his activity to 
Tripoli, in North Lebanon in the late 1970s. Unlike Beirut, Tripoli was then still a 
relatively safe place because it was located far from the heart of sectarian conflicts. 
More importantly, Tripoli had for a long time been a place where Sufis of various 
affiliations thrived and gained social support from the local community. His 
preaching activity went on quite smoothly as he managed to establish family 
connection with the Kabbani family, a prominent Sunni family of Lebanon on 
whom he heavily relied to sustain his mission. 
According to Habibis, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Tripoli had 
been established in the late 1960s through some disciples whom Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani initiated in Beirut and Damascus (1985:186). As a matter of fact, it was in 
Tripoli that the Kabbani brothers, Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (b. 1945) and 
Muhammad Adnan Kabbani (b. 1947), helped their master to sustain his mission 
by providing material resources. The high social prestige that the Kabbani family 
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enjoyed in Lebanon also secured social networks needed by Sheikh Nazim Haqqani 
to continue his dakwah activity.32 In the late 1970s, Adnan Kabbani took over the 
local leadership of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community there.  
As the political environment in Cyprus and Turkey became friendlier, 
Sheikh Nazim Haqqani returned to his homeland in Cyprus, though he made 
frequent visits to Lebanon where his daughter and his sons lived among Kabbani’s 
family. It should be noted that during that time, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani’s son-in-
law, Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, was living overseas, running his business as the 
manager of a medical clinic in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It is through Hisham 
Kabbani’s networks that Naqshbandi-Haqqani then flourishes in the West. 
Though Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon and Syria were important places in the 
formation of Naqshbandi-Haqqani as a Sufi group, Naqshbandi-Haqqani had there 
only a small group with a limited network. For Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, Sufism in 
general and Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular provide the most complete religious 
teachings not only for personal spiritual development, but also for the moral 
purification of Muslim society. His experience in Syria and Lebanon convinced 
him that the Middle East was no longer a viable place for spreading Sufi teachings. 
It was through his contacts among Turkish and Lebanese immigrants that Sheikh 
Nazim Haqqani began to turn his attention to spreading Sufism to the West. 
Through resource mobilisation and social networks in the USA and Western 
Europe, Naqshbandi-Haqqani managed to spread its teachings around the world, 
including Indonesia.    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Kabbani are one of the prominent families with strong political connection in Lebanon. This 
family is active in politics, religious matters and business. Muhammad Rashid Kabbani, the grand 
mufti of Lebanon, was the paternal uncle of both Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani and Adnan 
Kabbani. 
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2.4 New Age and Western Sufism: Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Western Europe 
The transmission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani among the people in Western 
Europe and North America began in the early 1970s.  This transnational expansion 
was a product of various factors: religious, demographic, socio-economic and 
cultural changes. The religious factor had to do with a growing interest in 
subjective experiential religiosity and perennial philosophy among some segments 
of Western society. Experiential religiosity was particularly represented by the 
growing popularity of New Age teachings through which Sufismfound a primary 
vehicle of transmission and gained its first adherents in the Western world. 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources suggest that Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani’s visit to 
London and other Western European countries simply fulfilled the prophecy 
espoused by his master, Abdullah Faiz Dagestani. Sheikh Nazim had also a strong 
personal conviction that it was his responsibility to bring Islam to the West and to 
revitalise spiritual life there. The 1970s was the time when Sufism in general and 
the Akbari ideas in particular had already become relatively known in the West 
through the works of Western Sufi converts.  
In London for instance, the first Western disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
came from those who were previously affiliated John G. Bennet (1897-1974). 
Bennet himself was a former British intelligence officer who, during the First 
World War (1914-1918), was stationed in Istanbul, Turkey. He was a student of G.I. 
Gurdjieff (1866-1949), a Greek-Armenian who was one of the pioneers of the New 
Age movement in the West. During his stay in Istanbul, Gurdjieff had established 
contact with the Naqshbandi’s masters there. According Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
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sources, Gurdjieff met Sheikh Sharafudin and Abdullah Faiz Dagestani, Sheikh 
Nazim Haqqani’s direct master, in Turkey in 1920s during which Gurdjieff 
received his knowledge on spirituality (Kabbani 1995, 412).33 Like his spiritual 
teacher, Bennet also met Abdullah Faiz Dagestani for the first time during his 
spiritual quest in Damascus in 1955.  
Interestingly, Bennet confirmed this story in recounting his first meeting 
with Abdullah Faiz Dagestani on the 11th of May 1955 as follows,  
Sheikh Abdullah is a true saint in whom one feels an immediate complete trust. 
With him there were no lengthy arguments or quotations from the scriptures. He 
simply said to me, "I was expecting you. Last night an angel appeared to me and 
told me to give three messages to a stranger who would come to my house." The 
first two messages were clear and unmistakable answers to very important 
questions that were troubling me about my work in England, and about which the 
Sheikh could not possibly have known by any ordinary means. They convinced me 
that he must have powers of a kind that I had already seen in Gurdjieff and one or 
two others, and prepared me to take very seriously anything that he might 
say…We were sitting in the evening on the open roof of a house on the hills 
overlooking the ancient city. The Sheikh was a man of over seventy, dressed 
entirely in white, with a turban and white beard but with a youthful complexion 
and a steady humorous eye. One could scarcely imagine a setting more appropriate 
to the transmission of a solemn message, and just as the sun was setting he began 
to speak to me of the manifestation of the power of God in the world. The Old Age 
was dominated by satanic influences, but the time had come when all was to be 
changed. He spoke of the man who was soon to appear and through whom the 
power was to be manifested. It would not be right for me to set down here all that 
he actually told me, for the event is not yet complete. My only reason for telling 
the story is that it was an important factor in my subsequent decisions…After 
saying that someone would come from the East, Abdullah startled me by telling 
me that not only was I chosen by God to be an immediate helper of this 'someone,' 
but that he would come to England and even live in my house. He added that when 
I returned to England I should prepare a place for him, and assured me that 
henceforward I would be guided and protected in all my doings. It is hard to 
explain why I found myself taking seriously such a fantastic story and why, on my 
return to England, I began without explaining my reasons, to prepare Coombe 
Springs to receive an extraordinary visitor (Bennet 1958, 30-31). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 http://naqshbandi.org/chain/39.htm, accessed 28 August 2011 
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In his autobiography, Bennet (1975, 309-310) also described his meeting with 
Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani as follows, 
After the usual salutations, and compliments of [on] the excellence of my Turkish, 
he astonished me by saying: “Why did you not bring the lady sister who is with 
you? I have a message for her as well as you.” It seemed unlikely that anyone 
could have told him about Elizabeth. We walked straight to his house, and the 
Dadji, my guide, had left me at the door without speaking to anyone. I replied that 
as he was a Muslim, I did not think he would wish to speak with a woman. He said 
very simply: “Why not? Rules and customs are for the protection of the foolish; 
they do not concern me…He was saying, “I was expecting someone today, but I 
did not know it would be you. A few nights ago an angel came to my room and 
told me that you would come to visit me and that I was to give you three 
messages…I was astonished at the two messages, for it was perfectly true that I 
had prayed for guidance on just those two questions…”The most important 
message is the last. You must know that there is a great wickedness in the world. 
People have given themselves over to the worship of material things, and they 
have lost the will and the power to worship God. God has always sent Messengers 
to show the way out of such situations, and he has again done so in our present age. 
A messenger is already on earth, and his identity known to many. Before long, he 
will come to the West. Men have been chosen to prepare the way for him.”…He 
said that he had finished telling me the messages, but wished to add as a personal 
advice that he recommended to me to practice incessantly the act of submission to 
the Will of God. He said that no harm can come to anyone when he is actively and 
consciously surrendering himself to the Will of God. He said: “I advise you 
frequently to repeat in your heart the words la ilahe il Allah – which means 
surrender to God alone.” When I said that this was the Muslim profession of faith, 
he replied that it is as much Christian as Muslim, for the foundation of all religion 
is that man should not follow his own will, but the Will of God…    
 
These long passages depict Abdullah Faiz Dagestani as a man with strong 
convictions. This incident also gives the impression that there was somehow 
already a strong spiritual connection between Naqshbandi-Haqqani and the New 
Age followers of Gurdjieff in Western Europe (Draper, 2002:125). It is interesting 
to note that Gurdjieff was a spiritual guru who traced his spiritual teachings back to 
the Naqshbandi’s masters (Bennet, 1975:27). In Meetings with Remarkable Men, 
Gurdjieff, for instance, shares his personal journey to see his spiritual masters in 
Central Asia and Turkey, which, according to Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources, 
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included some Naqshbandi masters.34 Meanwhile, in The Master of Wisdoms: An 
Esoteric History of the Spiritual Unfolding of Life on this Planet, Bennet 
elaborated on how his spiritual convictions were strongly attached to the 
Naqshbandi tradition.  
Moreover, perennial philosophical ideas were also instrumental in 
popularising Sufism in the West. Some of them have been increasingly linked to 
Islamic orthodoxy while others maintain universal values shared in all religions 
with an emphasis on cultivating self-consciousness, energy, love and peace. 
Among Western Sufi converts, this perennial philosophy is particularly related to 
the mystical-philosophical ideas of Ibn Arabi as represented by some initiated 
Western Sufi converts such as Ivan Agueli/Abdul Hadi (1869-1917) and his 
subsequent disciples like Rene Guenon/Abdul Wahid Yahya (1886-1951), Frithjof 
Schuon/Isa Nuruddin (1907-1998), Titus Burckhardt/Ibrahim Izz-al Din (1908-
1984), and Martin Lings/Abu Bakr Sirajuddin (1909-2005).35  
Though small in number, these Western followers came from educated 
backgrounds and did not hesitate to express their Sufi conviction through numerous 
written works. These Western Sufi converts, through their numerous works, played 
a pivotal role not only in introducing Sufism but also in paving the way for further 
Sufi transmission in the West. In a later generation, there were even some Western 
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34 This book has been translated into a movie with the same title and was directed by Peter Brook in 
1979.  
35 Ivan Agueli was a Swedish convert who continued the Akbari Sufi tradition. He was initiated into 
Sufism by Sheikh Abdurrahman Ilyas, one of the disciples of Sheikh Abdul Qadir al Jazairi (1808-
1883), an Algerian Sufi master with affiliation to Naqshbandi-Khalidi who was exiled by the French 
colonial government in Paris. He initiated Rene Guenon who, after Ivan Agueli’s death in 1917, 
became affiliated with a Moroccan Shadzili master, Sheikh Ahmad al-Alawi (1869-1934). Sheikh 
Ahmad al-Alawi visited Paris in 1926 and inaugurated the establishment of Shadzili Sufi lodge 
there. For details about Sheikh Ahmad al-Alawi, see Martin Ling (1993).   
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converts who became Sufi masters, such as Alexander Hixon (1941-1995), Ian 
Dallas/ Abdul Qadir Isa (b. 1930), and Nuh Hamim Keller (b. 1954).  Gibril Fouad 
Haddad, one of the main disciples of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, reportedly converted 
to Islam in 1996 after reading Martin Ling’s The Prophet Muhammad Biography. 
Given this, it is not surprising that Ernst (2003:6) has noted that Sufi material 
published in America and Europe has ‘joined the shelf of New Age teachings, in a 
veritable marketplace of spirituality’.  
In demographic terms, Sufi transmission to the West is related to the influx 
of Muslim migrant workers and Muslims with refugee status from conflict-torn 
countries in the Middle East between 1960s and 1990s. This growing number of 
Muslim populations provides a social basis through which Sufism in general and 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular gain followers. Sufi transmission had to do with 
growing number of Muslim migrant workers and. Increasing transnational 
migration between Turkey and Western European countries facilitates Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s move.36 In fact, Sheikh Nazim began his first journey by visiting 
London where he attracted an audience among the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot 
migrant communities there in 1974. After that, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani carried out 
his mission preaching the Naqshbandi path not only among his fellow Turks and a 
small Sunni community in the Middle East, but also to a broader audience of 
Muslims and non-Muslims.  
In terms of socio-economic and cultural factors, Sufi transnational 
expansion has to do with material resources and growing awareness to maintain 
Muslim identity and tradition. Charity and voluntary donation play a significant !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 As early as 1977, he also sent his representative to the USA, Sheikh Abdul Karim (d. 2012). 
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role for Sufi transnational transmission. During the 1970s, Sheikh Nazim al-
Haqqani used funds that were raised by his followers in London and the Middle 
East to buy a property in London. This property then functioned as a Sufi lodge 
(zawiya). In 1976, with the help of the Turkish Cypriot community, he bought a 
property in Shacklewell Lane/London which became the first zawiya in London 
until 1980 (Draper 2002, 137). In 1992, he bought another large unused church in 
St Ann’s Road, London, through a generous donation from Sultan Hassanal 
Bolkiah of Brunei. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah reportedly donated £2 million to buy 
and restore the property. It is still used as the main headquarters of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani in England (Atay 1994, 56, Draper 2002, 137). Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
sources reveal that Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei and Raja Dato Seri Ashman 
Shah (1958-2012)–the crown prince of the Perak Royal family–became his loyal 
disciples.  
With a permanent base in London, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani continued his 
habit of travelling regularly to visit his disciples in London every fasting month. He 
would then stay for a whole month before returning to Turkey by car (Stjerholm, 
2005:14). In this way, he reportedly managed to attract more followers in countries 
through which he travelled on his return route.  From London, Sheikh Nazim al-
Haqqani managed to open access to South and Southeast Asian countries. In 1986, 
for instance, he carried out a long tour to initiate more disciples in Brunei, 
Malaysia, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (Draper 2002, 131).  
 
!
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2.5 Expansion and Global Networks: Naqshbandi-Haqqani in North America 
The new trajectory of Naqshbandi Haqqani’s transnational mission 
occurred in the 1990s as Naqshbandi-Haqqani managed to establish a permanent 
home base in the USA. The new trajectory for further development of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani began when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, Sheikh Nazim’s son-in-law, 
obtained a green card and moved to the USA. With refugee status, Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani moved to the USA soon after the civil war in Lebanon ended in 1990 
along with all of his family.37 Although it did not fully lose its character as a new 
age group, Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the USA increasingly became overtly assertive 
in identifying itself with the Sufi tradition and Islamic symbols. Naqshbandi-
Haqqani, for instance, explicitly designated itself as Naqshbandi-Haqqani, 
strengthening its symbolic claim as a new Sufi group, which continued a long 
Islamic spiritual tradition.  
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani expanded Naqshbandi Haqqani from a relatively 
un-organised Sufi community to a global Sufi movement. He began his religious 
mission in New York before then moved to San Diego in California about 1994 
where he began his career as a preacher going from mosque to mosque. Sheikh 
Muhammad Hisham Kabbani is reported to have established 23 Sufi retreat centers 
across the USA and Canada. The largest center is located in Fenton, Michigan, 
where he and his family are currently living. Currently, both Fenton/Michigan and ######################################## #####################
37 Some sources state that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s move to the USA was simply to follow his 
master’s instruction. However, there seem to be other reasons for this move. Tripoli was obviously 
no longer viable as a permanent basis for Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities due to the devastation 
that resulted from the civil war (1975-1990). Moreover, Tripoli was too small to cater to the two 
emerging Naqshbandi-Haqqani propagators (Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and his brother, Adnan 
Kabbani) who were competing with each other.  
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Lefke/Cyprus are considered the main centers of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. He 
organised Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s mission into separate but related institutions and 
has established himself as an authoritative figure within the movement.  
Since the arrival of Hisham Kabbani, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has made 
deliberate efforts to fully integrate in and reach out to the wider Western society. 
While Muslim migrants still become the main source from which it attracts 
disciples, strengthening group identity became apparent as it began to promote the 
personal charisma of the Sheikh Nazim and position itself as a legitimate successor 
of Sufi tradition. Unlike Sheikh Nazim, who insists on not organising his disciples 
into a formal organisation, Sheikh Hisham Kabani has established numerous 
umbrella organisations to support his mission. He combines traditional authority as 
a spiritual guide and modern organisational skills to gain an audience not only 
among immigrant communities across America but also among white Americans.  
Nowadays, Naqshbandi-Haqqani is one of about a dozen Sufi movements, 
which are currently active in North America. Through Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s 
efforts, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has expanded its efforts throughout the world. 
Currently, there are reportedly more than 200 dzikr centers in 41 different countries. 
Moreover, since his arrival in the USA in 1991, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has 
established at least five umbrella organisations. They include American Muslim 
Assistance (AMA), Kamilat Sufi Women Organisation (KAMILAT), Unity One, 
Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA) and As Sunnah Foundation of 
America (ASFA). AMA was an organisation founded to provide relief for Bosnian 
refugees but along with KAMILAT and Unity One, it is currently no longer active.  
# 60#
Meanwhile, ASFA and ISCA were the key umbrella organisations through 
which Sheikh Hisham Kabbani run most of his social activities in the USA 
between the late 1990s and mid 2000s. He is a chairman of both the Islamic 
Supreme Council of America (ISCA) and As Sunnah Foundation of America 
(ASFA).
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Damrel describes ISCA as “the most visible, politically active and 
controversial of all the affiliated Haqqani organisations”. It plays a role in political 
lobbying (Damrel 2006, 119). The organisation defines its goal as follows: namely 
to “support peace, the precepts of justice for all, and condemn all violations of 
human rights”, “advocate social integration and cohesion”, “promote the pursuit of 
spiritual growth and harmony”, and “commit to strengthening the values of charity, 
family love, education and public responsibility in American life”. To meet these 
goals, the organisation emphasizes practical and authoritative solutions for 
American Muslims seeking to maintain Islamic beliefs in a modern secular society 
(Damrel, 2006:119). On the other hand, ASFA serves religious education and 
publishes general works based on the four major Sunni law schools. ASFA 
presents itself as an authoritative, legally sound guide to proper Islamic practice 
and is affiliated with a number of internationally known Islamic institutions such as 
Al Azhar University and others.  
These umbrella organisations and their fund-raising capability have enabled 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani to maintain a high-profile public appearance through its 
various websites, print publications, internet radio and television broadcasts, and 
video streaming. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has also managed to gather talented 
disciples who help him carry out his preaching mission around the world, 
maintaining various websites, producing publications, and running his umbrella 
organisations. These disciples are mostly new converts such as G.F. Haddad (b. 
1965), Nurjan Mirahmadi, Hedieh Mirahmadi, and Matteen Shiddique. Gibril 
Fouad Haddad (a Lebanese convert with a PhD on English Literature) in particular 
is a prolific writer who has learnt traditional Islamic subjects with Sayyid 
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Muhammad Alawi al Maliki of Mecca (1944-2004). Sheikh Hisham Kabbani 
assigns each of his associates a different role to perform.   
Sheikh Kabbani has organised two international conferences of traditional 
Sunni scholars in Los Angeles (1996) and in Washington DC (1998).38 Those 
conferences were officially named the International Islamic Unity Conference. The 
first conference was held in early August 1996 at the Westin Bonaventure Hotel in 
Los Angeles and was organised jointly by the As Sunnah Foundation (ASFA) and 
American Muslim Assistance (AMA). There were around 7000 participants and 69 
speakers attending the conference from several countries.39 The first conference 
dealt with the issue of standardizing Islamic curriculum in the mosques and for 
inter-faith dialogue.  
The second conference was organised by the Islamic Supreme Council of 
America (ISCA) and was held at Omni Shoreham Hotel, in Washington DC, from 
7th to 9th August 1998. 40  The conference was concerned primarily with the 
humanitarian aid for Muslim victims of atrocities in Kosovo during the Balkan war. 
Like the previous conference, this conference was also attended by delegates from 
several countries including Indonesia.41 Sheikh Hisham Kabbani is reported to have 
invited and provided transport and accommodation expenses for 30 people from 
Indonesia. Tutti Alawiyah (Minister of Women Empowerment) gave a speech !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/media-center/isca-in-the-news/49-washington-dc-hosts-
2nd-international-islamic-unity-conference.html 
39 The speakers included Dana Rohrabacher (US Republican Congress member of California), 
Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro (Grand Mufti of Syria), Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Islamic scholar), Dr. 
William Chittick (scholar) and many other people. The complete list of speakers can be seen on 
http://www.sunnah.org/nl/v0101/main_ballroom.html, accessed 10 September 2011. 
40The speakers included the President of the Chechnya Republic and US Congressman, Jim 
McDermott, WA. An example of media reporting about the conference can be accessed on 
http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/1098/9810107.html, accessed 23 July 2011. 
41 For details, see http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/109792-1, accessed 16 October 2011. 
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sharing Muslim experiences in Indonesia. The second conference was however a 
turning point for Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the USA. 
Due to mounting pressure and continuing polemics among within Muslim 
community in America, he withdrew himself from this kind of high-profile activity 
and dedicated himself to his writings and to guiding his disciples. 
 
2.6 Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia 
Prior to the collapse of the Ottoman rule and the emergence of the Saudi 
regime in the 1920s, Naqshbandi had been one of the most active Sufi groups in 
establishing transnational connections between Indonesia and the Haramain 
(Mecca and Madina). It spread to the archipelago through commercial relations, 
intellectual networks and personal contacts by those doing pilgrimage journey to 
the Haramain cities.42 Naqshbandi with many of its offshoots has grown further 
and even became a dominant Sufi movement at least from the late 19th century 
(Bruinessen 1990, 161, 1992a, 17). Due to dramatic socio-political changes in the 
Muslim world in the 1920s, international Sufi connections were completely 
disrupted, leading to the Naqshbandi movement in Indonesia becoming 
indigenised.43 The dramatic socio-political changes that took place in the early 20th 
century affected the dynamics of transnational Sufi transmission in Indonesia. The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Bruinessen showed that until 1920s, Mecca was still a center point from where Indonesian 
Muslims gained knowledge particularly about Sufi knowledge in general and particularly 
Naqshbandi’s teachings (1992:150-79).  
43 In the wake of the waning influence of transnational Sufism in Indonesia, transnational networks 
between Indonesia and other countries are established by new Islamic movements such as the 
Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hizbut Tahrir, Jemaat Islamiyah (JI), and Salafi groups between 1970s and 
1990s.  
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dramatic socio-political changes had to do with the decline of Ottoman rule and the 
rise of Wahabism in the aftermath of the First World War.  
After 1924, the transnational religious transmission between the Haramain 
and the Indonesian archipelago was radically altered. The decline of Ottoman rule 
had an immediate practical impact because for a long time, the Ottoman rule 
provided both material and political patronage to many Naqshbandi’s lodges in the 
Haramain where Indonesian students came to study and acquire Islamic knowledge. 
Wahabism, on the other hand, posed doctrinal challenges and, to large extent, even 
an existential threat to Sufism because of its rigorous efforts in promoting anti-Sufi 
Salafism. The fall of Ottoman rule and the rise of Saudi regime therefore 
completely disrupted transnational Sufi networks that had been maintained for 
generations.  
Naqshbandi-Haqqani began to attract audiences among Indonesian Muslims 
in the 1990s. According to some sources, a few Indonesian Muslims living in 
Europe and North America had known about Naqshbandi-Haqqani since the late 
1980s. Asniar Sahab is reported to be one of the first Indonesians to join the 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Western Europe. She was an Indonesian journalist who 
met and was then initiated directly by Sheikh Nazim Haqqani in London in 1991. 
In her book entitled The Spiritual Journey of Celebrities, she explains that she 
came to know Sheikh Nazim Haqqani through the help of his friend, Sabar Prayoga, 
who was then living in Rotterdam, Netherland (Sahab 2001, 21). Asniar’s 
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testimony confirms that an Indonesian living in Netherland was the first Indonesian 
to join Naqshbandi Haqqani.44  
Initial contact was also made in 1993 by Hadid Subki, a nuclear engineer 
who was then an employee at the General Electric Company in San Jose, California, 
USA. Hadid Subki got to know the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in California 
for the first time through his Pakistani colleague (Asman Khan). Asman Khan 
introduced Hadid Subki to Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani.45 Hadid Subki 
then regularly attended communal dzikr and eventually gave bai’at to Sheikh 
Muhammad Hisham Kabbani at the At Tauhid Mosque in Mountain View in San 
Jose. It was through Hadid Subki that his younger brother, Bernie Subki, joined 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani in 1995 while he was pursuing his PhD at the University of 
Oregon.46 Based on this early historical narrative, it could be said that in the mid-
1990s, Naqshbandi-Haqqani was known and embraced exclusively by a handful of 
Indonesians living overseas, namely Europe and North America, who met directly 
either with Sheikh Nazim al Haqqani in London or Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in 
California. There was no deliberate attempt by those early disciples to disseminate 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia.  
The turning point for enduring direct contact, however, happened in the 
mid-1990s. In mid-1996, several young students took the initiative to contact the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 It was very difficult to verify this testimony because Asniar Sahab passed away in 2005 and there 
are no other living witnesses to this early encounter between Indonesians and Naqshbandi 
Haqqani’s community in Europe back in the early 1990s.  Interview Hagi Ghani Azis and Muchtony 
Ghani Azis, 12 August 2010 
45 There were two deputies of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the USA, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani then living 
in California and Sheikh Abdul Karim living in Catskill, New York.  
46 Interview with Dr. Bernie Subki, 25 December 2010 
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Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s website administrator (Matteen Shiddique) through email.47 
Through Matteen Shiddique, some of these students then managed to establish 
direct contact with the early disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, Hadid Subki and 
Bernie Subki, who were living in the USA at that time.48 One of the people who 
regularly contacted Hadid Subki and Bernie Subki was Faried Bubhi Djamirin.  
After this, Hadid Subki and Bernie Subki took further steps by sending some 
written Sufi materials to their father’s home, Prof Iyos Subki, in Menteng in 
Jakarta.49 Following on from this, Sheikh Hisham asked Hadid Subki and Bernie 
Subki to arrange a visit to Indonesia. They then decided to follow up on their 
online contact with Faried Bubhi Djamirin in Jakarta. Hadid and Bernie Subki also 
shared their collection of Sufi materials with him. Among the many Sufi materials 
they sent to their father (Prof Iyos Subki) in Jakarta was the Dalail Khoirot, a 
classical Sufi text written by a Moroccan Syadzili’s master, Muhammad ibn 
Sulaiman Al Jazuli (d. 1465).  
Faried Bubhi Djamirin, who was rather uncertain of what to do next,  
contacted his aunt, Hagi Ghani Azis, asking for help. Together they contacted 
Mustafa Mas’ud and brought along with them the Dalail Khoirot. Mustafa Mas’ud, 
who was an authorised teacher of the Dalail Khoirot, was impressed of what he 
heard from both Hagi Ghani Azis and Farid Bubhi Djamirin.50 It was also through 
Hagi Ghani Azis and Faried Bubhi Djamirin that Mustafa Mas’ud received more 
detailed information about Naqshbandi-Haqqani, and about Sheikh Nazim Haqqani !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Matteen Shiddique is one of senior disciples of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in the USA. Interview 
with Farid Bubhi Djamirin, 16 December 2010 
48 Interview with Dr. Bernie Subki, 25 December 2010 
49 Professor Iyos Subki was then the head of Indonesian Nuclear Agency (BATAN) 
50 According to Mustafa Mas’ud, he received an authorization to teach Dalail Khoirot from his 
master, Kyai Thahir in Pekalongan in late 1980s.  
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and Hisham Kabbani. On his students’ insistence, however, he changed his mind 
and agreed to arrange a personal meeting with Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and if 
possible, even invite him to come to Indonesia. The plan to invite Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani was not, however, proposed until early 1997 and this plan was brought 
about by some of the closest students of Mustafa Mas’ud who decided to invite him 
when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was visiting his disciples in Singapore. 51  It 
happened that Hagi Ghani Azis and Iyos Subki’s wife were then regular attendees 
of the NAMIRA group. 
In the meeting, Faried also told Mustafa Mas’ud that his contacts in the 
USA planned to arrange Sheikh Hisham’s travel to Indonesia him.52 To invite 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to come to Indonesia, Mustafa Mas’ud  and some of his 
students (Hagi Ghani Azis, Tini Firdaus and his daughter, and Effendi Siregar and 
his wife, Ella Effendi Siregar) went to Singapore.53 What exactly happened during 
this first meeting in Singapore was not clear. Mustafa Mas’ud said that he and his 
students met Sheikh Hisham Kabbani for the first time at the Changi International 
Airport and invited him to come to Jakarta.54 Another source reports that Mustafa 
Mas’ud and his entourage met Sheikh Hisham Kabbani at the house of Sheikh 
Zakaria’s, a Naqshbandi-Haqqani representative in Singapore.55 Others attributed 
the arrival of Sheikh Hisyam Kabbani to the personal efforts of Hadid Subki, 
Bernie Subki, and Farid Bubhi Djamirin, a version of events that forms part of an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s community in Singapore began in 1991 when Sheikh Syed Hasan Bahara 
went to Cyprus and asked for initiation from Sheikh Nazim Haqqani. It grew significantly after 
Sheikh Zakaria was initiated during Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s first visit to Singapore in 1996 (Sani, 
2010:43-44).   
52 Interview with Hagi Ghani Azis, 12 August 2010 
53 Mustafa Mas’ud did not recall that Effendi Siregar (known as Sheikh Aweng) and his wife came 
along to Singapore, whereas Rizal Tarigan mentioned both names. 
54 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010. 
55 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010. 
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official narrative kept among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia. 56 
Whatever the case, all agree that soon after the direct meeting in Singapore, Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani agreed to come to Indonesia and finally arrived in Jakarta for the 
first time on 7 April 1997.57 
On his first visit, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani initiated Mustafa Mas’ud and 
some of his students into Naqshbandi-Haqqani. The initiation ritual took place in 
Mustafa Mas’ud’s residence at Haji Hasbi Street Number 40, Cawang, East Jakarta, 
with an audience of around 30 people. Among the first disciples who were initiated 
into Naqshbandi-Haqqani by Sheikh Hisham are Muchtony Ghani Azis and his 
wife, Effendi Siregar and his wife, Soetono Joyosuparto and his wife, Prof Iyos 
Subki and his wife, and Firdaus Wajdi and his wife, Tini Firdaus. At a meeting 
with MUI’s top officials the following day on 8 April 1997, Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani also initiated Ahmad Mubarok (then a MUI’s committee member). 
Together with Mustafa Mas’ud, Firdaus Wajdi and Ahmad Mubarok were 
particularly helpful in the further expansion of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia 
because it was through their social networks that Naqshbandi-Haqqani gained a 
solid basis among Jakarta’s urban middle class.  
Firdaus Wajdi was described by many sources as a businessman, a political 
lobbyist with vast social networks among Jakarta’s business elites, and a former 
intelligence officer of the State Intelligence Agency who had a good personal 
relationship with prominent Indonesian politicians and top military figures. He was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 It was previously displayed on http://haqqaniindonesia.blogspot.com/ but it is now no longer 
accessible.  
57 Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was accompanied by some of his students from Singapore and USA such 
as Mateen Siddiqui, Mohammed Khan, Leonardo Stoute, and Ibrahim Abdur Rahman. For details, 
see http://kunjungan7007.blogspot.com.au/2008/06/kunjungan-mawlana-syekh-hisyam-
kabbani_6657.html 
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also a former HMI activist in late 1960s and a close friend of Akbar Tandjung, the 
then chairman of Golkar Party.  
Ahmad Mubarok, on the other hand, was then a lecturer in Islamic 
psychology at the University of Indonesia, UIN Jakarta, and As Syafi’iyah Islamic 
University.58 His contacts among Jakarta’s political elites began in the late 1960s 
when he was a former PMII (Indonesia Islamic Student Movement, a Muslim 
student organisation affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama) student activist at Jakarta 
Islamic State University. His future political career was heavily influenced by his 
uncle who was also a political mentor, KH Muslich (1910-1998), and a former 
senior NU politician in the 1950s and 1960s. Like Firdaus Wajdi, he also 
established his personal contacts among the intelligence community.59 He was, for 
instance, financially sponsored by his personal contact at BIN for attending 
International Sufi Conference in Tripoli, Libya, in 1997.  
During his first visit, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani appointed Mustafa Mas’ud 
an official representative of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. Sheikh Mustafa 
Mas’ud was charged with the authority to give religious instructions on behalf of 
Sheikh Nazim and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. He was mainly responsible for leading 
dzikr, the recitation of dalail khoirot, and giving regular religious instruction. In the 
early days, he even required all students to come visiting him and conducting all 
rituals. On some occasions, he even asked his students to perform these rituals all 
night long. 60  Between 1997 and 2000, Mustafa Mas’ud also had a few 
opportunities to visit Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in the USA and accompany him in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Ahmad Mubarok was born in Purwokerto in 1950 
59 Interview with Ahmad Mubarok, 21 September 2010 
60 Interview with Sutono Joyosuparto, 14 August 2010 
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his overseas tours. On a few occasions, he also came to see Sheikh Nazim in 
London. Through Mustafa Mas’ud, the personal charisma of both Sheikh Nazim 
and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and the teaching of Naqshbandi-Haqqani were 
gradually accepted less as distant reality and more as personal testimony. 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani first became known among only a few university 
students in Jakarta around 1994.61 In Indonesia, the 1994 internet debate was 
particularly influential in driving increasing interests to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani 
personally and Naqshbandi-Haqqani and Sufi teachings in general. Many early 
disciples who followed the 1994 internet debate testified that they were impressed 
by the way Sheikh Hisham Kabbani answered questions, addressing each issue 
with a detailed argument based on the Quran, Hadits and previous Muslim scholars 
on the legitimate position of Sufism in a language that was easily understood, and 
by the use of media that can be accessed by lay people. It is not a coincidence that 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani began to be known among Indonesian Muslims only after the 
1994 Internet debate.62 Sheikh Musthafa Mas’ud himself confirmed that a group of 
university students in Jakarta stumbled upon Naqshbandi-Haqqani while surfing 
the net. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani shows that Sufism survives through the 
modern era by way of creativity, individual efforts, and family connection. It also 
continues to expand through various institutional changes adapted to different 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Interview with Faried Bubhi Djamirin, 18 September 2010. 
62 Interview with Farid Bubhi Djamirin, 28 December 2010 
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socio-historical contexts in the Middle East, Western Europe and North America. It 
began as a modest spiritual teaching in Central Asia in the 14th century. It then 
developed to be a transnational Sufi movement through creative and pious 
individuals who performed as a religious activist with a strong missionary zeal to 
spread their teachings across the then Muslim world.  
The widespread of Naqshbandi throughout the Muslim world owed much to 
dramatic socio-political changes affecting the Muslim world between 17th and 19th 
century. In the 19th century, Naqshbandi-Khalidi, the progenitor of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani, has survived through declining power of Mughal Empire and 
modernising challenge of Western colonialism by engaging in internal religious 
reforms. This Sufi movement also managed to avoid physical repression of the 
Russian Tsarist Regime and hostile attitude of rising secular government of the 
Kemalist regime in Turkey.  
Naqshbandi-Haqqani emerged under hostile religio-political environments 
in Syria and civil war in Lebanon in the 1970s.  At the beginning, it was just a 
small Sufi movement that flourished exclusively among Arabic and Turkish 
speaking people in Syria, Jordania, Lebanon and Cyprus. It is an offshoot of an old 
Sufi tradition with a claim of continuity to the authenticity of the Prophetic 
tradition. Naqshbandi-Haqqani becomes a fully global Sufi movement in the 1990s 
when it has a permanent base in the USA. The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
provides a good example of how transnational Sufi transmission plays a part in 
shaping religious piety and promoting Islamic morality in Indonesia.  
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Though it is not the only transnational Sufi group that currently exists, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani has become the most active transnational Sufi movement in 
contemporary Indonesia. There are several driving factors contributing to 
transmission and expansion of Naqshabandi-Haqqani in particular and Sufi piety in 
general among Indonesian Muslims: socio-cultural, political and economic factors. 
The expansion of Naqhsbandi-Haqqani in the late 1990s re-established these 
international networks in Indonesia.  
!
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Chapter 3 
S U F I  T R A N S M I S S I O N  A N D  R E L I G I O U S  L I F E  I N  
I N D O N E S I A 
S o c i a l  a n d  C u l t u r a l  Fac tors  !
The spread of Naqshbandi-Haqqani marks the contemporary development 
of Sufi movement and changing religious landscape in Indonesia. From the 1970s 
onward, the New Order policies brought about dramatic changes in the socio-
cultural life in Indonesia. The New Order regime was increasingly able to provide 
social and public services in  large scale to the  populace. Moderate secular policies 
of the New Order also helped piety to flourish among Muslims and diminished, 
though not completely, the appeal of Islamist political ideology. This chapter deals 
with domestic factors in the rise of contemporary Sufism in Indonesia. It shows 
that Sufism’s global expansion is not only determined by creative individuals with 
strong personalities and personal appeal but also driven by underlying socio-
cultural factors. There are at least three important socio-cultural factors that 
determine the general acceptance of Sufism among the urban population in 
Indonesia: urbanisation, improvement of higher education and religious 
commodification.   
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines how 
urbanisation and commercial life in urban setting have laid a strong socio-cultural 
foundation for the growth and expansion of Sufism in some segments of 
Indonesian society. Second section deals with changing curriculum in Islamic 
higher education from fiqh to philosophical-scientific oriented courses in which 
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Sufism and tasawuf are important subject matter to include. This section also 
examines changing student activism at secular university campuses that has been 
increasingly Islamic and their impact in generating educated Muslims with friendly 
attitude toward Sufi religious expression. The third section considers how religious 
commodification paves the way for introducing Sufism among Muslim urbanites. 
This section particularly concerns to examine five different sites of consumption 
through which Muslim urbanites get to know Sufi materials: 1) Islamic books, 2) 
Mosque/Praying House, 3) Art and Music, 4) Fashion, and 5) Travelling and 
Tourism. Finally, this chapter concludes by elaborating on overall argument of the 
chapter.  
 
3.1 Urbanisation and Islamic Religiosity 
Commercial relations and individualistic life-style in urban settings provide 
a fertile ground for the personal seeking of Islamic religiosity. This personal 
element of religiosity finds its social basis among the bourgeoning Muslim  
middle-class, which is not only aware of their social prestige, but also conscious 
about expressing their Islamic identity. This consciousness does not manifest 
naturally but it is shaped through a systemic and gradual process of informal 
learning in urban setting.  
Geertz’s classical study on Javanese society suggested that puritan Islam 
would eventually diminish the influence of and even replace traditional beliefs as 
Indonesia came to modern era and urban commercial life takes into effect (1960). 
Such a suggestion was not empirically correct because, instead of vanishing 
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completely, traditional Islamic belief like Sufism has gained popularity among 
contemporary urban people. On the contrary to Geertz’s suggestion, Howell (2000, 
17, 2001a, 701-729, 2007a, 217-240) points out that urban Sufism is a result of the 
New Order’s policy to promote economic modernisation through agricultural 
revolution in rural areas and industrialisation in urban areas. Thus, both Geertz and 
Howell have converging views that urban life in Indonesia can lead to rising 
Islamic piety. The principal difference is that while Howell believes in the survival 
of Sufism as a form of emotive piety, Geertz projected its replacement by a more 
legalistic or shariah oriented Islam.  
Sufi piety is not a given condition but has emerged through a series of 
socio-cultural changes that took place in urban areas in the last 40 years. It is partly 
a response to growing spiritual needs of the Muslim middle and upper classes in 
Indonesia (Burhani 2001, 2002). Jakarta for instance became a fertile ground for 
propagating activities by all Islamic groups including those with Sufi inclination 
because it is a metropolitan city where the development of Islamic learning in 
urban settings has been well established. The proliferation of majlis taklim 
(religious study club) in the early 1980s provided the social foundation for this 
development. Since then, there has been a gradual revival of Sufism that offers 
many alternatives to urban Muslim middle and upper class in Indonesia. The majlis 
taklim has become the main intermediary institutions through which urban middle-
upper class Muslims gain access to Sufi materials and instructions (Abaza 2004, 
173-202). The emergence of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular is closely 
associated with the burgeoning of ‘Islamic salon’ and ‘Islamic chic’ among urban 
Muslims in the 1980s (Abaza 2004, 173-174).  
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As suggested by Abaza, the term ‘Islamic salon’ refers to a popular trend 
among the middle and upper class in which their houses are used for religious 
propagation, whereas ‘Islamic chic’ refers to the circumstance in which Islamic 
propagation was seen to become increasingly successful, both politically and 
economically. This had to do with the emerging spiritual marketplace in general 
and particularly with ‘Urban Sufism’ in the Jakarta metropolitan area (Howell 2000, 
17). Higher educational background and a wealthier status among urban Muslims 
has led them to be more appreciative of philosophical or theoritical Sufism (Sufi 
falsafi). The flourishing of adult educational institutions with Sufi inclination such 
as Yayasan Tadzkiyah Sejati, IiMAN, and ICNIS manages to spread Sufi teachings 
and devotion to the urban population in metropolitan area of Jakarta. They offer 
tasawuf class with a curriculum that introduces prominent Sufi philosophers such 
as Ibn Arabi, Jalaludin Rumi, and Al Ghazali. This growing interest in 
philosophical Sufism opened up for practical Sufism (Sufi amali), which was 
preoccupied with ritual, charismatic veneration and emotive experience.   
During the 1990s, the Islamisation process became increasingly visible in 
all aspects of Indonesian society, leading to further changes in the landscape of 
Indonesia’s religious life. Sufi ritual gatherings helped to obscure the rigid 
demarcating line between traditionalist and modernist Muslims as a socio-cultural 
category (Howell 2000, 17). Promoting Sufi rituals therefore is considered 
necessary, if not pivotal, for teaching lay Muslims the virtue of loving the Prophet 
Muhammad and his family. 63  Moreover, Sufi rituals should be promoted, 
especially when the Muslim community is plagued by internal discord and conflict. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Interview with Mustafa Masud, 18 September 2010 
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The Naqshbandi-Haqqani represents further institutional development and 
transformation of urban Sufism in Indonesia as people become increasingly eager 
to attach their religious conviction and practices to a particular Sufi master/order.  
In this context, the biography of Mustafa Mas’ud provides a good example 
of how an urban lifestyle can be compatible with Muslim religiosity. Mustafa 
Mas’ud was born 25 January 1947 in Jombang from the family of Pesantren Darul 
Ulum. His mother is a younger sister of KH Romli Tamim, a well-known Sufi 
master of Naqshbandi-Qadiri. In his youth, he learned from his grandfather, K.H. 
Romli Tamim (1888-1958) at Pesantren Darul Ulum. He finished his elementary 
and secondary schools at Darul Ulum before pursuing his undergraduate degree at 
Sunan Kalijaga Islamic State University in Yogyakarta (1970-1974). During his 
undergraduate studies in Yogyakarta, Mustafa Mas’ud was a student activist 
through his involvement with PMII, a NU-affiliate university student association.  
After finishing his undergraduate degree in 1974, he moved to Jakarta 
where he started his career as a NGO activist at LP3ES (1975-1978). Then, he 
became a lecturer at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia between 1978 and 1981. He 
obtained an MA degree from SOAS University of London in 1982, and pursued his 
PhD at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat, Frankfurt in 1983. Unfortunately, 
he did not complete his PhD study because of, as he described it, personal conflict 
with the then Indonesian ambassador to West Germany following his refusal to 
stop his political activism .64  
Upon returning to Indonesia in 1983, he married Syarifah Fatmah Alatas, a 
descendant of Sayyid Hadrami from Pekalongan, Central Java. He made a living as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Interview with Musthafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010 
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a lecturer in Islamic studies at several private and state universities in Jakarta and 
Bogor (Ibn Khaldun University in Bogor, State School of Accountancy/STAN, 
Pancasila University, As Syafi’iyah Islamic University, and Jakarta 
Muhammadiyah University). It was during this period that he established a small 
religious study club consisting  largely of university students. Mustafa Mas’ud 
combines his modern educational background and traditional Islamic knowledge in 
his religious teachings. He sought Islamic knowledge from many Muslim scholars 
throughout Indonesia such as Kyai Hamid Pasuruan (1914-1982), Kyai Marzuki 
Magelang, Kyai Dimyati (1925-2003) Pandeglang, and Kiai Thohir Pekalongan. 
Many of his disciples claimed that he held authority in seven different tariqah 
before dedicating himself solely to teaching Naqshbandi-Haqqani. He is fluent in 
both Arabic and English, which helps him not only to communicate effectively 
with Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani but also to give his own interpretation of 
their teachings.  
Through his wife’s social connections - Fatmah Alatas was then a wedding 
planner/organiser for Jakarta’s middle andupper classes as well as top celebrities - 
Mustafa Mas’ud managed to get access to some Islamic study groups (majlis taklim) 
in Jakarta. With the help of his wife, Mustafa Mas’ud became a religious instructor 
in NAMIRA, a women Islamic study group established in 1986 and led by Tini 
Firdaus, wife of Firdaus Wajdi. The majority of its members came from Jakarta’s 
middle and upper classes and though relatively small in number, members of 
NAMIRA came from socio-economic backgrounds with strong connections to 
Jakarta’s political and business elites. Since its inception, the group has been 
running weekly gatherings in residential houses in Kebayoran Baru, Menteng, and 
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Pondok Indah. On many occasions, this Islamic study group also holds religious 
gatherings in luxurious five-star hotels across Jakarta. One of its principal financial 
patrons is Hartini Usman Affan, who was also the financial supporter of PTIQ and 
IIQ, the two Islamic institutions focusing on Quranic studies led by KH Ibrahim 
Hosen (1917-2001). 
Initially, Mustafa Mas’ud acted only as a religious instructor who 
specialised in fiqh-oriented Islamic learning, such as the proper way to do ablution 
and obligatory prayer (shalat), how to measure alms (zakat) and voluntary 
donations (infaq and shodaqoh), to conduct pilgrimage journey (haji) and so forth. 
As people’s Islamic knowledge increased, however, fiqh-oriented religious 
instruction gradually became obsolete.  He therefore began to focus on ritual-
oriented Islamic learning by providing personal services such as leading obligatory 
and supererogatory prayers and giving practical guidance on reciting prayer in 
Arabic. He also acted as pilgrimage guide (pemandu ziarah) for those conducting 
the ritual of hajj and umrah. Though he did not make a living from this service, it 
enabled him to conduct the hajj and umrah many times for free.65  
He continued and even expanded this service after being appointed national 
representative of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in 1997. As a national representative, he 
began to initiate people on behalf of Sheikh Hisham as well as accompanying his 
teacher  on several journeys overseas. Mustafa Mas’ud has also accompanied 
Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani on pilgrimage journeys in different countries 
where Naqshbandi-Haqqani has historical connections. Between 1997 and 2008, he 
visited the shrines of Bayazid al Bistami (Iran), Sheikh Bahauddin Naqshband, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Interview with Samson Nasarudin, 1 October 2010 
 81 
Amir Kulal, Imam al Bukhori, and Ubaidillah Ahrar (Uzbekistan), Sheikh Khalid 
al Baghdadi and Abdullah Faiz Dagestani (Syria), and Sheikh Sharafudin (Turkey).  
The case of Mustafa Mas’ud provides a broader picture of socio-cultural 
changes affecting the Muslim middle- class in urban areas. His personal 
experiences reflect the dynamics of religiosity among his followers. At the 
beginning, informal Islamic learning took the form of majlis taklim, an informal 
forum where Muslims  receive instruction in basic Islamic shariah provisions. 
Then, it transforms into majlis dzikir where the environment is more intimate 
through the introduction of collective and communal rituals. Collective ritual leads 
to initiation into Sufi tarekat when Islamic learning and collective ritual becomes 
more and more intense.  
 
3.2 Higher Education Reform and Emerging Muslim Urbanites 
Sufi resurgence is a result of a long process of higher educational reform in 
Islamic universities and changing nature of student activism in secular tertiary 
educational institutions across Indonesia. In Islamic universities, higher educational 
reform affects curriculum that is more appreciative to various branches of Islamic 
knowledge including Sufism, whereas in secular universities, declining leftist 
ideology and emerging authoritarian military regime lead to emerging student 
activism with strong Islamic orientation. Tertiary educational institutions then 
become a breeding ground for a new Muslim generation with positive attitude 
toward Sufi religious expression. Altogether, growing number of university 
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students and Muslim elites with university background also provide a strong social 
foundation for the flourishing Sufism to broader society.  
Higher educational reform in Islamic universities was closely related to 
broader social changes following the rise of the New Order in the late 1960s. The 
Islamic educational reform was part of the New Order’s modernising projects 
affecting all sections of society. It was made possible after the demise of 
traditionalist domination within the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The origins of 
Islamic educational reform began with the appointment of Mukti Ali (1923-2004) 
as the Minister of Religious Affairs in 1973.66 Enjoying political support from 
Soeharto’s inner circle helped him not only to consolidate the New Order’s power 
within the Muslim community but also to launch policy changes in Islamic higher 
education that would have considerable impacts on contemporary religious life in 
Indonesia.67  
Mukti Ali’s educational background is instructive to understand how higher 
educational reform in Islamic state universities (IAIN) combined both traditional 
Sufi Pesantren and modern educational institution that made him an important 
Muslim scholar with a progressive religious outlook.68 He was a disciple of Kyai 
Hamid Dimyati of Pesantren Termas, a prominent Naqshbandi-Khalidi master and 
local Masyumi political activist who was killed during the Madiun Affair in 1948. 
After finishing his undergraduate study at STI (later known as Indonesia Islamic 
University, Yogyakarta) in the 1950s, he went on to pursue   a postgraduate degree !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 He replaced Mohammad Dahlan (1909-1977), a Muslim politician from NU political party. 
67 Some other religious reforms launched during his tenure as a Minister included the establishment 
of MUI, draft of marriage law, and interfaith dialogue. 
68 For a complete account of the educational background of Mukti Ali, see    (Munhanif 1998, 269-
320) 
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in Islamic studies in Pakistan and at McGill University, Canada. This unique 
religious upbringing provided him with the skills and knowledge to become one of 
the first intellectual guides to a small group of young intellectuals who later 
pioneered Islamic neo-modernism in Indonesia. With Mukti Ali’s support, 
emerging pioneers of Islamic educational reform paved the way for the 
introduction of Sufism as a compulsory subject in tertiary curriculum.  
Harun Nasution was the most important reformist.69 During his tenure as 
Rector and Director of Post Graduate Studies at the Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic 
State University (now UIN Jakarta), Harun introduced changes to the curriculum 
that would considerably transform state Islamic universities across Indonesia. He 
replaced fiqh-oriented curriculum with Islamic philosophy, especially kalam and 
tasawwuf , as compulsory subjects in the faculty of theology. He was also the first 
to  recognise the need to adopt critical-analytical thinking, a humanistic approach 
and scientific methodology in dealing with complicated religious issues such as 
theology (kalam), revelation, predestination, and mysticism. He introduced his 
progressive ideas to address what he considered to be backwardness within the 
Muslim community in Indonesia (Cone 2002, 60-62). 
Harun Nasution played an important role in spreading a Mu’tazilite-style of 
rational thinking among Islamic university students (Woodward, Atmaja, and 
Martin 1997, 159). He also helped in transforming Islamic higher education in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Harun Nasution was a prominent Muslim thinker who was born on 23 September 1919 in 
Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra. He came from a traditional religious background. He attended 
Dutch elementary school before pursuing further study in Mecca, Cairo, and Canada. He finished 
his undergraduate degree at Al Azhar and at the American University of Cairo. He got his graduate 
degrees from McGill University in 1968 by writing his PhD thesis on the genesis of the rational 
theological thinking of the Egyptian Muslim thinker, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). Nasution 
proclaimed himself as a modern Mu’tazilite thinker.  
 84 
Indonesia (Afendi 2010). Through Harun’s Islamic educational reform initiatives, 
Sufism is no longer seen as an area of study accessible only to the chosen few but a 
subject of scientific inquiry open to everyone and not immune from critical 
evaluation. His initiative led to a growing interest in Sufism as a philosophical or 
theosophical discourse among the general academic community. This reform has 
also had long-term consequences in a sense that Sufism is currently no longer a 
foreign subject on Islamic university campuses across Indonesia. Moreover, 
Harun’s personal devotion to Sufism also demonstrates that Islamic rationalism and 
mysticism are not mutually exclusive.70  
All these gradual processes of educational reform in Islamic universities 
pave the way for incorporating Sufism into university curriculum. Unlike  in the 
past when canonical works of Sufi masters such as Ibn Athaillah’s Al Hikam and 
Al Ghazali’s Ihya Ulumuddin were restricted only to those who had achieved 
certain level of Islamic knowledge, contemporary Sufism has become part of 
university curriculum and is systematically studied as part of the Islamic 
intellectual tradition. Sufism as a philosophical discourse is now widely accessible 
to many students in a completely different academic environment, which is urban, 
critical, and modern.  
Islamic consciousness with Sufi inclination among academic community is 
also a result of the changing nature of student activism on secular university 
campuses across Indonesia. This changing nature of student activism had closely to 
do with two important developments within secular university campuses across 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 He became a devout Sufi practitioner in late 1980s after being initiated by Abah Anom (1915-
2011), a prominent Sufi master living in Tasikmalaya, West Java.  
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Indonesia. First, the New Order’s de-politicisation policy to silence dissenting 
opinion and to weaken campus-based popular resistance directly contributed to the 
decline of leftist and secular-nationalist ideologies in the secular university 
campuses across Indonesia. The 1974 Malari incident and NKK/BKK policy that 
followed dramatically changed resistance strategies from street demonstrations to 
Islamic preaching and learning activities.71 Under an oppressive environment, these 
changing strategies were characterised by a shift in orientation from overtly 
political to covertly pious activism among university student activists with 
university mosques as their center stage. This paved the way  for deepening 
Islamisation at secular university campuses  across Indonesia.  
Islamisation and pious activism at secular university campuses involved 
many players and organisations. Among others, DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia/Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation), an Islamic organisation 
established by some former prominent Muslim politicians, played a significant role 
in facilitating Islamisation in secular universities through the 1970s. By sponsoring 
religious training and providing scholarships for student activists, DDII helped to 
establish a nationwide network of student activists with a strong Islamic orientation. 
At first glance, this student activism appears to be replicating Islamist ideals as 
previously represented by Masyumi, the predeccessor of DDII. Through personal 
connection between Muhammad Nastsir and Saudi-funded World Islamic League, 
DDII also created the precondition for the acceptance of Salafi ideas among 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Malari is an Indonesian acronym for ‘Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari’ (15 January Tragedy). It 
refers to a mass riot that took place in Jakarta on 15 January 1974 to protest the state official visit of 
Japanese Prime Minister, Kakue Tanaka. Whereas NKK/BKK (Normalisasi Kehidupan 
Kampus/Badan Kordinasi Kampus) is a policy issued by Minister of Education, Daud Jusuf, to 
supress student political activities at university campuses throughout Indonesia.  
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Muslim student activists  at secular universities across Indonesia (Hasan 2002, 36). 
However, this new generation of pious Muslims with higher educational 
background actually embraced more diverse religious outlooks. Islamisation on 
university campuses therefore led to a new  Islamic consciousness that was neither 
Islamist in political outlook nor Salafist in religious conviction. Among student 
activists affiliated to the tarbiyah movement, a campus-based student activism 
inspired by Egyptian Ikhwanul Muslim (Muslim Brotherhood), for instance, there 
are some who also adopted the Sufi teachings of Hasan al Banna  (Machmudi 
2008).  
Second, the changing nature of student activism also had to do with the 
changing social background of those attending secular university campuses. The 
New Order’s economic development enabled people from diverse socio-religious 
backgrounds to attend universities. Unlike the previous era when the number of 
universities were limited, the oil boom in the 1970s widened this access as the 
government established and opened more public universities in provincial capitals 
and district towns. The number of universities grew further as the private sector 
founded their own universities in the 1980s. The growing number of possibilities 
for university education resulted not only  in a large number of university students 
but also social mobility as university graduates coming from diverse social 
backgrounds sought professional expertise in the modern economic sector.  
The New Order’s policies greatly affected rural and NU communities. 
Unlike the previous era when secular higher education was only accessible to a 
privileged few especially those coming from aristocratic and urban background, the 
opening of public and private universities generated a growing number of 
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university students coming from Muslim communities. Following the 
Muhammadiyah community which had stepped forward in higher education, there 
was a growing number of those coming from rural NU communities enrolling and 
graduating from universities. This number grew significantly after mid 1980s when 
NU officially declared its political support to the ruling regime.72  
Many of university students coming from an NU and Muhammadiyah 
background then played a significant role in the dynamics of student activism at 
secular universities through their involvement in extra campus organisations such 
as HMI (Islamic Student Association), PMII (Indonesia Muslim Student 
Movement), and KAMMI (Indonesia Muslim Student Action Front).73 While there 
was a growing number of Muslim student activists increasingly exposed to 
transnational Salafi and Islamist ideas, those who committed to Indonesian Islamic 
tradition remained large in number. Former Muslim student activists who took up 
academic and political positions in the 1980s and 1990s were relatively open-
minded toward Sufi religious expressions. It is not a coincidence that Mustafa 
Mas’ud and Firdaus Wajdi, two of the first propagators of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in 
Indonesia, had a strong background in student activism in the late 1960s and early 
1970s through their affiliation to PMII and HMI respectively. The combination of 
diverse social backgrounds and diminishing ideological divergence thus leads to a 
student activism that was no longer sharply demarcated along social class and 
ideological lines. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!72!The 1926 khittah as proclaimed during the NU national conference in Situbondo in 1984!
73 Though NU and Muhammadiyah remain the two largest Muslim groups in Indonesia, a growing 
number of new Muslims groups have emerged and flourished, some of which are splinter groups of 
NU or Muhammadiyah. Other groups such as HTI and Tarbiyah movement attract young Muslim 
followers who are disillusioned with mainstream religious organisations.  !
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3.3 Religious Commodification and Site of Consumption 
Sufi resurgence in contemporary Indonesia cannot be understood simply as 
a religious phenomenon. It is closely related to the considerable improvement of 
living standards of the Muslim population in Indonesia. Economic development 
has given rise to a new Muslim middle-class with a cosmopolitan lifestyle 
characterised by unabashed consumerism (Fealy and White 2008a, Hasan 2009, 
229-250). Economic development also facilitates the marketisation and 
commodification of various Islamic products, while education improves literacy 
and comprehension of Islamic symbols. Religiosity is increasingly dictated by 
considerations such as pleasure and fun to meet post-material needs. A combining 
factor of high educational background and wealthy status thus lead people to 
approach religion in the same way as they do with consumer goods. As people 
nowadays understand and practice it, religion is definitely not a consumer product, 
but a consumer culture with contemporary capitalist influences (Hiariej 2009, 
Rudnyckyj 2009). Under this general improvement of economic condition and 
market liberalisation that followed, popularity of both Sufi falsafi and Sufi amali 
among urban Muslims marks adaptability of Sufism to meet changing the religious 
needs of modern people.  
Moreover, nowadays, Islamic propagation no longer relies on direct contact; 
instead, modern media outlets and elaborate marketing strategy will determine the 
success or failure of religious propagation. Good packaging and intrinsic high 
quality of the product are a must for a successful propagating mission to reach the 
hearts and minds of Indonesian Muslims. In an economic sense, Sufi religiosity is 
thus a matter of consumeristic desire expressed in different sites of consumption: 
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Islamic books, Islamic healing, mosque and praying house, art and music, fashion, 
and travelling and tourism. It is through them that Indonesian Muslims satisfy and 
express their newly found religiosity. Altogether they have facilitated the 
dissemination of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia from the late 1990s.  
 
3.3.1 Islamic Books 
Sufism has been known through Islamic books that are currently available 
and easily accessible in bookstores throughout Indonesia. Islamic books are 
currently very popular as they satisfy consumers’ desire for religious products as 
well as offering practical solutions to, advice and guidance on problems in daily 
life. Practical solutions range from reciting certain surah of the Quran, performing 
dzikir, formulae of daily prayers, to other supererogatory rituals (amalan sunnah). 
Sufi self-help books often contain popular psychological topics, Islamic healing 
methods (thibbun nabawi) and healthy foods.  
For instance, the popular psychological topics commonly identify the 
source of all human problems as the tendency to follow ego (nafs). Preoccupation 
with ego (nafs) gives rise to arrogance, greed, hypocrisy, stinginess, and excessive 
love of the world (hubuddunya) that eventually leads to psychological and physical 
problems. To achieve real inner peace, Sufi self-help books prescribe initiating 
every action with a good intention by reciting bismillah (in the name of God), 
maintaining silent dzikir in every breath one take and reciting istighfar (to ask for 
forgiveness) for any mistakes or sins. The purpose of this method is to change an 
individual’s mindset and behavior so that every action becomes a meaningful 
 90 
expression of total devotion. Fighting the demands of the ego, therefore, is in fact 
an umbrella topic in most of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s self-help books. 
Self-help advice also touches upon other practical matters such as healing 
and halal food recipes. In Terapi Alamiah –a book translated and published by 
Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia in 2008– Sheikh Nazim identified more than 100 
different health problems/diseases that could be cured through natural or herbal 
treatments. Self-help book puts great emphasis on how to provide food properly in 
accordance to shariah prescriptions. These books, as suggested by Reynolds, do 
not only deal with the legal aspect of food but also integrate dietary habits “into the 
whole daily-life of the disciples which must be a nourishing routine of spiritual 
training” (2000, 198). For instance, in Secrets of Heavenly Food and Heavenly 
Foods, two self-help books written by Sheikh Nazim’s wife and are popular among 
the disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Jakarta, deals with cooking guide, dietary 
habits, and Islamic foods. These kinds of book not only prescribe food menus but 
also good etiquette or adab by advising reader to recite basmallah while preparing 
to serve foods.  
Smoking is another important health issue that Sufi books of the self-help 
genre deal with. In No Smoking: Merokok Akar Semua Masalah for example, 
Sheikh Nazim said that smoking leads people astray. He relates smoking habit to 
people’s inability to control their own ego; therefore he strongly discourages 
smoking, quoting his master’s narrative that identifies tobacco as the devil’s tree 
which is not worth touching, let alone consuming. In the book, Sheikh Nazim 
rhetorically said that, 
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“Smoking for a believer is something like letting a small hole to be used by a thief. 
While you have already closed all doors for committing big sin, it would be 
meaningless so long as you let the small door remain open…” 
 
Furthermore, Sufi books attract a large number of readers because they are 
entertaining, using as illustrations stories of extraordinary piety, wisdom, 
asceticism, miracles, humor, and even satire which are absent in the standard fiqh-
oriented Islamic books. Sufi books telling stories of angels, demons, the miracles 
of the Prophet and great saints, paradise, hell, the after-life, and death mystery have 
become a source of leisure and entertainment.   
Islamic books on spiritual healing are also instrumental in introducing 
Sufism to Indonesian Muslims. It refers to a method of healing that puts emphasis 
on the strength of prayer and ritual for curing physical health problems. 74 
Muhammad Salahuddin’s book, entitled ‘Mystic Healing: Panduan Praktis 
Menjadi Penyembuh dengan Pendekatan Spiritual dan Bekam’, is perhaps the best 
example of how Naqshbandi-Haqqani is introduced to the general public through 
healing. Published in 2006 by Hikmah publisher (an affiliate of Mizan publisher), 
as the title suggests, this book offers a practical guide to apply bekam and rukyah 
as an alternative healing method for any health problems. According to Salahuddin, 
medicine or syifa for any health problems could be obtained by combining ruqyah 
and shodaqoh (charity act) through the intermediary of Sufi saints.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Sufism became known among urban Muslims through the work of Abah Anom, an alternative 
healer and Naqshbandi Qadiri’s Sufi master of Pesantren Suralaya who was known for his Inabah – 
a healing method applied for curing drug addicts. During his lifetime, Abah Anom established more 
than 20 Pondok Inabah throughout Indonesia for helping those diagnosed of drug -related problems.  
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Sufi books on health and healing based on a person’s account and testimony 
about their spiritual experiences during the healing process are another way of 
introducing Sufism to the populace. One of these books is Amin Syukur’s Zikir 
Menyembuhkan Kanker (Reciting God invocation cures my cancer), which was 
published in 2007 by Hikmah publisher. Amin Syukur is a Professor of Islamic 
Studies at Walisongo Islamic State University in Semarang who suffered cancer 
but survived. As the title suggested, Amin shared his personal account and 
testimony regarding his struggle against and triumph over cancer. In short, Islamic 
books and their popularity play a part in promoting and introducing Sufism to the 
general public.  
 
3.3.2 Mosque and Praying House 
The Muslim worshipping places consist of mosques and other smaller 
praying houses such as mushola and langgar which are not used for Friday prayer. 
Mosque, as commonly understood, is a worshipping place where obligatory prayers 
is conducted regularly. It is also a place where communal prayer involving a large 
number of Muslims is carried out weekly/annually. Ridwan al-Makassary and 
Ahmad Gaus (2010), through their studies of mosques in Jakarta and Solo, show 
that mosques have become very important in recent years because they are a site of 
contestation among different religious groups with contrasting religious outlook. 
The mosque is also a site of consumption because the Friday sermon is often used 
for the quest for material incentives (Muzakki 2010, 67-82).  
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Complementing the previous study, the case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
reveals that mosque is a site of contestation as well as of consumption because 
access to and controlling over mosque has to do with social economic status. 
Mosque is now more than just a worshipping place. It serves as a public place 
where certain Islamic beliefs and doctrines are transmitted, obligatory and 
superregatory rituals  are performed, and religious symbols are displayed. A 
mosque running successfully  relies on the financial support of its regular attendees. 
By building and providing a mosque with financial support have become a 
consuming habit among wealthy Muslims in Indonesia. Changes in religious 
preferences of the financial supporter would eventually influence not only 
mosque’s organising committee but also other regular attendees.  
Of the 731,776 worshipping places registered with the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs in 2004, there are 643,832 Muslim worshipping places 
throughout Indonesia. Though an exact figure is not available, there is growing 
number of mosques and praying houses which are built or financially supported by 
wealthy Muslims. Financial patronage enables to change ritual habit and religious 
preferences practiced in mosque and praying house. The story of Sunarto and 
Sutono Joyosuparto, two senior Naqshbandi-Haqqani disciples, is indicative of the 
relationship of mosque, economic patronage, and Sufi religiosity.  
Since the early 2000s, Soenarto has donated a large amount of money to 
buy land for the construction of a mosque. For instance, he  donated a large amount 
of money to build a mosque in Sukabumi, West Java. The mosque itself is part of a 
large boarding school complex of Pesantren Darus Syifa al Fitrat that he also 
financially supported. He also built and donated a large building complex as a 
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retreat centre for conducting seclusion (suluk) in Cikereteg, Bogor. It is part of his 
villa used for family vacation. The construction of this retreat center was completed 
in December 2003, costing a total of Rp 2.3 billion.75 Relating to what he had done, 
he said as follows: 
“As a businessman, I have been through a hardship and success many times. While 
I used to ask for more from God, it is time to give back in His path. I am happy 
with what I have right now. I felt grateful that I spend a lot to build the mosque 
and school.” 
 
Another devout disciple, Sutono Joyosuparto, also shared a similar experience. 
Donating a piece of land in his hometown, Kuningan, West Java, he built a mosque 
that could cater up to 250 people. He was once a succesful architect who, after 
retirement, had more than enough to live on. He donated the land and built a 
mosque on it soon after visiting Sheikh Hisham in the USA in early 2000s.76 
On the surface, it is an act of piety in the hope for spiritual reward, but 
fulfilling material needs and desire is also a driving force behind his pious act. 
Financial support enables both Sunarto and Sutono Joyosuparto to dictate what 
kind of rituals would be conducted in the mosque. According to Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s sources, KH Ece Supriyatna, Imam of the mosque who is also leader of 
Pesantren Darus Syifa al Fitrat was at first not a Sufi follower. Some of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Jakarta described him as an educated person 
with Salafi inclination. Generous donations from the Sunarto family certainly play 
a part in his decision to join Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Nowadays, dzikir is part of the 
daily religious praxis in the mosque. Similarly, dzikir has been conducted on a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Interview with Abdurrauf Kurniadi, 30 September 2010 
76 Interview with Sutono Joyosuparto, 14 August 2010 
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regular basis in mosque donated and built by the Sutono family in Kuningan, West 
Java. 
 
3.3.3 Popular Music  
Music has been playing an important role in the transmission of Islamic 
traditions. The use of dance and music represents a deliberate effort to propagate 
Sufism not only as a complex theological, doctrinal and philosophical teaching but 
also an enjoyable communal festivity (Peterson 2008, 271-295). It is not 
uncommon that Sufi communal ritual includes art and music performances (Geertz 
1960).  The new styles and consumption patterns in music have to do with the 
current making of public sphere and youth culture (Sutton 2011, 212).  
Art and music performance is part of the entertainment industry through 
which Indonesian Muslims get to know about Sufism and Sufi materials. Sufi 
themes spread to general audience and can be found in song lyrics produced by 
well-known music bands or famous individual performer. Popular cultural 
expression of contemporary Islam appears in various cultural products such as 
audiocassettes, CDs and DVDs and is manifested in form of religious musical 
albums (album religi) and movies. There are three that are worth to mention: 
Haddad Alwi’s and Sulis’ Cinta Rasul, Laskar Cinta of Dewa 19, and Opick’s 
religious songs.  
Cinta Rasul (Love the Prophet) is a musical album recorded and distributed 
by Sony BMG in 1999. It is the most successful religious album ever made in 
Indonesia, with a record of 1.3 million copies sold. It contained eight sholawat 
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songs by Haddad Alwi and Sulistyowati. Haddad Alwi is of Sayyid Hadhrami 
background, while Sulistyowati (aka Sulis as she is known to her fans), was only 
nine years old then. This musical album is a good example of how the Islamic 
message is marketed as a popular cultural product. The album contains religious 
songs that emphasize the importance of loving the Prophet and one’s parents, two 
traditional religious themes popular among Sufi adherents. 
The Laskar Cinta (Warriors of Love) is a musical album launched in 2004. 
This musical album consisted of 12 songs written by Ahmad Dhani, the founder 
and lead vocalist of Dewa 19, a popular rock band in Indonesia The musical album 
has a strong Sufi flavour with lyrics inspired by various prominent Sufi figures 
(Wahyudi 2007). The title ‘Laskar Cinta’ itself was intended as a counter message 
to ‘Laskar Jihad’ which was notorious for its violent activism in Moluccas (Hasan 
2002, 145-169). The Laskar Cinta sold almost a half million copies and attracted 
strong criticism from some Muslim activists and groups such as Ridwan Saidi, FPI, 
and FUI on the grounds that it delivered deviant teachings.  
Meanwhile, Opick’s religious songs are attributed to a contemporary 
famous Indonesian performer, Opick, a nickname for Ainur Rofiq lil Fairdaus. He 
was born in Jember on 16 March 1974, and started his career as an entertainer and 
performer by launching a musical album entitled Istighfar in 2005. This musical 
album sold more than 800,000 copies and became one of the best selling Islamic 
albums in Indonesia. Unlike Ahmad Dhani who focuses on a rock musical genre, 
Opick has gained fame through his brand image as a singer of lagu ruhani 
(spiritual songs).77 His ‘Best of Opick’ album launched in 2011 included Islamic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 His first album, Istighfar, became a hit in 2005 and received double platinum with a total of 
300,000 copies sold.   
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songs with a strong Sufi message such as Tombo Ati, Rumput Bertasbih, and Shollu 
Ala Muhammad.78 
While Hadad Alwi’s and Opick’s songs share traditional Sufi messages on 
the importance of loving the Prophet and the need for remembrance of God, 
Ahmad Dhani’s songs cite universal love and humanity. Through his songs, 
Ahmad Dhani also expresses admiration for some controversial Sufi figures such 
as Al Hallaj, Bayazid al Bistami, Jalaludin Rumi, and Ibn Arabi.79 Song lyrics, 
accompanying music and the controversies they aroused introduced popular Sufism 
to lay Muslims in a way that was unimaginable before. Islam gained currency in 
determining Indonesian popular music (Sutton 2011). In the larger context, art and 
music represent contemporary popular culture that facilitates the shaping of 
Muslim piety among the middle- class in urban areas (Heryanto 2011, 60-82). 
 
3.3.4 Fashion 
 Fashion is another site of consumption through which Indonesian Muslims 
find their way to Sufism. Fashion refers to any popular styles worn or attached as 
bodily accessories. It includes but not exclusively relates to popular styles in 
clothes, shoes, hairstyle, and so forth. In the contemporary world, fashion is not 
only consumer goods, but also an industry and lucrative business that generates 
profit by selling distinct brand image and maintaining exclusive claim of 
authenticity. Sufi groups in general and Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular are 
fashionably attractive because they wear distinctive symbolic goods and 
accessories such as the long gown, turban, walking staff, praying beads, pin logo, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Opick was reported to have been initiated into Naqshbandi-Haqqani in 2011. 
79 Interview with Jerry Marmen, brother-in law of Ahmad Dhani, 18 May 2012 
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ring, tawiz, tooth-stick (siwak), fragrance dupa, and eye-liner (celak). They are also 
known for their distinctive long beards, and the custom of calling their fellow 
devotees sheikh.  
The long gown, turban, tawiz and pin are the most important items of 
clothing. The long gowns are in the style of clothing common in the Middle East. 
Male disciples wear the long gown during communal rituals and public events 
involving the Naqhsbandi-Haqqani community. Similarly, the turban is a head 
covering made from a long piece of cambric that is neatly wrapped up over the 
head. It comes in different colors such as white, green, black, purple or red. Each 
color is worn for a different purpose. Pin is a miniature replica of the Prophet’s 
sandals, whereas tawiz is a logo written in Arabic with the word Allahu Haqq 
embossed on leather and often used as an amulet. The miniature replica of the 
Prophet’s sandal is made of platinum, gold or simply metal attached to the turban 
or the long gown, while the tawiz is worn as a necklace, put in a wallet or hang on a 
wall.  
Before long, all the accessories are available online to buy using credit card 
or international money order. The accessories and their distinct appearance show 
the disciples’ devotion to their master. In fact, Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in 
America develops special websites that function as an online shopping site. There 
are two websites used for this purpose.80 Both websites display various Islamic 
products ranging from books, calligraphy, rings, clothes, fragrance, beads, to other 
accessories. Although deliberately designed as promotional, the products 
themselves are not regarded by the disciples merely as commercial products. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 These two websites are http://www.isn1.net and http://www.paradisenecklaces.com/  
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Instead, the disciples consider buying such products as a pious act. The books 
written by Sheikh Nazim Adel, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and other products, for 
instance, are highly sought after as expression of piety and devotion. 
 
3.3.5 Travelling and Tourism 
Ziarah is a popular religious practice among Indonesian Muslims. It is a 
ritualised practice of visiting graves to show respect and to pray over the dead. This 
practice is believed by Muslims to have the power of conferring divine blessing 
(barakah) on the living, a symbolic pious act to remind the living of the virtues of 
pious Muslims who have passed away (Jamhari 1995, Muhaimin 2006, Christomy 
2008). The practice of ziarah also provides reference to the past and signifies 
ritualised aspects of popular Islam in Indonesia (Fox 1991, 19, 2002, 160).  
Contrary to common understanding that it is just a remnant of an old-
fashioned rural tradition, pilgrimage journey is now a lucrative business. Ziarah is 
also attractive especially for those seeking spiritual retreat and alternative tourism. 
The practice of ziarah allows the urban upper-middle class to express their 
religiosity. The practice of ziarah now resembles travelling and visiting tourist 
destinations. Travelling overseas and visiting domestic tourist destination is a 
leisure activity common among urban people in Indonesia. As recorded by Asniar 
Sahab in a book entitled Anugerah Ilahi: Perjalanan Spiritual Selebriti ke 
Baitullah (Divine Blessing: The Spiritual Journey of Celebrities to Baitullah), 
 100 
performing hajj and umrah in a group by bringing their own guide has become a 
popular trend among celebrities and upper-middle classes in Jakarta. 81     
Muhammad Salahudin (Kang Din) is perhaps the only person in the 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani community who transforms pilgrimage journey into a modern 
consumption habit to express the new religiosity among urban Muslims. At the 
beginning, he only organised a modest ziarah visit to local pilgrimage sites in 
Jakarta and surrounding areas.82 This pilgrimage journey only took a few hours and 
was normally held between midnight and sunrise prayer times. Next, he 
successfully organised ziarah to some well-known pilgrimage sites across Java.  
At least once a year, he organised and led pilgrimage journey to several 
pilgrimage sites such as Sunan Gunungjati/Cirebon, Sheikh Abdul 
Muhyi/Pamijahan, Sheikh Panjalu/Ciamis, Batu tulis/Bogor), Sunan Kalijaga, 
Raden Patah, Sunan Kudus and Sunan Muria, Sunan Ampel/Surabaya, Sunan Giri, 
Sunan Drajat, KH Kholil Bangkalan, Maulana Malik Ibrahim, etc. The journey 
took between 3 and 5 days by using executive bus of 2-2 seats. The costs ranged 
from Rp 1,5 million to 2,5 million or Rp 500,000/day/person and included 
accommodation in 2 or 3 stars hotel. He managed to attract around 25 and 50 
people  for each trip. 
Since 2011, he has begun to organise pilgrimage journeys overseas, visiting 
pilgrimage sites in several countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Turkey and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Asniar Shahab’s book was published by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia in 2001.  
82 In Jakarta and surrounding areas, Kang Din has organised pilgrimage journeys to local pilgrimage 
sites such as the shrine of Habib Husein bin Abubakar Alaydrus/Luar Batang in North Jakarta, 
Habib Kuncung/Kalibata, Habib Ali Abdurrahman al-Habsyi/Kwitang,  and Pangeran 
Jayakarta/Jatinegara. 
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Cyprus.83 From 28 September to 5 October 2011, for instance, Kang Din led a 
pilgrimage journey to Turkey and Cyprus. During his stay in Cyprus, he and his 
entourage made ziarah visit to the tombs of the 7 companions of the Prophet buried 
there and also the shrine of Santo Barnabas in Cyprus. Kang Din also paid visit to 
the then living Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s masters, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani in Lefke, 
Cyprus and Muhammad Adil, Sheikh Nazim’s son and deputy, in Istanbul.  
In Turkey, Kang Din led ziarah to Bursa where several Muslim tombs with 
historical and spiritual connection to Naqshbandi-Haqqani are located, such the 
tomb of Sheikh Sharafudin and Jamaludin al Ghumuqi, the 38th and 35th in the 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s silsilah. This ziarah visit ended with a visit to popular 
tourist destinations such as the Blue Mosque, Hagia Shopia Museum, and Topkapi 
Palace. As shown in the itinerary, this was not purely a ziarah because there was 
also an element of tourism in it.   
The way Muhammad Salahudin promotes the practice of ziarah is 
instructive in understanding how this popular practice has been transformed into a 
new form of brand marketing. He identifies his ziarah visit as Wisata Sufi (Sufi 
Tourism) rather than simply a ziarah. This reflects his inclination to frame ziarah 
as a modern form of spiritual tourism. He offers his ziarah visit either as 
economical or exclusive tour packages with different prices and facilities. Kang 
Din also performs a dual role: a spiritual guide in traditional ziarah as well as a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83  For the complete list of pilgrimage journeys conducted by Muhammad Salahudin, see 
http://www.heavenlyhealingteam.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=featured&Itemid=180 
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tourist guide and travel agent. He would normally book in advance a comfortable 
accommodation and coach for travelling.84  
This tourism element becomes more apparent after Kang Din begins to 
conduct ziarah on a regular basis. This element of tourism indicates that the current 
practice of ziarah indeed has commercial aspects (Quinn 2008, 63-79). Though 
Kang Din flatly denies any economic motive in the ziarah visits he organises, it is 
not difficult to see that he is in the position to make some profit as he is the only 
person who has the experience to arrange overseas and domestic pilgrimage 
journeys regularly. He even acknowledges that he has and will continue to maintain 
a good personal relationship with some travel agents and autobus companies in 
Jakarta for this purpose.85 This sometimes invites criticism from some disciples on 
the basis that ziarah should not be carried out for commercial purposes but because 
of their growing popularity, Kang Din continues to organise these visits. 
In the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community, the practice of ziarah has become a 
signifier of collective identity and cultural fashion because it marks the boundary 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’. As a collective identity marker, the practice of ziarah is 
an outward ritual that distinguishes between the so-called ‘true Salaf’ and ‘fake 
Salaf’. Amid growing hostility toward this popular practice in the name of Islamic 
purification, ziarah is used by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples to identify ‘others’ 
based on the simple criterion of whether they accept and reject this ritual.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 Interview with Muhammad Salahudin, 14 August 2010 
85 Interview with Muhammad Salahudin, 19 November 2010 
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3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined and offered comment on the changing religious 
life in Indonesia in the last 40 years and its impact in generating favourable 
environment for Sufism to flourish among Indonesian Muslims. Urbanisation and 
higher education laid a strong foundation as they opened up opportunities for 
Indonesian Muslims to express their Islamic identity.  Economic improvement and 
an increase in wealthy also paved the way for changing religious preferences as 
urban Muslims came to know about Sufism through indirect and unconventional 
ways. These socio-cultural and economic factors helped to establish a broader 
context through which Sufism was able to gain followers in Indonesia. 
Transnational Sufi transmission in Indonesia is not a sudden or a recent religious 
phenomenon. This process is closely related to state policy and market 
liberalisation that had been implemented since 1980s. The flourishing development 
of Naqshbandi-Haqqani represents a gradual process in a changing religious 
landscape and broader sociocultural transformation that had been taking hold in 
Indonesia during the New Order.  !!!!!!!!!!
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Chapter 4 
E-S U F I S M  A N D  O N L I N E  A C T I V I S M 
Th e  Med i a  and  T echno logy  
 
The information revolution of the late twentieth century, generally subsumed 
under the title of globalization, has both posed dangers and offered new 
opportunities for the Sufi movement in general, and the Naqshbandiyya in 
particular…The most visible among the contemporary Naqshbandi branches, and 
arguably Sufi brotherhoods at large, on the global scene is the Haqqaniya branch 
(Weismann 2007, 166). 
 
Globalisation has had overarching transformational effect within Muslim 
society in which Islamic messages are increasingly disseminated through mediation 
of information and communication technology. The new development of 
information technology has to some extent diminished direct and face-to-face 
transmissions of religious knowledge. Ernst (2003, 4) has suggested that the use of 
mediated communication affects all Islamic groups and that Sufi movements in 
particular has been forced to adapt to this new situation and, in accord with this 
process, have reinterpreted their  teachings to conform to this situation. He has 
further argued that globalisation led to the so-called ‘publication of the secret’, 
referring to media representation of Sufism on the Internet.  
Mediated communication and information technology has generated 
unprecedented situations for the dissemination of Islamic knowledge through 
cyberspace. Islamic preaching is also increasingly transmitted indirectly by way of 
online activism. Bunt (2003, 7) has identified two main Islamic notions currently 
disseminated on the Internet: jihad and fatwa. Furthermore, the Internet has 
“reshaped the boundaries of Muslim networks, created new dialogues, and 
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presented new transaction routes within the Islamic knowledge economy” (Bunt 
2009, 276).  
This chapter will elaborate further Ernst’s and Bunt’s suggestions on the 
influence of globalisation and information technology to the pattern of 
dissemination and transmission of Sufism and their impact in Indonesia. This 
chapter argues that mediated-communication and modern technology (the internet) 
has practically generated e-Sufism and online activism, which are unprecedented in 
the history of Sufi transnational transmission. To support the argument, this chapter 
consists of 4 parts. First, it examines the adoption modern technology and its effect 
in changing strategy of dakwah following growing marginalisation in the USA in 
the late 1990s. Second, it deals with the adoption of information technology and its 
impact in generating E-Sufism. The third part will look at how the Internet 
influences in the making of online activism among Indonesian disciples.  
 
4.1 Information Technology and Change of Transmission Method  
Prior to the 1980s, Naqshbandi-Haqqani was disseminated through 
conventional methods of direct personal contact and the personal preaching effort 
of Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani. This personal contact was made possible through 
patronage relationships, commercial relations, and personal encounters. Among 
Sufi followers, there is a common term that refers to ‘heart-to-heart’ as the 
principal mode of transmission by which Sufi knowledge is passed among close-
knit relations. Afterwards, the dissemination of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings 
took another form of transmission by using modern media and written publications. 
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Indirect transmission brought along and opened new opportunities to reach out to a 
broader audience. It also addressed the limits of space and time that direct personal 
contact inherently had.  
The use of modern media and written publications began with Sheikh 
Nazim Haqqani’s disciples in Western Europe who recorded, published and 
disseminated his sermons in print form. The publication of Mercy Oceans – a 
collection of Abdullah Faiz’s speeches – in 1980 set the path. Since then, disciples 
of Naqshbandi-Haqqani have compiled about 21 books containing numerous 
sohbet given by Sheikh Nazim Haqqani. Until the early 1990s, these publications 
were disseminated on a limited scale. Publications in English increased 
significantly following the migration of Sheikh Hisham to the USA in 1991.  
The Muslim Magazine became the first print media through which Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani endeavoured to reach a broader audience in the USA. During the 
1990s, this periodical had around 20,000 active subscribers.86 When the magazine 
ceased publication in 1999, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani followed his master’s steps by 
writing books and treatises. In total, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has written about 30 
books and Sufi treatises. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s close aides such as G.F. 
Haddad, Hedieh Mirahmadi, and Noorjan Mirahmadi also wrote books elaborating 
on Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings as they received them from their master, 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. Haddad, in particular, was the most prolific writer.  He 
wrote more than 10 books detailing the teachings of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. 
The revolution in information technology in the 1990s changed everything. 
While Sufi materials could only be accessed by very few people and by very !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 Interview with G.F. Haddad, 19 November 2010 
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limited means in the past, they could now easily be reproduced electronically in 
cyber media. Cyberspace thus became one of the primary sites through which Sufi 
teachings are disseminated and where disciples go to seek guidance. The revolution 
in information technology and growing l interest in Sufism have driven some Sufi 
movements to use the Internet as their main preaching media. There are currently 
more than a hundred active websites affiliated with Sufi groups around the world, 
as well as hundreds of websites/blogs affiliated to prominent Sufi masters.87  
Although Naqshbandi-Haqqani is definitely not the only Sufi movement 
using the Internet, it provides a valuable case study on how the use of the Internet 
transforms not only the way Sufi teachings are disseminated but how new meaning 
is given to that ‘googling’ experience. In previous eras, Sufism was a matter of 
active personal quest often achieved through a physical journey, now ‘googling’ 
activities on the Internet fulfill this same function. Initially, googling was a journey 
for those seeking spiritual awareness and searching for a Sufi master. Eventually, 
googling, however, became an act of piety and an expression of respect and 
veneration toward a particular Sufi master. In this regard, the internet has become a 
sacred site to carry-out personal and communal acts of piety.  
Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani, the use of the Internet for the purposes of 
dakwah was not known until 1991 when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani moved to the 
USA. This new creative way of preaching was initiated for the first time by Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani and his disciples in the USA. Yet, at the beginning, the internet !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87  Their activities are also routinely monitored through Alan Godlas’ website 
(http://www.sufinews.org/) which is currently the most representative website reporting Sufi 
activities all over the world.87 Since its first appearance in 2005, the blog has covered more than 
3000 reports worldwide.  
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had a relatively minor role for teaching and preaching purposes. Until 1994, Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani was still preoccupied with the conventional method of Sufi 
transmission (direct, face to face contact). At the time, he was using At Tauhid 
Mosque in San Diego, South California, as his main base for that purpose. To reach 
out to a broader audience, he relied only on the Muslim Magazine, a periodical with 
a few thousand subscribers for which he was chief editor.88 With limited resources 
and media at his disposal, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani could reach out to only a 
handful of loyal disciples.   
The adoption of the Internet began to be seriously managed only after 1994. 
There were four main reasons for this adoption. First, the use of the Internet 
reflected a strong millenarian belief. Because the end of days was imminent, 
propagation of Sufi teachings should be as massive as possible and by any means. 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani repeatedly emphasized that Naqshbandi-Haqqani did not 
only rely on direct personal contact but also on non-physical/indirect contact for 
transmission of its teachings. This was closely related to the so-called “Uwaysi” 
spiritual transmission, a distinct Sufi transmission in which direct personal meeting 
between the master and disciple is considered unnecessary.89 On many occasions 
during fieldwork, many disciples acknowledged that the Internet was their first 
encounter with Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings and with either Sheikh Nazim or 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. They came to believe that finding the Haqqani websites 
did not happen by accident but it was predestined by God. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 Interview with Gibril F. Haddad, 19 November 2010 
89 Uwaysi is attributed to Uways al Qarni, a pious Muslim who lived during the lifetime of the 
Prophet Muhammad but never directly met him.  It was reported that he died during the Battle of 
Shiffin in 657 between Umayyad and Ali ibn Thalib, the Prophet’s son-in law Syria during which 
he supported Ali’s troops. For details about Uwaysi transmission, see 
http://naqshbandi.org/topics/uwaysi.htm    
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Second, the Internet provided a better platform for marketing because it 
helped Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to propagate his mission more broadly. This began 
in 1994 when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani accidentally became involved in an 
electronic debate on a mailinglist affiliated to the Muslim Students Association 
(MSA), an organisation for Muslim students in the US and Canada. The 
circumstances surrounding the debate are not completely clear because the MSA’s 
mailing list where the debate was posted cannot be accessed anymore.90 From the 
materials I have managed to trace, however, the debate occurred on 6 September 
1994 on the MSA’s mailing list between those who were pro and contra Sufi 
teachings. At the beginning, the online encounter only involved members of the 
MSA’s mailinglist. The debate was about Sufism and its position within Islamic 
tradition.  
The debate then led some members on the mailinglist to invite other 
authoritative figures to join the debate. This began when Jawad Ahmed,91 a student 
at the Department of Chemistry and Physical Sciences at the University of 
Maryland, posted a list of questions on the mailinglist. The list of questions was an 
open intellectual challenge raised by Sheikh Muhammad S. Adly, identified as a 
Salafi scholar who happened to be a religious teacher for all of those opposing 
Sufism on the MSA’s mailing list.92 The questions dealt with the definition of 
tasawwuf and legitimate religious basis for such teachings/practices in Islam.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 The debate was reposted on Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s old websites (http://naqshbandi.net) which is 
also currently no longer accessible 
91 ahmed@wam.umd.edu 
92 Sheikh Muhammad S. Adly was described as an Islamic scholar who was an Imam and Director 
of the Islamic Center and Al-Mumeniin Mosque in Columbia, South Carolina. He was also 
described by his supporters as a former religious teacher at the Masjid Al-Haraam in Mecca and a 
former Chairman of Muslim World League. 
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The six questions were: 1). “What is Tasawwuf? Please give a detailed 
definition and explanation of the meaning of this terminology and the word itself?, 
2). Are there any dhaleels (proofs & evidences) from the Quran in regards to 
Tasawwauf? If there are, then please state them explicitly? 3). Are there any 
dhaleels (proofs & evidences) from the Ahadeeths of our Prophet (saw) on 
Tasawwuf and its practices? If there are, then please verify their authenticity and 
state them explicitly? 4).Was our Prophet (saw) a Sufi? If yes, then please give 
vivid evidences from the Quran and the Sunnah only? 5). Did the Prophet (saw) 
practice Sufism or Tasawwuf? If yes, then please give evidence from the Quran and 
Sunnah only? 6). Did the Prophet (saw) tell/order or even recommend this, 
meaning Sufism and Tasawwuf? If yes, then please give us evidences from the 
Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet (saw) only?”  
These questions were referred to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani by one of his 
students (Matteen Shiddique) who was a member of the mailing list. With the help 
of Matteen Shiddique, Sheikh Hisham then posted his written answer on the 
MSA.Net mailing list on 9 September 1994.93 In the course of the debate, Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani elaborated his answer in detail on the undisputable place of 
Sufism within Islam. He also explained the textual basis in the Quran and Hadith of 
this religious practice. Interestingly, he quoted his primary sources mostly from Ibn 
Taymiyya’s Majmu'a Fatawa and al-Mukhtasar al-Fatawa al-Masriyya which was 
the main reference of his opponent. Sheikh Hisham even demonstrated that Ibn 
Taimiyah never completely rejected Sufism, but only certain aspects of Sufism. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Matteen Shiddique is a Pakistani-American US citizen and an engineer who at the time worked at 
Sybase, a well-known software company in the Silicon Valley. He served as the Secretary General 
of As-Sunnah Foundation of America (ASFA).  
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Sheikh Hisham Kabbani gave a detailed answer in which he made a strong defense 
of the legitimate status and textual basis of Sufi practices within the Islamic 
tradition based on Quranic exegesis, the Prophetic tradition and the views of 
previous Muslim scholars.  
The online debate went on for several weeks involving those who were for 
and against Sheikh Hisham. Sheikh Muhammad S. Adly posted no response to 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s lengthy explanation. Those opposed to his position, 
however, continued their personal attack against Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. They 
kept accusing him of being deviant without providing any refutation based on 
authoritative sources. Ignoring the personal attacks, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s 
followers who were members of the mailinglist managed to give the impression 
that Sheikh Muhammad S. Adly was not sincere in posing his questions because he 
failed to offer any response. In the end, perhaps because of Sheikh Hisham’s 
detailed explanation and quotations from many authoritative sources, the subject 
was simply dropped.  
This Internet debate highlighted the internal dynamics and religious 
tensions within the Muslim community in the USA. Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
followers, it was celebrated as a symbolic victory. The debate resonated far beyond 
the internet because it was the first time that comlex questions regarding Sufism 
were answered in great details. The difference was that while previously tensions 
were kept quietly behind mosque walls, after the MSA debate they became public 
for the first time. The 1994 Internet debate, however, brought about technical 
problems that had a short-term impact. There was a story that after the debate, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s internet-connected computers were disrupted by cyber-
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attack and Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers had no doubt that the cyber-attack 
came from those affiliated to Sheikh Muhammad S. Adly’s and his supporters.  
Third, the Internet helped Sheikh Hisham and the Naqhsbandi-Haqqani 
group to compensate for their growing marginalisation among the Muslim 
community in the USA. This growing marginalisation was the result of the massive 
boycott by Muslim organisations in the USA following a public speech given by 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani during an Open Forum at the State Department on 7 
January 1999. In that forum, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani gave a speech entitled 
“Islamic Extremism: A Viable Threat to US National Security”.  
In his speech, he mentioned four points that potentially threatened US 
national security. First, there was a widespread extreme religious ideology in the 
USA.94 Second, there were many Muslim organisations in the USA that adopted 
this extreme ideology and claimed to speak on behalf of the Muslim community. 
Third, the extremists had taken over 80% of the total of more than 3000 mosques in 
the USA. Fourth, because of the extremists’ domination of many Muslim 
organisations and mosques, their extreme religious ideology had spread quickly 
into many segments of Muslim life in the USA.95   
 His outspoken speech revealed the great divide within the Muslim 
community in the USA. According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources, this 
statement derived from the deep disappointment Sheikh Hisham felt toward 
mainstream Muslim organisations in the USA because of their elitist-bureaucratic 
nature and their refusal to absorb different religious opinions from different !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Sheikh Hisham defined Islamic extremism as ‘using religion to label intolerance and use it to 
make a militant movement and disturb the peace around the world’.  
95 http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/media-center/domestic-extremism/63-islamic-extremism-
a-viable-threat-to-us-national-security.html, accessed 10 January 2011 
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Muslim groups, especially the Sufi and traditional Muslim communities that 
Sheikh Hisham claimed to represent.96 There was also a report that Sheikh Hisham 
was prevented from voicing his opinion during an annual conference organised by 
some Muslim organisations.     
The speech sparked strong condemnation from several Muslim 
organisations.97 These Muslim organisations referred to Sheikh Hisham’s statement 
that 80% of mosques in the USA were run by extremists. This condemnation 
eventually led to a joint statement issued on 22 February 1999 by eight Muslim 
organisations – AMPCC (American Muslim Political Coordination Council), AMA 
(American Muslim Alliance), AMC (American Muslim Council), CAIR (Council 
for America-Islam Relations), MPAC (Muslim Public Action Committee), ICNA 
(Islamic Council of North America), ISNA (Islamic Society of North America), 
and MSA (Muslim Student Association) – boycotting Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and 
Naqshandi-Haqqani’s activities in the USA and Canada.98 This boycott prevented 
him from attending and giving speeches in many mosques across the USA. These 
organisations accused Sheikh Hisham Kabbani of putting the Muslim community 
at large in danger of being falsely suspected by the US government security 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Dilshad Fakroddin, a Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers wrote a  detailed story and chronology 
(1991-2000) revealing the relationship between Naqshbandi-Haqqani and other Muslim 
organisations and the dynamics within Muslim community in the USA on 
 http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/bin/site/wrappers/extremism.  
I managed to print out all materials before they were removed from the website.     
97 American Muslim Political Coordination Council (AMPCC), American Muslim Alliance (AMA), 
American Muslim Council (AMC), Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), Muslim Public 
Affairs Council (MPAC), Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) and the Muslim Students 
Association of USA and Canada, and Islamic Society of North America. For details, see: 
http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/0499/9904071.html  
 
98 A short review of the a whole incident was written by Richard H. Curtiss, the editor of the 
Washington report on Middle East Affairs in April/May 1999. For details, see: 
http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/0499/9904071.html  
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agencies. Some went even further in accusing him of being a Zionist agent who 
was attempting to create internal discord.  
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani strongly defended his statement as an early 
warning.  He fought back by asserting that his true motive was in the broad interest 
of the Muslim community in the USA. He claimed that his statement was intended 
to avoid possible future damage to the Muslim community itself.99 Following the 
9/11 tragedy in 2001, Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers hailed the statement as a 
fulfilled prophecy. They referred to the fact that Sheikh Hisham had already 
warned of the danger posed by Osama bin Laden, more than two years before the 
tragedy happened. 100  They blamed mainstream Muslim organisations for 
politicising divergence of opinion and for their unwillingness to listen to Sheikh 
Hisham’s warning.   
Unrelenting attacks directed against Sheikh Hisham and Naqshbandi-
Haqqani led to the launching of the http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org website 
in 1999.101  Unlike other websites, which mostly deal with religious issues, this 
new website contains materials with strong political messages. Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani and his disciples published a lot of materials detailing the inaccuracies and 
false accusations against the statement issued in the State Department Forum. They 
shifted their emphasis from a purely religious debate to the importance of freedom 
of speech and constitutional rights in the US. By posting materials related to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99 For details, see http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/media-center/domestic-extremism/64-
shaykh-kabbanis-response-to-false-allegations-about-state-department-speech.html 
100 In the aftermath of 9/11 tragedy and following intense scrutiny imposed toward Muslim 
community in the USA, the speech was pointed out by Naqhsbandi-Haqqani’s followers as a timely 
and correct warning.  
101 http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/, accessed 13 February 2011 
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1999 Open Forum, Sheikh Hisham and his followers wanted to show the public 
that Sheikh Hisham had a constitutional right to voice his opinion.   
Unlike the 1994 Internet debate, the 1999 State Department Forum, 
however, resulted in more serious repercussions with longer-term implications. In 
the aftermath of the incident, the relationship between Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and 
other mainstream American Muslim organisations was severely damaged leading 
to social exclusion, marginalisation, and even a massive boycott of Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani personally and of the da’wah activities of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the 
USA in general. As a consequence, more dramatic changes in da’wah strategy 
were adopted, making the use of the Internet inevitable and even strategic.  
The electronic encounter on MSA.Net mailing list in 1994 and State 
Department Forum in 1999 therefore became the two turning points in the 
transmission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings in the USA and worldwide. After 
the events, the internet was intentionally adopted for preaching and teaching 
purposes. Through the internet, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani involved himself in 
religious polemics and debates to assert the validity of Sufi traditional teachings in 
particular and Ahl Sunnah wal Jamaah doctrine in general. It was also through the 
internet that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani managed to regain his religious authority as a 
Muslim scholar and Sufi master. 
Fourth, the internet helped Naqshbandi-Haqqani to solve physical and 
spatial problems. These physical and spatial problems had to do with the fact that 
Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was getting older and no longer able to guide his disciples 
directly, especially after he stopped traveling overseas.  In 2001, Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani decided to stay permanently at his home in Lefke, Cyprus. Because of this, 
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the conventional method of dakwah by directly visiting disciples was no longer 
viable.  
The Internet therefore provided practical and strategic solutions to 
maintaining the da’wah activities of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, not only in the USA but 
throughout the world. Until 1999, the use of the Internet mainly served a limited 
audience, especially those who were already Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in the 
USA. Afterwards, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani launched a massive cyber da’wah 
under the banner of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. With the assistance of young internet-
literate Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani created six 
websites (five of them no longer exist) between 1995 and 2001.  
Since the mid-1990s, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has maintained Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s message on various different websites. Currently, there are six websites 
officially affiliated to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. This number excludes numerous 
other unofficial websites created by his disciples. These websites recorded site-
visits ranging from a few hundreds to a few hundred thousand daily. The 
Sufilive.com is the highest in terms of site-visits: it is currently accessed by more 
than 900,000 times each day from around the world. 
 
TABLE 1.1 NAQSHBANDI-HAQQANI'S WEBSITES  
AFFILIATED TO SHEIKH HISYAM KABBANI IN USA 
Website 
 
 
http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org Launched 1999 
http://www.naqshbandi.org  Launched 1997 
http://www.eshaykh.com launched 1 November 2010 
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http://www.sufilive.com Launched mid-2000s 
http://www.youtube.com/sufilive  Launched 2008 
http://www.youtube.com/mercyloveoceans  Launched 12 February 2007 
(3,985,169 site visits) 
http://www.sunnah.org Launched in 1992  
http://www.isn1.net Commercial site 
http://www.paradisenecklaces.com/  Commercial site 
http://www.haqqanisoul.com  
http://www.nurmuhammad.com/  Established by Noorjan 
Mirahmadi 
http://www.sufimeditationcenter.com/  Idem  
http://www.sufilovematch.com  Dating website  
http://www.naqshbandi.net  
http://www.kamilat.org 
http://www.muslimmag.org 
http://www.as-siddiq.org 
http://www.mawlid.net 
 
No longer accessible  
 
Along with these websites, other deputies and representatives in some countries 
also have their own websites. Among these deputies and representatives, the most 
prominent are S. Muhammad Adil, S. Adnan Kabbani, S. Abdul Karim (d. 2012), 
and S. Amerudin. They each manage websites that are dedicated to spreading 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings. 
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TABLE 1.2 NAQSHBANDI-HAQQANI'S WEBSITES 
AFFILIATED TO OTHER DEPUTIES/REPRESENTATIVES 
Affiliation/Location Websites Content  
S. Muhammad Adil  http://www.beforearmageddon.com 
http://www.saltanat.org/ 
 
S. Adnan Kabbani http://www.theholyseal.com/  
Salim E. Spohr http://www.beforearmageddon.com Audio-podcast, 
video and news 
websites 
S. Abdul Karim http://naksibendi.us/ 
http://www.nakshibendi.com 
 
S. Amerudin http://www.alsunnahfoundation.org  
South Africa http://www.naqshbandi.org.za  
Argentine http://www.naqshbandi.com.ar  
Australia http://www.naqshbandi.asn.au  
Canada http://www.naqshbandi.ca/  
Singapore http://sufihub.com/   
Spain http://www.naqshbandi.org.es/  
UK  http://www.haqqaninaqshbandiuk.com/ht
tp://naqshbandi-sheffield.com/ 
 
Germany http://www.sufismus-online.de  
 
The websites created by followers of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and those 
affiliated to him are quite successful in attracting visitors. They have become the 
major instrument for the dissemination of Haqqani’s teachings in the West and 
worldwide.  There are several reasons for the success of these websites. Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani is supported by a creative team who has the technical skills 
needed to create and maintain interesting websites. All the websites affiliated to 
him are regularly  updated with new content both in written and audio-visual form. 
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Sheikh Hisham Kabbani is also able to organise students to write about Sufism and 
spirituality.102 Among other students, Gibril Fouad Haddad is perhaps the most 
prolific one who learnt traditional Islamic subjects in Damascus and Mecca with 
Sayyid Muhammad Alawi al Maliki (d. 2004) and Sayyid Ramadhan al Bouti (d. 
2013).  
Moreover, the umbrella organisations established by Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani to support his activities are quite successful in fundraising. Because of this 
successful fundraising, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani can maintain a relatively high-cost 
online media presence. The thousands of audio-visual presentations on the Sufilive 
and ISCA websites, with many more updated regularly, show the extent of storage 
capacity and sophistication of the server owned by Sheikh Hisham and his team. It 
also gives an indication of the extent of the financial resources at his disposal to 
keep these websites running.          
However, the existence of these numerous websites affiliated to different 
deputies or representatives often results in a degree of contestation over which 
website is to be considered the most authoritative source for representing Sheikh 
Nazim Haqqani and the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings. This contestation is 
often displayed openly on various websites. Each claims that its website is the only 
authoritative source of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings.  Sheikh Hisham Kabbani 
claims that his websites are the most authoritative sources of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s teachings, but Sheikh Abdul Karim and other deputies also make similar 
claims. In this situation of claims and counterclaims, only those with the most 
attractive web-designs tend to attract most people.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!102!These talented followers include Gibril Fouad Haddad, Ali Elsayed, Noorjan Mirahmadi, and 
Hedieh Mirahmadi among others.  !
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4.2 The Internet and E-Sufism  
The use of the Internet serves to project further the personal charisma of the 
Sufi master. Schmidt (2004, 113) argues that Naqshbandi-Haqqani uses the internet 
to help a Sufi master strengthen his ‘natural gift’ and personal charismatic appeal 
among his followers. Elaborating on Schmidt’s argument, the case of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani shows that the internet has even generated an e-Sufism, which is 
unprecedented in the transmission of traditional Sufi teachings.  
The term e-Sufism refers to any kind of Sufi figures, products, teachings, 
knowledge, materials, emotional expressions, ways of devotion, rituals, and 
activities mediated by or found on the internet and deliberately used for 
disseminating, venerating, and preaching purposes. The websites that have brought 
about the creation of this e-Sufism are diverse. They include: e-Bai’at (initiation), 
e-Dzikr (recollection), e-Fatwa, e-Jihad, e-Sohbet (association with the sheikh), e-
Rabitah (focusing on the master’s face), e-Muroqoba (Sufi meditation), and e-
Ziarah (pilgrimage). Each website serves a different purpose.  
The initiation or bai’at is perhaps the most important ritual that every Sufi 
disciple has to go through. It is a formal declaration of allegiance and commitment 
to and before his or her spiritual teacher. Since 2006, Sheikh Nazim has given 
permission for e-bai’at for those aspiring to be his disciple.103 The Naqshbandi 
website gives detailed information on how to do bai’at properly, followed by a 
detailed contact form.104 Next, the website provides a note encouraging anyone !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 Interview with G.F. Haddad, 19 November 2010 
104 For e-bai’at, see http://naqshbandi.org/about/baya.htm  
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who takes e-bai’at to renew it once he or she meets Sheikh Nazim Adel or his 
deputy in person. The same website also provides complete ritual guidance (daily 
prayers and protocols) that have to be performed as routine religious obligations.   
Sufilive and ISCA websites that contain audio/video recordings and live TV 
broadcasts of Sheikh Nazim Adel and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani are sites where 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples have the opportunity to carryout e-Sohbet as part 
of their daily devotion. Both websites are highly venerated as proven by more than 
900,000 sitevisits per day. E-Sohbet is increasingly popular and perhaps has 
become a reasonable solution to address the problem of time and space without 
losing the essence of Sohbet itself, whose object is to be as close as possible to the 
guiding Sheikh. Until now, both websites have more than 5000 audio/video 
recordings of Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani.  
Followers are encouraged to regularly visit the websites as a way of 
carrying out e-Rabithah by looking at the picture of the Sheikh, keeping in touch 
with and receiving the ever-flowing blessing (barakah) from both Sheikh Nazim 
and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. Video recordings are sometimes used to strengthen 
the charisma of the master. Thus, watching e-Suhba on the Sufilive for many 
disciples is no longer an entertaining activity to be taken lightly. Instead, it 
becomes a ritual with certain adab (etiquette) to follow just as though the Sheikh 
himself were actually there in person.  
On 19 December 2010 for instance, news spread among Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples following a video recording on Sufilive that showed visitors 
from Chile who had come to show their gratitude to Sheikh Nazim for helping 
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them. The video was related to the use of tawiz and its miraculous effects for its 
users. Sheikh Nazim al Haqqani, through one of his disciples in Chile, reportedly 
gave the tawiz for protection to the miners who were trapped underground at the 
mining site in Chile.105  
The Internet has also become a site through which disciples establish 
intimate relationships, seek guidance and ask for counsel and through which the 
master performs his role as a spiritual guide. The Sunnah and Eshaykh websites 
address the daily concerns of disciples on family issues, health, and gender 
relations. They are also sites where the master explains matters of doctrine and 
shariah provisions to disciples. More importantly, the websites provide interactive 
communication between the master and his disciples in the form of Questions and 
Answers. This Q&A interaction is definitive and final; therefore, the websites 
include e-Fatwa telling the disciples what to do and what not to do based on 
shariah prescriptions. The websites also offer e-Jihad, not to promote violence or 
wage a campaign of cyber-terror (hacking or cracking), but instead to emphasize 
the importance of carrying out the greater Jihad (tadzkiyah an-nafs) rather than the 
lesser Jihad (holy war). The websites affirm the legitimacy of Ahlus Sunnah wal 
Jamaah in general and Sufism in particular within Islamic tradition and also 
condemn religious views, particularly Wahabism, which is regarded as a false 
doctrine that violates Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah’s orthodox stance.       
Some video recordings show Sheikh Nazim or Sheikh Hisham opening and 
kissing a box containing the hair of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) followed by 
their disciples. To distant disciples, these recordings and devotion resemble a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 http://sufilive.com/interview_with_chilean_miners_part_1-3014.html, accessed 15 March 2011 
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pilgrimage that is mediated electronically. This kind of mediated pilgrimage can 
also be seen when a distant disciple attentively reads on the websites about the 
pious acts and miraculous power (karamah) of every single Naqshbandi’s golden 
chain masters. This e-pilgrimage is repeatedly shown during special months of the 
Islamic calendar such as Rajab, Muharram, Rabi’ul Awal, and Sya’ban.  
Noorjan Mirahmadi (a Western convert living in Vancouver, Canada) 
created two websites containing materials related to e-Muroqoba, a complete 
guidance on Sufi meditational techniques. 106 These websites are dedicated to 
Sheikh Nazim Adel and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. The websites provide practical 
guidance in the form of pictures and video recordings for conducting Sufi 
meditation but also give the philosophical and theological basis of these practices. 
The websites are quite popular in Indonesia especially among young Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples. However, the websites have also sparked controversy, 
allegedly because they openly display and elaborate ‘the so-called secret of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings and beliefs’ which seems contrary to its orthodox 
standing on shariah. This is one reason that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani instructed the 
creator of these sites to move from the USA to Canada in 2006.       
However, the adoption of the Internet was not as smooth as might seem. It 
was not always considered acceptable to present Sufi materials so openly to the 
public, especially to those who were not initiated. Using the internet for preaching 
purposes has led to Naqshbandi-Haqqani adapting to a more open environment and 
revealing all its teachings, which have previously been kept secret or shared only 
among the most advanced students. The ‘publication of the secret’ as suggested by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 These two websites are http://nurmuhammad.com and http://sufimeditationcenter.com  
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Ernst, about Nur Muhammad (Muhammad’s light), unseen worlds, and miraculous 
powers led to accusation that Haqqani held heretic beliefs. It was only after Sheikh 
Nazim Adel gave his permission that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani went ahead with his 
efforts to reveal all the secrets of Naqshbandi’s teachings. Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
disciples described Sheikh Nazim Adel and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani as masters 
who are not stingy in sharing their knowledge because they were willing to impart 
everything they knew to their disciples. 
 
4.3 Online Activism and Youth Culture in Indonesia 
Information technology (IT) plays a significant role for Sufi resurgence in 
Indonesia. It directly related to dramatic improvement in and increasing access to 
the Internet in the 1990s. This particularly coincided with the ‘internet fever’ that 
was widespread Indonesia for the first time around 1995. The booming demand for 
the internet services, especially among young urbanites, emerged when a private 
Internet Service Provider (RADNET) began to offer subscriptions for private 
customers in Jakarta (Hill and Sen 1997, 69-72). This contributed to dramatic 
increase of the number of Internet subscribers from less than 25,000 to 400,000 
between 1995 and 2000. While Sen and Hill (2005) demonstrate the effect of this 
new technology in driving democratisation in Indonesia, other scholars focus on 
the role of the internet in shaping Islamic identity, radical activism, and online 
proselytization (Brauchler 2003, 123-151, Lim 2005, Hosen 2008, 159-173). This 
has opened new opportunity spaces for growing interest in global spiritual 
marketplace.  
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Naqshbandi-Haqqani is one of the first beneficiaries of this new 
technological trend because it facilitates Sufi propagation at an unprecedented scale. 
Technological advancement enables direct personal contacts with Sufi masters 
overseas. Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s massive presence on the web attracted 
Indonesians literate enough in information technology and the use of the Internet to 
actively seek direct contact. It gained an initial Internet audience as early as 1994 
among Indonesian urban youth, especially university students in Jakarta.107 They 
were particularly interested in accessing Sufi materials on two Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s websites.108 It can even be said that Naqshbandi-Haqqani was known for 
the first time through googling activities.109 The role of the Internet and its 
concomitantly emerging youth culture are thus pivotal factor in the early 
transmission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia.  
Robinson (1993, 231) argued that mass literacy and education, as well as 
technological advancement result in forms of religious transmission that are more 
abstract and intellectual. Despite the early influence of the Internet in the 
dissemination of Naqshbandi-Haqqani materials in Indonesia in the late 1990s, the 
use of the internet for preaching purposes came relatively late. In fact, the 
widespread use of the internet for Sufi propagation in Indonesia did not develop 
until at least 2005. The use of the Internet for Sufi propagation in Indonesia departs 
from three related factors, technological advancement, IT-literacy and growing 
number of young disciples who join the movement. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Interview with Faried Bubhi Djamirin, 28 December 2010 
108 http://www.naqshbandi.net and http://www.sunnah.org 
109 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010 
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In the beginning of his mission in Indonesia, Sheikh Hisham encouraged his 
disciples to regularly access websites run by his student in the USA.110 While he 
did not visit his followers regularly yet, online materials became a source of 
reference and even the only authoritative source of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
teachings. Sheikh Hisham justifies the internet-mediated communication through 
his emphasis on the so-called Uwaysi chain of transmission adhered by 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, who wrote short 
biographies of all Naqshbandi’s masters, pointed out that Uwaysi referred to the 
way in which Sufi teachings were taught not only by physical contact but also, 
more importantly, through the spiritual presence of long-gone masters.111 This non-
physical contact is attributed to the figure of Uways al Qarni, a companion who 
allegedly never met the Prophet Muhammad directly during his lifetime.  
Young disciples regard the Internet with its interactive nature as an 
attractive media for disseminating Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s written materials. In fact, 
it is these young disciples who maintain all websites and blogs related to 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. The massive use of the Internet thus represents 
emerging youth culture in a sense that the internet becomes creative sites where 
young disciples can express their Sufi affiliation and religiosity. Moreover, the use 
of the internet for Islamic propagation represents a form of online activism and 
gives expression to religious identity among young Indonesian Muslims (Brauchler 
2003, 123-151, Lim 2005). The difference is that such online activism does not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010 
111 Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources further make clear that most of the Naqshbandi’s masters are 
Sheikh of the two wings (dhul janahain) of spiritual descent because beside direct/physical descent, 
they also recognize  non-physical contact for spiritual transmission or Uwaysi (Kabbani 2004c, 66-
68). 
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uphold radical ideas, as previously represented by some Muslim groups in 
Indonesia. 
There are currently around 27 websites and blogs managed by Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia. They display the most update sohbet of Sheik 
Nazim and Hisham Kabbani, as well as disseminating Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
materials and other information regarding Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities. They 
include pictures, videos, online advice/consultation, and schedules of local 
activities conducted by each zawiya, providing update information regarding the 
travel plans of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and his entourage in Indonesia. These 
numerous websites/blogs are also used for communication among fellow disciples. 
They also facilitate and help to guide an expanding cohort of disciples across 
Indonesia. These websites and blog are important because they provide translated 
materials that Indonesian followers can access in the vernacular language.  
 
TABLE!1.3!WEBSITES/BLOGS!AFFILIATED!TO!NAQSHBANDI7HAQQANI!IN!INDONESIA!
Affiliation Address of Websites Type 
Fornaqsda http://www.madadulhaqq.net/  
http://www.kampungsholawat.net  
Website 
Rumi Café  http://www.caferumijakarta.com/  Idem 
Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia http://naqsybandi.org/     Idem  
Rabbani Cinere http://www.haqqanirabbani.asia/  idem  
Yayasan Haqqani Batam http://naqshbandibatam.org/  Idem 
HHT http://www.heavenlyhealingteam.org  Idem 
 http://indonesiazawiyah.blogspot.com.au/ Free Blog  
 128 
 www.naqsybandi.web.id/ Idem 
 http://haqqaniindonesia.blogspot.com/  Idem 
 http://haqqani7007id.wordpress.com/ Idem 
 http://eshaykh7007.wordpress.com/ Idem 
 http://nationalgathering.blogspot.com Idem 
YBS/HHT http://heavenlyhealingteam.blogspot.com/  Idem 
Pondok Rumi (Arif Hamdani) http://mevlanasufi.blogspot.com Idem 
Arif Hamdani http://naqshbandihaqqani.blogspot.com/ Idem 
Zawiyah Pakanbaru http://haqqanipekanbaru.blogspot.com/ Idem 
Zawiyah Bandung http://muhibbunbandung.wordpress.com/ Idem 
Balikpapan http://zawiya.wordpress.com/activities/ Idem 
Balikpapan http://www.zawiya-balikpapan.org/    Idem 
 http://wiridnaqsybandi.blogspot.com/  Idem 
 http://indonesiasufi.blogspot.com   Idem 
 http://perpushaqqani.blogspot.com  Idem 
 http://abuahsan.blogspot.com   Idem 
 http://naqshbandiyun.blogspot.com   Idem 
 http://ariefhamdani.blogspot.com    Idem  
 http://syekhkabbani.blogspot.com  Idem  
 
Table 4.4 shows that many affiliates of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia maintain 
their presence on the Internet either in the form of subscribed domain websites or 
free-of-charge blogs. Yet, of 27 websites/blogs managed by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
 129 
disciples in Indonesia, there are only a few which can sustain their presence on the 
Internet.  
The relationship between technological advancement and youth culture can 
be seen in the massive use of social media. In fact, social media are becoming 
increasingly popular for exchanging information on Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
teachings and activities in Indonesia. The Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in 
Indonesia uses a free email service provider of yahoo and maintains its presence on 
social media such as Twitter, BBM Group, and Facebook.112 The community also 
provides a Short Message Service (SMS) in Jakarta.113 The mailinglist and social 
media function mainly in updating recent sohbet given by Sheikh Nazim and 
Hisham Kabbani, disseminating announcements of recent dzikir activities, and 
delivering short messages from the two masters. Though the number registered in 
the mailing list and social media account is far less than the actual number of 
disciples in Indonesia, social media plays a significant role in transmitting the 
master’s teachings.  
However, there are also several technical problems regarding the use of the 
Internet among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia, such as technical 
problems of accessibility and network coverage, and financing. Most Internet users 
in Indonesia access this service on a time basis and this result in a costly service 
that not all people can afford. High-speed Internet access is rare due to a lack of IT 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!112 !The mailing list of Naqshbandi-Haqqani can be found on the following address:!
muhibbun_naqsybandi@yahoogroups.com 113!Until! 2010,! the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s mailing-list had 1555 active members, the twitter 
account (https://twitter.com/Haqqanindonesia) has 1365 followers, and FB group has more than 
5000 active members in Indonesia.  !
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infrastructure. This poses a problem because high-speed Internet access is crucial 
for videos and audio materials. In terms of network coverage, the Internet service is 
not yet equally available in every region in Indonesia. Even when this service is 
available, there is still the problem of high cost. As it becomes available in every 
region and is cheaper to access, the demand for Internet services increases.  
Due to these problems, the importance of the Internet for disseminating Sufi 
teachings has to be evaluated through observation of those who have access to it 
and how they respond to online messages in offline situations. People certainly 
respond differently to the various messages. These different responses have to do 
with language, cultural understanding, and accessibility problems. In terms of 
language, the use of Arabic and English is obviously a big problem because not all 
disciples are fluent in these languages. Even if they regularly access the websites, 
they still need a translation service, which is not always available. There is also a 
question of cultural understanding. Most Sufi messages from Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani are addressed particularly to Western audiences.  All 
embracing messages and a preoccupation with the New Age spirits of cultivating 
love and energy sometimes fail to resonate with an Indonesian audience who are 
orthodox Muslims.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter shows that globalisation and advancement of information 
technology play an important part in Sufi transmission. Naqshbandi-Haqqani has 
adapted itself to this change by adopting the Internet for preaching purposes. 
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Adopting modern media opens up new opportunities for expanding and 
maintaining international connection across time and space. However, mediated 
transmission has intrinsic weakness such as lack of intimacy and emotional ties 
between the master and disciples. In turn, this contributes to distortion and 
misunderstanding of the messages and the masters. While it attracted a large 
number of new followers, modern media put Naqshbandi-Haqqani into constant 
public scrutiny, which attracted both support and strong opposition within and 
without the group.  
!
 132 
Chapter 5 
C H A R I S M A  A N D  R I T U A L 
Exper i en t ia l  Re l i g io s i ty  and  Com mun a l  Sp i r i t  
 
Because Sufi orders and saints had been a regular aspect of everyday life in 
Muslim communities for centuries, they were a natural framework for Muslims 
who wished to remain true to their faith in the new sociocultural contexts (Voll, 
2003: 8-9) 
 
In her empirical studies on emerging urban Sufi groups in Indonesia, 
Howell makes a compelling argument that Sufi resurgence is connected with the 
seeking of experiential religiosity among urban middle class Muslims (Howell 
2001a, 701-729, 2004, 2007a, 217-240). She suggests that improvement of the 
educational system and modernist reformism do not necessarily correlate with 
scriptural religiosity (Howell 2001a, 713). Elaborating on Howell’s analysis of 
experiential religiosity, I argue that Sufism is still pursued by Indonesian Muslims 
as a form of Islamic piety because it offers intimacy based on the close relationship 
between master and disciples. Sufism also provides a ritualised environment for 
maintaining a communal spirit of friendship and brotherhood/sisterhood among 
disciples of diverse social backgrounds.  
This chapter focuses on examining experiential religiosity as expressed in 
the venerating attitude toward Sufi charismatic masters, as well as the role of Sufi 
communal ritual. The first section of this chapter examines the personal biography 
of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, the founder and once the supreme leader of this Sufi 
movement, and Sheikh Hisham, the principal deputy of Sheikh Nazim from whom 
Indonesian disciples seek guidance. The next section deals with the idea of 
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sainthood and its importance as supreme religious authority within the movement. 
The remaining part of the chapter examines the role of collective rituals in 
maintaining solidarity and finally, this chapter concludes by summarizing 
variousimportant points emerging from this discussion.   
 
5.1 The Biography of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani (1922-2014) 
The Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement is named after its founder, Sheikh 
Nazim Effendi Adel al Qubrusi al-Haqqani, a Turkish Cypriot who once lived in 
Lefke, in the northern part of Cyprus.114 Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani, as he is known 
among his disciples, was born on 23 April 1922 in Larnaca, a region located in the 
southeastern part of Cyprus inhabited mostly by Greek Cypriots. He married 
Hajjah Amina Adel (1929-2004), a woman of Tartar origin, in 1952. The couple 
were married for more than 50 years and had two daughters (Nazihe and Ruqaya) 
and two sons (Bahauddin and Muhammad Adel). When he died on 7th May 2014, 
Sheikh Nazim left behind a vast network of Naqshbandi-Haqqani around the world 
to his successors and deputies. 
Sheikh Nazim Haqqani traces his family’s lineage back to Sheikh Abdul 
Qadir Jilani (1077-1166) on his father’s side and Sheikh Jalaluddin Rumi (1207-
1273) on his mother’s side.115 His grandfather (Hasan Yasir Baz) was a Qodiri 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!114!Nazim Effendi Adil is the family name whereas al Qubrusi and al Haqqani are titles attributed by 
his master and disciples. Al Qubrusi is an Arabic term referring to his Cyprus origin, and Haqqani 
means the true one.!
115 Abdul Qadir Jilani was the founder of the Qadiri Sufi Order whose shrine is located in Baghdad, 
Iraq, whereas Jalaluddin Rumi is the founder of Mevlevi Order. He was also well-known as a poet. 
He died on 17 December 1273 and was buried in Konya, Turkey.   
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master at the Umm Hiram Mosque in Larnaca, 116 while his father (Ahmad Adel) 
was a junior Egyptian colonial administrator in the British crown colony of Cyprus 
(Damrel 2006, 116). He is described as Hassani wal Hussaini, related to the 
Prophet through the lineages of his paternal and maternal grandparents. The young 
Nazim spent his childhood and teenage years in his hometown until 1940 when he 
decided to follow his two older brothers and a sister who were living in Istanbul. 
He pursued his undergraduate studies in chemical engineering at Istanbul 
University between 1940 and 1944.  
The teaching of Naqshbandi-Haqqani represented an uneasy and even 
traumatic experience that Sheikh Nazim personally dealt with. Sheikh Nazim was 
born and grew up during the final phase of the territorial disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Saudi regime in the 1920s. He came to maturity 
at a time when various secular socialist governments emerged in the 1960s and 
took power. During this time he also saw successive humiliating defeats of Arab 
socialist regimes in the Arab-Israeli war and the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict.  
According to his biographers, Nazim Haqqani’s inclination to Sufism had 
begun at an early age and stemmed from his family tradition. Nazim Effendi 
reportedly received both Qadiri and Mevlevi instruction from his grandfathers at a 
relatively young age. However, his interest in Sufism is also related to the personal 
crisis while he was studying in Istanbul in the early 1940s. Sheikh Nazim Haqqani 
began to seek a spiritual path when he learned that his most-beloved brother, who 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 Umm Hiram binti Milhan was the Prophet’s companion who died in 649 during the Umayyad 
military campaign to conquer the island. Umm Hiram or Hala Sultan tekke in the Turkish language 
was erected in the 18th century during the Ottoman rule.    
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was a doctor and had joined the Turkish Army, was killed during World War II 
(Atay 1994, 50). 
Afterwards, he left his study at the university and devoted himself to the 
pursuit of religious knowledge from various scholars in Istanbul. He received 
religious trainings on shariah and Arabic from Sheikh Jamaludin al Alasuni (d. 
1955). Under Jamaludin al Alasuni’s tutelage, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani learnt to be a 
scholar of the Hanafi School of Islamic law. He also received guidance from 
Sheikh Sulayman Arzarumi (d. 1948) at Sultan Ahmad mosque, who introduced 
him to the Naqshbandi for the first time. There is no further information about 
Sheikh Sulayman Arzarumi whose name cannot be found in the later Naqshbandi-
Haqqani silsilah. However, it is interesting to note that in those days, when 
Naqshbandi was officially banned and most of its tekke were taken over by the 
Turkish secular government, there was still a Naqshbandi circle remaining intact in 
Istanbul.  
Sheikh Nazim continued his spiritual quest in Damascus where he met his 
spiritual mentor, Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani (1891-1973), who initiated him 
into Naqshbandi-Khalidi. He remained under the guidance of Sheikh Abdullah Faiz 
Dagestani for more than 25 years (1945-1973). Between the 1940s and the late 
1960s, Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani underwent a period of intensive spiritual training 
and extensive journeys. During that time, Sheikh Nazim reportedly spent a lot of 
time either with his master or by himself in seclusion (suluk) in Jordan, Baghdad, 
and Madina. Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, for instance, performed his seclusion ritual 
close to the Prophet’s shrine in Madina and in the shrine of Sheikh Abdul Qadir 
Jailani in Baghdad.  
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In the formative period of his mission between the 1940s and 1960s, Sheikh 
Nazim Haqqani travelled extensively to conduct religious preaching, and if 
possible, initiate new disciples across Cyprus, Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, and 
occasionally visiting Jordania, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia as well. Since his 
initiation in 1944, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani had dedicated himself to propagating the 
spread Sufism across Syria, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey as 
part of his training (Draper, 2002:129). It was his habit at the time that Sheikh 
Nazim Haqqani spent between six and nine months each year travelling across the 
region for dakwah (Habibis, 1985:83).   
In his extensive walking tours between the 1940s and 1960s, Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani encouraged people to ‘leave atheism, secularism and materialism and to 
come back to God’ (Kabbani, 1995:385). His uncompromising stance often led to 
clashes with the political establishment in countries where he conducted his 
preaching missions. These clashes did not, however, result in broader social 
prosecution because in most cases, it was only Sheikh Nazim Haqqani who was 
subjected to the hostility of secular governments in Cyprus, Turkey, Syria and 
Lebanon.  
His courage to preach Islam in his homeland, for instance, provoked strong 
opposition from the Turkish political establishment in Cyprus. His biographer has 
quoted hundreds of charges against him for insisting on the call to prayer in Arabic 
in mosques throughout Cyprus during the 1940s and the 1950s.117 He emerged as a 
vocal opponent of the secular coalition government of the then President !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 The prayer call had been forbidden since Musthafa Kamal came to power in 1924. The ban was 
only revoked in 1950 after Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) of the Democratic Party rose to power as 
Prime Minister of Turkey (1950-1960). 
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Archbishop Makarios (d. 1977) and Vice President Dr. Vazil Kucuk. This led to his 
complete ban from visiting his homeland in 1965 (Damrel, 2006:116-117). Banned 
from entering his own homeland, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani then moved to Damascus, 
Syria.  
During his stay in Damascus, Sheikh Nazim also reportedly recorded 
thousands of different sohbet given by his master. These were then published in 
two volumes entitled Mercy Ocean, which then became the principal guiding book 
for new disciples.118 Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was a man with a sense of mission. He 
believed that he had been charged to spread his master’s teachings not only to his 
fellow Muslims but also to non-Muslims, especially in the West.  
Between the 1970s and 1980s, Sheikh Nazim often visited Europe by plane, 
spending the whole fasting month (Ramadhan) among his disciples there, before 
returning overland to Cyprus (Damrel 2006, 117). During his travels he paid visits 
to his disciples and initiated new ones. He spent most of his time in the UK where 
he had loyal followers in cities like London, Birmingham, Sheffield, and 
Glastonbury (Stjernholm 2005, 14). After 20 years of following this routine, his 
disciples steadily expanded to include Western converts and Muslim immigrants 
from Turkey, Africa, South and Southeast Asia living in Western Europe such as 
UK, Germany, France, Italia, Spain, Portugal. Through Sheikh Nazim’s personal 
charisma and religious authority, Naqshbandi-Haqqani  developed from  a small 
religious congregation into one of the largest Sufi groups worldwide. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 htt  p://www.friendlycombatant.com/naqshbandi/biography.htm, accessed 10 December 2009 
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5.2 Sheikh Hisham Kabbani the Deputy 
As far as deputies (khalifah) are concerned, there are many disagreements, 
claims, and counterclaims. Some claim that Sheikh Nazim assigned only three 
deputies to be his future heirs in the movement: Sheikh Muhammad Hisham 
Kabbani and his brother, Sheikh Adnan Kabbani living in Tripoli, and  his son, 
Sheikh Muhammad Adel Nazim who now lives in Lefke, Cyprus. Others reject this 
view and are convinced that Sheikh Nazim appointed five deputies to help him 
spread Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings. In addition to the Kabbani brothers and 
his son, there are another two deputies:  Sheikh Abdul Karim (New York) and 
Sheikh Ahmad Ameerudin.119  
According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani is 
the sole assigned deputy overseeing all Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in North 
America and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. Hisham Kabbani plays an 
important role in codifying the Sufi teachings of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, 
disseminating its teachings, and reaching out to a wider audience by organising and 
consolidating Naqshbandi Haqqani’s disciples into a relatively cohesive group. 
Though there were many deputies and loyal disciples who also contributed to these 
efforts, as son-in-law of Sheikh Nazim, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was in a relatively 
better position than other deputies. This shows that personal and emotional ties, as 
well as family connections still matter for fostering Naqshbandi-Haqqani.  
Sheikh Kabbani became one of the most prominent deputies in 
disseminating Naqshbandi-Haqqani throughout the world.  This is partly because !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 Sheikh Abdul Karim is a Turkish Cypriot who led Osmanli Dergah, a Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
lodge located in Mount Catskill New York. He has been living in the USA since the late 1970s. On 
the other hand, Sheikh Ahmad Ameerudin lives in Ottawa, Canada. 
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he is a son-in-law of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, but most importantly because he is 
the person who has written extensively on all aspects of the teachings of Sheikh 
Nazim Haqqani and has managed to re-organise Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples 
worldwide.  
Born on 28 January 1945 in Beirut, Lebanon, Sheikh Kabbani finished his 
undergraduate degree in chemistry at the American University of Beirut and went 
on to pursue postgraduate study of medicine at the Louvain Catholic University in 
Belgium. Apart from this secular educational background, he also reportedly 
attended formal study in Islamic law at Al Azhar University’s Damascus campus. 
He married the oldest daughter of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani (Hajjah Naziha Adel) in 
the early 1970s and the couple had four children (three sons and one daughter). He 
came from a prominent Lebanese Sunni family with hereditary claim to descent 
from the Prophet. His uncle, Muhammad Rasyid Kabbani, was the grand mufti for 
the Lebanese Sunni Muslim community.120  
Growing up in a prominent Lebanese Sunni family, Sheikh Hisham 
witnessed and directly experienced the increasingly hostile religious environment 
that resulted from the emergence of political Islamism and the growing influence of 
Wahabi-Salafism after the oil crisis in the 1970s. Sheikh Hisham was initiated 
directly by Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani in Damascus in the early 1960s. After 
Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani died in 1973, he  continued his spiritual 
development under the guidance of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani. He became the main 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120 Annabelle Bottcher noted that the rest of the Kabbani family in Lebanon belong to the 
Naqshbandi movement. For details, see 
http://www.naqshbandi.org/naqshbandi.net/www/haqqani/features/naqshbandiyya_in_us.html) 
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communicator bridging the spiritual visions of both Sheikh Abdullah Faiz 
Dagestani and Nazim Haqqani. 
Before dedicating himself to spread the teachings of his master, Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani ran the family business during the 1960s and 1970s in Lebanon. 
After that, he spent his time doing business for a few years in Saudi Arabia 
between the 1970s and late 1980s. In Saudi Arabia, he made a living by running a 
medical clinic for the Saudi Arabian elite. His biography reveals that he was a co-
founder and former General Manager of the Islamic Medical Center in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia.121 While in Saudi Arabia, he reportedly had a spiritual crisis as a 
result of directly witnessing the widespread moral decadence among the Saudi 
elite.122 He suffered from the devastation that resulted from the unfolding sectarian 
conflict and civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990). In 1990, soon after the end of the 
Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani was granted 
refugee status in the USA; he left for the United States with all his family in 1991.  
Since the mid-1990s, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has faced a hostile religious 
environment leading to a total boycott by other Islamic organisations. Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani’s personal experiences in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
States have had a considerable influence in shaping his opposition to Islamic 
radicalism, violence, and extremism. Through his regular and extensive journeys to 
visit distant disciples, he has managed to claim both spiritual and organisational 
authority. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani received the title of Madadul Haqq Hujjatul-
lahi Mukhlis (The support of al haqq, the proof of Allah, the sincere one) and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 http://www.sunnah.org/about/shaykh_muhammad_hisham_kabbani.htm, accessed 10 December 
2009 
122 For 15 years, from 1977, he lived in Jeddah where he established and managed a medical clinic 
serving mostly wealthy and prominent Saudi princes before returning to Tripoli, Lebanon. 
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Quttubul Mutasyarrif  (The guardian of the planet) from his master, Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani. 
It is Sheikh Kabbani who strengthens Sheikh Nazim’s authority as a Sufi 
master by a silsilah or chain of Sufi transmission. A silsilah is not only about 
legitimate symbolic authority but also historic authenticity within the Islamic 
tradition. Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, this chain of transmission 
(silsilah) is popularly known as the ‘golden chain’ (silsilat ad-dhahab).123 The term 
silsilah ad-dhahab refers to the silsilah, which combines both personal and 
spiritual descent from the Prophet (Algar 1976, 130). Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was 
said to be the sole spiritual heir of Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani with a 
genealogy going back to the Prophet Muhammad.  
 
 
1. Prophet Muhammad SAW (d. 632)  
2. Abu Bakr as-Siddiq (d. 634) Siddiqiya 
3. Salman al-Farsi (d. 655)  
4. Qassim ibn Muhammad ibn Abu Bakr (d. 687)  
5. Jafar as-Sadiq (d. 765)  
6. Tayfur Abu Yazid al-Bistami (d. 784) Taifurriyah  
7. Abul Hassan Ali al-Kharqani (d. 1034)  
8. Abu Ali al-Farmadi (d. 1084)  
9. Abu Yaqub Yusuf al-Hamadani (1019-1140)  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 The chain of this silsilah, however, creates controversy and generates strong criticism because of 
the appearance of Prophet Khidr (Abu Abbas al Khidr). This is deemed as an innovation but 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani denies all such accusations by emphasizing the spiritual nature of the silsilah 
and rejects the idea that this genealogy consists of purely historical characters. 
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10. Abul Abbas, al-Khidr  
11. Abdul Khaliq al-Ghujdawani (d.1220) Khawajaganiya 
12. Arif ar-Riwakri (d. 1259)  
13. Khwaja Mahmoud al-Anjir al-Faghnawi (d. 
1245/1272) 
 
14. Ali ar-Ramitani (d. 1306/1321)  
15. Muhammad Baba as-Samasi (d. 1340/54)  
16. as-Sayyid Amir Kulal (d. 1371)  
17. Muhammad Baha'uddin Shah Naqshband (1318-
1389) 
Naqshbandi 
18. Ala'uddin al-Bukhari al-Attar (son in-law, d. 1400)  
19. Yaqub al-Charkhi (d. 1447)  
20. Ubaydullah al-Ahrar  (1404-1490)  
21. Muhammad az-Zahid (d. 1515)  
22. Darwish Muhammad (d. 1549)  
23. Muhammad Khwaja al-Amkanaki (d. 1599)  
24. Muhammad al-Baqi bi-l-Lah (1563-1603)  
25. Ahmad al-Faruqi as-Sirhindi (1564-1624) Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi 
26. Muhammad al-Masum (1586-1668)  
27. Muhammad Sayfuddin al-Faruqi al-Mujaddidi (1645-
1685) 
 
28. as-Sayyid Nur Muhammad al-Badawani (1664-1722)  
29. Shamsuddin Habib Allah (1700-1781)   
30. Abdullah ad-Dahlawi (1745-1824)  
31. Khalid al-Baghdadi (1776-1827) Naqshbandi-Khalidi 
32. Ismail Muhammad ash-Shirwani (1787-1839) Baku 
Azerbaijan 
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33. Khas Muhammad Shirwani (1786-1844)  
34. Muhammad Effendi al-Yaraghi (1777-1848)  
35. Jamaluddin al-Ghumuqi al-Husayni (1788-1869)  
36. Abu Ahmad as-Sughuri (1789-1882)  
37. Abu Muhammad al-Madani (1835-1913)  
38. Sharafuddin ad-Daghestani (1875-1936)   
39. Abdullah al-Fa'iz ad-Daghestani (1891-1973)   
40. Muhammad Nazim Adil al-Haqqani (b. 1922  ) Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
 
FIGURE 2. NAQSHBANDI-HAQQANI’S CHAIN OF TRANSMISSION 
 
By including Abul Abas al Khidr, a mystical figure well-known among Sufi 
disciples whose name cannot be found in any other Naqshbandi silsilah, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani strengthens its claim to being the descendants of Sufi masters 
with two wings (dhul janahain), referring to both physical and spiritual descent of 
the Uwaysi chain of transmission (Kabbani 2004c, 66-68).124 This is partly the 
reason why Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was hailed as the direct spiritual heir of both 
Jalaluddin Rumi and Abdul Qadir al Gilani, to whom he also claims a genealogical 
connection. The emphasis on an Uwaysi chain of transmission and particularly the 
placement of Abul Abas al Khidr in the silsilah represent, as will be explained later, 
the strong influence of Akbari ideas among Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Interestingly, 
Sheikh Kabbani is the one who repeatedly says that Sheikh Nazim would be the 
last in the silsilah.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124 The figure of Khidr as a spiritual transmitter is well-known among Sufi disciples. For details see 
(Halman 2008). 
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5.3 Charisma and Sainthood: Religious Authority and Veneration 
The relationship between the Sufi master and disciple is close and intimate 
in nature. It is commonly characterised by excessive veneration and unreserved 
allegiance from disciples to the master, not to mention a strictly hierarchical 
structure that exerts a high degree of control over its adepts (Trimingham 1971, 
Buehler 1993, 1998, Werbner 2003). The Sufi masters, borrowing Phillipon’s 
terms, represent typical “charismatic leaders who embody the group’s ideals, 
inspire love and respect, are a catalyst for commitment, and facilitate the 
identification of disciples with their cause” (2011: 353). This charisma allegedly 
derives from successive lines of knowledge, genealogy and teaching lineages 
(silsilah) and proximity to God combining the inner-path of religious devotion and 
the requirements of sharia’s observance (Buehler 1993, 10).  
For generations, the Sufi movement has survived through the embodiment 
of charisma (Werbner 1998). The charisma has been long associated with a 
personalised religious institution that is maintained through a ritualised relationship 
between master and disciple. Far from being obsolete, the concept of Islamic 
sainthood still attracts people to join the Sufi movement. The Sufi sheikh, along 
with the ulama (Muslim scholar), is still considered as a legitimate personified 
religious authority among Muslims (Bottcher 2006, 241-268, Foley 2008, 521-545). 
Foley particularly pointed out that Muslim saints merit great respect and are 
thought to fill a role for their age analogous to that played by the prophet 
Muhammad in the earliest Muslim community (2008:528).  
The framework of charisma closely resembles to that of the traditional 
Islamic concept of wali (singular for awliya). Those personified as holy persons 
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and resembling the status of wali could perform karamah (divine miracles) and 
confer baraka (divine blessings). The status of wali attributed to someone is not an 
abstract status but one built on a concrete personal encounter and strengthened 
through continuous reproduction by those having experience of it. Within this 
framework, one’s ability to build a clientele usually validates one’s religious 
mission and in effect, worldly success is proof that God is on one’s side. Thus, Sufi 
piety flourishes because it combines observance of shariah provisions and devotion 
toward an exemplary living figure of a spiritual guide.  
For Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, both Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and 
Hisham Kabbani are living saints (awliya) who perform divine miracles (karamah) 
and confer divine blessings (barakah). With this attributed status, they are highly 
venerated for having religious spiritual authority to issue religious decrees (fatwa) 
and embodying miraculous power to intercede between God and the human beings 
in the world and the hereafter (wasilah). In practical terms, this authority implies 
recognition being a spiritual guru to guide disciples, whereas miraculous power has 
to do with the power to heal the sick and make correct prediction of the future. 
Sheikh Kabbani is particularly highly venerated and even considered by many 
disciples as a living wali because he addresses daily concerns of his disciples in 
private matters of healing, dream interpretation, marriage and family issues, and 
even mundane matters such as business, career, and work. The disciples are able 
seek personal spiritual advice and general religious counsel related to their daily 
concerns.125 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010 
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First of all, Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples regard both Sheikh Haqqani 
and Kabbani as par excellence Muslim scholars with extensive and deep religious 
knowledge. Both are instrumental in introducing tasawuf as an integral part of 
Islamic knowledge. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani for instance teaches that inner-self 
transformation and purification, in the sense of total control over body, mind, 
desires and passion, is not only possible but is in fact a religious necessity. It can 
only be achieved by practicing the constant remembrance of God in dzikir recited 
in a definite number and in accordance with other required obligatory and optional 
rituals under the guidance of a spiritual master.  
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani further states that there are three levels of 
understanding for a believer: the knowledge of certainty (ilmu ‘l yaqeen), the eye 
of certainty (‘ainu ‘l yaqeen), and the truth of certainty (haqqu ‘l yaqeen). The first 
refers to the discursive level, the second to the level of imaginary perception, and 
the third has to do with total bodily experience. To achieve this level of 
understanding, every believer must express love (mahabbah) and strive for the 
presence of (hudur) God, the Prophet and Sheikh, before directly experiencing 
complete self-annihilation (fana) (Kabbani 2004a). 
Moreover, Sheikh Hisham becomes a religious authority whom they seek 
knowledge on the importance of self-purification. From him, the disciples learn 
that the widespreadsatanic traits such as backbiting, arrogance, jealousy, fear, 
selfishness, greedy, and so forth are the by-product of a total neglect of the 
Prophet’s moral examples. These traits cannot be eradicated without a commitment 
to certain rituals and devotion. Following the Quranic stipulation, Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani insists that while shariah in principle regulates the bodily needs of human 
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beings and the kalam (Islamic theology) limits rational thinking on the existence of 
unseen realities, self-desire and passion can only be controlled through the constant 
remembrance of God. Cultivating this constant remembrance of God is a 
prerequisite for total self-consciousness. This can only be carried out through 
tadzkiyah an nafs (self-purification). 
Most of the disciples commonly attribute their veneration for both Sheikh 
Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani to their personal appeal as pious persons. 
This personal appeal generates trust and love among their disciples. They described 
their affiliation to Naqshbandi-Haqqani as an experience of ‘falling in love’ with 
both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani. They related this feeling to the smiling 
face and warm gesture that Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani usually 
demonstrate before their disciples. All these personal qualities enabled Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani to establish the core of his loyal disciples. They further testified 
that both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani are trust-worthy and sincere persons 
whom they seek out for guidance and wisdom. They trust them because both 
persons are quite consistent in their saying and behavior.  
Bernie Subki for instance testified that he is ‘two hundred percent’ sure that 
both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani are sincere in their role as spiritual guides. 
He described both as individuals who are in the state of fana-i Rasulullah (self-
annihilation within the Prophet). They have no egos and no personal agenda, 
except to spread the love of the Prophet.126 He further testified that to be a Sufi 
adept is not easy at all, if not even babak belur (mentally exhausted) because the 
Sufi master always puts emotional tests designed to teach adepts to control their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 Interview Bernie Subki, 26 December 2010 
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temper and emotions. The following testimony from Dani (not hisreal name) shows 
how Sheikh Kabbani’s personal appeal is the main reason for his conversion to 
Sufism. He said, 
“Before I was initiated, I was a bad Muslim because I was too lazy to perform 
obligatory rituals such as five day prayers and fasting during Ramadhan. I knew 
the scripture and I was aware that I was committing a sin, but that was not 
persuasive enough to change my behavior. After I met Sheikh Hisham in 2003, I 
was completely in love with him. He never blamed me for what I had done and 
had not yet done. After that, I try my best to perform all my obligations as a 
Muslim wholeheartedly. I believe love makes everything light and easy, no matter 
how hard they are.”127 
 
Healing power is certainly one of the most appealing aspects that attract 
people to join and stay in the group. Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani for 
instance are known for their gifts as alternative healers. For devout disciples, there 
is a strong belief that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani is indeed an alternative healer, not 
because his MD degree but because of his authority as a Sufi sheikh. In the process 
of performing his role a healer, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani often prescribed special 
invocations (doa), gave holy water (air doa), led qiyamul lail (night prayers) and 
khatm khawajagan and delivered sohbet.128 I observed that the most common 
media for healing among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples is by using water. 
During the visit of Sheikh Hisham Kabani, the organisers will usually distribute 
one liter bottle of spring water that has been blessed (air doa) by Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani himself. Many believe that  using this water for drinking or washing could 
help ease the sickness they were suffering from.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Interview with Dani (not his real name), 15 September 2010 
128 Interview with Soetono Joyosuparto, 14 August 2010 
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Interestingly, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani also promote 
natural and alternative methods of healing for those who are in need. Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani even wrote a special book entitled Natural Medicine elaborating treatment 
for various diseases using natural products such as honey, dates, onions, tea, 
lemons, almonds, and so forth. Sheikh Nazim’s Natural Medicine remains a 
principal reference for those interested in alternative healing. Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani also elaborates on the idea that healing is part of the prophetic tradition. 
He said that there are and always will be those who are gifted with the skills of a 
spiritual healer.  
One of the disciples, Lia (not her real name), said that she previously 
suffered from cancer, asthma, and eye problems. She almost gave up before she 
finally joined Naqshbandi-Haqqani in 2007. Not long after that, she had a chance to 
visit Sheikh Nazim in Cyprus in 2008 during which she had only one intention: 
asking him to pray for her health. Before she even had the chance to convey her 
intention, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani suddenly tapped her head gently with his stick. 
She then realized that all her health problems were miraculously gone.129 After that, 
she joined the dzikr congregation at Rumi Café and dedicated her skills in art 
design to support fellow members.  
Alan (not his real name), a loyal male disciple in Batam also shared a 
similar story about his reason to join Naqshbandi-Haqqani. He said that he became 
a disciple not long after he found out that his wife was suffering from a very 
serious health problem and had been bedridden for months.130 At first, he turned to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 Interview with Rina (pseudo name), 5 January 2011 
130 Interview wth Alan (pseudo name), 13 October 2010 
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Sufism only in the hope that his wife would be cured. . He had visited almost all 
the best doctors in his town, but to little avail. Not only did the doctors fail to cure 
his wife but they could not even provide a definite medical diagnosis. When his 
wife fully recovered in 2003, he became fully committed to Sufism and even 
provided financial support for the movement.  
The charisma of both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham fulfill the drive to be rich 
and prosperous. Many strongly believed that associating with the two masters 
would bring about barakah (divine blessing) that would have a powerful effect as 
support to be successful in business or a career. Some others even believe that the 
barakah and karamah of the master are the reasons for the material success of top-
ranking Naqshbandi-Haqqani disciples in Indonesia. Both are considered by many 
disciples as a kind of secret formula for generating material gains and fortunes.  
One disciple, Samson Nasarudin, testified that he joined the Naqshbandi-
Haqqani not long after finding out that one of his business’ partners cheated him 
and left him nearly bankrupt. After many unsuccessful attempts to recover his 
assets, he had no other recourse but to ask for spiritual advice.  He was then given a 
certain  dzikr formulae. Not long after that, his business partner came and 
apologized for cheating him. All his assets were returned. This incident 
transformed him completely, and he is now a fully committed Sufi disciple. From a 
very rational person with a Western educational background in engineering, he 
came to believe in the so-called ‘miracles’ and saints.  Leaving behind all his bad 
habits and sinful acts, the man has been very diligent in attending ritual gatherings. 
Moreover, he actively helps Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and Mustafa Mas’ud in 
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spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani to his hometown in Padang and in Batam since 
early 2001.131  
For some disciples, joining the Naqshbandi-Haqqani is a remedy for the 
disillusionment and disappointment they suffered from prior involvement in other 
Islamic groups. This experience I found among a few of those coming from Islamic 
movement/organisation with long traditions of social activism such as Tablighi 
Jemaat and the Tarbiyah movement. For an ex-Tablighi Jemaat and Tarbiyah 
member, being initiated to Naqshbandi-Haqqani opens an opportunity for new 
religious learning that focuses on continous self-reflection and personal 
improvement. Muchsin Mulaela (an ex-Tarbiyah activist) and Dicky Aryo Seno (an 
ex-TJ activist) said that while they were previously too busy to teach and preach to 
others, they sometimes ignored purifying themselves.  
They further said that, through his teachings, advice, guidance and 
prescribed rituals, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani made them realize that teaching religion 
to other people is not so simple and easy because it requires continuous self-
reflection. According to them, social activism does not necessarily fulfill their 
personal needs for living under Islamic ideals. It is a real figure/person not simply 
an organisation, they affirmed, providing genuine emotional expression of 
spirituality. It does not mean however that they reject all types of activism. Rather, 
they simply want to balance activism with their personal spiritual needs.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!131!His close personal relationship with Habib Luthfi bin Yahya even made him a committee 
member of foreign relations in Indonesian Sufi Association (JATMAN). This practically positions 
him as a religious activist. He is now the main channel through which Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, 
Mustafa Mas’ud, Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia and Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in general 
establish contact and vice versa.       
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There are also those who join the Naqshbandi-Haqqani to reconnect with 
family tradition. According to Alvian Awwal, he fully committed himself as a 
disciple soon after finding out that his grandfather was actually a prominent 
Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s master in West Sumatra.132 His commitment was proven as 
he organised a khaul in his grandfather graveyard in Parak Gadang, something that 
was very uncommon in Padang. It is also the case with some other disciples who 
testified that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has a gift to tell the disciples about their 
family backgrounds and relationships to Naqshbandi without prior knowledge. In 
most cases, they come to believe that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani simply guides them 
to re-establish a connection to the religious tradition of their ancestors.     
Mystical experience and vision are also another reason why people join 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani. This mystical experience is mostly in the form of visions of 
Sheikh Nazim that appear in a dream. As suggested by Ewing (2008), dreams have 
indeed a transformational effect on Sufi followers by changing their behavior and 
mental state and hence their religious preferences. In fact, every disciple seems to 
be obsessed with having a vision/dream that is always described as a sign of 
Prophet-hood. Dreams also have a very important role in determining the spiritual 
attainment of disciples, and each dream must therefore be shared with an  
authorised person who can interpret it. Related to that, true spiritual vision in form 
of dream could be a basis for correct prediction of the future. It is not surprising 
that dream interpretation is the most popular subject addressed on the Naqshbandi-
Haqqani affiliated websites.          
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!132!His! grandfather! was! Chatib Muhammad Ali bin Abdul Muthalib, a prominent Naqshbandi-
Khalidi’s Sufi master between the late 19th and early 20th century in West Sumatra.!
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According to the late Pudjo Basuki, when he and his Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
colleagues from Jakarta were visiting Sheikh Nazim Haqqani in Lefke/Cyprus in 
late 2004, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani made a prediction. At their private meeting, 
Pudjo Basuki and his colleagues were told to be careful and, if possible, to stay 
away from North-West Sumatra and Central Java because there would be a very 
big disaster coming soon. As Sheikh Nazim Haqqani did not elaborate on his 
prediction, Pudjo Basuki and his colleagues were very confused as to what it meant 
exactly. The answer materialised a few weeks after their return to Indonesia when 
the media reported a tsunami hitting Aceh in late 2004.  
After this, the earthquakes that hit Padang and Yogyakarta were already 
anticipated simply as a fulfillment of what had been predicted by Sheikh Nazim. 
This story is still continuously reproduced to prove the karamah of Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani. In fact, natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunami, and volcano 
eruptions, and the people’s fear of their destructive power may have contributed to 
the expansion of Sufi movement in Indonesia. This may explain the growing 
number of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Padang and Jogjakarta, the two 
regions, which were severely hit by the earthquake in 2004 and the volcano 
eruption in 2006.133 
Nevertheless, the charisma has its  limits. As the number of disciples grows, 
personal encounter is not always possible due to limited time and space. In fact, 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani reportedly encourages his disciples to consult him directly 
on only three personal affairs: marriage, moving in/out of new houses, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 Interview with Musthafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010 
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conducting a pilgrimage journey. 134  He delegates all other issues to his 
representatives. Practically speaking, the representatives enjoy a high degree of 
religious autonomy and authority and therefore the disciples venerate them as 
charismatic guides too. In reality, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has been sharing 
religious authority with his three representatives in Indonesia, Sheikh Mustafa 
Mas’ud, KH Taufiqurrahman Subki and KH Ahmad Syahid as well as with 
numerous badal/imam/amir. 
 
5.5 Ritual and Communal Spirit 
Sufi ritual is basically a religious platform through which certain religious 
practices are performed on regular basis and doctrinal views are shared with an 
attending audience. The ritual plays a significant role in strengthening the personal 
charisma of a Sufi master and cultivating strong emotional ties among Sufi 
followers. Most importantly, ritual provides a religious repertoire to balance  the 
personal seeking of piety and communal spirit of friendship and 
brotherhood/sisterhood among the disciples with diverse social background. 
Besides its important role in generating emotive feelings of joy and happiness for 
the individual attendee, the Sufi collective ritual  has an important social aspect for 
maintaining internal cohesion as a social movement.  
There are two basic forms of Sufi typical ritual: chanting dzikir and 
sholawat recitation. The dzikir is a devotional act that includes the repetition of 
divine names, supplications and aphorisms from sections of the Qur’an or from the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 19 September 2010 
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literature of the Prophetic tradition (hadits), whereas sholawat recitation is singing 
praise songs and poems dedicated to commemorate the  virtues of Prophet 
Muhammad. These praise songs are compiled in maulid books (Hasan 2012, 370, 
Zamhari and Howell 2012, 48-49).135  
While dzikir ritual has to do with the virtue of constant remembrance of 
God, sholawat emphasizes the importance of loving the Prophet Muhammad and 
his descendants. The ritual has recently become a feature of the contemporary Sufi 
resurgence in Indonesia. Like many other Sufi groups, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has a 
set of rituals performed regularly by all the disciples. These collective rituals 
include khatm khwajagan, hadrah, maulid, and a whirling dance. Altogether, they 
have become a distinctive marker of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia.  
Khatm khawajagan is collective dzikir held once a week, normally every 
Thursday night. It is a moment during which disciples chant dzikir that consists of 
asking for forgiveness (istighfar), praising the Prophet Muhammad (sholawat), 
chant dzikir, and recite some Quranic verses. Different from most Naqshbandi Sufi 
groups, which maintain silent dzikir (sirr), the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community 
adopts loud dzikir (jahr). On the other hand, hadrah is an Arabic term referring to a 
form of collective ritual that combines elements of dance, music, and singing. 
During the performance of hadrah, disciples collectively stand up in circle while 
they move their upper body rhythmically forward and backward, with two hands 
folded and released up and down while they chant loudly the praise songs to Allah, 
the Prophet and master accompanied by musical instruments such as duff and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 These maulid books include popular ones such as barzanji, burdah, diba, simtudduror, and 
dalail khoirot.  
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percussion. Both khatm khwajagan and hadrah are a distinct collective ritual 
performed by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples. They follow currently compulsory 
ritual menus and are performed together in many Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s dzikir 
centers. Normally, the disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani would conduct khatm 
khawajagan and follow it up by performing hadrah. They are a communal 
gathering during which joyful feelings are cultivated through repetitive recitations 
and bodily movement.  
Maulid celebration is another ritual dedicated mainly to commemorate the 
Prophet Muhammad’s birthday by reciting sholawat. Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani, 
there are two types of maulid books to read which are simtud duror and dalail 
khoirot. 136   Different from common practice, the maulid ceremony within 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia is conducted almost throughout the year and 
followed by the so-called ziarah of the Prophet’s holy hair. Some sources said that 
Sheikh Hisham brought along the holy hair with him to Indonesia on Sheikh 
Nazim’s instruction. The sholawat recitation and the holy hair prompt strong 
emotive response among those attending the ritual. This emotive response 
particularly occurs during mahalul qiyam (standing ovation) in which the disciples  
stand up and kiss a small cylindrical glassed case keeping the hair inside. Many 
people testified that such experience brings about inner-peace and tears, something 
which they desperately sought. Many respondents among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
disciples further said this kind of thing is one of the reasons they would never give 
up their affiliation. Not only did they experience feelings of joy and happiness, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!136!Simtud Duror is a maulid book written by a Yemeni Sufi, Habib Ali bin Muhammad bin Husain 
al Halbsyi (1843-1915), whereas dalail khoirot was written by Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin 
Sulaiman al Jazuli, a 15th century Moroccan Sufi leader.!!
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sholawat ritual’s emotional impact on the participants is so strong that they even 
believe this kind of ritual will somehow create solidarity not only among their 
fellow Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers in Indonesia and around the world but also 
in the Muslim community as whole. 
The whirling dance is also a ritual commonly practiced by young disciples 
of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. The whirling dance is originally a Sufi ritual 
common among members of the Mevlevi Sufi Order in Turkey. The whirling dance 
involves several dancers who perform anti-clock wise  bodily movement 
accompanied by musical instrument. As the name suggest, it is attributed to 
Jalaludin Rumi, the Sufi master who founded Mevlevi Sufi order in the 13th century. 
Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani disciples, this ritual practice is attributed to Abu Bakr 
as-Shiddiq who began to sway his body when he was told during their hijrah 
journey from Mecca to Medina that he would be among those going to paradise 
along with the Prophet.137 The use of music and dance has an important role in 
addressing growing internal disappointment between the youth disciples and the 
old ones. While the old disciples tend to be exclusive and limit their activities only 
in dzikir ritual, the young disciples are willing to make their affiliation public. They 
believe that Sheikh Hisham and Naqshbandi-Haqqani have a strong appeal over the 
youth seeking  religious guidance. Music and whirling are just a good way to 
approach these prospective disciples.      
For those who are already well-off, practicing the ritual of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani fulfills post-material satisfaction. While I attended the khatm khawajagan, 
I was often asked about my feeling regarding the ritual. I took the opportunity to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 15 October 2010 
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ask participants the same question. The common response is that khatm 
khawajagan, which is recited loudly and in rhythmical sound, brings about 
excitement, comfort, joy and a feeling of instant delight. This feeling is commonly 
identified as a truth confirmation of this ritual. For those coming from a secular 
background, the ritual offers a self-disciplining and simultaneously a non-rigid 
method of religious praxis. For  disciples, regular recitation of dzikr at a certain 
prescribed time is considered as a training session for more serious religious 
learning because it is more intensive than compulsory prayers. However, Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani is always very soft in his approach, encouraging his disciples to 
practice only the most suitable and appropriate ritual in private. The ritual is not 
presented as a rigid formula. Rather it is considered as an enjoyable activity, which 
can result in benefits only if the disciples practice it voluntarily and sincerely.138 
All this clearly plays a part in changing the perception about the ritual and the 
master among the young disciples.  
For lay disciples, the ritual and surrounding environment where it is 
conducted has an emotionally powerful effect. It is a moment when the communal 
spirit of friendship is cultivated and flourished. Attending collective dzikr in a large 
luxurious house, meeting face-to-face, and sharing a meal are something that was 
previously unthinkable for most of the disciples, especially those coming from 
modest backgrounds. According to them, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s communal 
ritual enabled people from very different economic backgrounds to meet, 
something which is just impossible in a normal situation, especially in metropolitan 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!138!An explanation for Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s gentle approach is perhaps the fact that he is from 
the USA. He is fluent in both Arabic and English and attracts disciples from a middle-upper class 
background.!
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city like Jakarta. Both khatm khawajagan and hadrah for instance are communal 
gatherings where those attending the event can share and enjoy leisure time 
together.  
The repetitive nature of ritual cultivates what Durkheim identified as 
‘collective effervescence’, referring to a situation in which an amplified and 
excited reaction is made possible when a group of people experience something 
emotional together. Jasper (1997, 184) suggested that, 
“Collective rites remind participants of their basic moral commitments, stir up 
strong emotions, and reinforce a sense of solidarity with the group, a “we-ness”. 
Rituals are symbolic embodiments, at salient times and places, of the beliefs and 
feelings of a group.” 
 
Collins (2001, 27) further argues that ritual has to do with transmutation of feeling 
and emotion to the moral commitment of those joining the movement. As Collins 
has said, emotional ties thus play an important role in maintaining internal cohesion 
within the movement. This emotive expression is, to a large degree, more 
influential than material motivation in persuading disciples to stay and commit 
themselves to the movement.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani confirms what Howell identifies as 
experiential religiosity among middle-upper class in Jakarta. This experiential 
religiosity relies on the charisma of the Sufi master and his ritual. Strong personal 
charisma and repetitive collective litanies  offer a joyful environment to create 
affectionate ties between the master and disciples and among the disciples 
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themselves.  It is through mobilisation of emotion and passion that Naqshbandi-
Haqqani manages to maintain collective ties among people with different socio-
cultural and economic backgrounds. A charismatic figure provides a leadership 
resource to lead and direct the disciples, whereas collective rituals generate 
intimacy and emotional feeling within the group. Emotional feelings, instead of 
rational calculation, are a particularly important aspect for this social movement 
because it lays a strong foundation for passionate mobilisation that motivates 
people to join, maintain their commitment  and sustain their active involvement in 
the movement (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001, 2004, Jasper 1998). All this 
personalised religious experience therefore contributes to transform this Sufi group 
into an Islamic social movement.  
!
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Chapter 6 
MOBILISING STRUCTURE AND S O C I A L  N E T W O R K S 
A f f i l i a t e s  a n d  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  A r r a n g e m e n t  !
The charismatic leader focuses the forces for change and brings them to bear upon 
cracks in the edifice of the existing traditional establishment. In this way, over 
time, the new movement inspired by the charismatic leader may come to 
overthrow the existing power structure, whether this being political or religious in 
form. But in order to complete his task the leader must not only attract followers [,] 
he has also to develop an organization, and it is out of this requirement that many 
difficulties arise (Nelson 1987, 117).  
 
Sufi resurgence did not happen overnight through magical means. It has 
been going through institutional innovations that are flexible enough to adapt to 
changing social, economic, cultural, and political conditions over a long period of 
time. In the institutional sense, Sufi resurgence is closely related to the 
organisational capacity to mobilise resources and expand social networks. 
Examining this organisational capacity is pivotal to have comprehensive 
understanding about Sufi resurgence in Indonesia.  Howell points out that 
institutional innovation, in a sense of partial disengagement from traditional Sufi 
underpinning institutions, has led to a wider appeal of Sufi devotion beyond its 
traditional audience (Howell 2002, 4-5).  
This chapter deals with institutional innovation, arrangement, and 
organisational capacity. In this chapter, I will examine internal organising 
structures, schism and internal dynamics of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. This 
organising structure lays a strong foundation for resource mobilisation. While this 
organising structure helps the Sufi sheikh to expand his mission, the existing 
structure and diverse background of followers also generate schism and internal 
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conflict. This internal dynamics show the extent of institutionalisation and 
organisational capacity to recruit new members and maintain the old ones.  
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section deals leadership 
structure and membership. Second, it examines institutional arrangement of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia by focusing on four different forms of religious 
institutions (Zawiya, Pesantren, Yayasan, and Shelter/Rumah Singgah). The third 
section examines internal conflict and organisational dynamics of these various 
institutions. Fourth section of this chapter is about internal mechanism to maintain 
cohesion and strengthen collective solidarity within the movement and finally this 
chapter concludes by re-elaborating the main arguments and its supporting 
examples.  
 
6.1 Leadership Structure and Membership 
The leadership structure of Naqshbandi-Haqqani closely resembles that of 
many other Sufi movements. Sheikh Nazim claims the highest religious authority, 
but this authority is then dispersed among different deputies and, particularly in the 
Indonesian context, religious authority is equally shared among the three national 
representatives (Mustafa Masud, K.H. Taufiqurrahman Subki, and K.H. Ahmad 
Syahid) and around 40 assistants (badal/imam/amir/ustadz) who help the 
representatives to guide and give religious instruction to disciples.  The large 
number of local leaders forms a complex web of independent religious authority. 
Some local assistants pay allegiance to different representatives, while others claim 
direct allegiance to the deputy (Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani).  
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FIGURE'3.'ORGANISING'STRUCTURE'OF'NAQSHBANDI4HAQQANI'IN'INDONESIA'
 
The three different layers of disciples (muridin, muhibbin, and salik) are 
distinguished by their relationship with the master, as well as the degree of 
commitment and interactional intensity. The murid (pl. muridin) refers to those 
who have taken bai’at and know either Sheikh Nazim Haqqani or Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani in person. They consist mostly of senior and early initiated disciples. They 
are considered spiritually mature and trusted by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to 
perform certain rituals and spiritual roles such as leading 
dzikir/muraqabah/i’tikaf/suluk, interpreting dreams, and representing the master in 
taking baiat. The national representatives are in this category and, in a few cases, 
the murid also refers to those senior initiates who have been given a new name by 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani.  
Local!Assistants!(Imam/Amir/Badal/Ustadz)!(!around!40)!
National!Representatives!(3)!
Regional!Deputy/Sheikh/Maulana!!
Supreme!Leader/Grand!Sheikh! S.!Muhammad!Nazim!Adil!Haqqani!
S.!Muhammad!Hisham!Kabbani!
Sheikh!Mustafa!Mas'ud! KH.!Ahmad!Syahid!
Imam! Badal! Amir! Ustadz!
KH.!TauOiqurrahman!Subki!
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FIGURE'4.'THE'CATEGORY'OF'DISCIPLESHIP''
 
The muhib (pl. muhibin) refers to committed disciples with certain roles and 
institutional responsibility such as looking after day-to-day rituals, fundraising, and 
translating Naqshbandi Haqqani materials. They are committed and loyal disciples 
who are keen to provide material and non-material resources to support 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities in Indonesia. The first and second layers are thus 
the core of disciples who perform their role as Sufi activists to spread the message 
and attract new disciples. This distinction seems to continue the legacy of Abu 
Muhammad al Madani (the 37th master in the silsilah) who distinguished between 
ittiba’iyya (fully committed and sincere disciple) and syar’iyya. This distinction in 
turn also resembles the distinction between tariqa murid and na’ib murid during 
the Great Jihad era of Abu Ahmad as-Sughuri (Kemper 2002, 58-60).  
Beyond these layers, there is salik (seeker) which refers to all those who 
have sympathy for and no objection toward Sufi beliefs and rituals. They normally 
Muridin!
Muhibin!
Salik!
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come, especially when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani pays a visit to Indonesia, and 
attend public ceremonies conducted by his murid/muhib. They will commonly 
attend or participate in public sermons given by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
representatives/badal/imam/amir or occasionally access Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
websites. Through a gradual learning process, some of them become muhibbin but 
most of them remain distant sympathisers.  
 
6.2 Naqshbandi Haqqani and Its Affiliates in Indonesia 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia is not a typical Sufi order. Unlike most 
other Sufi movements which maintain close and strict charismatic institutions, it 
deliberately develops a complex and rather sophisticated organising and mobilising 
structure. It is also relatively open, welcoming everyone to join and participate in 
its ritual congregation, even before they are formally initiated. Though the personal 
charisma of the Sheikh is still essential, modern organising structure and 
institutional arrangement have become increasingly important in supporting 
transnational missionary mission and further expansion. Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
attempts to adapt to the organising needs of the modern world that requires 
impersonal institutions and capable personal leadership. Because of this, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani is able to gain important strategic resources such as financial 
support and social networks which are vital for supporting its activities and 
propagating mission in Indonesia.  
Naqshbandi-Haqqani was previously an elitist and exclusive religious group. 
This Sufi congregation was concentrated in luxurious residential houses in Jakarta 
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consisted mostly of people from upper middle class background such as 
businessmen, politicians, and celebrities. Though Sheikh Hisham Kabbani allowed 
and, to some extent, even encouraged his disciples to set up various institutional 
arrangements to spread Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia as early as the late 1990s, 
the elitist and exclusive nature of Naqshbandi-Haqqani remains unchanged.  
The development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia cannot be separated 
from the establishment and flourishing of its underpinning institutions such as 
zawiya, shelter, yayasan, and pesantren. The zawiya and other similar institutions 
are not simply a building complexes where people gather to chant dzikir 
collectively, but more importantly, it is a religious institution where Islamic 
teachings are taught and practiced, that of social institution where solidarity and 
cohesion are built, of political institution where resources are mobilised, of 
economic institution where voluntary exchanges occur, and of cultural institution 
where Islamic living tradition is manifested and performed on daily basis.  
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani asked his disciples to establish an official umbrella 
organisation representing Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufi Order of America Foundation 
in Indonesia. According to Bernie Subki, this request was related to the 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s world tour planned to be held in the following year.139 In 
short, the request was then warmly welcomed by some senior disciples such as 
Firdaus Wajdi, Bernie Subki, Farid Bubhi Djamirin, Muchtony Ghani Azis, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139 In this 25 days world tour, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani brought along his master, Sheikh Nazim al 
Haqqan, visiting Uzbekistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Srilanka, and Pakistan. During the 
visit, Sheikh Nazim al Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani were accompanied by some of their close 
disciples such as Sheikh Raja Asman (Malaysia), Sheikh Zakaria (Singapore) etc. Interview with 
Bernie Subki, 25 December 2010 
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Effendi Siregar who immediately followed it up by initiating the establishment of 
Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia (YHI) in December 2000.  
It began to change around 2003 when new disciples from different social 
backgrounds were initiated to this Sufi movement.140 A further significant turning 
point in the development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani occurred especially when Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani instructed his main deputy, Mustafa Mas’ud, to shift his focus of 
propagating activity from Jakarta to other regions across Indonesia. Since then, 
Mustafa Mas’ud has spread Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s religious teachings and 
initiating new disciples in other parts of the country. In 2004, Sheikh Hisham also 
authorised 38 disciples to spread Naqshbandi-Haqqani in other areas after they had 
completed their seclusion ritual.141 From this time on, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has 
been gradually transforming itself into an inclusive religious movement with active 
participants from all walks of life.  
However, progress was slow at the beginning. Until 2004, there were only 
around five dzikir centers in Jakarta, one dzikir center in Bandung, and another in 
Batam.142 The five dzikir centers in Jakarta were located  at Mustafa Mas’ud’s 
house in Hasbi, Cawang/East Jakarta, Firdaus Wajdi’s house in Brawijaya/South 
Jakarta, Hagi Ghani Azis’ and Prof Iyos Subki’s house in Teuku Umar Street and 
Indramayu Street, Menteng/Central Jakarta, and Muhammad Hasan’s house in 
Pangkalan Jati/South Jakarta, while the dzikir center in Bandung was located at 
Hadid Subki’s house and the one in Batam was at Yandri Irzaq’s house. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140 Interview with Buddy Rachmadi, 11 November 2010 
141 Interview with Wahyudin Yusuf, 5 November 2010 
142 Interview with Bernie Subki, 26 December 2010 
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Since then Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples have continued to establish 
their own formal and informal institutions to organise their activities. Through 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s continuous encouragement and personal support, 
disciples have been developing different institutionalising strategy to establish both 
formal and informal organisations. The number of dzikir centers has grown 
significantly from only 5 in 2000 to around 37 in 2004. This number went up again 
to 72 in 2009; there are currently 135 dzikir centers in Indonesia. The proliferation 
of dzikir centers throughout the country led to significant increases in the number 
of disciples, which  rose from about 1800 in 2004 to around 3000 in 2006. These 
organisational resources play an important role in spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani. 
More importantly, Naqshbandi-Haqqani also manages to establish and maintain 
social networking with other Sufi movements and Islamic organisations in 
Indonesia.   
There are some factors contributing to the rapid expansion of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani across Indonesia such as the unconventional method of dakwah and the 
use of modern media and information technology. For instance, in his early mission, 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani had the habit of taking mass bai’at in every public forum 
he attended. The unconventional use of music and dance performances attracted 
many young people in Jakarta and other areas. The use of media and information 
technology, especially the internet, also helps to boost Sheikh Nazim and Hisham 
Kabbani’s prestige and charisma as Sufi masters, especially among those who are 
IT-literate.  
Moreover, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani seemed to realise that confining 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani only to Jakarta’s elites increasingly compromised his 
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independence as a Sufi master. Though exclusive and elitist approaches manage to 
secure both financial and political support, those approaches are no longer 
sustainable for long-term dakwah mission in Indonesia. As the number of new 
disciples continues to grow, more inclusive and open approaches are needed. By 
expanding the mission beyond his original audiences among Jakarta’s elites, 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani tries to strengthen his religious authority by giving 
spiritual instruction to his disciples independently rather than following the dictates 
of those who provide his movement with financial and political support. The 
movement’s rapid expansion changed the dynamics and nature of the relationship 
between master and disciple.  
Organisationally speaking, Naqshbandi-Haqqani is relatively egalitarian 
and less hierarchical than commonly understood. As the number of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples continues to grow, some followers began to set up their own 
religious institutions. Disciples are organised by their social and geographical 
backgrounds, and receive religious instructions from their own local leaders. There 
are currently four types of institutions: Zawiya, Pesantren, Yayasan, and Shelter. 
These institutions are responsible for organising all ritual congregations (Majelis 
Dzikir) and manage those disciples who have been initiated into and practice 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s rituals as part of their daily religious devotion.  
 
 
 
! 171!
 
 
 
 
!
!
!
! FIGURE!5.!INSTITUTIONAL!ARRANGEMENT!OF!NAQSHBANDI:HAQQANI!IN!INDONESIA!
 
6.2.1 Zawiya 
The term zawiya originally means a Sufi lodge where a master guides his 
disciples in spiritual training, a practice long established in Islamic history. In the 
Indonesian context, the term zawiya refers to a meeting place where disciples 
would come regularly to perform collective rituals.  This meeting place can be a 
private house, a mosque, or mushola. Organisationally speaking, zawiya is a loose 
institution characterised by informal and voluntary nature.  
Mustafa Mas’ud’s zawiyah Hasbi is the first Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
affiliate-institution in Indonesia. It was originally located at Jl. Hasbi 40 Otista, 
Cawang, East Jakarta, which is a private house of Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud. This 
zawiya was established in April 1997 soon after the first visit of Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani in Indonesia. The zawiya started with a modest number of people (less 
than 30), most of whom were women.  
Naqshbandi!Haqqani!SuDi!Order!of!America!
Pesantren!
Yayasan!
Shelter!
Zawiyah!
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After this modest start, Mustafa Mas’ud proceeded to establish more than 
40 dzikir centers across Indonesia between 2004 and 2009,143 attracting followers 
from diverse backgrounds. In Pekanbaru, his followers are mostly medical doctors. 
Prominent medical specialists such as Chairudin Lubis, Eko Suyono, and Pramudjo 
Abdulgani have joined Naqshbandi-Haqqani since 2005 and become its main 
financial supporters.  
In Jakarta, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Malang, and Surabaya, most of the 
followers are students, young professionals and academics from prestigious 
universities such as University of Indonesia, IAIN Walisongo, Diponegoro 
University, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia Islamic University, UIN Malang, 
and 10th November Institute of Technology (ITS). According to Muhammad 
Hikam, a lecturer in the Department of Physics at the University of Indonesia, 
many of his colleagues became followers of Naqshbandi-Haqqani through Mustafa 
Mas’ud, including Prof. Gumilar Rosliwa Somantri, the then vice counselor.144   
Since 2005, Mustafa Mas’ud has organised his disciples under one umbrella 
called FORNAQSDA (stands for Forum Naqshbandi Daerah – Regional 
Naqshbandi Forum). This informal organisation receives financial support in the 
form of voluntary donations by his loyal disciples. For instance, one of his 
disciples in Batam, Elvian Awwal, established a special trading company and 
dedicated most of its profit to support the organisation. Mustafa Mas’ud also 
founded several retreat centers where he would pay most visits. These retreat 
centers are designed to be the place where he would guide his disciples in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!143!This!dzikir!centres!are!located!in!Riau and Riau islands, West and North Sumatra, Jambi, 
Central and East Java, Jogjakarta, East Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi!
144 Interview with Muhammad Hikam, 15 December 2010 
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conducting suluk, tawajuh, or i’tikaf rituals. The retreat centers are mostly busy 
during Muharram and Rajab when the disciples come to hold the rituals together 
Using a generous donation from one of the disciples (Chairudin Lubis), 
Mustafa Mas’ud also founded a permanent retreat center in Lembah Manah 
Khwajagan in Pekanbaru, Riau. It is located on the 20 hectares of land that used to 
be a palm plantation about 30 minutes drive from the capital city of Pekanbaru. The 
Lembah Manah Khwajagan is used for those living in Sumatra. Currently, the 
retreat center is looked after by Abdul Mughitz, one of Mustafa Masud’s disciples 
from Demak, Central Java.  Similar retreat centers are also established in Bambu 
Apus-Tangerang and Takeran-Madiun, catering to disciples in Jabotabek and East 
Java regions with the further plan to build another two centers in Batam and 
Samarinda, East Kalimantan.  
Since 2009, he has been planning to build a permanent base in Takeran, 
Madiun, on a plot of land donated by KH. Maskin Abdul Azis where he planned to 
build Kampung Sholawat. Sheikh Mustafa Masud admitted that, at his age, it has 
become increasingly difficult for him to travel long distances and make regular 
visits to Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples all over Indonesia. Therefore, he began to 
consider staying permanently in one place and guiding his disciples from there.  
Zawiya Brawijaya is the second oldest zawiya in Indonesia and has been 
used exclusively for holding ladies’ dzikir gathering once a week. This zawiya is 
founded and led by Tini Firdaus. This zawiya is located in Firdaus Wajdi’s private 
residential house in Brawijaya Street, Kebayoran Baru-South Jakarta. Most of the 
attendees come from the NAMIRA group. Zawiya Brawijaya caters ladies mostly 
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coming from Jakarta’s middle upper class. By contrast, the Haqqul Mubin is the 
newest Naqshbandi-Haqqani zawiya. Located in South Tangerang, this zawiya was 
officially opened in 12 May 2012. Like zawiya Brawijaya, zawiya Haqqul Mubin 
also receives financial support from an oil-drilling contractor.  
In addition to those zawiya, there are also independent zawiya. There are 
five independent zawiya, one in each of the following places: Jakarta, Bandung, 
Cirebon, Cianjur, and Cipanas. These independent zawiya are small congregations 
with around 25 disciples each. Compared to the three large zawiya (Hasbi, 
Brawijaya, and Haqul Mubin), these zawiya are less resourceful but they keep 
growing in number.  
 
6.2.2 Shelter  (Rumah Singgah) 
Shelter is an urban institution, especially one kept by a religious order that 
gives shelter to pilgrims or strangers. In the Indonesian context, it refers 
specifically to a meeting place for young disciples to chant dzikir and conduct other 
activities, as well as a temporary shelter for street kids and homeless persons. This 
type of religious institution appeals particularly to young disciples. There are 
currently two shelters affiliated to Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia: Rabbani 
Cinere and Rumi Café.  
Rabbani Cinere – also known as Rabbani Sufi Institute of Indonesia – 
began its activity in 2003, not long after Sheikh Kabbani initiated Dicky Aryo Seno 
(aka Sheikh Zulfikar) at Firdaus Wajdi’s house in Brawijaya, South Jakarta. Dicky 
began his involvement in the Islamic movement as a member of JT (Jamaat 
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Tabligh) in 1991 while he was studying at Parahyangan Catholic University, 
Bandung. He became disillusioned with that organisation because of a personal 
spiritual crisis. Perhaps due to the founder’s background as a JT’s activist, the 
Rabbani Cinere was very rigorous in spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings 
through various proselytizing initiatives. Dicky became particularly active in 
preaching Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings among his JT’s fellows to the extent 
that it created tension among the top ranks of JT that led to his expulsion from his 
previous affiliation.145  
At the beginning, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani authorised Dicky Aryo Seno as 
the sole leader (amir) for the Rabbani Cinere. By the help of his brother (Doni 
Indarto aka Sheikh Abu Tufail) and two close friends (Zalyati and Eri Barkah 
Saridria), Dicky initiated the establishment of a large dzikir center in Jl. Vila 
Terusan Mas 16 Cinere, Pondok Cabe. After that, Sheikh Kabbani assigned both 
Doni Indarto (aka Sheikh Abu Tufail) and Eri Barkah Saridria (aka Sheikh Barkah) 
as amir to lead the shelter collectively in 2005. Sheikh Kabbani attributed the name 
of Rabbani for this new congregation in 2006.  
The Rabbani Cinere secured financial support from some businessmen in 
Jakarta who are sympathetic to its activities. Between 2006 and 2008, the shelter 
expanded to other areas such as Bandung, Solo, Jogja, and Bontang. Until 2009, 
this shelter was Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s principal vehicle for reaching out to the 
growing numbers of young urban disciples through its unconventional approach of 
religious propagation by adopting music, dance performances (whirling dervishes), 
and martial arts. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
145 Interview with Dicky Aryo Seno, 21 September 2010 
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For most of the disciples, Abu Tufail is the de facto leader of the Rabbani 
Cinere. He reportedly possesses a spiritual power that enables him to foresee the 
future and heal the sick, so much so that he is regarded as qutb ghwat (living saint). 
It is claimed that Abu Tufail is the only authorised representative who was directly 
appointed by Sheikh Nazim Haqqani while the former and some of his closest aides 
visited Lefke in 2008. It was symbolised by a staff that was reportedly given to him 
by Sheikh Nazim as a gift.146 Abu Tufail’s growing personal reputation might also 
be explained by the fact that the shelter is located at his own house where he 
provides shelter and free meals for most of the disciples.  
This is the first dzikir center which introduced the whirling dervishes’ dance 
performance, Sufi meditation (muraqaba), and the use of music (hadrah) as part of 
ritual devotion. Sheikh Nurjan Mirahmadi, the trusted deputy of Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani from the USA, was sent by Sheikh Kabbani in 2006 to teach Sufi 
meditation at the center. After the training, Sheikh Nurjan authorised Dicky Aryo 
Seno to teach this technique to others. Along with Sheikh Nurjan, there was also 
Sheikh Abdul Wahid (an Australian from Melbourne and disciple of Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani) who spent some time at the center to share his skills in performing the 
whirling dervishes.147  
Another important shelter is Rumi Café. It was founded in 2008 and 
pioneered by two young Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples (Arif Hamdani and 
Mukhsin Mulaela). The Rumi Café is financially supported by the Asih Foundation, 
a charity organisation founded by prominent business figures such as Hendro 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 Interview with Muhammad Sholeh, 20 July 2010 
147 Interview with Aat, 20 September 2010 
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Martowardoyo, 148  Miranti Abidin, 149  Amania Rai, and Tito Sulistio. It was 
officially inaugurated on 10 August 2008 at the Four Season Hotel by Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani. It is located at a two-storey building of Wisma Iskandarsyah 
Blok B4, Jl. Iskandarsyah Raya Kav 12-14 Kebayoran Baru, a commercial district 
of South Jakarta, close to Pasaraya Sarinah Blok M, and owned by Tito Sulistio, 
one of the founders of the Asih Foundation.  
The founders of Rumi Café come from very different background. Arif 
Hamdani is an ex-Jamaah Tabligh activist and was previously active at the Rabbani 
Cinere. He was very active there and became one of the key figures in the Rabbani 
Cinere until 2008. He actively translated and disseminated Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
teachings. He also organised many public events which enabled Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani to reach out to the urban youth. On the other hand, Mukhsin Mulaela is a 
former Tarbiyah activist. Financial supporters of Rumi Café come from those who 
have studied Sufism through Paramadina’s executive tasawuf courses. It was 
through Mukhsin Mulaela that the Rumi Café came to its existence because he is a 
personal aide for Hendro Martowardoyo and works at Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina 
in which Hendro Martowardoyo is a board member (treasurer).  
With the support of Asih Foundation, both Muksin Mulaela and Arif 
Hamdani worked together to transform Rumi Café into a meeting place and shelter 
for young Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Jakarta.150 Rumi Café represents an 
urban institutional adaptation that attempts to combine zawiya and yayasan. Like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 Hendro Martowardoyo is older brother of Agus Martowardoyo, the Minister of Finance, a banker 
and close friend of Robby Djohan of Niaga Bank, and the President Commissioner of Resource 
Alam Indonesia Co. Ltd., a private coal mining company 
149 Miranti Abidin is owner and CEO of Fortune Indonesia, a private largest advertising company in 
Indonesia 
150 It should be noted however that Arif Hamdani split from Rumi Cafe in 2009, brought along with 
him some disciples and established his own zawiya in Pondok Jaya, South Jakarta. 
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Asih Foundation, the Rumi Café focuses its activities on providing social charity to 
the needy. It also runs weekly religious programs (dzikir khatm khwajagan, Sufi 
meditation, Islamic studies, etc.) and providing free meals for street kids. It has 
hadrah and whirling teams that are sometimes invited to perform publicly in 
several prestigious places across Jakarta. During the 2010 fasting month, for 
instance, the Rumi Café’s hadrah and whirling teams were invited to perform at 
the Pacific Place Plaza of SCBD and some other places.  
Since 2008, Rumi Café has also proposed the establishment of new 
foundation (Raudlatul Madina) that would be functioned as educational and 
publishing centers of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. There was a plan to 
abolish the YHI and replace it with the new one called Yayasan Raudlatul Madina 
in 2009.151 Hendro Martowardoyo was actually ready to donate 3000 square meters 
of land in Cilandak area for this purpose.152 However, Soenarto’s reluctance to 
support the proposal prevents this to materialise any time soon.153 It seems that 
Soenarto is reluctant to support the establishment of Raudlatul Madina because he 
does not want to lose his control over it.  
 
6.2.3 Yayasan 
Yayasan (foundation) is an urban-type institution established to organise 
religious and social activities. It is formally structured and officially registered with 
the government. There are currently three social foundations affiliated to 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani: Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia (YHI), Yayasan Haqqani Batam 
(YHB), and Yayasan Baitus Syifa (YBS).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010 
152Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 18 August 2010 
153 Interview with Bernie Subki, 25 December 2010 
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The first official institutional representative of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in 
Indonesia, the YHI was founded in December 2000, but it was not officially 
inaugurated until April 2001. It serves as the official branch of Naqshbbandi-
Haqqani Sufi Order of America Foundation and responsible for organising 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities in Indonesia. Until 2012, the YHI’s was located in 
41 Teuku Umar Street, an elite suburb of Menteng, Central Jakarta before then 
moved to Permata Hijau.154 The YHI is funded by Jakarta’s businessmen, and is 
politically connected to prominent politicians and top bureaucrats in Jakarta. 
From 2000 to 2004, Faried Bubhi Djamirin and Dr. Bernie Subki were in 
charge as chairman and secretary of the YHI respectively, whereas Firdaus Wajdi 
and Muhammad Hasan (1920-2005) were in charge as advisors.155 However, 
because of his vast social networks and organisational skills, Firdaus Wajdi became 
the key figure and even de-facto chairman of the YHI. Trough his vast social 
networks among Jakarta’s elites, Firdaus Wajdi managed to secure financial 
support which was important for further dissemination of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in 
Indonesia. 
Since its inception, the YHI has been responsible mainly for fundraising 
and arranging travel plans during the visit of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani or Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani and their entourage in Indonesia. Its duties range from selecting 
places for the Sheikhs to visit or events for them to attend to booking 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 The headquarter used a pavilion building attached to Muchtony Ghani Azis’s house, one of the 
senior disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani before then moved to private residence of Soenarto in 
Permata Hijau. 155!Muhammad Hasan was former Chief of National Police between 1971 and 1974.!
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accommodation, transport, and even voorijder.156 The YHI is also involved in 
publishing, organising national gatherings, charity works, and social networking 
with other national Islamic organisations. 
During the tenure of Firdaus Wajdi, the foundation seemed concerned with 
political lobbying to secure financial support and political patronage from Jakarta’s 
elites. However, Firdaus Wajdi’s influence in the foundation sharply declined after 
Soenarto formally took over as the chairman of YHI in 2004. Unlike his 
predecessor, Soenarto is a businessman and currently the biggest financial 
supporter of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities in Indonesia. 157  He financially 
supports the foundation along with some other businessmen such as Ahmadin 
Ahmad and Malik Tarigan.158 The YHI is currently run by the younger generation 
with family connection to the financial patrons. In daily operation, the YHI is 
currently managed by Rizal Tarigan (Malik Tarigan’s son), Buddy Rakhmadi 
(Soenarto’s son), and Nasher Nasran (Ahmadin’s son).159 
The YHI routinely holds weekly dzikir rotating from one to another 
residential house. There are currently eleven houses used for this weekly dzikir 
ritual across Jakarta.  The dzikir ritual is led by one of the most senior disciples 
(Effendi Siregar) without sohbet. The regular dzikir’s attendees are mostly from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 During the visit of Sheikh Hisyam Kabbani in December 2010 for example, I observed how the 
foundation and its ranks prepared everything  down to the last  detail, from booking domestic flight 
tickets, buses, police voorijder, and establishing SMS center to documenting all the attended event 
into video live-streaming etc.     
157 Soenarto is the owner of Gurita Lintas Samudra Company, an Indonesian cargo ship company 
specializing in coal and mining shipment.   
158 Both Malik Tarigan and Ahmadin Ahmad are businessmen. Malik Tarigan is the owner of 
Kaliguma Transindo, an Indonesian freight forwarder company, whereas Ahmadin Ahmad is a 
businessman closely related to a former commander of Indonesian Special Forces, Sjahrir MS  
159 Nasher Nasran is a particularly interesting person because many testified that he is an initiated 
Shadzili’s disciple who learnt Sufism while he was studying in Damascus, Syria.  
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Jakarta’s middle-upper class background and numbered around 200 people. 
Though small in number, the YHI provide most of material resources for 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities in Indonesia thanks to its vast political networks 
and established financial support. The YHI also owns and operates a large retreat 
center in Cikereteg, Bogor.  
Yayasan Haqqani Batam (YHB) was established in September 2003. This is 
the second oldest foundation affiliated to Naqshbandi-Haqqani. The YHB was 
founded by Yandri Irzaq, the then top official at Batam Industrial Development 
Authority (Otorita Batam), with the strong support from Firdaus Wajdi, the 
founder of YHI in Jakarta. The YHB’s headquarter is located in Orchid Park D11 
Batam Centre, Batam, and is responsible for organising Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
disciples in Batam, many of whom have been initiated since July 2001. According 
to Alvian Awal, Batam is the third place – after Jakarta and Bandung – where 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani gained audience. It was initiated by Mustafa Mas’ud and 
some of his disciples who moved from Jakarta to Batam.160 
At least until 2006, the YHB was financially established thanks to the 
support from local politicians and businessmen in Batam. A few people recalled 
that some of the disciples there used their Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s affiliation to seek 
positions in the local bureaucracy and to gain financial support from the local 
government. Due to the position of its chairman, the foundation worked in close 
collaboration with the Batam Authority Agency. The YHB for instance tried to 
establish a permanent base by building a mosque on 5000 square meter plot of land 
donated by Ismet Abdullah, who was the head of Batam authorities at that time. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 Interview with Alvian Awwal, 18 October 2010 
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Sheikh Hisham Kabbani attended its opening ceremony on 11 October 2003. 
Following the downfall of its political patron (Ismet Abdullah, the then Governor 
of Riau Islands Province) in 2010 because of corruption charges, the socio-political 
influence of the YHB significantly declined. 
However, to date, the YHB still manages to maintain regular dzikr ritual 
every Tuesday and Thursday night. Muhammad Yusuf Ridwan Syafe’i was the 
principal Imam of dzikr ritual at the YHB until his death in 2011. While Yandri 
Irzaq provides material resources for running Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activity, 
Muhammad Yusuf Ridwan as Syafe’i is mainly responsible for leading the dzikr 
ritual and gives religious instruction. As the principal Imam, Muhammad Yusuf 
Ridwan is assisted by two badal (Faridudin and Abdurrahman) who run their own 
religious congregation after finishing seclusion ritual in the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
retreat center in Cikereteg, Bogor in 2007.   
Meanwhile, Yayasan Baitus Syifa (YBS) was recently established by 
Muhammad Shalahuddin in 11 November 2011. Muhammad Shalahudin was born 
on 7 August 1974 in Bandung as the third of five children of Rasyid Abdul Kadir 
and Dedeh Suryawati. He studied at secular schools and attended an Aviation 
School in Sydney, Australia in 1994. He gave up his dream to be a pilot reportedly 
after experiencing a ‘spiritual illumination’ of seeing the Prophet in a dream. 
During his stay at Surry Hill Mosque, Muhammad Shalahudin received religious 
instruction from his first spiritual master, Sheikh Jaffar, a Pakistani Qadiri master. 
Upon returning to Indonesia in early 2000, he pursued his religious study at PTIQ 
(Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Al Quran) where he had to memorize the entire Quran to 
gain the title of al hafidz.  
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Muhammad Shalahudin was initiated into Naqshbandi-Haqqani by Sheikh 
Nazim Haqqani when he visited Indonesia in May 2001. Between 2001 and 2007, 
he spent most of his time travelling across Indonesia to teach alternative healing 
methods (ruqyah and bekam). He organised those with similar skills into HHT 
(Heavenly Healing Team). At least once a year, he goes on a pilgrimage, which 
often includes a retreat, to local saints’ graveyard across Java. Among his disciples, 
Kangdin is believed to have special skills in healing methods such as ruqyah and 
bekam. Under Kangdin, zawiyah HHT disseminates the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
teachings indirectly through alternative healing campaigns carried out throughout 
Indonesia. Those who have been successfully cured by Kangdin or his team usually 
seek initiation into the Naqhshbandi-Haqqani.  
The YBS was previously known as HHT – stands for Heavenly Healing 
Team – an independent zawiya founded by Muhammad Shalahudin. The name of 
HHT was reportedly given and authorized by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in 2007. 
This group is called Heavenly Healing Team (HHT) because Muhammad 
Shalahudin organises those who have alternative healing skills. The YBS/HHT has 
currently its own permanent home base at Baytul Jalal mosque, Jl. Danau Raya No. 
4 Islamic Village Kelapa Dua, Tangerang.161 The YBS/HHT’s affiliated-zawiya is 
located in many regions such as Lampung, Tangerang, Anyer, Jakarta, Semarang, 
Garut, Karawang, and Cikampek with around 700 disciples.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161 Muhammad Shalahudin currently organizes his disciples into Baytusy Syifa Foundation aimed to 
establish a permanent Islamic educational institution. 
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6.2.4 Pesantren 
Pesantren is a typical Islamic educational institution in Indonesia where a 
Muslim scholar teaches various traditional Islamic subjects and rituals. Pesantren is 
also a traditional educational institution where Sufism and other Islamic subjects 
are taught as part of the curriculum and where Sufi devotion is practiced on a daily 
basis. The Pesantren is thus the most established institution for the preservation and 
transmission of Sufi teachings (Dhofier 1982, Zulkifli 2002).  
There are currently 12 Islamic boarding schools (Pesantren) affiliated to 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Some of them are small and modest Pesantren, but some 
others are quite large with more than 300 students. They include Pesantren 
Madaniyah (Batam), Pesantren Sirajul Huda (Karo), Pesantren Miftahul Jannah 
(Pakanbaru), Pesantren Al Falah and Sirojal Muniro (Bandung/Lembang), 
Pesantren Al Maunah and Nurul Hidayah (Depok), and Pesantren Darus Syifa al 
Fitrat (Sukabumi), Pesantren At Taufiqy (Pekalongan), Pesantren Al Falah (Kajar, 
Bondowoso), Pesantren Darus Sholawat (Takeran-Madiun), and Pesantren Asri, 
Singaraja, Bali. Of the twelve Pesantren, Pesantren At-Taufiqy/Pekalongan, 
Pesantren Al Falah/Bandung, and Pesantren Darus Syifa al Fitrat/Sukabumi are 
particularly important as centers of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia.  
Pesantren At-Taufiqy was founded and is led by KH. Taufiqurrahman 
Subki and located in Rowokembu Kaum, Wonopringgo, Southern Pekalongan. 
K.H. Taufiqurrahman Subki is a close friend of Mustafa Masud when both attended 
undergraduate study at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, back in the late 1960s in Yogyakarta. 
K.H. Taufiqurrahman Subki began his religious mission as an instructor of Quran 
reciting course in his village’s mosque in the 1970s. As the number of his students 
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grew, he decided to establish a modest pesantren close to his home. At present, 
Pesantren At Taufiqy has about 600 hundreds pupils aged between 12 and 25. The 
focus is on traditional subjects such as Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and Arabic 
grammar (nahwu and shorof).  
K.H. Taufiqurrahman Subki was appointed to be the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
representative by Sheikh Hisyam Kabbani in December 1997, and was responsible 
for overlooking Central Java region. According to some reports, K.H 
Taufiqurrahman Subki already had close connections to Naqshbandi long before 
his formal initiation in December 1997. In the middle of his pesantren, there is a 
tomb of Sheikh Abdullah Khani, believed to be one of Maulana Khalid al 
Baghdadi’s Syrian deputies sent to Java in the 19thcentury.  
Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, K.H. Taufiqurrahman Subki is a 
legendary figure and considered one of the 7007 Naqshbandi’s living saints. His 
pious reputation stems from the popular story that he had built his Pesantren by 
reciting shalawat for every piece of materials and stones he laid down on the 
foundation of the building. His pious reputation is well-known especially among 
those regularly attend his religious congregation in his Pesantren. This regular 
propagating event has attracted an average of 3000 people every Wednesday night 
since 2000. This large congregation increases dramatically during special 
commemorations such as Sheikh Abdullah Khani’s death commemoration (khaul), 
the Prophet’s birthday celebration (maulid), and so forth. KH Taufiqurrahman 
Subki always provides free meal for all those who attend the event.  
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Pesantren Al Falah is located in Cicalengka, Bandung-West Java. The 
pesantren was founded by Ahmad Syahid in 1971. At the beginning, this Islamic 
boarding school caters those specialising in Quranic recitation. This is perhaps 
related to the founder’s background as a former qori’ (Quran reciter) who won the 
first national competition of Quran recitation in Makassar in 1968. The pesantren 
then developed into a large complex providing Islamic education from kindergarten 
to tertiary levels. Pesantren Al Falah has about 2000 students in two locations, 
Cicalengka (Al Falah I) and Nagrek KM 38 (Al Falah II). KH Ahmad Syahid 
himself was initiated as a representative of Naqshbandi-Haqqani for West Java 
region during the visit of Sheikh Muhammad Hisyam Kabbani in 18 October 2000. 
At the beginning, K.H. Ahmad Syahid knew Naqshbandi-Haqqani through his 
father-in law (K.H. Yayat Ruhiyat Siroj, the leader of Pesantren Bidayah) who was 
introduced to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani through Hadid Subki’s family.162  
Ahmad Syahid spread Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings not only among his 
students but also to the surrounding community. Attended by his students and 
women from surrounding areas, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s dzikir is routinely held 
on the 17th of each month of the Islamic calendar. Since then, Pesantren Al Falah 
has become the main dzikir center of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in West Java. Naturally, 
tasawwuf in general and Naqshbandi Haqqani’s teaching in particular are not 
taught to all students at Pesantren Al Falah because these teachings are only for the 
chosen students and those who are mature enough to receive instruction.  
Ahmad Syahid is both not an ordinary Muslim scholar because he has long 
been as a seasoned politician. He became politically active by joining Golkar !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
162 Interview with Bernie Subki, 26 December 2010 
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during the New Order and was once the chairman of the advisory council to the 
National Awakening Party (PKB) of Yenny Wahid faction. It is perhaps because of 
his political activity that for many Haqqani’s disciples, K.H. Ahmad Syahid is less 
popular than other representatives as a spiritual guide.   
Meanwhile, Pesantren Darus Syifa Al Fitrat is located in the village of 
Cipetir, Sukabumi, West Java. Pesantren Darus Syifa al Fitrat is currently led by 
K.H. Ence Supriyatna. From modest beginnings, this pesantren developed into a 5 
hectares modern complex through generous donations from Soenarto’s family, the 
chairman of Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia. The name of Al Fitrat was named after 
Soenarto’s wife. It has currently about 2500 students from junior to senior high 
school’s age. According to some sources, K.H. Ece Supriyatna was previously a 
salafi-type scholar. After being initiated into Naqshbandi-Haqqani in early 2000, 
the Pesantren routinely conducts mawlid performance and dzikir at the suggestion 
of Sheikh Hisyam Kabbani. This Islamic boarding school is a regular destination 
when Sheikh Hisham visits Indonesia.  
Overall, the four principal institutions are independent of each other but 
together they are the backbone of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s community in Indonesia. 
Together, they play an important role as intermediary institutions to interact and 
cooperate with other Muslim organisations. Through these four principal 
organisations, Naqshbandi-Haqqani manages to maintain its presence and directly 
contributes to the expansion and consolidation of Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement 
in Indonesia. All those institutions also serve the practical purpose of maintaining 
day-to-day activities and, more importantly, enable Naqshbandi-Haqqani as a 
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missionary group to expand and establish a good relationship with other Muslim 
figures and mainstream Islamic organisations in Indonesia.  
Though they all share function as dzikir centre, the four types of institution 
are different in some respects. The difference in institutional arrangement stems 
from differences in socio-religious backgrounds, geographical context, sources of 
funding, degree of institutionalization, and type of activity. This difference affects 
the organising capacity of these instutions, as well as their effectiveness in 
mobilising people and material resources. Naqshbandi-Haqqani practically adopts a 
combination of traditional and modern organising structure based on specific 
division of labor and distinct organisational roles. In this sense, the expansion of 
Naqshabandi-Haqqani is not as miraculous as commonly claimed by its disciples. 
 TABLE!1.4!COMPARISON!OF!NAQSHBANDI:HAQQANI’S!INSTITUTIONAL!ARRANGEMENT!
 Zawiya She lter  Pesantren Yayasan 
Geograph ica l 
Context 
Urban & rural Urban  Rural Urban 
Soc ia l  Background 
of D isc ip les 
NU Ex-Tarbiyah & 
Jamaah Tabligh 
 
 NU Muhammadiyah 
Type of Act iv i ty Ritual-Social Socio-religious  Education  Social 
 
Source of Fund ing Voluntary donation Sponsor  Self-sufficient Permanent 
Funder 
Degree of 
Inst i tut iona l i sat ion 
Informal Semi-Formal  Semi-Formal Formal  
 
Since 2009 Naqshbandi-Haqqani has focused on consolidating its existence 
in Indonesia. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani seems to realize that it is simply impossible 
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to maintain mass initiation without provoking and even inciting suspicion from 
other Sufi and established Islamic organisations in Indonesia.  Consolidation means 
that the current priority is not initiating more people into Naqshbandi-Haqqani, but 
to establish contact with Naqshbandi’s networks across Indonesia.  Naqshbandi-
Haqqani is concerned to create a friendly religious environment in which 
traditional Sufi teachings in particular and Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah religious 
tenets in general are respected and, if possible, held by other Islamic organisations 
and lay Muslims.  
While maintaining its basic characteristic as a spiritual movement, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani has also been preparing itself as an established propagating 
(da’wah) movement and educational institution. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has been 
trying to shift his focus to establishing a relatively small but solid institutional basis 
with strong financial support, loyal and well-connected disciples who would be 
able to secure political protection and a vast social network reaching out to a 
broader audience. Since 2009, he has given up mass initiation and has become 
more selective in his choice of disciples.  
 Given the internal dynamics among his disciples and the broader Islamic 
environment in Indonesia, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s decisions seem realistic 
enough. He is fully aware that expanding his mission throughout Indonesia will be 
very costly, and the current Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s social base cannot fully support 
this mission yet.163 Instead of pushing his disciples to support his propagating 
mission, he gives freedom to his disciples to run their own activities and also to 
establish and expand their own organisations for propagating purposes.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 Interview with Nursyafaat, 19 November 2010 
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Nevertheless, Jakarta is still very important for Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
because it is where the wealthiest disciples live. In 2008, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani 
initiated another powerful financial supporter of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Hendro 
Martowardoyo, a banker and businessman, joined Naqshbandi-Haqqani in August 
2008 and since then he has been, along with Soenarto, an important financial 
supporter.164  Through Hendro Martowardoyo’s financial support, Gibril Fouad 
Haddad, one of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s deputies, is able to visit Indonesia on 
regular basis to guide Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Jakarta and other regions.  
 
6.3 Schism and Internal Dynamics  
As a social movement, Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia is by no means a 
single entity because the disciples are organised into various different institutions. 
They come from very diverse social backgrounds and give allegiance to numerous 
different local leaders. Each of them also has different aspiration and expectation. 
It is quite surprising that as a social movement based on strong religious conviction, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani community also has internal divergence and friction that 
divide this Sufi movement into various factions with different orientation. The 
nature of this divergence is mostly personal but then disperses to the group as a 
whole. This situation also creates a ‘free-rider’ problem – a situation in which there 
are those who want to get benefits without making a contribution – that often leads 
to divergence and contestation over resources, leadership and religious authority.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
164 Hendro Martowardojo is a prominent banker at Niaga Bank, chief commissioner of Resources 
Alam Indonesia, and treasurer at Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina. He was also a committee member at 
Yayasan Pendidikan Al Azhar.   
! 191!
The internal conflict has actually started since 1997, not long after the first 
visit of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in Jakarta. This involved the top ranks of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, especially between Firdaus Wajdi and Mustafa 
Mas’ud. Between 1997 and 2004, the disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani consisted 
mainly of the so-called Hasbi and Brawijaya group referring to both Mustafa 
Mas’ud’s and Firdaus Wajdi’s residential address, respectively.165 The reason for 
the conflict was not completely clear because different people had different 
versions of what happened.  
For some, this simply showed a lack of respect on the part of Firdaus Wajdi 
toward Mustafa Mas’ud.166 As a person who has a long experience and strong 
political connections to Jakarta’s elite circle, Firdaus Wajdi tends to underestimate 
Mustafa Mas’ud who comes from a modest student activist background. Others 
blame this conflict on Mustafa Mas’ud’s immoderate style in his role as a 
representative. 167  For instance, Mustafa Mas’ud reportedly put the title of al 
Haqqani behind his name and placed his own name on the chain of silsilah, 
contrary to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s own instruction for not doing so.168 He also 
encouraged his disciples to perform rabitah (imagining the face of the master) 
ritual directly to Sheikh Nazim Haqqani rather indirectly through Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani. One informant also recalled that in the early days, Mustafa Mas’ud 
obliged all the initiated students to come visit him at his home where he would lead 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
165 There was then a permanent zawiya in Bandung and Batam. In Bandung, Hadid Subki gathered 
around 15 disciples whereas in Batam, Mustafa Mas’ud established a zawiya with around 25 people 
in 2001. Interview with Samson Nasarudin, 1 October 2010 and Medi Kusmedi, 3 October 2010  
166 This narrative is common among students close to Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud at zawiya Hasbi.  
167 Interview with Ahmad Mubarok, 21 September 2010 
168 Mustafa Mas’ud refused this accusation because he said that he simply used the title given 
personally by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani during the first visit in April 1997, not from his own will. 
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all the rituals. On some special occasions, he even asked his students to stay the 
whole night, a practice which was considered as too demanding.169 
On the other hand, there are also those who attribute this conflict to 
personal dislike between the two due to their different social backgrounds and 
political orientation. As a person with Muhammadiyah background, Firdaus Wajdi 
reportedly dislikes Mustafa Mas’ud who comes from NU’s background. There are 
even those who believe this conflict originated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
when both were student activists. Mustafa Mas’ud admitted that he was an ex-PMII 
(Indonesia Islamic Student Movement) student activist and was very much 
influenced by his political mentor, Subhan ZE (1931-1973). 170  He indirectly 
denounced the pragmatist approach taken by some ex-HMI (Islamic Student 
Association) student activist like Firdaus Wajdi toward the New Order. As a strong 
supporter of Golkar, Firdaus Wajdi was reportedly worried that Sheikh Nazim and 
Hisham Kabbani’s charisma would be used by Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud for his own 
political interests especially for boosting PPP’s influence. 171  Mustafa Masud 
recalled an incident when Firdaus Wajdi, without giving any prior explanation, 
cancelled a planned trip of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in East Java though there were 
already thousands of PPP’s supporters waiting for them in the city park of Tuban 
during the 2004 campaign time.  
During the Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency (1999-2001), Naqshbandi-
Haqqani managed to establish contact with the inner circle of the President.  It !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169 Interview with Sutono Joyosuparto, 14 August 2010 170!Subhan ZE refers to Subhan Zaenuri Ehsan (, a prominent NU politician and businessman who 
actively involved in mobilising political support in the early days of the New Order.!
171 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010 
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began in 1999 when Sheikh Hisham met the President at the palace. This meeting 
was made possible through the help of Mustafa Mas’ud who used his Jombang-
NU’s connection to get in touch with the President. President Wahid met Sheikh 
Nazim during the latter visit in Indonesia. The President was initiated in 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani. It took place during their meeting at the Grand Melia Hotel, 
Jakarta, on 2 May 2001. President Wahid was reported seeking for spiritual counsel 
from Sheikh Nazim amid mounting pressure from his political opponents.  
Perhaps because of this that Sheikh Hisham once gambled his religious 
authority to defend the President during the political turmoil in 2001. According to 
Mustafa Mas’ud, Sheikh Hisham summoned Firdaus Wajdi, the founder and 
financial supporter of Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia, to come to Michigan where he 
warned the latter not to continue his personal involvement in the efforts to topple 
the then President Abdurrahman Wahid from power. There was a widely circulated 
story within Naqshbandi-Haqqani community that Firdaus Wajdi, along with his 
HMI’s networks and political colleagues, opposed Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
presidency and even actively involved in the efforts for toppling the President.  
In 2003, Firdaus Wajdi attempted to broker the meeting between Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani and the then President Megawati to whom Firdaus Wajdi at the 
time support her bid for presidency in the coming 2004 Presidential election. He 
arranged the meeting between the two in Yogyakarta during Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani’s visit there in early July 2003. The arranged meeting however failed to 
materialise because Megawati and her inner circle cancelled it at the last minutes 
right before it actually took place. Some attributed this failure to Megawati’s 
religious background which comes from abangan. Because of this background, her 
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refusal to see Sheikh Hisham was perceived as a deeply unsympathetic attitude 
toward Islam. Others, however, related this incident simply as representing 
personal disrespect and symbolic loss of face  for Megawati that indirectly 
contributed to her failure to win a second term. Ironically, this failure directly led 
to the decline of Firdaus Wajdi’s influence within the YHI in particular and 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s community in general.  
Although he denied all accusations, Mustafa Mas’ud indirectly confirmed 
that he was then indeed a politically-minded person. For instance, he admitted that 
he was personally close to PPP due to his good personal relationship with 
Djamaludin Tarigan (d. 1998), a senior central committee member of the United 
Development Party (PPP). On a few occasions during the interview, Mustafa 
Mas’ud did not even try to conceal his strong opposition against Golkar and 
Soeharto’s policy toward the Muslim community. He especially referred to his 
opposition to the decision of his distant cousin, the late KH Mustain Romli, to join 
Golkar in 1975. He even acknowledged that at certain point he indeed dreamt 
Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani could somehow help in revitalising 
NU’ political influence in Indonesia.  
It was not surprising that because of Firdaus Wajdi’s interference, Mustafa 
Mas’ud was no longer involved in the establishment of the Yayasan Haqqani 
Indonesia since December 2000. Muhammad Hasan and other senior disciples of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani insisted that Mustafa Mas’ud should be included, but Farid 
Wajdi refused to comply.172 Under Firdaus Wajdi’s influence, the YHI’s inner 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 Muhammad Hasan (1920-2005) was an advisor of the Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia. He was 
former chief of Indonesia National Police (1971-1974) and one of the early patrons of Naqshbandi-
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circles also excluded Mustafa Mas’ud from leading dzikir and any other collective 
rituals conducted by YHI. The YHI’s financial supporters also refused to fund 
Mustofa Mas’ud activities in spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings in 
Indonesia, though Sheikh Hisham Kabbani encouraged them to do so. 
 
 
FIGURE 6. INTERNAL FRICTION WITHIN NAQSHBANDI-HAQQANI COMMUNITY  
IN INDONESIA !
This internal conflict greatly affected the development of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani. Those who supported Mustafa Mas’ud’s position formed their own 
congregation which led to the creation of FORNAQSDA, while those sided with 
Firdaus Wajdi gathered into the Yayasan faction. Interestingly, most of the senior 
disciples who were previously close to Mustafa Mas’ud chose to leave him and 
organise their own dzikir gathering in Yayasan with Effendi Siregar (Sheikh !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!
Haqqani in Indonesia. He became the disciple of Naqshbandi-Haqqani through his daughter, Ella 
Effendi Siregar in late 1990s and he had a very good relationship with Mustafa Mas’ud.  
YHI!
Rabbani!Cinere!
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Aweng) as the Imam. Meanhile, those who were neutral preferred to stay away 
from both groups and conducted the rituals on their own. Surprisingly, this internal 
schism did not prevent new disciples from joining.  
As the number of disciples steadily grew, Firdaus Wajdi became involved 
in another internal battle, this time against the newly initiated young disciples of 
urban background.  Like most senior disciples, he particularly resented the use of 
music, whirling, and distinct physical symbols which were popular especially 
among young disciples.173 The conflict began to escalate and became increasingly 
intolerable when Firdaus Wajdi openly challenged Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s 
religious authority.  
In 2001, he was reportedly summoned and given a warning by Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani to stop his active involvement in the attempts to topple the then 
President Abdurrahman Wahid. He reportedly went to Fenton, Michigan on Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani’s request and became furious when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani 
simply told him not to go further with his political activities.174 In 2004, he also 
refused Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s request for fundraising to support the YHI’s 
involvement in the ICIS conference in Jakarta.175 In the very same year, he once 
again sparked controversy among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia 
when he managed to persuade Yandri Irzaq of Yayasan Haqqani Batam (YHB) to 
invite Sheikh Adnan Kabbani in a deliberate attempt to counter balance his 
brother’s influence among Indonesian disciples.176 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
173 Interview with Muhammad Shalahudin, 20 October 2010 
174 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010  
175 Interview with Muhammad Solahudin, 14 August 2010 
176 Interview with Alvian Awwal, October 2010 
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Firdaus Wajdi’s bid for power backfired when his close associates turned 
against him.  His actions antagonised fellow disciples who still respected Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani’s religious authority. Firdaus Wajdi also met with fierce 
resistance from younger disciples because they could not accept that Firdaus Wajdi 
and other senior disciples limiting access to and, to some extent, even 
monopolising the attention of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. Firdaus Wajdi’s maneuvers 
went on unchecked because he controlled most of the resources. Events in 2004, 
however, changed everything.  
With strong support from Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani 
took actions to end this internal schism. He realized that internal schism posed a 
threat to his movement. There are several actions taken by Sheikh Hisham to 
address this problem. First, he instructed Mustafa Mas’ud to completely shift his 
preaching activity from Jakarta to other regions. For instance, Mustafa went and 
established the first dzikir center in Batam in 2001. After the death of his wife in 
2003, Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud completely shifted his attention and focused his 
mission on spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani outside Jakarta. For Mustafa Mas’ud 
himself, this was a win-win solution following his growing isolation in Jakarta. Yet, 
he still guides those who remain loyal to him in Jakarta. 
Sheikh Hisham then appointed Soenarto as the new chairman of Yayasan 
Haqqani Indonesia (YHI) in December 2004. Following this decision, though not 
completely renouncing his affiliation to Naqshbandi-Haqqani, Firdaus Wajdi was 
no longer involved in the day-to-day activities of YHI. After this, Soenarto 
gradually replaced Firdaus Wajdi as the most important financial supporter of YHI, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!
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providing material support that enables Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to visit Indonesia 
more regularly.  
Under the new chairman Soenarto, the schism did not entirely disappear yet. 
The new schisms and internal conflicts afterwards involved contestation over 
religious authority, leadership, and resources.  This internal conflict was a direct 
result of the growing number of disciples and institutions affiliated themselves to 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani. In Jakarta alone, there were five institutions: Yayasan 
Haqqani Indonesia, Zawiya Hasbi, Rabbani Cinere, Rumi Café, and, Zawiya HHT. 
They all have their own local leaders claiming religious authority and control over 
resources.  
For instance, those in YHI claimed sole authority in organising 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia and denounced those who refused to 
accept it.  The argument is that because the YHI was established by direct order 
from Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, all the disciples must follow the Yayasan’s direction 
in their religious activities. On the other hand, those who are not in the YHI (most 
prominently zawiya Hasbi) refuse to recognize the claim, and insist that, as a Sufi 
movement, Naqshbandi-Haqqani cannot be established through institutional 
framework an sich. Only those who have enough religious knowledge can be 
spiritual guide.  
Though the Yayasan has abundant material resources, it does not have a 
capable spiritual guide who can meet the spiritual needs of disciples. The yayasan 
has only an Imam to lead dzikir, but not a spiritual guide, hence it has absolutely no 
religious authority to provide spiritual guidance. For non-YHI members, the 
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Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s religious authority should be put in the hand of those who 
have adequate religious knowledge (‘alim) and are bestowed with personal 
qualities of a spiritual guide.  
As a matter of fact, both Rabbani Cinere and Rumi Café were established as 
a result of growing disappointment among young disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
to exclusive and elitist approaches taken by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia (YHI) in 
spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s religious messages. 177  At the beginning, the 
Rabbani Cinere was among the favorites of Sheikh Hisham. With the help of 
Sheikh Hisham, the Rabbani Cinere group for instance managed to invite Abdul 
Wahid from Melbourne to teach some young disciples of Rumi’s whirling 
dervishes (sema’) at Zawiya Rabbani Cinere for two months in 2006.  
Ironically, the Rabbani Cinere then also split into some smaller groups. 
While Eri Barkah Saridria and Zalyati maintained their allegiance to Abu Tufail, 
Sheikh Zulfikar and Arif Hamdani established their own group following their split 
from the Rabbani Cinere. Sheikh Zulfikar has been conducting dzikir ritual at his 
own house in Pamulang since 2007 and Arif Hamdani soon followed the path by 
co-founding Rumi Café along with Muchsin Mulaela in 2008. Later, Arif Hamdani 
also split from Rumi Café and established his own congregation named Pondok 
Rumi after his personal dispute with financial supporter of Rumi Café, Hendro 
Martowardoyo.  
The internal divergence and friction indeed pose organisational challenge to 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Indonesia. The nature of the conflict and its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
177 There is widespread view among those I encountered at Rumi Café that the ranks of Yayasan 
Haqqani Indonesia concern to keep Sheikh Nazim and Sheikh Hisyam only for themselves. 
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consequences raises question about its endurance as a social and religious 
movement. The internal dynamics within Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement in 
Indonesia demonstrates that internal divergence is not necessarily negative. 
Growing challenge to address the divergence and friction force the Naqshbandi-
Haqqani community to rely back on their strength as a Sufi movement.  
 
6.4 Cohesion and Collective Solidarity 
As aforementioned in the previous section, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
community in Indonesia has been struggling in managing organisational dynamics 
and simultaneously maintaining internal cohesion among the disciples and 
collective solidarity within the group. Cohesiveness has to do with leadership skill 
to maintain degree of unity within the movement, whereas collective solidarity is 
partly related to a sense of belonging as a group arising from common purposes 
and shared emotional ties.  
In this sense, cohesiveness and solidarity are less about instrumental 
rationality and logical calculation. Rather, they involve various emotive 
expressions such as trust, love, comfort and joy. Emotive religious experience 
resulted from close relationship with the Sufi master and nurtured by intense ritual 
practices is a powerful motivating factor for keeping the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
disciples in Indonesia intact and committed to the movement. Instead of developing 
a complex mechanism of organisational discipline, Naqshbandi-Haqqani relies 
back to charismatic authority and communal ritual to address this internal 
divergence.   
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Sheikh Hisham plays a central role in addressing the internal divergence 
and maintaining collective solidarity within the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in 
Indonesia. He seems to be fully aware that his disciples are far than united entity. 
By exerting his spiritual authority as a spiritual guru, Sheikh Hisham always 
reminds his disciples to stay focus. He would not denounce internal divergence 
schism and conflict at once but frame them as a natural part of continuous inner 
struggle to fight ego or nafs. It is framed as part of self-purification process that 
one has to deal with before being uplifted to better spiritual station (maqom). This 
self-purification can be achieved through constantly performing private and 
communal ritual as prescribed by the master when a disciple joins the movement at 
the first place.   
 
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrates that Sufi guide increasingly relies on a complex 
and relatively sophisticated organising structure to lead and mobilise its disciples. I 
relate the development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesian to its organisational 
capacity. Growing number of disciples is followed by the establishment of 
hierarchical leadership structure. Resource mobilisation provides organisational 
capacity and material also plays a significant part in organising growing number of 
disciples. Resources mobilisation involves the use of materials, social networks, 
and organisation. The institutional innovation and decentralised organisational 
structure of Sufi movement go hand in hand with the flourishing of ‘regional cult’ 
of charismatic model as proposed by Werbner in a sense that a charismatic leader 
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increasingly shares, rather than monopolises, his religious authority with 
designated representative or deputy. 
Despite its institutional innovation and modern organising structure, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani remains to maintain its typical nature as a Sufi movement. 
Personal charisma still plays an important role for the existence of any Sufi 
movement. Sufi sheikh is still preoccupied with initiating new disciples and 
guiding the old ones through the embodiment of charisma and emotive religious 
rituals. Emotive and passionate religious expressions are important in attracting 
people to join and maintaining commitment to stay in the group. This emotive-
passionate expression is mainly centered on personal appeal of the masters and the 
performance of collective ritual. Intimate and emotive environment generate 
passionate mobilisation Passionate mobilisation also has to do with the role of Sufi 
rituals in cultivating collective solidarity among the disciples. Yet, personal 
charisma still has a strong appeal and is even deliberately reproduced to maintain 
solidarity and internal social cohesion.  
!
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Chapter 7 
THE AKBARI  LEGACY AND MILLENARIANISM  
Mys t i c i sm,  I s l amic  Lega l i sm,  and  Po l i t i ca l  I s l amism  
 
For more than three decades, the Naqshbandiyya has attracted considerable 
scholarly attention, unmatched by any of the other Sufi brotherhoods in Islam. 
This interest has largely been due to the realization that in the eight centuries or so 
of its existence masters affiliated with the Naqshbandi tradition, and with its major 
successive Mujaddidi and Khalidi offshoots, time and again acquired positions of 
influence with the rulers of the day and within their respective communities. Such 
outstanding political and social involvement has been employed by scholars not 
only to discredit the once prevalent view about the decline of latter-day Islam, but 
also to demonstrate that Sufism played an important role in framing the Muslim 
world’s response to modernity (Weismann 2007, xii). 
 
 
This chapter endeavours to explicate the teachings of Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
that attempt to reconcile the maintenance of Sunni orthodoxy on the one hand and 
socio-political activism on the other hand. This explication addresses in particular 
the question of how Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings provide a basic framework 
for collective action. I argue that Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings attempt to 
reconcile mysticism, Islamic legalism, and political Islamism. Based on written 
materials, online publications, direct observations and in-depth interviews, I try to 
give a nuanced discussion of the relationship between religious teachings and the 
formation of Islamic activism.  
This chapter is divided into five parts. First, it will examine the roots of the 
distinct Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s Sufi teachings by focusing on the influence of Ibn 
Arabi’s ideas. Second, it will examine the theological and doctrinal positions of 
Sunni orthodoxy and the difference between Naqshbandi-Haqqani and other 
Islamic movements, particularly Wahabi-Salafism. Third, it will examine 
 204 
Naqshabandi-Haqqani’s millenarian-apocalyptic beliefs by focusing on various 
notions such as the Signs of the Hour and Armageddon (Qiyamah), the coming of 
Mahdi (Sahibus Zaman), Isa ibn Maryam (Jesus Christ), Dajjal (Anti-Christ) and 
Juj wa ma’juj (Gog and Magog). Fourth, it will examine Naqshabandi-Haqqani’s 
socio-political views especially its rejection of political Islamism, radicalism and 
violence. Finally, this chapter will conclude by re-emphasizing the argument put 
forward at the beginning. 
 
7.1 Naqshbandi-Haqqani and the Influence of Akbari ideas  
The term Akbari refers to Sufi ideas and teachings introduced by the 
Shaikhul Akbar, Muhyiddin ibn ‘Arabi (1165-1240), an Arab Andalusian mystic 
who was hailed as one of the greatest and most prolific Muslim philosophers, poets 
and scholars in Islamic history (Knysh, 1999). He was born in Murcia Andalusia in 
present-day Spain and travelled extensively across the Middle East during his 
lifetime. He died and was buried in Damascus in 1240. He wrote more than 350 
manuscripts that have survived to modern times. Some of his acclaimed works 
include Futuhat al Makiyya (The Revelation of Mecca)–a vast encyclopedia of 
spiritual knowledge which unites and distinguishes the three strands of tradition, 
reason and mystical insight–; Fusus al Hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom)–an 
exposition of the inner meaning of the wisdom of the prophets in the Judaic/ 
Christian/Islamic tradition–; and Diwan–a fine collection of poetry expounding his 
spiritual experience.     
The influence of Akbari ideas is not openly acknowledged because of the 
controversial nature of Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi and his teachings among mainstream 
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Sunni scholars. His supposedly wahdatul wujud (the unity of being) idea, for 
example, is often cited as evidence of his antinomian view that is incongruent with 
tawhid (the Oneness of God) as the basic pillar of Islamic belief. However, the 
influence of Akbari ideas among Naqshbandi’s masters has a long historical 
precedence and dates from as far back as Ubaidillah Ahrar in the 14th century to 
Khalid al Baghdadi in the 19th century (Algar: 1991:45-66). As a matter of fact, 
since the late 19th century, Turkey, Lebanon and Syria have been in fact a fertile 
ground for the revitalization of Akbari ideas in a concerted opposition to the 
encroaching Western influences of late Ottoman Rule (Weismann, 2001:145).178 
Akbari ideas provide a philosophical, ethical and practical basis for the superiority 
of Sufism in general and Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings in particular compared 
to other Islamic groups.  
The influence of Akbari ideas perhaps derives from the long acquaintance 
between Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani and Nazim Haqqani during their stay in 
Damascus. The great admiration toward Ibn Arabi and the influence of his teaching 
on Naqshbandi-Haqqani can be found in Mercy Oceans, Mystical Secrets of the 
Last Days, Angels Unveiled, The Muhammadan Light, and numerous sohbet 
delivered by Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani. Interestingly, Abdullah 
Faiz Dagestani’s house in Maidan district was located in a place overlooking the 
burial site of Ibn Arabi. This location is important in that it symbolizes a 
continuous spiritual connection between Abdullah Faiz Dagestani and Ibn Arabi.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 In Damascus, the Akbari ideas were embraced by many Naqshbandi-Khalidi masters/scholars 
associated with Abdul Qadir al Jazairi (1808-1883), an Algerian Sufi resistance leader who was 
exiled in Damascus in 1855. 
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Some aspects of Akbari ideas that are popular among Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
are al haqiqatul al Muhammadiya (the reality of Muhammad), al insan al kamil 
(the perfect human being), walaya (sainthood), and kashf (spiritual unveiling). 
These four religious concepts epitomize the spiritual vision, religious discourse and 
Sufi teachings of Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani. Framing Abdullah Faiz 
Dagestani’s spiritual visions within the Akbari theosophical ideas, Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani have endeavoured to demonstrate the authenticity of 
their master’s teachings and the legitimate status of his spiritual visions.  
Preoccupation with millenarian ideas, eschatology and prophesy, which are 
the hallmark of contemporary Naqshbandi-Haqqani, are some of the signature 
themes that can also be found in Ibn ‘Arabi’s spiritual visions as revealed in his 
many works.  Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani always reiterate 
Abdullah Faiz Dagestani’s background as uneducated and illiterate to establish his 
superior spiritual claims. Emphasizing the master’s background, Naqshbandi-
Haqqani seems to achieve two important things:  first, to prove that Sheikh 
Abdullah Faiz Dagestani has indeed a miraculous legacy resembling the Prophet 
Muhammad as the ummi (illiterate) and second, to make a convincing case that 
Sheikh Abdullah Faiz’s religious knowledge comes directly from God and the 
Prophet through mystical-spiritual illumination and was not achieved through 
learning and systematic study.  
Al Haqiqatul al Muhammadiya is derived from a metaphysical view that the 
Prophet Muhammad is a manifestation of the light of Allah. As such, Nur 
Muhammad (the light of the Prophet) is regarded as the primary substance of all 
other creations and that of any other preceding creations. It relies on Ibn ‘Arabi ‘s 
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interpretation in Futuhat al Makiyya of the verse “There has come to you a Light 
from Allah, and a Manifest Book” (Quran 5:15). Relying on Ibn ‘Arabi, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources explain that God then divided this very first light into 
four parts to create kalam (the pen), lauhul mahfudz (the preserved tablet), arsy’ 
(the Divine Throne); from the fourth, God created all other things.179 Given this, 
the Prophet Muhammad is conceived as embodying two separate but closely 
related existences as a human being (maqam bashariya) and as a divine spirit 
(maqam uluhiya). These two existences are exemplified in the testimony of 
sahadat requiring a professed Muslim to affirm Allah as One God and the Prophet 
Muhammad as His messenger. The unity of tawhid is complete only if a professed 
Muslim affirms both, not just one. Consequently, pure tawhid (Oneness of God) is 
to be upheld through total submission to God’s will and complete veneration of the 
Prophet.   
Related to its view of Al Haqiqatul al Muhammadiya, Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
also follows Ibn ‘Arabi’s idea of al Insan al Kamil (the perfect human being). Ibn 
‘Arabi, in Fusus al Hikam, suggests that humanity attains its ultimate perfection as 
exemplified by personal characters of the Prophet Muhammad. This is based on the 
Prophet Muhammad sayings that he was already in existence while Adam was in 
between ‘water and clay’. The Prophet Muhammad is thus an example of al Insan 
al Kamil (the perfect human being) whose existence and moral character became a 
model for human beings. The Prophet Muhammad is also an exemplary human 
being whose essence provided the existential paradigm for humanity in 
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179 http://nurmuhammad.com/NurNabi/creationlightofmuhammad.htm 
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general.  Rather than the one who overcomes fear in himself, the Perfect Man is 
instead one who overcomes, through God, the fear of what is other than Him.  
The religious conception of walaya (sainthood) is closely related to Ibn 
‘Arabi’s idea of nubuwwa (Prophethood). As suggested by Chodkiewicz (1993), 
Ibn ‘Arabi distinguished two related notions in nubuwwa: nubuwwa tashri’ and 
nubuwwa ‘amma. Nubuwwa tashri’ refers to the idea that God appointed certain 
messengers to teach humanity about certain legislation and this had stopped with 
the coming of Prophet Muhammad who was the last and ultimate messenger 
(khatm nabiyyin). However, nubuwwa ‘amma or non-legislative prophethood will 
always be present till the end of the world as a sign of mercy from God. The 
nubuwwa ‘amma refers to the elect or the chosen people who master not only 
exoteric but also esoteric dimensions of religion. After the Prophet Muhammad, the 
nubuwwa ‘amma or walaya will represent Prophet Muhammad to revitalise his true 
message and teachings. According to Ibn ‘Arabi, the Prophet Isa ibn Maryam 
(Jesus Christ) will be the seal of walaya, someone who has both spiritual and 
worldly authority to reveal the true meaning of the Prophethood.   
Based on Ibn ‘Arabi’s conception of walaya, Naqshbandi-Haqqani believes 
that the Prophet and the living saints give constant spiritual guidance to human 
beings at any given time. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has said that in total there are 
124,000 living saints in every generation. These saints are ranked according to the 
hierarchy of sainthood. Of 124,000 saints, there are 7,007 saints with higher status, 
of these 7,007 there are another 313 with higher status, another 40 with higher 
status than 313 saints, 5 with higher than 40 saints, and above all, there is one saint 
with the supreme status (the king of saints). The 124,000 resemble the number of 
 209 
Prophets, whereas 313 are the number of messengers sent by God to the world. The 
7,007 and 313 saints are reserved exclusively for the Naqshbandi lineage, whereas 
the 40 represent the founders of another 40 different Sufi orders (Kabbani 2004c, 
638). 
Through his conception of kashf (spiritual unveiling), Ibn ‘Arabi also 
postulates that spiritual experience (direct experience to sense God’s existence) is 
real and a source of religious knowledge. This conception derives from Ibn 
‘Arabi’s own spiritual visions of seeing Prophet Moses, Jesus and Muhammad.  
This knowledge is not achieved through ordinary sensory perception and mind-
logic but through visions and dreams. It is based on the Prophetic tradition that 
says that when the Prophethood and revelation cease to exist, visions and dreams 
will guide the believers (Knysh, 2012:2). Based on this, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani 
and Hisham Kabbani put strong emphasis on the importance of dreams and 
spiritual visions as part of spiritual experience. Seeing the Prophet in a dream, for 
instance, has a very deep spiritual meaning. However, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani 
makes a clear demarcation between true and false kashf. If a dream or vision is 
true, it must be followed as long as it does not violate shariah provisions.     
Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani devote their mission to 
revitalising Islam in the modern world by promoting the love of the Prophet 
(mahabbah fi rasul) and the importance of dzikr and other supererogatory rituals. 
They also believe that personal and moral cultivation can only be achieved through 
constant seeking of subjective religious experience, strictly following shariah, and 
maintaining the unity of Muslim ummah. Framing Abdullah Faiz Dagestani’s 
religious discourse and teachings in the legacy of Ibn ‘Arabi, Sheikh Nazim 
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Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani therefore personify themselves as Muslim revivers 
and spiritual guides who are involved in the struggle for religious reform and moral 
cultivation to counterbalance the excessive Mu’tazilite-style of speculative rational 
thinking, the taqlid limitations and rigid legalism of Muslim jurists (fuqaha), 
modern secular-scientific modes of thinking, and technological and scientific 
advancement that has been inflicted upon the Muslim ummah. Their insistence on 
upholding madzhab and on a millenarian-apocalyptic belief with a strong 
opposition to radicalism and political Islamism distinguish them from other Islamic 
groups.  
 
7.2 Millenarian-Apocalyptic Beliefs and Islamic Eschatology   
Millenarian belief has long been identified as one of the main ideological 
forces in traditional peasant societies in Asia and Africa (Hobsbawm 1959, 
Worsley 1968, Burridge 1969, Kartodirdjo 1966, 1971, 1973, 1984). There are also 
those who suggest that millenarian-apocalyptic ideas, though not mainstream, are 
well-established within the Islamic tradition, stemming from social turmoil and 
political crisis (Cook 1997, 2002, 2005, Filiu 2011).  All these scholarly studies 
imply that millenarian-apocalyptic belief plays a significant role in driving popular 
revolutionary and socio-political movements because it sets a high religious 
commitment and offers a coherent and total vision of socio-religious change. The 
idea of the Mahdi in Islam has been used to rally support for moral purification, 
armed struggle, economic demands, and political protest (Furnish 1999, 22).  
Since its inception, millenarian-apocalyptic belief has been a signature 
theme for Naqshbandi-Haqqani (2006, 122, Habibis 1989, 225, 1990, 605, Atay 
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1994, 200). Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, this millenarian-apocalyptic 
belief is primarily attributed to spiritual unveilings (kashf) that the Grand Sheikh 
Abdullah Faiz Dagestani had during his five years of seclusion (c.1908-1913) and 
his near-death experience after being shot during his service in the Ottoman army 
in the First World War (1914-1918). According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources, 
Sheikh Abdullah Faiz predicted in advance the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and 1973 
in which Arab forces would be defeated. He predicted that ‘Islamic spirituality 
would be popular in England’.  
He made prophesies that “there would be a war in the Gulf area involving 
the whole world”, “Germany and England would lead the whole of Europe”, and 
“in Germany there would be a saint assigned by the Mahdi and Jesus who would 
raise and train people there in spirituality”. He also prophesied that “‘there would 
be a big change in the approach of Arabs to politics, one powerful regime was 
going to change to a better way of government”, “communism would collapse”, 
and “a peace deal would occur between Israel and Arab which the United States 
would broker”. In addition, he also predicted that “in the midst of peace, suddenly 
there would be an attack and invasion of Turkey by a close neighboring country 
that would lead to a big war causing a great disaster across the world during which 
the Mahdi would come forth and Jesus Christ would return on earth”.180 
This millenarian-apocalyptic belief was at the beginning only transmitted 
orally (sohbet). Afterwards it was disseminated globally through written materials 
and online publications by his deputy (Sheikh Hisham Kabbani) and other 
disciples. This openly proclaimed millenarian-apocalyptic belief is certainly one of 
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180 http://naqshbandi.org/chain/39.htm, accessed 20 June 2011 
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the main features distinguishing Naqshbandi-Haqqani from other Sufi movements 
in Indonesia. In a translated book entitled Kiamat Mendekat: Kronika Terobosan 
Ilmiah dan Peristiwa Akhir Zaman yang Membuktikan Ramalan Nabi,181 Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani has stated that his master attempted to elaborate an established 
eschatological view among Sunni Muslims and addressed this distinctive teaching 
to both fellow Muslims and Western people.  
Through this book, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani echoed his master in his 
attempts to provide a textual basis from the Quran and Prophetic tradition (hadits) 
as well as compelling scientific evidence that the Muslim community has passed a 
thousand years in triumph and currently lives within the five hundred years of 
decline that will soon be revived by the Mahdi and Jesus Christ. The emphasis on 
millenarian belief and the last days departs from the interpretation of the Prophetic 
tradition implying that God granted the Muslim community only fifteen hundred 
years in this world (Kabbani 2004a, 41), which means that less than 70 years are 
left. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani  has written: 
For the first millennium of Islamic civilization, the Muslims were favoured by 
Allah with advancement unparalleled before or after...After its first millennium a 
gradual yet definite decline began within the Ummah which has continued until 
our present time. As the Muslims have wandered away from the way of the 
Prophet and Allāh’s heavenly message of Islam, the divine blessings and support 
have similarly diminished. Miraculously, the Prophet predicted that this process 
would take one thousand years and it came to pass. The second prediction in this 
hadith is that the Ummah will continue further for five hundred more years in 
decline (2003a, 35). 
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181 This book was originally entitled ‘The Approach of Armageddon: A chronicle of scientific 
breakthroughs and world events that occur during the last days, as Foretold by Prophet 
Muhammad’ and published by the Islamic Supreme Council of America in 2003. With 10,000 
copies, it was sold out soon after it became available on the market. Interview with Arif Hamdani, 
11 August 2010 and Abdurrauf Kurniadi, 30 September 2010.  
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The contemporary era is perceived therefore as a critical time of preparation for the 
coming of the last days in which Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular and the Muslim 
community in general will again play a great historical role, once and for the last 
time.  
This millenarian belief as held among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples is 
closely related to the notion of the Signs of the Hour. These signs relate to all 
unfolding events in the past, present, and future that affect humanity and the 
Muslim ummah. Echoing his master, Abdullah Faiz Dagestani, Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani believes that the minor Signs of the Hour have already passed and the 
major ones are soon to come.   
The minor Signs have to do with the widespread moral decadence resulting 
from weakening religious norms in regulating people’s daily life.182 The Signs of 
the Hour are characterised by massive injustice, oppression, bloodshed, tyrannical 
rule, and especially sexual permissiveness affecting everyone in all walks of life, 
especially those who are not guilty, the poor, and the weak.183 The minor Signs of 
the Hour are also related to modern fashion that disregards modesty in clothing, 
especially among women, pornography, same-sex relationships and other forms of 
sexual permissiveness as being foretold by the Prophet Muhammad (Kabbani 
2004a, 113-179). Such minor Signs thus apply practically to present self-
examination of the contemporary moral decadence within the Muslim ummah.   
The major Signs of the Hour include major occurrences:  the time when the 
sun will rise from the West, smoke will cover the whole world, massive 
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182http://www.sufilive.com/print.cfm?id=122&lc=EN, accessed August 2011 
183 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010. 
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earthquakes, and plagues that will affect everyone in the world. Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani relates the major signs of the hour to the current state of countries in the 
Middle East about which the Prophet reportedly said that in the last days “the 
barefoot, naked, indigent shepherds compete in building tall structures” and “the 
barefoot and naked, the deaf and dumb are the kings of the earth” as narrated in 
Sahih Muslim, and that “…the destitute (al-buhm) camel-herders compete in 
building tall structures” as recorded in Sahih Bukhari. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani  has 
also said that, 
…the Prophet (s) said: "Sawfa tudi'u narun min ardi Najdin yashra'ibbu laha 
a'naqul ibili bi Busra," "Such a fire will come from the land of Najd that camels in 
Basra will run away from its heat" (Bukhari, Muslim). That happened last year 
[Iraq war]. Prepare yourselves, therefore, not for the best, but for the worst. Dark 
ages, not progress, [are] is coming ahead. Only after the dark ages will the golden 
age of Islam come about, which is the age of Mahdi (s). In the very near future 
many events are going to take place around us. Every one of us must be careful 
concerning his beliefs, the beliefs of his wife and family, and of his children. Satan 
is not leaving anyone alone. He is trying to change your beliefs and to remove you 
from the love of saints, of Sufi people, and of the Prophet.184 
 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani also related the prophecy of the ‘fire in Hejaz’ to what is 
happening in Arab countries.185 He attributed all these developments to the 
economic boom in the Gulf countries and particularly  to the war for oil and the 
chaotic situation in Gulf areas (Kabbani 2004a, 340). Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and 
Hisham Kabbani have taught their disciples that the world is heading toward an 
imminent Armageddon. Sheikh Nazim described this as follows, 
Armageddon is the war between East and West, and it is written that the West will 
win and the East will vanish. The biggest of all wars is between the believers, 
followers of Jesus Christ, people who have prepared themselves for the savior, and 
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184 http://www.sunnah.org/audio/2nd.htm, accessed 10 June 2011 
185 As recorded in Sahih Bukhari and Muslim, hadith number 6935. 
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the followers of the Anti-Christ, unbelievers, who are running after this life’s 
pleasures, following materialistic thoughts, seeking pleasure that their egos are 
asking for, asking for every freedom. They are people who always come into 
contact with the devil, falling under his control, and supporting the kingdom of 
Shaytan. They will be with the Anti-Christ because they are evil in themselves. 
The devils will carry them to the source of evil and devils, the Anti-Christ 
(Haqqani 2004, 67). 
 
The coming of Armageddon, depicted as the great battle between Good and Evil 
and between Truth and Falsehood, between believers and unbelievers, is a constant 
theme in Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s apocalyptic teachings. The great battle is 
personified by the well-known figures in Islamic apocalyptic literature: the Mahdi, 
Jesus Christ, the Dajjal/Anti-Christ, and Gog and Magog. The Mahdi and Jesus 
Christ are always depicted as representing the forces of Good, while the Dajjal 
(Anti-Christ) and Gog and Magog are bad. The Mahdi is described as a direct 
descendant of the Prophet Muhammad who was born in the Wadi Fatimah, a green 
valley on the way from Jeddah to Medina between 1930 and 1940. He is the 
fortieth generation in the line of Hasan and Hussein’s descendants.  
Sheikh Nazim has further stated that the world has been heading toward a 
catastrophic situation in which people will be killed en masse. Only one out of 
seven will survive and the number of women will be 40 times higher than men.186 
Yet, in many of his sohbet, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani changes the details of when and 
what will actually happen, though he is consistent in saying that the new era will 
come during his life time. In the 1980s, Sheikh Nazim, for instance, associated this 
catastrophic event with a nuclear war. During the 1990s, he explored this topic in 
relation to the fear of the coming Y2K and its impact on computer networks across 
the globe. Currently, he elaborates the last-day scenario in relation to the socio-
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186 http://www.sheiknazim2.com/thirdwar.html, accessed 10 June 2011 
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political dynamics in the aftermath of 9/11, especially in the Middle East.187 He 
pays particular attention to the role that Turkey will play in the global conflict. 
Sheikh Nazim has asserted that the Mahdi is alive now but remains hidden 
because ordinary people are not ready yet to see him physically. His first 
appearance was in 1960 when 12,000 saints gathered and gave bai’at to him.188  He 
is now still hidden in a place behind the Mountain of Qaf, in the empty quarters, 
the Ruba Qali, a desert between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. No one can go there, 
because of the quicksand, moving sands. The place is protected by genies that send 
out electricity that can kill intruders or drive them away. He is living with his 99 
caliphs and other highly spiritual and powerful people (Haqqani 2004, 67). The 
Mahdi will eventually appear during the Hajj-Akbar in Mecca when people will 
gather and give bai’at to him en masse (Haqqani 2004, 64). Sheikh Nazim has 
given these details about the Mahdi: 
He will appear for all people, according to the Lord’s Command, in the Great War, 
Armageddon. There are one hundred and one hindrances which he must overcome 
before he can appear; ninety-nine of those hindrances have passed. Now only two 
are remaining. Then there are 7 stations on his way from Damascus to Istanbul- 
Homs, Hama, Trablus/Tripoli, Halep/Aleppo, Konya, Bursa/Turkiye, and in 
Istanbul he will take out the flag of the Prophet peace be upon him from the 
Topkapi Palace. But before that, the Padishah will appear and they will meet in 
Konya where Mehdi will put on the sword of the Prophet and his coat, the Holy 
Amanats/The Relic. After Mehdi has taken out the flag in Istanbul, the Anti-Christ 
will come quickly through Khorasan in Iran, and run to Jerusalem, to go around 
the whole world from there for 40 days. Muslims are expecting Sayyidena Mehdi 
and they are waiting also for Sayyidena Isa/Jesus Christ to come from the 
Heavens. Christians are expecting Jesus Christ to come back from the Heavens, 
too. But the Jews, because they do not believe in Sayyidena Isa and Sayyidena 
Muhammad peace be upon them, are still waiting for a prophet from among 
themselves to appear…There will be a Heavenly Announcement: "The enemy of 
Allah, dajjal, has appeared. Whoever wants to save himself from him must go to 
Damascus, Mecca or Medina… so believers will run because dajjal will be after 
them. They will run like streams to Damascus, and all believers must be there for 
40 days..dajjal will go around the whole world, but 700 Angels, 700 Jinn/beings 
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187 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010 
188http://www.sheiknazim2.com/sahibuzamaan.html 
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made of smokeless fire who inhabit the earth with us, and 700 Awliya/Saints from 
Budala, Nujaba, Nuqaba, Autad and Ahyar will protect Damascus so he won’t be 
able to enter.189 
 
Meanwhile, Ahmed Amiruddin, one of Sheikh Nazim’s disciples living in Canada, 
associates the coming of Mahdi with the finding of the Ark of the Covenant. 
Quoting al Suyuti, Ahmed Amiruddin has written that “the reason he will be 
known as the Mahdi is that he will show the way to a hidden thing. He will bring 
the Ark of the Covenant to light from a place called Antioch”. He has further stated 
that the Ark will emerge from the Tabariya Sea through the efforts of Imam al 
Mahdi and it will be placed before him at the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.190 
The Mahdi will rely on Jesus Christ to defeat the Dajjal because he will not 
manage to face the Dajjal alone.191 Sheikh Nazim Haqqani stated this about Jesus 
Christ’s descent to earth during the Armageddon:  
After 40 days, Isa alaihi salaam peace be upon him will come down from the 
Heavens. It will be the time of the fajr/dawn prayer when he comes down in the 
Omayyad Mosque in Damascus. He is coming down to a minaret of that Dome in 
the East, under which Sayyidena Yahya, John the Baptist, is buried. Two Angels 
will protect him with their wings, and bring him down to earth. He will be wearing 
a green turban, and he will be shining. He has the most beautiful face, rosy and 
white. His beard is red, and he is sweating. And he has a sword. When he was on 
earth, he never touched a sword, but now he is coming as a Savior to save people 
from the hands of the Anti-Christ. His sword is a miraculous sword, a Heavenly 
sword; it can reach any point to where he sends it. The Lord gave it to him. He is 
not coming as a Prophet anymore but as a member of the ummah/nation of 
Sayyidena Muhammad, following his shariat (2004, 65-66).192 
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189 http://naqshbandihaqqani.blogspot.com/2005/12/saviors-imam-mahdi-as-jesus-christ-as.htm, 
accessed 25 June 2011 
190http://ahmedamiruddin.wordpress.com/2009/05/13/history-of-the-ark-of-the-covenant-an-islamic-
perspective/, accessed 10 June 2011 
191 Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s ideas regarding Prophet Isa (Jesus Christ) is allegedly based on the 
interpretation over the gospel of Barnabas which was reportedly found in Cyprus during the 
Byzantine rule (Stjernholm 2011).  
192http://naqshbandihaqqani.blogspot.com/2005/12/saviors-imam-mahdi-as-jesus-christ-as.html, 
accessed 21 June 2011 
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The Dajjal or Anti-Christ is described as an arch enemy of both the Mahdi 
and Jesus Christ. The Dajjal is depicted as a one-eyed man coming from Khorasan 
who will lead the world to disobey God and His commandments. He will offer a 
worldly paradise to those who follow him and a worldly hell to those opposing 
him. Under these circumstances, the most illiterate believer can recognise him 
because kafir will be clearly encrypted on his forehead. Like the Mahdi, he is now 
ready to appear but still hidden. Sheikh Nazim has said: 
He is now in chains imprisoned on an unknown island that no one can approach 
because he is saying: "I am your Lord", claiming to be the Lord of mankind, not 
just a prophet but the Lord... He can't move from there. He is shaitan, the father of 
all devils. He is giving orders, and he has 30 deputies who are preparing people for 
his coming.193 
 
As revealed in this statement, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani asserts that the Dajjal will 
appear and proclaim himself as the Lord for human beings. On his appearance, the 
Dajjal will be the main source of confusion and create a rift and discord within and 
among Muslims. However, before the true Mahdi appears, Sheikh Hisham also 
asserts that there would be thirty false Mahdi and, by implication, thirty false 
Dajjal (Kabbani 2004a, 229).194  Sheikh Hisham Kabbani describes the Dajjal and 
what he will do to the Muslim believer as follows: 
The Dajjal will have powers of the devil.  He will terrorize the Muslims into 
following him, converting them into unbelief.  He will conceal the truth and bring 
forth falsehood.  The prophet said that the Dajjal will have the power to show the 
image of one’s dead ancestors on his hand, like a television screen.  The relative 
will say, “Oh my son! This man is correct.  I am in Paradise because I was good 
and I believed in him.”  In reality that relative is in hell.  If the relative says, 
“Believe in this man, I am in hell because I didn’t believe,” one must say to the 
Dajjal, “No, he is in Paradise.  This is false.” The Prophet said: the Dajjal will say 
to a Bedouin Arab, “what will you think if I bring your father and mother back to 
life for you? Will you bear witness that I am your lord?  The Bedouin will say, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  193http://naqshbandihaqqani.blogspot.com/2005/12/saviors-imam-mahdi-as-jesus-christ-as.html 
194http://eshaykh.com/doctrine/false-mahdis/ 
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“Yes.”  So two devils will assume the appearance of his father and mother, and 
say, “O my son, follow him for he is your lord (Kabbani 2003a, 223-224). 
 
According to Sheikh Nazim Effendi, the coming of Armageddon, in which 
a deadly clash will occur between the believers and non-believers, is a prerequisite 
for the coming of the new awaited golden era, under which Muslims would 
eventually be led by a true spiritual-political leader. Under his leadership, Muslims 
and all human beings around the world will eventually embrace and seek deeper 
spirituality, live in a natural way, be concerned only with God, and take no heed of 
worldly things. The new awaited era is also characterised by justice, peace and by 
implication the disappearance of oppression, ignorance, confusion, and disunity or 
division. This last-days theme therefore projects both a grim scenario of the coming 
of massive global conflict under which people will suffer terribly and a positive 
utopian vision of the heavenly kingdom on earth afterwards. Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani has further stated that the Mahdi and Jesus Christ will support each other 
during the Armageddon. He has explained that, 
Sayyidena Mehdi will offer the place to Jesus to be Imam, but Jesus will refuse. 
Sayyidena Mehdi will lead the prayer once, and after that Jesus will be 
Imam…And Sayyidena Mehdi will be with him for 7 years…Jesus will kill the 
Anti-Christ, break the crosses, and make clear the truth about himself and his 
mother Sayyidena Mariam/Meryem/Mary the Virgin. He will govern the Heavenly 
Kingdom on earth for 40 years. In his time, all technology will be destroyed, and 
everyone will be given miraculous powers so that when you look somewhere and 
you say: "BismillahirRahmanir Rahim, by Your Divine Permission, Oh My Lord, 
You honored me to be Your Deputy, I ask of You", and if He gives permission, 
you may put your step from here to there. After Jesus has killed the Anti-Christ, 
there will be no more devils…people will live a life like in Paradise, Paradise 
Appearances, Tajallis/Divinely Visions will come on them…At that time, the 
purpose of Allah’s creation will appear. Isa will marry and have children. When he 
is going to die, he will be buried in Medina, in the fourth tomb next to the Holy 
Prophet, Sayyidena Abu Bakr and Sayyidena Omar may Allah be well pleased 
with them, that is empty now. Then all believers will die by a sweet scent from 
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Paradise. Everything terrible after that will come to the unbelievers who will have 
started to reappear during Jesus’ time...195 
 
Soon after the Dajjal is defeated, the new awaited era will prevail in which 
people can fulfil their potential as God’s servants. The new awaited era will be led 
by the Mahdi and Jesus Christ. Under the Mahdi and Jesus Christ, evil rule will 
eventually be demolished and an Islamic order will be established in which the 
Mahdi will give constant spiritual guidance. In addition to that, during the time of 
the Mahdi and Jesus Christ, spiritual people will do miraculous things without the 
help of modern technology. Sheikh Nazim has further stated that, 
 
After this big war people will be like a candle ready for the match. Sayyidina 
Mahdi will open the seed of faith in their hearts, opening the hearts of the believer 
who lived through that war. Common people will be dressed in sainthood and will 
be granted miraculous powers and lights from Allah Almighty. Awliya will be 
love springs. People will be perfect servants of Allah, living on prayer and dhikr, 
and swimming in love oceans. Everywhere you will find the love of the Lord. 
Creatures will take from you that divine love. We are created for that. The 
perfection of creation should appear in those days (2004, 68).  
 
Together, both will uphold justice and peace over the whole world. The 
Mahdi and Jesus Christ will lead people into spiritual life and political harmony. 
Sheikh Nazim even stated that during the Mahdi era, the 73 different sects in the 
Muslim community and religious divergence among Muslims and between 
Muslims and non-Muslims will eventually disappear. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has 
also said that the caliph is a spiritual leader who will give guidance to political 
leaders. According to Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, the 21st century is the age of truth as 
people come to realise their basic existential mission as God’s servants. Sheikh 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
195http://naqshbandihaqqani.blogspot.com/2005/12/saviors-imam-mahdi-as-jesus-christ-as.html 
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Nazim said that the coming of Armageddon is one of the two last unfulfilled 
prophesies before the last day. According to him, the coming of Armageddon is 
inevitable in order to cleanse the world and to draw a distinction between sincere 
believers and non-believers.196 During the Armageddon, no place in the world, 
except Mecca, Medina, and Damascus, will be safe.  
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani said that the Mahdi, with the help of Jesus Christ, 
will act as a mujtahid mutlaq (a religious reformer of absolute authority) in the 
modern era. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has also said that the title of caliph is reserved 
exclusively to the Mahdi as a spiritual leader, not as a political leader (2004a, 279). 
Interestingly, Sheikh Nazim also relates a future scenario for the unity of the 
ummah in line with the Mahdi prophecy. For example, has said that under the 
Mahdi, all people will be united to the extent that all religious rifts and political 
divergence will end. He has further proclaimed a utopian vision under the Mahdi 
and Jesus Christ, in which all human beings will be united. On the 29th November 
2010, Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani stated that, 
The Lord wants to change everything now…[a]new declaration [for the] first time 
in Islamic history, that 73 sects will now be made one…they are putting a line for 
ending Tasawwuf (Sufism), from now until end of world because [the]Holy 
Prophet and Quran never spoke on it…no more Naqshbandi, Qadiri, 40 tariqats, no 
Tasawwuf (Sufism) or Salafi, Wahabi…nowhere it is saying [does it say] Israel 
chosen ones, twelve sects (the twelve tribes of Israel mentioned in Surah al-
Maidah v. 11-12) no more…from now until [the] end of world we must say we are 
Rabbaniyoon…no[t] any Tasawwuf, I am not Sufi, I am Rabbani, that is [the] 
highest honour, this is for Christians, Jews, [the] whole Islamic world, to end all 
nifaq (treason), that order coming tonight, don’t say “I am Naqshbandi, I am 
Haqqani”…just say I am Rabbani, finish…. O `ulamas! If anyone asks you what is 
your way, say, “I am trying to be Rabbani,” or “I am Rabbani.” Finished! La ila 
aha illa-Llah.That is bombardment on the fortress of Shaytan. Finished! Don’t say, 
“I am Christian,” “I am Jewish,” “I am Maronite,” “I am Orthodox,” “I am 
Catholic,” “I am Protestant,” “I am Shi`a,” “I am this, or that”. No! No more using 
the term “tasawwuf” as it was never used by the Sahabah (r)!…Quran saying only 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
196 http://www.sheiknazim2.com/thirdwar.html 
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Rabbaniyeen, no more Naqshbandi, no more Tasawwuf (Sufism)….you must be 
for  whole nations…no more fighting between Mutasawwif (Sufis) and Salafis….I 
am saying first for myself, that I am not Mutasawwif, but trying to be Rabbani 
(Divine).197 
 
 
By Rabbani, Sheikh Nazim refers to those who commit themselves only to 
serve God and humanity. He therefore proposed a total vision not only for Muslims 
but expanded this total vision to include the followers of other religions: Jews, 
Christians and others. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani describes this total vision by 
referring to a prophecy that in the last days, Islam will enter every house and 
people will voluntarily embrace Islam, including those in the West (2004a, 253-
263). 
When the Mahdi and Jesus Christ are gone, the world will again descend 
into moral decadence leading to total natural destruction which will also be the end 
of the time for all believers and the world. The final signs for the Judgement Day 
will then appear which includes the emergence of Dabbah (the beast) from 
underground, heavy smoke in the sky, the sun rising from the west, the destruction 
of Ka’bah in Mecca and the appearance of Gog and Magog (Yajuj and Majuj) who 
will destroy everything in sight (Habibis 1990, 608, Kabbani 2004a, 289-302). The 
final signs will also include the flooding of Egypt and Cyprus, and the eruption of a 
volcano near Bursa. Next, there will be a time when the Angel Israfil will blow the 
first trumpet resulting in the death of all remaining believers. This will be followed 
by resurrection day, the day when Angel Israfil blows the second trumpet. Between 
the first and second soundings of Israfil’s trumpet, there will be heavy rain lasting 
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197 http://sufilive.com/Koonoo_Rabbaniyeenah_Be_Those_Who_Establish_Lordly_Worship_-
2770.html 
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for 40 days during which all human beings will rise to life again, ready for the 
judgement day, the day when human beings will go to God’s court. Only those who 
did good deeds will go to Paradise, whereas those who carried out bad deeds will 
receive Hellfire. 
Having elaborated in detail on the signs of the hour and the coming of 
Armageddon, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani  ends his account by simply instructing his 
disciples to recite Al Kahf verse and a formula of dzikr recommended for avoiding 
the Dajjal’s fitnah (Kabbani 2004a, 343-347). In doing this, he is using 
millenarian-apocalyptic narratives to create a dramatic effect that can be applied as 
a teaching method (Habibis 1989, 221-240, 1990, 603-619, Atay 1994, Damrel 
1999, 1/6). This ritual-devotional practice is employed as ‘what has to be done’–a 
practical recipe for anticipating the imminent coming of Armageddon and the 
Mahdi/Jesus Christ for individual Muslims. In this respect, Naqshbandi-Haqqani is 
not completely unique compared to other Islamic movements.  
Though employing different religious terms, Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
resembles other Islamic movements in its insistence on upholding a utopian vision 
about Islam and Muslims and their role in addressing current socio-political 
problems. Through the prism of millenarian-apocalyptic scenarios, Naqshbandi-
Haqqani provides both negative and positive scenarios about the future. Through 
ambiguous and symbolic narratives of this millenarian-apocalyptic view, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani not only offers a distinct world-view but also attempts to 
change religious preference, ritual, and behaviour in line with a traditional Sufi 
religious repertoire.  In the case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, a millenarian belief 
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represents a worldview for dealing with the world and the self-perception of those 
who play a part in it.  
The millenarian-apocalyptic belief as embraced by Naqshbandi-Haqqani is 
quietist rather than revolutionary in nature because this belief is primarily 
concerned with cultivating self-piety and is disseminated as an instrument for 
teaching. The motivational framing is not directed to drive broader socio-political 
change but to modify personal behavior and religious preference. Naqshbandi-
Haqqani maintains that cultivating good character is a basic foundation for 
enduring social and political change. As a faith-based movement, Sufi collective 
action involves more emotional attachment than rational calculation. 
Using this millenarian-apocalyptic scenario, Sheikh Nazim teaches that the 
secular worldview, science and technology and all the promises for continuous 
advancement and rationalistic solutions prevent people from accepting the 
miraculous, spirituality and the quest for religious-spiritual guidance.198 Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani further states that because modern people are addicted to science 
and technology with its proven advancement, the belief in karamah and miraculous 
powers has disappeared to the extent that people tend to disregard them completely. 
He has also stated that nowadays, ‘people are preoccupied only with seeking for 
proof of everything and lack of belief in anything’. Asking for proof of karamah 
and miraculous powers, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani said, gave the belief no 
meaning.199 Sheikh Nazim Haqqani has further stated that modern people reject 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
198 http://www.sufilive.com/Technology_Removes_the_Taste_of_Mankind_s_Real_Life-2547.html 
199 Sheikh Nazim’s and Hisham Kabbani’s position on modern science and technology is  based on 
his interpretation of the dominance of the pen (written tradition) as one of the signs of the Hour. 
Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010. 
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spirituality because of their addiction to technology and that modern science 
enslaves people who depend on it rather than on their own faculties. It is not 
surprising that Sheikh Nazim prophesied that when the Mahdi recites the takbir 
(recitation of Allah the great in Arabic) three times, all technology will be obsolete. 
It is interesting to note, however, that Sheikh Nazim and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani 
accept and utilize the internet and information technology.  
 
7.3 Returning to the Consensus of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah: The State of 
Ignorance (Jahiliya) and Dissension (Fitnah) 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani identifies the current problem within the Muslim 
ummah as representing the prevailing state of jahiliya (ignorance) and fitnah 
(dissension). He has further identified some aspects of the current state of 
ignorance (jahiliya): Islam is becoming marginal within the ummah, secessionist 
groups have re-emerged within the ummah; there is a rejection of honesty and 
honest people, and a rejection of Prophetic tradition (Kabbani 2004a, 183-221). He 
has described the current situation as the second era of ignorance (jahiliya). He has 
said that, 
…Islam came to take people from darkness into light. That time is called Jahiliyya 
in Arabic, the Era of Ignorance. Unfortunately, we are regressing, in our century, 
to jahiliyya ukhra, another Era of Ignorance. Everywhere now you find ignorance. 
The people on the right path are being opposed, disliked, defamed, and fought. 
The people of falsehood are being praised and honored. This was foretold by the 
Prophet (s) who said that in such a time, "Yukhawwanul amin wa yusaddiqul 
kha'in," "The most trustworthy one will be called 'dishonest and untrustworthy', 
and the dishonest one will be called 'trustworthy’…200 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
200 http://www.sunnah.org/audio/2nd.htm  
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On the other hand, the great dissension (fitnah) and division among the Muslim 
ummah is depicted as a situation in which the whole ummah no longer knows 
which religious authority to follow and where to seek spiritual guidance. Because 
of this, the Muslim ummah is trapped in constant religious strife. The prevailing 
problems among contemporary Muslims are therefore conceived as having their 
origins mainly from disunity in the matter of theology and doctrine, and being 
related to religious divergence incited by religious reform deviating from a Sunni 
major consensus.  
Naqshbandi-Haqqani maintains that it is only the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah 
group that will be saved.201 Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani, the term Ahlus Sunnah 
wal Jamaah specifically refers not only to those who are the followers of the two 
schools of Sunni Islamic theology (Ash’ari and Maturidi ) and one of the four 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence (madzhab),202 but also those following one of the 
forty-schools of self-purification with a direct chain of spiritual transmission to the 
Prophet (tarekat al mu’tabarah). The Ash’ari and Maturidi schools of theology, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
201 This is based on a hadith compiled by Abu Dawud (#4579) and narrated by Abu Hurayra saying 
that “The Jews were split up into seventy-one or seventy-two sects; and the Christians were split up 
into seventy-one or seventy-two sects; and my community will be split up into seventy-three sects. 
All [will] go to Hell, except one who follows the sunnah.” 
202 The madzhab is a compilation of Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh that comprises the interpretation 
of Islamic jurists and mostly deals with the observance of rituals and method of worship (ibadat) 
and social legislation (mua’malat) in Islam. There are four schools of Islamic jurisprudence with the 
largest following in the Muslim world: Hanafi, Maliki, Syafi’i, and Hambali. The Hanafi School is 
named after the Persian scholar Abu Hanifa an-Nu‘man ibn Thābit (699-767) who was born in 
Kufah, Iraq. He was one of tabi’in generations and his school is the oldest surviving Islamic 
jurisprudence. This School of Islamic jurisprudence is embraced by Muslims in Central Asia, 
Turkey, Balkan, and South Asia. The Maliki School was founded by Mālik ibn Anas ibn Mālik ibn 
Abī 'Āmir al-Asbahī (711-795), a Medina born Muslim jurist. His school of Islamic jurisprudence is 
adopted mostly by Muslims in North Africa, whereas Syafi’i School derives from Abu ʿAbdullah 
Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi‘i (767-820), a Palestinian jurist whose school of Islamic 
jurisprudence has great influence for Muslims in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. The Hambali 
School derives from Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Hanbal Abu `Abd Allah al-Shaybani (780-855), an 
Iraqi jurist. They are considered the most authoritative figures applying the principles of using 
Qur’an, Prophetic tradition (sunnah), ijma’ (consensus) and qiyas (analogy) as sources for Islamic 
jurisprudence and, with the greatest following, they are unanimously considered as the great 
mujtahid (renewers). For details about the four schools and their pioneers, see (Haddad 2007). 
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four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, and the forty schools of self-purification are 
believed to represent the very foundation and the most authentic and authoritative 
form of Sunni orthodoxy. They, as a whole, are what the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
disciples are supposed to believe and practise as part of their faith and daily 
religious devotion.  
In terms of theology, both Abu Hasan Ali ibn Ismail al Ash’ari (874-936) 
and Abu Mansur al Maturidi (853-944) are considered as providing the most solid 
and authoritative foundation for the unity of Sunni orthodox theology. The Ash’ari 
and Matudiri schools avoid the use of philosophical speculation, rational logic and 
literal interpretations as a basis of Islamic theology (kalam). Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
holds the belief that God ‘is above all conception of His creation and He is exalted 
above any description or likeness’ (Kabbani 1996b, 9). By this theological position, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani rejects, for instance, the Mu’tazilite’s rationalist stance that 
the Qur’an is simply a creation and that the Night-Ascension of the Prophet 
(mi’raj) occurred in spirit only (Kabbani 1996b, 8-9). Naqshbandi-Haqqani also 
rejects the Mu’tazilite denial of the positive significance of the divine attributes and 
believes in the symbolic and figurative attributes of God and a balance between 
human free-will and predestination (Kabbani 1996b, 10).  
Moreover, Naqshbandi-Haqqani upholds that the Qur’an comprises the 
eternal words of God consisting of verses with clear unambiguous meaning 
(muhkamat) as well as those with ambiguous or even secret meanings 
(mutashabihat). The muhkamat verses, because of their clear and non-ambiguous 
meaning, can be interpreted by those called fuqaha (Islamic scholars) whereas 
mutashabihat verses, because of their ambiguous meaning, can only be interpreted 
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by those bestowed with spiritual illumination (Kabbani 1996b, 104-109).203 Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani writes regarding the method of interpretation regarding 
mutashabihat verses, 
The scholars of true Salaf – that is, the pious Muslims of the first three centuries 
after the Hijra of the Prophet – used to interpret the mutashabihat in the following 
way: they refuted the unacceptable interpretations but did not specify which one of 
the acceptable meanings was the intended meaning of the verse or the 
hadith…Thus we see that the way of the Salaf was mere acceptance of expressions 
on faith without saying how they are meant, and without additions, subtractions, or 
substituting meanings imagined to be synonyms, while stressing Allah’s absolute 
transcendence beyond the characteristics of created things in order to preclude 
likening Him to His creation (Kabbani 1996b, 108). 
 
Closely related to this, Naqshbandi-Haqqani strongly rejects tajsim 
(anthropomorphism), takyif (asking about God’s attributes), tamthil (conceiving of 
God and His attributes by comparison to creation), and tashbih (likening God to 
creation). Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has pointed out further that tajsim, takyif, 
tamthil, and tashbih are altogether a clear-cut aberration not known during the first 
three generations of Islam/salaf as-shalih (Kabbani 1996b, 104-182). Avoiding 
literal interpretations about God and His attributes is therefore regarded as the 
essence of tawhid (monotheism) and establishes the basic pillar of Islamic belief. 
Adopting such views leads to corrupted belief and, by implication, committing 
heresy.  
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani maintains the position that the unity of doctrine is 
crucial and vital for the unity of the ummah. The unity of doctrine as espoused by 
the Ash’ari and Maturidi becomes the foundation for the idea of tauhid, which is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
203 Implicit in this view, Naqshbandi-Haqqani believes that the Prophet Muhammad actually left the 
legacy of the two kinds of religious knowledge to his heirs, dhohir (shariah) privileged for Islamic 
scholars and batin science (tasawuf) reserved specially to the Sufi saints. 
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the essence of every Muslims’ faith. Regarding theology, he thus takes a critical 
position toward Ibn Taimiyah and his modern students such as Muhammad ibn 
Abdul Wahab and the likes. He has said that it was Ibn Taimiyah who introduced 
innovative views regarding God’s attributes and theological doctrine with long-
term consequences within the Muslim ummah. He has quoted classic Muslim 
scholars who opposed Ibn Taimiyah’s theological position to affirm that such 
views were not known during the Prophet’s lifetime and the three generations of 
pious ancestors.204 Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has said about Ibn Taimiyah’s 
theological position, 
Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, to whom Ibn Taimiyah stated his affiliation, never said 
that tawhid consisted of two parts, one being tawhid al-rububiyya and the other 
tawhid al-uluhiyya, nor did he ever say that “whoever does not know tawhid al-
uluhiyya, his knowledge of tawhid al-rububiyya is not taken into account because 
the idolaters also had such knowledge”; nor did any of the followers of the 
Followers (taba’ al-tabi’in) ever say such a thing to his contemporaries, nor any of 
the Followers (tabi’in) to his, nor any of the Companions of the Prophet to his. 
Nor did the Prophet himself in his Sunna, which is the exposition of the Book of 
Allah…(Kabbani 1996b, 54-55). 
 
He made a very similar criticism against Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab, the 
follower of Ibn Taimiyah’s theological position as follows, 
It is strange that he [Muhammad Abdul Wahab] shuns the name of “Islam” given 
by Allah to His religion, and he shuns the name of “Ahl al-Sunna” used by 
Muslims to refer to those of sound belief, naming it instead “the Salafi doctrine”, 
an invented name in Islam suggesting that there is more than one doctrine among 
Ahl al-Sunna. What is worse, he makes the Prophet the adherent of a doctrine – his 
doctrine – when in fact it is the Salaf who are by the very definition of the term 
“Salaf” the adherents and followers of the Prophet (Kabbani 1996b, 184). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
204 This stand is also supported by another prolific writer and eloquent speaker of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani, Gibril Fouad Haddad (b. 1960), who wrote an extensive refutation of Wahabi-Salafism 
and its modern manifestations as proposed by contemporary scholars like Abdul Azis ibn Abdullah 
ibn Baz (1910-1999), Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani (1914-1999), and Muhammad al Utsaimin 
(1917-2001) who were strongly influenced by the method developed by Ibn Taimiyah. For details, 
see http://www.livingislam.org/n/slfm_e.html 
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Moreover, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani wrote about the Wahabi-Salafi and other 
groups embracing Ibn Taimiyah’s theological position as, 
…[the] Westernized modernists striving to distance themselves from their own 
authentic but "messy" Islamic past in favor of an inauthentic but "hygienic" past 
which they identify, in youthful, revisionist fashion, with the pious Salaf (Kabbani 
1997, 8-9). 
 
Based on this theological position, Naqshbandi-Haqqani rejects the use of 
takfir  against other fellow Muslims on the ground that it is contrary to the Sunni 
mainstream principles of religious rules–Quranic exegesis, Prophetic tradition 
(hadist), the consensus of scholars (ijma), and analogy (qiyas). Sheikh Hisham 
particularly condemns the use of takfir doctrine because he, following the 
consensus of the traditional Sunni scholars, maintains that the Qur’anic verse 
regarding this should not be used to target fellow Muslims. Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani maintains that after someone has professed the declaration of faith 
(shahadat), any mistake/sin a Muslim has committed, let alone difference in the 
belief system and Islamic jurisprudence, cannot be a basis for unjustified and 
excessive accusations against fellow Muslims of being a musyrik (idolater) or a 
kafir (disbeliever) or a murtad (apostate). If a Muslim commits a sin, he/she is only 
considered fasiq (disobedient to Allah/rebellious against God’s command). By 
implication, his/her rights as a Muslim are still protected under Islamic law and 
thus it is completely unlawful to harm or confiscate his/her property, let alone kill 
him/her.    
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After having written a long refutation, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani offers his 
reconciling view regarding Ibn Taimiyah’s position on the matter of theology. He 
offers the following statement about Ibn Taimiyah and his disciple (Ibn Qayyim al 
Jawzi) and his theological and doctrinal position: 
There is no doubt that these two scholars had the ability to exercise ijtihad in the 
area of mu’amalat. In fact, they gave many good fatwas in this area. Moreover, 
they did not attempt to bring about major changes in ‘ibadat, although they 
diverged substantially from the Ahl al-Sunna in their ijtihad. However, they did 
pursue change in the area most crucial to Muslim unity and soundness of religion: 
they went astray in the area of ‘aqida and completely left the pure teachings of the 
original scholars of the Salaf (Kabbani 1996b, 44). 
 
Following the madzhab is likewise considered vital among Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples because it regulates in detail the way Muslims worship and 
behave in fulfilling their religious obligations. Maintained strictly through the 
chain of religious transmission (silsilah), the madzhab is considered as providing 
the most reliable source regarding the Prophet’s teaching, devotional practices, and 
social behaviour. Following a particular madzhab is also regarded as necessary for 
practicing Muslims because it provides a complete guidance for proper 
worshipping conduct and ritual performance. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani stated the 
wisdom of following the precedence laid upon by previous Islamic scholars by 
saying that, 
Jurisprudence requires not just knowledge and understanding of the sacred texts, 
but a deep comprehension of the circumstances around the issue being addressed 
and an intuitive spiritual wisdom that guides the jurist toward a decision that fulfils 
not just the letter of the law, but also the practical realities of a given time and 
place. The spiritual wisdom needed to derive well-rounded and valued rulings is 
not something that comes from excessive study or memorization. Rather, it is an 
inner light that comes from sincere devotion to Allah and a spiritual connection to 
the source of guidance. That light is developed and maintained by means of 
rigorous exercises under the guidance of masters of spiritual training and 
enlightenment. The history of Islam shows that ijtihād and juristic reasoning, 
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conducted by competent and spiritually enlightened scholars, have enabled the 
social, cultural and intellectual adaptation of Islam to innumerable contexts. This 
living, vibrant heritage, that is open to change and adaptation, will continue to 
sustain the faith through many centuries to come (Kabbani 2007a, 182-183).205 
 
Accepting those sources of Islamic jurisprudence is thus regarded as inevitable to 
avoid the twin pitfalls of subjective rationalism and blind literalism (Haddad 2007). 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani supports his position by reiterating that the rules of ibadat 
and mua’malat in Islam have been complete for hundreds of years and that later 
generations of Muslims should only follow the previous path, otherwise they are 
very likely to go astray. Interestingly, though strongly defending the validity of 
following the madhab, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani does not accept the idea of taqlid 
(blind imitation). According to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, although taqlid is not 
completely bad especially for lay people, it cannot sustain them since people are 
becoming increasingly learned in their religious knowledge.206 Thus he still opens 
the possibility of ijtihad for contemporary Muslim scholars. He has said that, 
Though some scholars have attempted to freeze the interpretation of Islam, most 
accept the view that Islamic Divine Law, or shari‘a, is subject to ongoing re-
evaluation according to the principles of juristic reasoning, known as ijtihad. The 
purpose of this ongoing process of ijtihad is to adapt shari‘a to changing societal 
circumstances. Thus, most Islamic scholars say that "the door of ijtihad" remains 
open (Kabbani 2007a, 180).207 
 
Nevertheless, he seems to be ambiguous in this regard because he strongly adheres 
to the Sunni orthodoxy that the ijtihad can only be delivered by those who meet the 
requirements to do so. He stated this about the requirement for ijtihad: 
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205http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/publications/articles/45-viewpoint-door-of-ijtihad-is-
open.html 
206 Interview with Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud, 17 October 2010. 
207http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/publications/articles/45-viewpoint-door-of-ijtihad-is-
open.html 
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…scholars sought to penetrate the principles behind the thousands of rulings made 
in the time of the Prophet and his successors in order to build a system of 
precedent-based law that would provide a solid foundation for jurists in the future. 
These principles include the consensus of scholars, analogy to prior rulings, 
pursuit of the greater good, the idea that a lesser harm is preferable to a greater 
harm, and the importance of pre-existing customs and practices.208 
 
Thus in practice Naqshbandi-Haqqani maintains the Sunni mainstream 
conservative position on the closure of the door of ijtihad due to the alleged 
absence of qualified scholars in the contemporary era. 
Furthermore, Naqshbandi-Haqqani holds and maintains the belief in several 
aspects of religious creed that have been a consensus among Ahlus Sunnah scholars 
such as the belief in intercession (syafa’at) and in the role of the intercessor 
(mediator) and the permissibility of conducting  visits (ziarah kubur) to shrines and 
graves. Naqshbandi-Haqqani maintains the belief in the power of intercession 
(syafa’at) embodied in the Prophet Muhammad as an integral part of the Muslim 
faith. This is related to the belief that the Prophet Muhammad left two related 
legacies to the later generations of the Muslim community: the Quran-Sunnah and 
the blood descendants of the Prophet.209 While the first represents the written form 
of Islamic teaching, the second is about oral transmission, which is in fact a 
contested issue within the ummah and distinguishes the Sunni and Shiah 
communities.  
Naqhsbandi-Haqqani venerates the descendants of the Prophet. The 
descendants of the Prophet (ahl bayt) are considered as living Sunnah who must be 
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208http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/publications/articles/45-viewpoint-door-of-ijtihad-is-
open.html 
209 Interview with Samson Nasarudin, 20 September 2010.  
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followed and respected. Because of this, the Prophet Muhammad is regarded as 
having supreme authority to be an intermediary between human beings and God in 
the hereafter. The emphasis on love of the Prophet, peace and tolerance is based on 
the belief that these qualities represent the basic teachings of the Prophet 
Muhammad.  
Naqshbandi-Haqqani also holds belief in the permissibility of tawasul and 
tabaruk. Tawasul involves seeking a path to God through the Prophet or through 
the person of a saint. Tabaruk involves seeking goodness by virtue of touching or 
being close to the relics of the Prophets and of living or dead saints. Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani has, however, suggested that tawasul and tabaruk can be possible only 
with the permission of God.210 Among the Naqshbandi Haqqani’s disciples, the 
belief in the permissibility of tawasul is expressed in the ritual of dzikr during 
which God is invoked on behalf of the Prophet, whereas the tabarruk is expressed 
through kissing the remaining hairs of the Prophet. 
Naqshbandi Haqqani believes that visiting the graves of saints is 
permissible and has a foundation within the Islamic tradition.  Ziarah is regarded 
not only as an act of piety but also as symbolically important to ensure the 
continued flowing of blessings (barakah) from the Prophet, the pious ancestors and 
dead saints. According to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani,, the Prophet was a noble man, 
who has brought about a real freedom, from the state of disbelief to belief, from the 
state of idolatry to the state of Oneness. In this regard, the Prophet Muhammad is 
also considered as a man who laid down the foundation of Muslim identity 
(Kabbani 1998b, 30). Given his theological and doctrinal position, the state of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
210 For details about the permissibility of intercession, tawasul and tabaruk, see (Kabbani 1998c) 
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jahiliya, fitnah and their impact in creating growing disunity within the Muslim 
ummah is believed coming from the propaganda of Wahabi-Salafi groups.211 
Sheikh Hisham Haqqani has said that, 
 
With the neatness of mind which they had learnt from the West, and driven by a 
giddy enthusiasm which blinded them to the finer aspects of the classical heritage, 
many of the fundamentalists announced that they found the Islam of the people 
horribly untidy. Why not sweep away all the medieval cobwebs, and create a 
bright new Islam, streamlined and ready to take its place as an ideology alongside 
Marxism, capitalism, and secular nationalism? To achieve this aim, it was thought 
that the four madhabs of fiqh had to go. Ditto for the Ash’ari and Maturidi 
theological traditions. The Sufi orders were often spectacularly exotic and untidy: 
they of course had to be expunged as well. In fact, at least ninety percent of the 
traditional Islamic texts could happily be consigned to the shredding machine: 
while what was left, it was hoped, would be the Islam of the Prophet, stripped of 
unsightly barnacles and presiding over a reunified Muslim word, striding towards 
a new and shinning destiny (1997:9).  
 
The Wahabi-Salafi group is regarded responsible for waging doctrinal, political and 
even physical wars that in the end have created social disintegration and chaos 
within the Muslim community. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has stated that, 
We are coming to the end of the present world. There is not much time left for this 
world to continue. Today we heard something very surprising: a Sufi movement 
has been banned in one of the Far Eastern countries. This is the influence of the 
Wahhabi movement. Using their money, they are trying to control and to fight the 
love of the Prophet (s). They don't like anyone to love the Prophet (s), and for that 
reason Wahhabis are spreading false teachings that go against the person of the 
Prophet (s) and against the teachings of the four madhhabs (schools), in order to 
show Islam as a dry and cruel religion. They are the ones responsible for the 
present scandalous view of Islam, due to which Islam has a bad name in the West. 
They say, it is the Jews that are responsible for passing Islam off as cruel; but in 
reality more harm is coming against Islam from Wahhabis than from Jews. The 
Wahhabis' disrespect to the Prophet (s) is so great! They are buying religious 
departments and institutions in every country. They are giving as much money as 
people want in order to induce them to fight the love of the Prophet (s).212 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
211 The terms, Wahabism and Salafism, as used among Naqshbandi-Haqqani, are not necessarily 
terminologically correct because such labels represent a broad-brush designation referring to any 
Islamic group opposing Sufi religious belief and praxis. 
212http://www.sunnah.org/audio/2nd.htm 
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This anti-Wahabi-Salafism and anti-Saudi Arabia has strong religious 
tones. Echoing his master, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani always quotes authentic hadith 
in which the Prophet Muhammad reportedly cursed the Najd people for causing 
fitnah (confusion) among the Muslim community. It is based on Bukhari and 
Muslim who narrated a hadith in which some groups of companions came to the 
Prophet (s) in his time and asked him to pray for them. He said, "Allahumma barik 
lana fi shamina wa fi yamanina," "O God, bless us in our Sham (Syria) and bless 
us in our Yemen." They said, "What about Najd, O Rasulallah?" He said another 
time, "O God, bless Sham and Yemen." Again they asked, "What about Najd" and 
again he did not answer them except by blessing Syria and Yemen. The third time 
they asked him about Najd, he said: "Yakhruju minha qarnayyish shaitani wa 
yakthuru fiha az-zalazilu wal fitan," "The two horns of the devil will appear from 
there, and earthquakes, confusion and corruption will abound there."213 The 
repeated reference to Najd is interpreted as the whole area around present-day 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani further told the disciples how the new students 
from Saudi Arabia disrupt social cohesion and incite hatred within the Muslim 
community by accusing other fellow Muslims of being committed to bid’ah 
(innovation) and syirik (idolatry). The bombings and attacks on Sufi shrines that 
have occurred in Pakistan and Somalia is also not missed in the narrative.214 The 
attempts to desecrate the Holy Prophet Muhammad’s shrine and the destruction of 
other historical sites in Medina and Mecca carried out in the past  by Wahabi 
followers  spark a particularly  emotional response among the disciples and are 
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213 For a complete collection of the hadith, see http://mac.abc.se/~onesr/ez/hdth/hpf_e.html 
214 Interview with Aat, 20 September 2010. 
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used  as proof of the deviant position of Wahabism.215 By saying that, Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani seems to reopen an old rift that dates back to the late 19th century 
during the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Wahabism and the bloody 
repercussions within the Sunni community in Saudi Arabia region.216 
Moreover, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has characterised the allegedly deviant 
position of the Wahabi-Salafi as opposed to the mainstream ahl Sunnah in five 
aspects: anthropomorphism of God’s attributes, disrespect for the Prophet 
Muhammad, an egalitarian approach to the Quran and Hadith, disregard for the 
four schools of the Sunni Imam, and the practice of the doctrine of takfir. The first 
has to do with rejection of the Sunni theology of Ash’ari and Maturidi, the second 
relates to the rejection of the practice of celebrating the Prophet’s birthday, the 
third is about not using the traditional methods of the Islamic sciences, whereas the 
fourth involves the differences of scholarly schools in religious rulings regarding 
worship and devotion and the fifth is about excommunicating other fellow-
Muslims (Kabbani 1997, 8). In addition to those, Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani has 
reportedly said that the Wahabi’s doctrinal position, which is strongly against 
‘miracles and spirituality’, qualifies the group as materialist in principle.  
In Salafi Movement Unveiled and 200 Years of New Kharijism: the 
Ongoing Revision of Islam, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani presents the debate in a simple 
and straightforward manner in which Naqshbandi-Haqqani identifies every aspect 
of disputed theological and doctrinal matters. In the 200 Years of New Kharijism: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
215 Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s affiliate website (www.nashbandi.org) displays pictures on the 
desecration carried out across the Arabia. See for example, 
http://www.naqshbandi.org/ottomans/wahhabi/relics_under.htm 
216 For details of the history and rise of Wahabism in Saudi Arabia, see David Commins (2006). 
 238 
The Ongoing Revision of Islam, for instance, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani begins with 
very strong and sharp words as follows: 
 
[w]e live in a time when the enemies of Islam are attempting to destroy it from 
within. Resourceful and determined, they announce a new mode of leadership that 
pretends to restore the purity of the faith as a guise to gain the confidence of 
Muslims and non-Muslim alike. The unwary observer is readily misled by their 
portrayal, which is eagerly disseminated by the media. In fact, it is these 
proponents of extremism who are themselves outside the realm of true Islam. 
 
These strong and straight words perhaps derived from the fact that both writings 
are intended as a counter-attack against the Wahabi-Salafi groups that provoked the 
attack in the first place. Salafi Movement Unveiled was written in 1997 by Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani following the publication of The Naqshabandi Tariqah Unveiled, 
an anonymous nineteen-page booklet reportedly published by a Salafi group in Sri 
Lanka attacking Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teaching and Sheikh Nazim Haqqani.217  
200 Years of New Kharijism is a short introduction for a book translated into 
English entitled “Advice to Our Brothers the Scholars of Najd (Nasiha li Ikhwanina 
`Ulama' Najd)” written by Yusuf Al Rifai and “Refutation of the Innovator from 
Najd (Misbah al-Anam fi Radd Shubah al-Najdi al-Bid`i al-Lati Adalla biha al-
`Awamm)” written by Sayid Alawi bin Ahmad al Haddad.218 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s refutation is more extensively developed in a 
work entitled the Encyclopaedia of Islamic Doctrine, a seven-volume work of 
1,500 pages, which reportedly took five years of research and writing by Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani.219 In the Encyclopaedia of Islamic Doctrine, Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani details his view on every disputed aspect of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah’ 
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217 http://islamicweb.com/beliefs/cults/sufi_naqshabandi_unveiled.htm  
218 http://www.livingislam.org/n/nkhar_e.html  
219 http://www.naqshbandi.org/about/Sh_Kabbani_bio.htm  
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belief and devotional practice and provides their basis according to Quran and 
sound Hadits. In this work, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani refutes the salaf-ness claims of 
Salafi-Wahabism in every disputed matter of doctrine, belief, and the way of 
worshipping and devotion. He points out that the so-called Wahabi-Salafi   
represents a khalaf and neo-kharijite group which deviates from Sunni orthodoxy. 
The term of khalaf and neo-kharijite has become a preferred label attributed to any 
Islamic group which is against the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah. The most interesting 
thing about this work is that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani quotes many passages from 
Ibn Taimiyah’s own works to reveal that his views are in line with the majority of 
Muslim scholars. By doing this, he attempts to show the healthy intellectual debate 
during classical period of Islamic history.  
 Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has also spent a great deal of effort to counter the 
accusations of bid’ah (innovation) and syirik (idolatry) by Wahabi-Salafi groups in 
which he draws a clear-cut boundary between ‘correct’ and ‘false’ belief and 
praxis. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has been trying to engage in religious debate in a 
way that follows the example set by the classical Muslim scholars. He is ready to 
agree to disagree because he believes that difference is a good thing. He believes 
that putting aside theological and doctrinal disputes would be much better and help 
to address the prevailing ignorance and avoid dissension within the Muslim 
ummah. 
Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani have been trying to position 
themselves as authoritative figures in Islamic jurisprudence.220 Both figures are 
considered capable and have religious authority to give Islamic legal rulings 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
220 Sheikh Nazim Haqqani is a Hanafi scholar whereas Sheikh Hisham Kabbani follows the Syafi’i 
school of Islamic jurisprudence. 
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(fatwa) regarding fiqh-related matters. Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham 
Kabbani hold the strong belief that differences in theological and doctrinal 
positions should not affect the unity of the ummah so long as people follow a 
guide. Yet not all Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples are keen to involve themselves 
in this complicated religious debate. They consider discursive debate on matters of 
theology and jurisprudence is well beyond their reach and comprehension and 
therefore leave this exclusively to the masters to deal with.221 
 
7.4 Social and Political Views: Political Islamism and Radicalism  
Naqshbandi-Haqqani is certain that the Muslim community currently has its 
own socio-political problems which, according to Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and 
Hisham Kabbani, have their origins in the adoption of the secular worldview, 
capitalistic economic system, and democratic political order in the Muslim ummah. 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s socio-political views derive from a long encounter with 
various Islamic political movements in the Middle East and USA, and stem from 
the belief that Islam provides the only comprehensive solution to the current 
problems facing the world.  
Sheikh Nazim Haqqani’ and Kabbani’s personal experience in hostile 
political environments particularly in the Middle East and USA have played a part 
in the formation of their strong opposition to Wahabi-Salafi ideas as well as their 
opposition to the radical Islamist ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, 
relying on many Prophetic traditions to make his point, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani 
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221 On one occasion, Gibril Fouad Haddad frankly admitted that Naqshbandi-Haqqani simply 
followed the madzhab of the Sheikh and nothing else. Public sermon at Rumi Café, Jakarta, 12 
November 2010. 
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specifically examines the current situation in conflict areas such as Somalia, 
Chechen, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen where the Muslim community 
has been experiencing internal sectarian political conflicts.222  
Sheikh Nazim Haqqani has said that Islam has been downgraded because it 
is used simply for justifying political struggle and worldly material interests. He 
rejects the idea of individual freedom embedded in modern democracy.223 He does 
not accept that under democracy, the rule is in the hands of lay people and the ruler 
is chosen through a general election. By saying that, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani does 
not accept democracy as a matter of principle but he does accept it as a matter of 
political reality. This view derives from Sheikh Nazim’s interpretation of the 
hadith (Prophetic tradition) in which the Prophet reportedly said that, 
After me come caliphs, and after the caliphs come princes, and after princes there 
will be kings and after the kings, there will be tyrants. And after the tyrants a man 
from My House will fill the earth with justice, and after him is al-Qahtani. By the 
One who sent me with the Truth! Not a word less.224 
 
Sheikh Nazim interprets the caliphs to refer to the Rightly Guided Ones (Abu Bakr, 
Umar, Utsman, and Ali bin Abi Thalib), the princes were the Ummayad of 
Damascus and Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad, and the kings were attributed to the 
Ottoman Sultans. The tyrants therefore refer to the current politico-economical 
system adopted by Muslim society (Kabbani 2003a, xxi).  Sheikh Nazim Haqqani 
states that many Muslim countries are now trapped in debt because they have 
adopted an evil economic system based on interest (riba’). According to him, 
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222 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 27 September 2010. 
223 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5drDJ3CenTU 
224 Hadith narrated by Abdurrahman bin Qays bin Jabir al Sadafi, Naim bin Hammad in Fitan. Kanz 
al Ummal, hadith #38704 
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people should only use gold and silver as the Prophet did, instead of paper money 
as is common today.225 Though sharing a view that the current political and 
economic system is un-Islamic, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani seems to soften his 
language in dealing with these complicated issues.  
While theological-doctrinal dispute is juxtaposed as a part of the jihad 
struggle to combat the state of jahiliya and fitnah within the Muslim ummah. 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani asserts that the greatest jihad in the contemporary era is 
standing and speaking out through intellectual and civic engagement against those 
proposing anti-Ahlus Sunnah belief and doctrine.  He also emphasizes that the best 
activism in the contemporary era is showing love of the Prophet and the peaceful 
and tolerant nature of Islam. In his response about the distinctive feature of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani preaching, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, for instance, reiterates 
that, 
…the most distinctive quality has to do with my emphasis on love, peace and 
tolerance. Others can emphasize politics and activism but we present a historically 
authentic version of Islam. The Prophet Muhammad always extended his hand to 
all people, regardless of their beliefs, and so do we.226 
 
Meanwhile, in Islamic Extremism: A Viable Threat to US National Security, 
the first political statement he delivered in an Open Forum at the State Department 
on 7th January 1999, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani pointed out his concern over what he 
called an Islamic extremist ideology and its potential threat to American security. 
He expressed his political views about the condition of Muslim society in America 
as follows: 
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226 http://www.meforum.org/61/muhammad-hisham-kabbani-the-muslim-experience-in 
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 [t]he most dangerous thing that is going on now in these mosques, that has been 
sent upon these mosques around the United States…is the extremist ideology. 
Because they are very active they took over the mosques; and we can say that they 
took over more than 80% of the mosques that have been established in the US…So 
it means that the methodology or ideology of extremist has been spread to 80% of 
the Muslim population, but not all of them agree with it. But mostly the youth and 
the new generation do because they are students and they don’t think except with 
their emotions and they are rebellious against their own leaders and government. 
This is the nature and psychology of human beings. When we are students in 
university or college we always fight the government, whether they are right or 
wrong, we have to attack the government. This is how they have been raised. 
In this way we see that the extremist ideology…is beginning to spread very 
quickly into the universities through the national organizations, associations and 
clubs that they are establishing around the universities...Through the universities 
there will be the most danger. If the nuclear atomic warheads reach these 
universities, you don’t know what these students are going to do, because their 
way of thinking is brainwashed, limited and narrow-minded…. I’d like to tell you 
that extremism, when a person has been brainwashed, demands that a person 
doesn’t think, even if his father or his mother or his brother tells him to stop, he 
has to go to do what he has been asked to do. That’s why there are 5,000 suicide 
bombers being trained by bin Laden in Afghanistan who are ready to move to any 
part of the world and explode themselves. They are very sophisticated, they can 
buy anything they need locally and then put it on and explode themselves. 
This is what I want to say to you, to present to you from within the Muslim 
community. We want to tell you that the Muslim community as a whole is 
innocent from whatever extremism and extremist ideology is being spread around 
the world. The problem of extremism is a big danger, and it can be solved if the 
West better understands Islam and builds bridges with the moderate Muslims, the 
traditional Muslims. This way, the Muslim community will eliminate the extremist 
threat from within. Otherwise, media, television, newspapers, and the leadership 
will not understand that there is a difference between extremists and Muslims. 
They have to begin a dialogue with Muslims from around the United States, and 
they have to have good advisors. What I am seeing, unfortunately, are those that 
are advising the media, or advising the government are not the moderate Muslims. 
Those whose opinion the government asks are the extremists themselves. Those 
that have been quoted in the newspapers, in the magazines, in the television, in the 
media are the extremists themselves.227 
 
In Islamic Radicalism: Its Wahhabi Roots and Current Representation, Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani clearly shows the relationship between an extremist ideology and 
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a-viable-threat-to-us-national-security.html 
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Wahabism. He said that Wahabism and its distinct religious doctrine and theology 
are the origins of Islamic radicalism. According to him, 
…the broader ideology name "Wahhabism" represents a serious challenge to the 
theology and practice of the mainstream Sunni Islam to which most of these 
nations' populations adhere. Should this radicalized understanding of Islam 
continue to spread unchecked, radical interpretations could threaten social stability 
at the local, national, and regional levels and create serious geopolitical dangers to 
which neighboring powers, as well as the US and Europe, would have to react.228 
 
He related encroaching global Wahabism as posing a threat not only to the Muslim 
community but also to the whole world. In  The Globalization of Jihad: From 
Islamist Resistance to War against the West, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani expresses his 
opposition to  Islamic radicalism and political Islamism. He particularly opposes 
Islamic groups such as Hizbut Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas. Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani wrote about the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas as follows: 
The Muslim Brotherhood was born as anti-imperialist movement and has always 
been focused as much on winning political power for its own sake as it has been 
on anything having to do with the religion of Islam. Today, that emphasis has only 
increased, and we now see the Brotherhood – along with the many other national 
movements it has spawned over the years – expressing more and more enmity for 
the West. It is in part by promoting such anti-Western sentiments that Hamas, 
effectively the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood, was able to generate so 
much support in the recent Palestine elections, just as its own anti-Western 
rhetoric helped the Brotherhood itself at the polls in Egypt. The people who 
respond to such rhetoric are not religious people. Rather, they are motivated by 
socioeconomic concerns. It is true that poverty and socioeconomic inequity are 
very real problems in many parts of the Muslim world today. The extremists are 
cleverly exploiting these problems. Wherever people are living in poverty, 
extremism is bound to find fertile ground. Therefore, addressing these problems is 
one way of undermining the influence of the extremists.229 
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In Principles of Leadership in War & Peace, a paper delivered at the first 
International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS) organised by PBNU 
(Nahdlatul Ulama Central Board) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 
2004, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani again affirmed his view on the importance of self-
restraint to impose jihad and fight against others. He has said that Muslims must 
avoid aggressive and violence acts in the pursuit of their political goals and do their 
best to seek truce and peace whenever possible. He follows Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani’s political view of discouraging his disciples to take to the streets and be 
involved in demonstrations or political protest.  
Sheikh Nazim reportedly said that to prepare for the terrible situation of the 
imminent coming of Armageddon, there is no better way than maintaining the 
practice of ritual. He also encourages his disciples to spend most of their time at 
mosques either gaining religious knowledge or reciting dzikr. He even reportedly 
said that there will be no safe guarantee for those preoccupied with protest and 
demonstrations during the Armageddon. He warns that only those keeping 
themselves busy worshipping and learning at the mosque will be safe. Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani also continually reiterates Sunni political conservatism by stating 
that every Muslim must follow a legitimate ruler.230 
  
7.5 Conclusion 
In the current Islamic resurgence in Indonesia, Sufism is  both a practical 
devotion and philosophical discourse whose religious teachings remain influential 
in shaping a collective framework of action. Despite the differences in practical 
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devotion (e.g. litanies of recitation), contemporary Sufism shares the metaphysical 
and philosophical views elaborated by the prominent founders of the Sufi schools 
who have had a lasting influence in the Muslim world: Junaid al Baghdadi (830-
910 C.E.), Al Qushayri (986-1073 C.E.), Al Ghazali (1058-1111 C.E.), and Ibn 
‘Arabi (1165-1240 C.E.). Through their scholarly works, these Sufi Muslim 
scholars have provided not only the intellectual basis for the legitimate position of 
Sufism within the Islamic tradition but have also provided a personal model of 
piety to which all later generations of Sufi masters and Muslim scholars have 
looked for their inspiration.  
As elaborated in detail in the previous sections, Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
conveys eclectic religious teachings characterized mainly by mystical visions, an 
interpretation of the Quranic and Prophetic tradition, millenarian-apocalyptic belief 
and eschatological views, along with a pious reading of Islamic tradition. It 
believes that revitalizing Islam can only be achieved through complete emulation 
of Prophetic piety. In this regard, following a madzhab and a school of theology 
(kalam) along with acceptance of the canonical works in Quran exegesis (tafsir) 
and the Prophetic traditions (hadist) in particular are emphasized as a prerequisite 
for  ‘correct religious belief and ritual and action’.  
As a total framework – meaning a set of beliefs, theology, ritual, physical 
symbols, and, to some extent, even political aspiration – Sufism thus provides 
utopian visions that include messianic expectation and salvation, justification of 
moral protest and social action, shared identity and solidarity. In its totality, Sufism 
therefore offers a comfortable mantle for rallying support for collective action 
seeking social, political, cultural and religious change within Muslim society. As a 
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Sufi group, Naqshbandi-Haqqani embraces a religiously and politically 
conservative stance because instead of providing a broad socio-political platform, 
this Sufi group targets changing personal attitudes and behavior as a foundation for 
broader socio-political changes.  
However, the metaphorical and sometimes even ambiguous nature of the 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani teachings often generates differing interpretations, 
speculations, and even disillusionment among its disciples. In this regard, it is not 
the teachings themselves but the personal credibility of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and 
Hisham Kabbani that is also important to defend the validity of their teachings and 
convince people of the relevance of this teaching in fulfilling unique personal 
religious needs. The coherent teachings and personal credibility of the Sufi master 
therefore will significantly determine whether Naqshbandi-Haqqani can continue to 
exist in the future or not.  
 
!
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Chapter 8 
PUBLIC  OUTREACH AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT   
Po l i t i c s  and  I s lamic  Propagat ion  
  
“…a tariqa is an “institution” that translates the needs, aims, and ideals of 
Muslims in particular settings into “a social organization or movement.” (Halil 
Inalcik as quoted by Foley, 2008: 524) 
 
In this chapter, I contend that the Sufi movement consists of more than a 
collection of inward looking group preoccupied solely with ritual and other-
worldly salvation. This chapter examines the social engagement, public appearance, 
and preaching activities that involve the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in 
Indonesia. This chapter deals with political determinants for Sufi propagation by 
focusing on Indonesia’s involvement in the global war against terrorism, the use of 
Sufi ritual as an electoral strategy for mobilising people and prevailing mysticism 
and supernatural culture in Indonesian politics. It also examines various different 
method of dakwah employed by the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community to reach out 
to the general public. This chapter is concerned to show that Sufi propagation 
represents collective efforts to maintain Sunni orthodoxy (Ahlus Sunnah wal 
Jamaah) as a dominant religious norm among Indonesian Muslims, and to reclaim 
Sufism as a legitimate voice of the Islamic tradition in Indonesia. In the end, Sufi 
propagation contributes significantly to maintaining the moderate and peaceful 
character of Islam in Indonesia. 
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8.1 Political Determinants for Sufi Activism: Moral Protest and Islamic 
Mobilisation 
The history of Sufism in Indonesia has always been closely related to 
certain political factors. In the early inception of Islam in the 15th century, Sufi 
propagation laid a strong foundation for the political consolidation of newly 
emerging Muslim rulers in their competition over the diminishing influence of 
hitherto Hindu-Buddhist Empire in the archipelago. In the 19th and early 20th 
century, Sufi propagation was part of anti-colonial resistance against the Dutch 
colonial power. From independence until the 1990s, Sufi propagation was mainly 
concerned with strengthening Islamic orthodoxy against the legacy or remnant of 
‘pre-Islamic heterodox belief and religious praxis’. In contemporary times, Sufi 
propagation represents a popular expression and political aspiration for affirming 
collective identity as a pious Muslim democratic country. Such popular expression 
and political aspiration have to do with three recent developments in Indonesian 
politics: the threat of terrorism, electoral politics and popular Islamic mobilisation, 
and the prevailing mysticism in Indonesian politics.  
 
8.1.1 Threat of Terrorism and Moral Protest 
Since the Bali bombing in 2002, Indonesia has joined in the global 
campaign against terrorism. The Bali bombing and several subsequent terrorist acts 
became a catalyst for creating a domestic political environment in which radical 
religious messages and violence become less favourable. The Salafi radical rhetoric 
against secular democracy and on behalf of strict observance of shariah provisions, 
on the one hand, and the Sufi preoccupation with the political establishment and a 
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peaceful religious message, on the other hand, make the Sufi community a natural, 
though not necessarily reliable, political ally to address growing security concerns 
about terrorist threats. Sufi and other Muslim groups with a similar religious 
outlook thus provide political support for government without raising suspicion 
from the Muslim community at large.  
For Sufi community, violence acts and radical religious messages remain an 
alarming concern because they not only pose a threat to human security but also  to 
the traditions that have been maintained for a long time. These traditions include 
popular religious traditions that are common among Indonesian Muslims but 
fiercely denounced by some Muslim groups with a Salafi religious outlook. In 
early 2000, a rumor was spread in Cirebon  about a time bomb had beeng planted at 
Sunan Gunungjati and the Grand Mosque of Cirebon. This terror plot was 
successfully thwarted by the police with the help of a prominent kyai who had a 
vision about it in a dream the day before.231  
There is no way to find out whether this incident really happened or was 
simply a false rumor. Yet, Indonesia is a country where religious dispute and 
sentiment over doctrinal and ideological matters can lead to serious political 
repercussions. In the 1920s, doctrinal disputes divided the nation into two large 
Islamic camps, traditionalist vs. reformist. In the 1960s, religious sentiments played 
a part in mobilising people to fight against communism with disastrous results. 
Recent news reports on the desecration and even complete destruction of popular 
pilgrimage sites in other countries perpetrated by terrorist groups create an 
atmosphere of fear that similar things can happen in Indonesia. Reports about what !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
231 Interview with Yakub Romdhoni, 10 September 2010 
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has been happening in other Muslim countries are  taken seriously  by the 
Indonesian population.   
Sufi communal rituals have become a rallying point in the fight against 
terror. Such rituals receive political support because of their preoccupation with 
peaceful Islamic messages, a counterbalance to radical religious views posed by 
some Muslim groups. These Sufi rituals therefore cannot be understood simply as 
religious events because they are also  communal gatherings during which religious 
and political messages come together for expressing moral protest. Through 
communal rituals, the Sufi community expresses its political concerns regarding 
perceived moral decay and the growing influence of Salafism. Ritual gatherings 
also become a political stage where a pluralist vision about Islam is upheld and 
pious acts are demonstrated openly in public. 
On 29 September 2012 for instance, Sheikh Hisham attended a dzikir akbar 
and maulid celebration in Purbalingga, Central Java. In this ritual gathering, Sheikh 
Hisham delivered a sermon that touched upon the virtue of obeying the legitimate 
ruler. Sheikh Hisham also shared his political convictions with those attending the 
ritual gathering, urging them to love their country, avoid political discord and 
violence acts. These political ideas resonate among the general Sufi community in 
Indonesia: that Indonesia as a national entity should not be challenged and must be 
defended at all cost. It is interesting to note that all these ritual gatherings were 
facilitated and financially supported by the local security apparatus such as the 
Head of the Local Police (Kapolres) or a local military commander 
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(Dandim/Danrem).232 The peaceful and nationalistic messages that the Sufi ritual 
gatherings promote certainly play a part in bringing about this cooperation.  
Habib Luthfi, the president of Indonesia’s largest Sufi Association of 
JATMAN (Jamiyyah Ahli Thariqoh Mu’tabarah an Nadhliyyah), with whom 
Sheikh Hisham has established a good personal relationship since the late 1990s, 
has been active in religious campaigning to promote the so-called “Sufisme 
Kebangsaan” or Nationalistic Sufism (Arifin 2012, 91). This nationalistic Sufism 
provides symbolic legitimacy for combatting terrorism, violence and radicalism 
that widely resonates among Muslim community with political slogan of “NKRI 
Harga Mati” or Indonesia is final entity. In his hometown, Pekalongan, he 
organises annual communal festivals called “Pawai Panjang Jimat” during which 
participants salute the Indonesian national flag amid the chanting of dzikir and 
maulid celebration.  
 
8.1.2 Electoral Politics and Mass Mobilisation 
Reliance on Sufi rituals has become part of an electoral strategy to mobilise 
popular support and gain symbolic legitimacy. In the new democratic era in 
Indonesia, ritual is an effective mobilising tool that is far less expensive than other 
conventional forms of mass political mobilisation such as street rallies, parades, or 
demonstrations. This is because Sufi rituals such as dzikir akbar and maulid 
celebrations often involve a large number of people. Hasan (2012, 369) has  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
232 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 10 October 2010 
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suggested that typical Sufi ritual like dzikir akbar provides a religious platform 
through which social networking can be established and maintained in Indonesia.  
This use of Sufi ritual for Islamic mobilisation in Indonesia is a recent 
phenomenon. The historical precedent for this kind of Islamic mobilisation can be 
traced back to the time when the then chairman of NU central board, Abdurrahman 
Wahid (1940-2009), conducted mass istighotzah ritual in the traditionalist Muslim 
community in the 1990s. At the time, the istighotzah ritual became an effective 
mobilising instrument to counterbalance the mighty authoritarian state. During his 
short presidency (1999-2001), some of Abdurrahman Wahid’s supporters in fact 
manipulated istighotsah rituals to rally political support from the NU community to 
respond to growing pressures from his political opponents (Feillard 2002, 117-144). 
Instead of co-optation, this kind of Islamic mobilisation is mutually 
beneficial because Sufi activism helps those aspiring to political power to mobilise 
and rally popular support from the Muslim community in Indonesia. The ritual is 
equally vital for both challenging and maintaining political power (Kertzer 1989, 
38). The dzikir and maulid celebrations for example, offer a religious platform 
through which mass mobilisation takes place. The practice of ziarah also 
constitutes political strategy for those who are in power (Quinn 2009, 173-199). By 
conducting dzikir, maulid celebrations and ziarah, an aspiring politician is able to 
reach large numbers of people and fulfill his political ambitions at the same time. 
This is clearly a factor in the political dynamics behind the proliferation of such 
rituals and communal gatherings at the local and national level.  
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During the SBY era, Sufi communal rituals were organised and financially 
supported by political elites as part of their electoral strategy to rally political 
support from the Muslim community, as well as showing personal piety and the 
religious credentials of these political leaders. The Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
community shares its religious and socio-political concerns with the general public 
through the promotion of religious rituals in the form of dzikir and maulid 
celebrations. Sufi ritual is therefore not only a religious gathering but also a form of 
Islamic political mobilisation.  
 
8.1.3 Mystic and Politics: Charisma and Symbolic Legitimacy 
Sufism strongly accords with the prevailing tendencies toward mysticism 
and supernatural culture in Indonesian politics (Mulder 1978, 1999, Stange 1980). 
Javanese culture in particular is rich with symbolism and with people who still 
associate political leader as embodied in a divinely chosen charismatic person. 
From this perspective, political power, to some extent, has little to do with electoral 
legitimacy and instead, is sought and maintained mainly through a mystical quest 
(Anderson 1972, 1-69). Though there is an overall shift towards scripturalist Islam 
in contemporary Indonesia, the charismatic mystical teacher has not lost his 
personal reputation for miracle-working to bolster symbolic legitimacy, thus 
providing spiritual counsel, especially for those aspiring to political power 
(Bruinessen 2007b). 
Sufi charisma represents an expansion of spiritual counsel for those who 
seek to gain or maintain political power, whereas its rituals represent the seeking of 
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divine blessing (barakah). As happened in the previous era, Sufi charisma was 
frequently co-opted by the authoritarian regime to rally Muslim political support 
(Sujuthi 2001, Turmudi 2004, 2006, Sukamto 2012). Following deepening 
Islamisation, Sufi charisma and ritual are replacing, though not completely, some 
of the older mystical and supernatural symbolism of power. Sufi charisma and 
ritual also can be used to gain symbolic legitimacy because it incorporates the Sufi 
ideals of the unity and solidarity of the Muslim ummah.  
Sheikh Hisham often uses his authority as a Sufi master to approach the 
political establishment at the local and national level. The relationship between 
Sheikh Hisham and Naqshbandi-Haqqani community and the political 
establishment is marked by a pragmatic political attitude. This is typical of Sunni 
political conservatism that has been a hallmark of Naqshbandi for generations in 
Indonesia and in other part of the Muslim world. Sheikh Hisham, for instance, 
enjoyed a good personal relationship with President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-
2001). He also attempted to make contact with President Megawati, though 
unsuccessfully. At the local level, on 18 December 2010, Sheikh Hisham and 
Habib Syekh conducted a maulid celebration in Bantul to show their support for 
the Bill for Yogyakarta’s special autonomy status. This support perhaps had to do 
with Sheikh Hisham’s view that Yogyakarta’s sultanate is symbolically vital for 
protecting the majority Sunni community in Indonesia.  
However, it is in Jakarta that this political connection is well maintained. 
Through the help of his disciples in Jakarta, Sheikh Hisham manages to reach out 
to Jakarta’s elite politicians and high-ranking officials. In fact, during Sheikh 
Hisham’s visits between 1999 and 2004, those in the Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia 
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(YHI) were responsible for arranging “VIP meetings”- a practice that has continued 
to this day. Through these VIP meetings, Sheikh Hisham got to know dignitaries 
such as Azwar Anas (Coordinating Minister of People Welfare during the Habibie 
administration), Akbar Tandjung (State Secretary), Tuti Alawiyah (Minister of 
Women Empowerment), Jusuf Kalla (Coordinating Minister of People Welfare), 
Jahja Muhaimin (Minister of National Education), Djohan Effendi (State Secretary 
during the Abdurrahman Wahid administration), and A.M. Hendropriyono (Head 
of Indonesia Intelligence Agency during the Megawati administration).233  
Yet, it was during the SBY administration that these personal relationships 
were particularly fruitful. The relationship between the Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
community and Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) began when Sheikh Hisham, 
with the help of Ahmad Mubarok and Firdaus Wajdi, met SBY in person when he 
was Coordinating Minister for Political, Law and Security Affairs. The meeting 
took place at Firdaus Wajdi’s house in Brawijaya, Kebayoran Baru, on 10 July 
2003. SBY was even reported as giving ba’iat to become a Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
disciple. On that occasion, Sheikh Hisham was reported to have spontaneously 
touched SBY’s chest with his hand, assuring SBY that he would be President. To 
show his support, Sheikh Hisham gave SBY a set of prayer beads (tasbih) and the 
ijazah (authority) to practice a certain formulic dzikir.234 Sheikh Hisham was 
indeed identified as one of the three religious figures – together with KH Achmad 
Muzakky Syah/Pesantren Al Qodiri, Patrang, Jember and KH Achmad Khairun 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
233 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010 
234 Interview with Ahmad Mubarok, 21 September 2010 
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Nasihin/Pesantren AKN Marzuki, Pati – from whom SBY sought spiritual 
guidance in his bid for political power.235 
As a person growing up in Javanese culture, SBY appears to believe in 
mysticism (Artha 2009, Mubarok 2011). 236  Exploiting his inclination toward 
mysticism to defend himself and undermine his opponents, SBY often became 
overly sensitive to criticism against his personal integrity and moral character. He 
would be very furious if someone accused him of lying (bohong), for instance. 
Using Sufi pious language, he often labelled criticism against his personal integrity 
and moral character simply as fitnah, which means unrest or rebellion, especially 
against a rightful ruler. Nor did hesitate to frame his political endeavors in mystical 
terms. For instance, he publicly announced that he managed to capture black magic 
(sihir) from his political opponents237 and further stated that practicing dzikir was 
the most effective way to deal with this black magic.238 The terms fitnah and sihir 
that SBY packed into his messages might be politically irrelevant but they had 
strong religious resonance.  
Pujo Basuki (aka Syekh Muhammad Djamil) said that not long after being 
inaugurated as President in 2004, SBY met with Sheikh Hisham Kabbani at the 
Presidential Palace where Sheikh Hisham delivered Sheikh Nazim’s personal 
message to the President.239 He described how Sheikh Hisham sat on the floor right 
before the President and asked him to remain seated in his high chair. Sheikh !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
235 For details, see Gatra Special Report, Para Kiai Sekitar SBY, No. 47 Tahun X, 9 October 2004 
236 His personal inclination to mysticism is also partly shared by his wife who is reported to be a 
follower of Paguyuban Ngesti Tunggal (Pangestu). Pengestu is a Javanese mystical group 
established by Soenarto Mertowardojo (1899-1965) on 20 May 1949 in Solo. 
237 http://us.politik.news.viva.co.id/news/read/72286-sby__banyak_yang_menggunakan_ilmu_sihir  
238  http://www.tempo.co/read/fokus/2009/07/04/699/SBY-Mengaku-Banyak-Dikirimi-Sihir  and 
http://blog.tempointeraktif.com/portal/yudhoyono-sihir-dan-dzikir/ 
239 Pujo Basuki was a former Army colonel and a close friend of Firdaus Wajdi. He was died during 
a dzikir gathering at Pesantren Ba’alawi Gunungpati, Semarang, 19 June 2011. 
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Hisham delivered to the President of Sheikh Nazim’s personal message that as long 
as the President maintained his commitment to propagate Islam and support the 
Muslim community, Indonesia would be just fine. In addition, there was also a 
story that Sheikh Hisham passed on a message about a large amount of hidden 
treasure belonging to the Indonesian people.240  
Nevertheless, Naqshbandi-Haqqani community was disappointed by SBY 
and his failure to keep his commitments as a disciple. Among Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples, SBY’s political blunders, the country’s ongoing socio-
economic problems, and the series of personal attacks following his inauguration 
for the second term (2009-2014) are perceived as a consequence of not fulfilling 
his commitments as a disciple. Unfortunately, Pujo Basuki declined to give details 
of the kind of commitments that SBY was supposed to fulfill. Other disciples have 
suggested that SBY was more interested in gaining power and was not sincere in 
his personal commitment to support Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities in Indonesia.  
However, Sheikh Hisham does not always feel comfortable giving spiritual 
advice to political leaders because this often involves unnecessary political 
maneuvers that can create tension and discord among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
disciples. For many disciples, this political involvement undermines the principal 
mission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia and potentially weakens its internal 
solidarity. The pluralistic ideological and political orientations of his numerous 
disciples have certainly played a part in shaping Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s political 
attitudes. .  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
240 Interview with Pujo Basuki, 10 November 2010 
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It is perhaps because of this reason that during the 2009 Presidential 
election, Sheikh Hisham personally and secretly endorsed Jusuf Kalla rather than 
his rival, SBY, on the grounds that Jusuf Kalla  was more sincere in his support  for 
the Muslim community in Indonesia. Despite his endorsement, Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani warned his disciples in advance that Jusuf Kalla would lose because he 
did not have enough political support.241 
  
8.2 Sufism and Islamic Propagation 
The influence of Sufism stemmed from the fact that most Indonesian 
Muslim scholars living and studying in the Haramain in the 19th century learnt 
Islamic knowledge and sought spiritual guidance from Naqshbandi’s masters 
residing in the holy cities. In contemporary times, popular acceptance of Sufism is 
a result of active propagation through various media, ranging from print 
publications, sermons, music, public performances of ritual and seminar/academic 
conferences. 
!
8.2.1 Print Publication and Propagation 
Print publication has been pivotal for Islamic transmission in Indonesia. 
Sufi print publication in modern times had a historical precedent especially when 
Hamka collected and then published his short essays from  Pedoman Masyarakat 
magazine into a book entitled Tasawuf Modern in 1939 (Howell 2008b, 2, 2010, 
1031). The growing number of Islamic publications since the early 1990s has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
241 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 10 September 2010 
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developed further and played a significant role in informing the contemporary Sufi 
resurgence in Indonesia (Watson 2005a, 190). Indonesian Islamic publishers such 
as Mizan, LKiS, Serambi, Pustaka Hidayah have contributed significantly to 
popularising the great works of prominent Sufi masters, which were previously 
known only among the Pesantren community. It is within this general environment 
of the rising popularity of Islamic publications that books and other forms of 
reading materials with Sufi themes gain popularity and find readers among the 
general Muslim population.  
Sufi books cover a wide range of topics: from Quranic exegesis and 
Prophetic tradition, to Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). In terms of Quranic exegesis, 
the Prophetic tradition and fiqh, the four books of Ensiklopedia Akidah Ahlusunah 
series published by Serambi are particularly important. It is because they are 
among the first translated publications detailing Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s orthodox 
religious views. They provide the Quranic and Prophetic basis for popular Sunni 
orthodox positions on matters relating to doctrine, belief and religious practices 
such as dzikir, sholawat, tawassul (intermediary), maulid (the Prophet’s birthday 
celebration), and ziarah (pilgrimage). They also provide detailed explanations of 
those popular doctrines, beliefs and religious practices and their historical 
precedents.  
Sheikh Hisham’s Ensiklopedia Akidah Ahlusunah, for instance, became a 
model for the writing of books of a similar genre, most of which were published by 
followers. Noval bin Muhammad Alaydrus’ books entitled Mana Dalilnya (2 
volumes) and Ahlul Bid’ah Hasanah (2 volumes) are good examples of this 
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genre.242 Noval’s books were published by Taman Ilmu, a small Islamic publisher 
in Solo between 2008 and 2011. Unlike Sheikh Hisham’s Ensiklopedia Akidah 
Ahlus Sunnah, Noval’s books were relatively cheap and targeted lay Muslims using 
simple and straightforward messages. His books were supposed to be a source of 
guidance protecting followers from the so-called “deviant teachings” of Salafi-
Wahabism. 
The Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Indonesia has been actively 
involved in disseminating Sufi genre of Islamic publications since the late 1990s. 
Sheikh Nazim’s books such as Mercy Oceans, Mystical Secrets of the Last Days, 
The Divine Kingdom, and Sheikh Hisham’s books such as The Naqshbandi Sufi 
Way: History and Guidebook of the Saints of the Golden Chain, The Approach of 
Armageddon: A Chronicle of Scientific Breakthroughs and World Events that 
Occur During the Last Days as Foretold by Prophet Muhammad, and Universe 
Rising found many readers. Prior to 2003, these books arrived in Indonesia through 
direct order or online purchase to fill private libraries and collections. It is through 
Subki’s family that one of these private collections was used for instructing a small 
group of initiated disciples. When the number of disciples grew, a collective effort 
was made to translate and publish these books for the general audience.  
At the beginning, Naqshbandi-Haqqani relied on large publishers in Jakarta 
such as Serambi and Hikmah. Serambi translated and published The Approach of 
Armageddon: A Chronicle of Scientific Breakthroughs and World Events that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
242 Habib Noval bin Muhammad Alaydrus was born in Solo, 27 July 1975. He married the 
granddaughter of Habib Anis al Habsyi (1928-2006), a prominent Sayyid-Hadrami figure and the 
founder of Majelis ar-Riyadh, Solo. He is personally close to Sheikh Hisham and has accompanied 
him and served as his translator on many occasions; he also gave a religious instruction at some 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s affiliates in Jakarta 
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Occur During the Last Days as Foretold by Prophet Muhammad into Indonesian 
with the title of Kiamat Mendekat. This book has a distinct place in the popular 
Islamic literature on millenarian prophecy because, unlike other similar books 
written by Indonesians and foreigners who emphasize a Christian-Jews 
conspiracy,243 Kiamat Mendekat combines rational scientific explanations and its 
textual basis in the Quran and the Prophetic traditions with a view of the 
inevitability of peaceful coexistence among different religious affiliations. Hikmah 
publishing house, on the other hand, published Dialog dengan Malaikat which 
contains stories and materials that are mostly based on the personal spiritual 
experiences of both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani.  
With more than 5000 copies of each book sold, the success of these two 
books is comparable to that of other books of a similar genre. Sheikh Hisham’s 
Dialog dengan Malaikat in particular repeated the success of similar books such as 
Dialog dengan Jin Muslim and Dajjal Akan Muncul Dari Segitiga Bermuda, a 
best-selling book written by an Egyptian journalist, Muhammad Isa Dawud, and 
published by Pustaka Al Hidayah in 1995 and 1996 respectively. Like Muhammad 
Isa Dawud, who    claimed that his two books were based on a real dialogue with a 
fellow genie, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani claims that Kiamat Mendekat and Dialog 
dengan Malaikat are based on the true spiritual vision of his masters, Sheikh 
Nazim and Abdullah Faiz, and his own experiences during the civil war in his 
home country, Lebanon. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
243 Some examples of popular books dealing with millenarian prophecy are Abu Khalid Majdi bin 
Saad’s Imam Mahdi: Pemimpin Akhir Zaman yang Dijanjikan, Akhmad Muhaimin Azzet’s Story of 
Dajjal: Membongkar Ramalan Akhir Zaman, Ahmad Thomson’s Sistem Dajjal: Menguak Akar 
Krisis yang Menjelma Secara Global di Berbagai Bidang Kehidupan, Muhammad Isa Dawud’s 
Dajjal Akan Muncul dari Segitiga Bermuda, Abu Fatihah al-Adnani’s Kaki Tangan Dajjal 
Mencengkeram Indonesia, Ahmad A. Suci’s The Secret of Dajjal, etc. 
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The publication of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s materials dramatically increased 
after 2003. Since then, hundreds of written materials in the form of books, journals, 
and booklets have been translated and published by disciples and affiliate 
organisations in Indonesia. Unlike Serambi and Hikmah, these other translated 
works were initially produced for internal use but then have spread to the general 
public through massive copying. Arif Hamdani for instance translated more than 
100 booklets containing the teachings of Naqshbandi-Haqqani.244 These translated 
works were published by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s affiliate organisations such as 
Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia, Rumi Café, and Rabbani Cinere. These numerous 
booklets are mostly short versions of Sheikh Nazim’s and Hisham’s books and 
sohbet on the internet which were then translated into Indonesian.  
Some of the bestselling booklets produced by Arif Hamdani are Nur 
Muhammad (The Light of Muhammad), Kedatangan Imam Mahdi (The Coming of 
Savior), Ruh dan Raga (Body and Soul), Rahasia Power Sembilan (The Secret of 
Power Nine), Operasi Spiritual (Spiritual Operation), and Cahaya Para Wali (The 
Light of Saints). Arif Hamdani also helped Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia to publish 
its own periodical named Ahl-Haq. This periodical was published regularly 
between early 2005 and mid-2009. The Ahl-Haq was of good quality with a full  
glossy cover page. Both booklets and the Ahl-Haq periodical contained Sheikh 
Nazim’s and Hisham Kabbani’s sohbet, which had been downloaded from 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s websites.  
Despite its significant role in transmitting Sufi teachings to the general 
public in Indonesia, print publications have their weaknesses, however. High !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
244 Interview with Arif Hamdani, 12 July 2010 and Abdurrauf Kurniadi, 8 November 2010 
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market demands result in numerous technical errors, bad translations and poor 
editing.  Many publications mistranslate and simplify the metaphoric/symbolic 
languages used in the original texts.  Arif Hamdani’s booklets/blogs, for instance, 
are criticized for their errors and misunderstanding of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
teachings. The high demand for Arif Hamdani’s booklets, it is said, leaves no room 
or time for double-checking of grammatical errors. According to some reports, Arif 
Hamdani was in such a hurry to translate and publish materials from Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s English websites and books that he often lost the real meaning, message 
and the socio-cultural contexts of the original texts. 
 
8.2.2 Sermon 
Since his arrival in Indonesia in the late 1990s, Sheikh Hisham has been 
invited to lead prayers or deliver sermons at prestigious mosques. During his 
regular visits to Indonesia, Sheikh Hisham  has lead prayer/dzikir and delivered 
Friday sermons at several mosques in Jakarta and other regions. This was made 
possible through the personal relationships and connections of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples with the organising committee (takmir) of the mosques. Prior 
to a visit, Naqhsbandi-Haqqani’s disciples would contact the organising committee 
of the mosque to make arrangements.  
Yet arranging Friday sermons for Sheikh Hisham is not always easy. 
Sometimes, the organising committee of the mosque refuses to give permission for 
various reasons. In that case, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples have to rely on 
their social networks. Failing that, those in charge in Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia 
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will resort to providing the mosque with material incentives so long as Sheikh 
Hisham has permission to attend because leading prayers and delivering sermons at 
prestigious mosques not only helps Sheikh Hisham to reach a broader audience but 
also shows strong financial support for him. 
Since early 2000, Sheikh Hisham has led prayers or delivered sermons at 
mosques located in some of the most prestigious areas in Jakarta such as Istiqlal, 
Sunda Kelapa/Menteng, Al Bina/Senayan, and Cental Bank Mosque/Kebonsirih.245 
For instance, in mid-2009, after many failed attempts to gain permission, Sheikh 
Hisham gave a khutbah at Sunda Kelapa mosque, a well-known  house of prayer 
located in Menteng, Central Jakarta. The permission to deliver the sermon at this 
prestigious mosque in Menteng was given only after Soenarto, the chairman of 
Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia (YHI), contacted his business partner, Aksa Mahmud, 
the brother of Vice President Jusuf Kalla and a well-known businessman from 
Makassar who also happened to be a financial patron of the mosque. Afterwards, 
Aksa Mahmud guaranteed that Naqshbandi-Haqqani could use the mosque anytime 
they wanted to conduct dzikr or other rituals.  
This is also the case with Central Bank Mosque in Kebon Sirih. At first, 
Sheikh Hisham was not allowed to lead prayer/dzikir and deliver Friday sermons at 
Masjid BI/Kebonsirih. After a few attempts, the organising committee of the 
mosque finally gave permission. Some Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples believed it 
to be a miracle. It was said that  one of senior members of the mosque’s organising 
committee gave permission only after he had a dream in which the original !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
245 He has also delivered Friday sermons in less prestigious but important and large mosques such as 
Al Mughni Gatot Subroto, Al Hawi Condet, Hidayatullah, and Pekojan in Jakarta, Al Akbar 
Surabaya, and Kauman Solo. 
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founders of the mosque urged him to allow Sheikh Hisham to lead prayer and 
deliver a sermon at the mosque.246 In reality, however, the permission to use the 
mosque had very likely to do with economic and social capital of those sponsoring 
the event. A disciple attributed this success to the fact that Hendro Martowardoyo 
was the financial supporter of the event. Hendro is a well-known investment banker 
of Niaga Bank and older brother of Agus Martowardoyo, the current governor of 
Indonesia Central Bank. Through this connection, the mosque has been used by 
Naqshbandi community and Sheikh Hisham repeatedly, not only for delivering 
Friday sermons but also for holding communal dzikir.  
Sheikh Hisham often delivers his Friday sermons either in Arabic or 
English without any translation. A translator is needed only during tele-preaching. 
In his Friday sermons, Sheikh Hisham usually speaks of the importance of loving 
the Prophet and following the right path of pious ancestors. He also urges his 
audience to respect the legitimate government and follow the majority voice of the 
Muslim ummah,  avoiding fitnah and discord.247 
 
8.2.3 Hadrah and Whirling Dance 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani is one of the few Sufi groups in Indonesia that 
currently propagates Sufism by non-conventional dakwah methods, as well as 
adopting music and dance in their communal rituals. Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
promotes hadrah and whirling as part of the vibrant urban youth culture. 
Promoting hadrah and whirling has become an important strategy through which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
246 It was narrated that Masjid BI was originally a small prayer house built by seven pious Muslims 
on endowment land in that neighbourhood in the early 20th century.  
247 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 10 September 2010 
 267 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani propagates the beauty of Sufi rituals and the value of 
loving and venerating the Prophet Muhammad. This is partly driven by the 
millenarian belief that music (hadrah) will be an instrument for uniting the Muslim 
ummah in the last days and during the Mahdi era. According to this view, both 
music and dance will be a universal language to address misunderstanding and 
mistrust, an effective means of communication for people coming from different 
social backgrounds.248 Overall, music and dance have a practical function through 
which young disciples can express publicly their involvement in dakwah activities.  
In the Indonesian context, the use of music for the propagation of Islam is 
not something new because it has been around since the 16th century. Back then, 
the early Muslim propagators in Java adopted folk art and local culture such as 
wayang (shadow puppet), tembang (traditional poetry/songs), and gamelan 
(Javanese musical instrument) to disseminate their Islamic message. For instance, 
Sunan Kalijaga is credited with propagating the Islamic message through the 
shadow puppet performances, whereas Sunan Giri adopted Javanese tembang in 
disseminating his dakwah messages. Their creations survive into the contemporary 
era and some of them are even reproduced in modern packaging.  
Naqshbandi-Haqqani has introduced music and dance as a propagating 
instrument. Now there are around 45 hadrah teams and around 25 whirling dancers. 
While hadrah teams spread all over Indonesian, all the whirling dancers affiliated 
to Naqshbandi-Haqqani are only in Jakarta. The use of music and dance for 
propagating missions targets young audience in urban areas. It began in 2006 when 
Sheikh Nazim Haqqani instructed his disciple, Steve Abdul Wahid, to teach the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
248 Interview with Arif Hamdani, 14 August 2010 
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whirling dance at the Rabbani Cinere center.249 Steve Abdul Wahid himself is an 
Australian living in Melbourne. He was reported to have been initiated into the 
Mevlevi Sufi Order in 1995. In 2005, not long after the death of his Sufi master, he 
met Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. Through Sheikh Hisham, he then met and came to 
know Sheikh Nazim Haqqani in Cyprus. After he renewed his initiation into 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Cyprus, he spent 45 days doing seclusion (suluk) in 
Cikereteg, Sukabumi in 2006, after which he spent about two months at the 
Rabbani Cinere center giving instruction and teaching his skills in whirling dance 
to Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples there. The Rabbani Cinere center became the 
first Naqshbandi-Haqqani dzikir center in Indonesia, with its own whirling dance 
and a hadrah team.  
The Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s whirling team was involved in the making of 
Laskar Cinta’s video clip, a successful musical album launched in 2005.250 On 10 
September 2006, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani also attended a music concert organised 
by the Rabbani Cinere group. In the concert, the Rabbani Cinere’s whirling team 
accompanied Ahmad Dhani/DEWA to perform. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani took this 
opportunity to give sohbet and take mass bai’at from all those who attended the 
event. This cooperation was made possible through close personal relationship 
between Ahmad Dhani and Arif Hamdani (a whirling dancer and a disciple of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani who was once affiliated to the Rumi Café and Rabbani 
Cinere center).  
Dhani himself has established good contact with the Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
community through his personal relationship with Sheikh Hisham. There is a story !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
249 Interview with Aat, 21 September 2010 
250 Interview with Arif Hamdani, 11 August 2010 
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that Sheikh Hisham initiated Dhani around 2006. A master and disciple 
relationship between Ahmad Dhani and Sheikh Hisham is, however, unlikely 
because Ahmad Dhani has long been associated with another spiritual guide, Habib 
Faiz al Muhdor of Malang, East Java.251 Thus, instead of a formal initiation (bai’at), 
the close personal relationship between Sheikh Hisham and Ahmad Dhani is more 
likely associated with the Ahmad Dhani’s outspoken admiration for some 
controversial Sufi figures such as Al Hallaj, Bayazid al Bistami, Jalaludin Rumi, 
and Ibn Arabi, all of whom figure in his song lyrics. Sheikh Hisham also shares 
similar admiration for the ideas of these prominent Sufi figures. 
Moreover, Sufi songs and music are performed at luxurious hotels and 
meeting halls on various occasions such as gala wedding ceremonies, company 
events, TV shows, circumcision ceremonies, interfaith art performances, and music 
festivals. In fact, the whirling teams affiliated to Rabbani Cinere center and Rumi 
Café are often invited to perform on television or at the private ceremonies of 
upper class families in Jakarta. For instance, between 2006 and 2012, the hadrah 
and whirling teams performed at several TV stations including RCTI, Indosiar, 
SCTV, TPI, TVRI, TVOne, Trans7, TransTV, and ANTV.  
They also performed in well-known places such as Planet Hollywood, the 
Senayan City Mall, the Ritz Charlton, the Pacific Place, the Grand Melia, the Four 
Seasons, Shangrila, the Grand Indonesia Kempinsky, the Grand Hyatt Hotel, and 
the Savoy Homan in Bandung. 252  Because of the high demand for such 
performances, they have become a lucrative source of income for those directly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
251 Interview with Jerry Marmen, Ahmad Dhani’s brother in-law, 10 September 2012 
252 Interview with Arif Hamdani, 14 August 2010, Aat, 21 September 2010, and Muchsin Mulaela, 
15 October 2010 
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involved. One member of the whirling dance team said that he can perform from 3 
to 5 times a month with a fee of Rp 1 million per performance. This number 
increases significantly during Ramadhan (fasting month). The best whirling dancer 
could perform up to 100 times during the fasting month, and earn up to Rp 25 
million.253  
 
8.2.4 Tele-preaching  
The growth of the television industry since the late 1980s has played a 
significant role in the dynamics of Islamic propagation in Indonesia. A booming 
TV industry provides a religious platform through which Islamic and Sufi 
messages can be transmitted directly on a scale that is unprecedented in the long 
history of Islamisation in Indonesia. Howell (2008a, 40-62) notes  that the use of 
television is an expression of active piety to influence others about Islamic ideals. 
Television is, however, also an arena of contestation and a site of power relations 
between different groups with different religious outlooks. Due to its public nature, 
tele-preaching is not only about commodifying Islam but also about shaping the 
public space and religious opinion. Under these circumstances, tele-preaching 
cannot be ignored in understanding the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia because it is 
one of the primary institutions to exert influence on the general public and also to 
help shape dominant religious views in society.   
Tele-preaching is small in scale but it is no less important for Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s propagating mission in Indonesia because of its ability to reach millions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
253 Interview with Aat, 21 September 2010 
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of viewers at once. Tele-preaching was made possible through good personal 
contacts and master-disciple relationships established between Sheikh Hisham and 
several prominent contemporary tele-preachers in Indonesia. Sheikh Hisham 
attracted prominent tele-preachers such as Wahfiudin, Jeffrie al Buchorie, 
Muhammad Arifin Ilham, and Yusuf Manshur who coincidently became hosts in 
various popular Islamic broadcasting programs both in public and private television 
stations. These prominent tele-preachers were instrumental in helping Naqshbandi-
Haqqani community to reach public audience in Indonesia.  
Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani were once invited as guest speakers to 
deliver sermons on TVRI, Indosiar, RCTI, MNCTV and TransTV. For instance, as 
early as 13 October 2000, Sheikh Hisham attended and delivered a live sermon at 
Indosiar, one of the private TV stations in Indonesia, hosted by Ustadz Wahfiudin. 
On 17 October 2000, Ustadz Wahfiudin once again arranged for Sheikh Hisham to 
be a speaker on an Islamic program at TVRI. During the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
World Tour in 2001, Ustadz Wahfiudin invited both Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and 
Hisham to speak about the topic of Sufism on one of TVRI’s religious program 
broadcasted on 28 April 2001.  
Muhammad Arifin Ilham and Abdullah Gymanstiar also invited Sheikh 
Hisham to their television programs. The biggest broadcast took place at Istiqlal 
Mosque under the banner of Indonesia Berdzikir. This event was broadcasted live 
by TVRI in early February 2004 and was attended by the then Vice President 
Hamzah Haz and around 30,000 people. After a long delay, Sheikh Hisham 
resumed his public appearances on TV by attending Nikmatnya Sedekah on 15 June 
2011. The Nikmatnya Sedekah is a television program at MNCTV hosted by Yusuf 
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Manshur, a prominent young Muslim preacher. In his TV appearances, Sheikh 
Hisham often speaks about the meaning of tasawwuf, its textual basis in the Quran 
and the Prophetic tradition, and its role in Islamic teaching.   
Prior to 2008, Sheikh Hisham’s Friday sermons and tele-preaching were 
recorded and then distributed in the form of VCDs/DVDs  with Indonesian 
subtitles. Since 2008, however, all sermons and tele-preaching delivered in 
Indonesia have been recorded and uploaded to the internet, and can be accessed 
online on Sufilive.com and islamicsupremecouncil.org websites. Interestingly, 
Musthafa Mas’ud has said that sometimes he is compelled to change some of these 
messages without altering their basic meaning because he does not consider them 
appropriate for Indonesian culture, especially when Sheikh Nazim and Hisham 
Kabbani touch upon their millenarian views and the coming of Jesus Christ, or on 
gender issues and the position of women in Islam.  
 
8.2.5 Dzikir Akbar dan Maulid Celebration 
Since 2004, Sheikh Hisham has been conducting public dzikir and maulid 
celebrations with other ritual congregations in Jakarta and other regions.254 Prior to 
2008, he mainly conducted these ritual gatherings in and around Jakarta. Because 
of the relatively small number of his disciples, he had to rely on his own 
connections and the social networking of his disciples within the Muslim 
community in Indonesia. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
254 These ritual congregations include Majelis Azzikra Depok, Jamaah TQN Jakarta Rawamangun, 
Majelis Maulid Darul Islah Buncit, Majelis Dalail Khoirot Cidodol, Majelis Jamaah Dzikir-Maulid 
al Muawanah Cempaka Putih, and Majelis Ahbabul Musthofa Solo. 
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In Jakarta, the disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani are willing to provide 
financial support in sponsoring large public ritual along with other more 
established congregations.255 The appearance of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani at Istiqlal, 
the largest and most prestigious mosque in Indonesia, is indicative of this support. 
The first event was held in February 2004 together with Arifin Ilham’s Majlis Ad 
Dzikra when Sheikh Hisham attended and gave a sermon at a religious event 
entitled Indonesia Berdzikir on 22 February 2004. The second event took place at a 
maulid celebration entitled Indonesia Bersholawat which was organised by Habib 
Hasan bin Jaffar’s Majlis Nurul Musthofa on 30 May 2009.  
Because of the small number of disciples in Jakarta, it seemed impossible to 
organise such a big event. But Naqshbandi-Haqqani community managed to do so 
because they have money. Offering material incentives in return for permission to 
lead prayers has even become a common practice among Naqshbandi-Haqqani. 
Rizal Tarigan did not openly admit to the idea that material incentives were the 
reason behind the success of such a big event in such a prestigious place.  
According to him, the event was simply an expression of devotion to his master. 
However, he acknowledged that sometimes he, on behalf of YHI, had to resort to 
using financial incentives to make such events possible.256 Another disciple, Aat, 
stated that YHI could spend up to Rp 150 million for each of Sheikh Hisham’s 
visits to Indonesia. Though this number covers travel and accommodation costs, it 
also indicates that Naqshbandi-Haqqani community is willing to pay because it has 
the resources to do so.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
255 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010 and Muchsin Mulaela, 10 October 2010 
256 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010 
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Hisyam Musawwa, the person who often organises these events for the 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani community, said that he was willing to help because he 
believed Sheikh Hisham simply wanted to spread his religious message beyond his 
own disciples. He also added that it was natural for the Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
community to offer material incentives. Yet, he declined to say if this was the main 
reason for helping Naqshbandi-Haqqani to organise these events.  
In the local context, Majelis Ahbabul Musthofa has become the most 
important local network through which Sheikh Hisham reaches a broader audience 
by means of music and dance. It is the largest sholawat congregation in Central 
Java with a vast local network in other regions such as East Java and South 
Kalimantan. According to some sources, the relationship between Naqshbandi-
Haqqani community and Majelis Ahbabul Musthofa began in mid-2008 when 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples managed to persuade Habib Syech, the leader of 
Majelis Ahbabul Musthofa, to hold a maulid celebration together in Yogyakarta.257  
Habib Syech bin Abdul Qadir Assegaf was born in Solo, 20 September 
1961. He is a student of Habib Anis bin Alwi al-Habsyi (1928-2006), a prominent 
Muslim scholar of Hadhrami background in Solo. The Majelis is derived from a 
small sholawat congregation established in Solo in 1998 that combined both 
Hadhrami and Javanese style of sholawat recitation (Woodward et al. 2012, 122). 
Habib Syech has organized his disciples into several branches across Central Java 
that routinely performs sholawat recitation with musical instruments. He has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
257 Interview with Joko Sulistiyono, 19 October 2010 
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regular ritual gatherings with more than 10,000 devout followers in several cities 
such as Solo, Yogyakarta, Purwodadi, Jepara, Kudus, and Sragen.258 
The relationship between Habib Syekh bin Abdul Qadir and Sheikh Hisham 
reflects shared mutual interests. Habib Syekh bin Abdul Qadir and his Ahbabul 
Musthofa group provide a religious platform through which Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani can deliver his message to a larger audience. Through Ahbabul Musthofa, 
Sheikh Hisham has managed to introduce both hadrah and whirling dance to the 
general public in several places such as Solo, Yogyakarta, Kudus, Wonosobo, 
Surabaya, Bangkalan, Purwokerto, and Purbalingga.  
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, in turn, provides an opportunity for Habib Syekh 
to reach out to Jakarta’s elites and even to an audience overseas. Habib Syekh is 
often invited to perform sholawat recitations for prominent businessmen and 
politicians with connections to Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Jakarta. For 
instance, through the financial support of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in 
Jakarta, Habib Syech accompanied Sheikh Hisham to perform sholawat recitations 
in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore in 2013. Afterwards, it became a routine for Habib 
Syech’s Ahbabul Musthofa to perform whenever Sheikh Hisham came to visit his 
disciples in Indonesia.  
On 15 May 2010, Sheikh Hisham attended a maulid celebration organised 
by Majelis Ahbabul Musthofa in Jepara City Park in support of a   local candidate 
who was running for local election. On 20 July 2005, Sheikh Hisham also visited 
Padang, West Sumatra during which he led communal dzikir (istighotsah) in the 
Imam Bonjol Park in Padang. According to Alvian Awwal, a Naqshbandi-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
258 http://ahbaabulmusthofa.org/profil.html , accessed 6 April 2011 
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Haqqani’s disciple in Batam who organised the event, this ritual gathering aimed at 
relieving the traumatic experiences caused by the earthquake and the pervading 
fear of a potential tsunami like the one that hit Banda Aceh a year before.  
During this visit, Sheikh Hisham gave a speech on the spiritual lesson of the 
natural disaster that hit Padang. He was reported to have urged people to return to 
the spiritual legacy of many Naqshbandi’s masters in Padang. However, 
considering a large number of people who attended the event (approximately 
10,000 people),259 it was likely that the religious event had to do with Fauzi Bahar’s 
(incumbent Mayor of Padang), bid to run for election later that year. Direct and 
indirect support from the incumbent Mayor of Padang for the event indicated that 
the event was not merely religious but also political in nature.  
Dzikir akbar and maulid celebrations are rituals that can attract thousands 
of people to gather in one place at any one time.  With the support of a good sound 
system, the maulid ritual is a joyful experience in which people from all walks of 
life come together and sing in praise of the Prophet. Participants often express their 
confusion at the rejection of the maulid celebration, which in their view is simply 
an expression of their love for the Prophet.  They also said that loving the Prophet 
and seeking his blessing during the maulid should be the minimum requirement for 
Muslims nowadays. I observed one such ritual in the city park of Bantul in 
December 2010. Attended by around 5000 people, the ritual lasted for a full 2 
hours at night and under heavy rains. Yet, not one person moved to seek cover 
from the rains. Everybody excitedly followed the recitation of shalawat led by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
259 Interview with Alvian Awwal, 19 October 2010 
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Habib Syech bin Abdul Qadir Assegaf and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani at the front of 
a large stage.  
 
8.2.6 Seminar/Conference  
Naqshbandi-Haqqani takes advantage of changing religious environment on 
university campuses throughout the country. Sheikh Hisham is perhaps the first and 
still the only Sufi master to deliver public lectures on Sufism on various campuses 
in Indonesia. The academic forums which Sheikh Hisham has attended have ranged 
mostly from seminars, talkshows, to public lectures at university halls or luxury 
hotels across Jakarta.260 He elaborated on various different topics ranging from 
philosophical discourse, socio-moral reform, interfaith dialogue, Islamic radicalism, 
to popular psychological prescription for personal development. Nevertheless, he 
tends to be less sermonising when delivering khutbah or subbah by using popular 
psychology and philosophical terms. More importantly, he tends to play down the 
miraculous narratives common among Sufi followers; instead, he provides rational 
explanations to meet the expectations of his educated audience.  
Through his disciples in some universities in Jakarta, Sheikh Hisham has 
begun to arrange academic forums where he has been delivering speeches since 
2005. On 14 June 2011, Sheikh Hisham delivered a public lecture to academics and 
students at the Islamic State University (UIN) in Jakarta. This public lecture was 
organised by Faculty of Ushuluddin, UIN Jakarta along with Yayasan Haqqani 
Indonesia. Sheikh Hisham combined his knowledge of Qur’anic exegesis and 
hadits to support his argument on the necessary and legitimate place of Sufism !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
260 http://kunjungan7007.blogspot.com.au, accessed 20 August 2011 
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within the Islamic tradition. He stressed the importance of critical thinking, which 
he described as better than performing ritual continuously for 70 years.261  On these 
occasions, he affirms   his position as a reformist Sufi because he shares the rather 
ambiguous idea that a Sufi master is not obligatory for those aspiring to follow the 
Sufi path. He is reported as saying, 
There is no such thing as an obligation to have a Sufi master. The existence of a 
Sufi master is not essential. It is possible to follow the Sufi path by purifying the 
self and cultivating good character and this can be carried out without guidance 
from a Sufi master....The Mursyid [spiritual master] is not a compulsory 
requirement for those learning Sufism. There is no such demand. It is possible to 
achieve self-purification and cultivation of good character without the guidance of 
a Sheikh. However, if you are afraid that you could be misled, then it is better to 
have a Sheikh and to accept his guidance and follow his ritual instruction. But, 
let’s see the good lesson behind the revelation. Why did the Prophet Muhammad 
receive the revelation through Jibril as an intermediary? Why did God not convey 
His message directly as He talked directly to the Prophet Moses? There is one 
lesson that we have to learn. If we want to fully commit ourselves to performing 
our religious obligation, we have to follow someone who can be a guide…when it 
comes to spiritual matters; we certainly need a guiding Sheikh because it is a long, 
difficult, and complicated path. It would be wiser that we learn from an 
authoritative teacher and master. The only obligation of spiritual master is to guide 
and direct His disciples, nothing more.262  
 
A few days afterwards, on 17 June 2011, Sheikh Hisham also delivered a 
public lecture at the University of Indonesia. In this forum, Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani spoke about Spiritualism in the Modern World. 263  This forum was 
organised by PKTTI (The Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies) along with 
Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia (YHI), KMNU (The Nahdlatul Ulama Student Forum), 
PMII (The Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), and IKABA (The West Asia 
Student Association). The public lecture was made possible through a formal 
invitation by Gumilar Rosliwa Somantri, the then rector of the University of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
261 For more details, Al Kisah, No. 14/11, 24 July 2011  
262 Republika, 13 June 2012 
263 http://www.sufilive.com/University_of_Indonesia_Spiritualism_in_the_Modern_World_-
3683.html, accessed 12 March 2012 
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Indonesia and Muhammad Hikam, Senior lecturer at Department of Physics, 
University of Indonesia, who is a disciple of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. In his speech on 
Spiritualism and the Modern World Sheikh Hisham spoke about the signs of bad 
character and how to address them from a Sufi perspective.  
These public lectures are important because they reach out to audiences 
who may have been skeptical about Sufism or have never been exposed to Sufism 
at all. His mastery of Arabic and English also gave him some academic credibility 
because these are the languages that the academic community in Indonesia is 
familiar with. His experience as a preacher in the USA is important cultural capital 
in attracting an audience. In different forums, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani uses a 
different language in delivering his message. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani usually 
speaks in his mother tongue of Arabic while giving sermons and speeches at the 
mosques, and always uses English in delivering public lectures on campuses. He 
gives the impression that he can deal with people from very different educational 
backgrounds, and it is not uncommon that after a sermon or public lecture, many in 
the audience come to him for bai’at.  
According to some Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources, Sheikh Hisham 
deliberately targets academic community because he strongly believes that 
university educated people play a critical role in the survival and maintenance of 
Sufism in the future. He believes that Indonesia is one of the very few countries left 
in the Muslim world where the doctrine of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah still has a 
dominant influence. Furthermore, academic engagement opens up opportunity for 
expanding social networks among educated and upper-middle class Muslims in 
urban areas. Through their intermediary, Sufism can reach the elites and this would 
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indirectly influence the loyalty of the mass. This conviction represents an elitist 
approach of Islamic propagation which has long been a hallmark of Naqshbandi. 
Furthermore, Sheikh Hisham considers Sufi ritual as a significant identity-marker 
for distinguishing between the so-called true and false salaf. He also believes that it 
is no longer appropriate to teach Sufism exclusively to the religious elites while lay 
Muslims are increasingly exposed to anti-Sufi Islamic ideas.264  
At this stage, it is still difficult to assess how academic engagement can be a 
contributing factor in spreading Sufism among the academic community in 
Indonesia. However, considering that many other Sufi groups also begin to target 
university campuses for propagation, this could be potentially significant for Sufi 
propagation on university campuses. Naqshbandi-Haqqani along with its 
counterpart such as AL KHIDMAH KAMPUS and MATAN will potentially 
provide a counterbalance to the encroaching influence of Tarbiyah, HTI and other 
Islamic groups that are currently claiming to be the sole authoritative voices of 
Muslim piety and activism within the academic community in Indonesia. As the 
Islamisation of campus in the 1970s brought about the rise of Islamism, Sufi 
activism will potentially alter the religious landscape of Indonesia in the near future. 
 
8.3 Conclusion 
Indonesia has long been recognised as the largest Muslim country in the 
world, but it is only recently that Islamic piety has taken center stage in the 
religious life of the country. Since the late 1990s, the religious landscape in 
Indonesia has changed to such an extent that it is no longer possible to distinguish !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
264 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010 
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between nominal and pious Muslims. The distinction nowadays is between pious 
Muslims of different religious outlooks. The religious expressions of various 
Muslim groups have tended to create a pluralistic Islam and, borrowing Casanova’s 
term, a ‘public religion’. It is pluralistic because Islam is interpreted and practiced 
in many different ways by different people, whereas the term of public refers to a 
‘deprivatising’ process in which Islam has been increasingly important in 
determining public morality and discourse in Indonesia (Casanova 1994, 2003, 111, 
2008, 101).  
The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani demonstrates that it has been actively 
propagating Islamic message to a larger audience. Though Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
community is not the largest Sufi group in Indonesia, it is among the most 
outspoken and active in upholding the validity of Sufism in the public sphere. 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani community does not hesitate to use all the resources at its 
disposal to conduct public campaigns and religious dakwah. Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
combines a traditional approach with modern packaging to reach a broader 
audience. In the name of its dakwah mission, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community 
is actively involved in collective attempts to re-appropriate ASWAJA as a 
collective identity and a dominant religious norm in Indonesia. Its traditional 
Islamic belief is presented in modern packaging that attracts upper and middle- 
class Muslims in urban areas. This rigorous effort, in turn, contributes to shaping 
public discourse and morality with a broad impact on religious, cultural, and socio-
political life in Indonesia.  
Sufi propagation through various means plays a significant role not only in 
generating a new Islamic consciousness with greater appreciation toward Sufi 
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traditions, but also in shaping public morality and consumption patterns of Muslim 
upper and middle classes in urban areas. Written and oral forms of transmission 
become the two main media through which Sufism shapes popular Islamic 
discourse within the Muslim community. Written religious transmission takes the 
form of online publications on the internet and print publications in form of books, 
journals, and pamphlets, whereas oral transmission is expressed through Friday 
sermons (khutbah) and through preaching on television. They serve to promote and 
maintain Sufism as a popular Islamic discourse among Indonesian Muslims. All 
these forms of religious transmission share a view that following shariah is in itself 
inadequate for instilling piety so long as it contributes to cultivating virtue and 
good character.  
!
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Chapter 9 
R I V A L R I E S  A N D  O P P O S I T I O N   
R e l i g i o u s  P o l e m i c s  a n d  C o n t r o v e r s i e s  
 
Criticism of and opposition to mystical conceptions of Islam and their adherents 
have been and are still crucial forces shaping and coinciding with socio-political 
configurations in the world of Islam while constituting an integral part of an 
ongoing debate inside the Islamic tradition (Jong and Radtke 1999, 1) 
 
Indonesia is not only the biggest Muslim country but perhaps among the 
most diverse in terms of its religious orientations. Though claiming to be Sunni 
Muslims, Indonesian Muslims have been in reality very pluralistic in their religious 
outlooks due to the long history of Islamisation in the archipelago, Western 
colonialism and differences in socio-economic and cultural bases, as well as 
geographical and political factors. Since the pre-colonial period, NU and 
Muhammadiyah have  represented two mainstream religious orientations. 265 
Muhammadiyah, for instance, considered the NU community as representing 
impurity because it allegedly promotes “TBC”, that is takhayul (irrational belief), 
bid’ah (innovation), and churafat (superstition).266   
Among other important and highly contested issues, opposition against Sufi 
teachings has been particularly influential in shaping Islamic reform and the 
dynamics of socio-political and cultural religious life in Indonesia (Azra 1999, 665-
686, Steenbrink 1999, 687-704, Bruinessen 1999, 705-728). Since the flourishing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!265!NU was identical with the Pesantren community and rural peasant Muslims with traditional 
orientation, whereas Muhammadiyah attracted urban Muslims and embraced modern reformist 
ideas of religious thinking and practices.  !
266 In Indonesia, TBC has also a negative connotation for infectious disease of tuberculosis. This 
reformist critique is still shared by contemporary Salafi and Islamist groups. 
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tajdid movement in the 17th century onward, Sufism has been a subject of scrutiny 
by orthodox ulama for its alleged deviations from shariah. Reformist Muslims 
denounced it because of its supposed religious heresies deviating from shariah 
provisions. They considered Sufism to be contaminating and degrading the purity 
of belief and ritual. Moreover, the reformist Muslims also regard Sufism, which is 
preoccupied with supposedly mysticism and other worldly orientation, as being a 
major source of backwardness and ignorance embedded in traditional peasant 
society. Sufism was seen as leading to fatalistic attitude that hinders rational 
thinking, economic development and progressive social changes. 
In the contemporary era, the controversies regarding Sufism have not ended 
yet. While old divergences as represented by the two mainstream Muslim 
organisations remain intact, Islamisation in the 1990s also brought about religious 
polemics and disputes between existing mainstream organisations and the newly 
established ones and among the new coming groups themselves. These religious 
polemics are  principally related to theological and doctrinal positions, whereas 
other disputes are trivial in nature and may have something to do with political, 
material or cultural differences. Though these differences have steadily diminished, 
minor and major polemics on religious, political and social affairs involving Sufi 
community still play a role, and will likely remain, to be significant in shaping the 
socio-cultural and political dynamics of Islamisation in Indonesia.  
This chapter discusses ongoing controversies and polemics following the 
coming of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. As a new Sufi movement in 
Indonesia, Naqshbandi-Haqqani was the subject of ongoing controversies and 
polemics. The way Naqshbandi-Haqqani community addresses these controversies 
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and deals with its opponents reveal an interesting aspect of contemporary Islamic 
resurgence in Indonesia. I argue that these controversies and disputes are not an 
isolated case but they actually reflect broader cultural and religious struggles within 
Indonesian Muslim society. Naqshbandi-Haqqani has to interact with diverse 
Muslim groups, some of which either completely oppose or are critical of its 
doctrines and rituals. Naqshbandi-Haqqani defends its practices through various 
strategies, including publication, social networking, and even seeking political 
support.  
This chapter consists of four sub chapters. For a comprehensive discussion, 
the chapter will situate these controversies and polemics in different local contexts 
in Indonesia. The first part traces the origins and source of contestation between the 
Ahbash group and its affiliate organisation (SYAHAMAH) in Indonesia on the one 
hand and Naqshbandi-Haqqani on the other. Second part of this chapter deals with 
controversies that emerge within traditionalist Muslim communities especially 
among the Habaib group, among Sufi groups and, in general, within the NU and 
Pesantren community. Third, the chapter then examines the critique of Amin 
Jamaluddin from LPPI and his Salafi-Islamist colleagues in HTI and FUI. Finally, 
this chapter concludes by considering these controversies and polemics in a broader 
context of Islamic resurgence in Indonesia.   
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9.1 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. The Ahbash group: Competition over Disciples 
and Resources 
Since its inception in Indonesia in the late 1990s, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
community has been in conflict with another transnational Islamic movement with 
a relatively similar background, Jami’yyat al-Mashari’ al-Khayriyya al-Islamiya 
(The Society of Islamic Philanthropic Projects), a transnational Islamic group of 
Lebanese origins. This group is also known as the Ahbash/Habashi group. The 
name of Ahbash/Habashi is attributed to Sheikh Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 
Yusuf al-Hirari al-Shibi al-Abdari (1920-2008), the principal master of the group 
who originally came from Ethiopia. 267  In Indonesia, the Ahbash group is 
represented by its local branch, SYAHAMAH (Syabab Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaat).  
The SYAHAMAH was founded in the late 1990s by the followers of Salim 
Alwan, a loyal disciple of Sheikh Abdullah Hariri and Lebanese Muslim preacher 
who is currently the head of Darul Fatwa, an Islamic organisation based in Sydney, 
Australia. 268  The Darul Fatwa itself is a branch of the Ahbash group in 
Australia.269 The roots of the conflict between Naqshbandi-Haqqani community 
and the Ahbash’s local branch in Indonesia have to do with competition over 
disciples and resources. Compared to Naqshbandi-Haqqani, the SYAHAMAH has 
been in fact far less successful in attracting people to join. It is just a small 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
267 The Ahbash/Habashi is originally an Arabic term for an Ethiopian.  
268 Salim Alwan was born in Tripoli, Lebanon in 1967.  
269 Darul Fatwa was founded in the late 1990s by Salim Alwan and organised many local Muslim 
organisations in Sydney such as Al-Amanah Islamic College, Islamic Charity Projects, Muslim 
Community Radio, the Sufi Society of Australia, Al-Ashraf Muslim Society of Australia, the 
African Australian Islamic Association, the Muslim Society of Liverpool, the Muslim Women 
Welfare of Australia, the Lakemba Islamic Association, the Islamic Association of Auburn, the 
Muslim Youth of Truth, Sydney Eid Festival Inc., El-Eslah Islamic Association, the Australian 
Arabic Family Association, the Nile Cultural Association, Ahle Sunnat Islamic Centre of Australia, 
the Multicultural Australian Women's Association and Blacktown Islamic Association. For details, 
see http://www.darulfatwa.org.au 
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congregation with only few hundred members and limited resources at its 
disposal. 270  Reportedly until 2002, Salim Alwan regularly visited religious 
congregations and pesantren Java on behalf of SYAHAMAH to campaign against 
Naqhsbandi-Haqqani.271   
According to some sources, the competition between Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
and the Ahbash group began in Lebanon in the 1980s. Some attributed this 
competition to a long political dispute involving the Kabbani family and the 
Ahbash group. There is a story that the Ahbash group favored its own leader to be 
the Mufti of Lebanese Sunni Muslim community, while it was the Kabbani family 
which eventually won the position.272  If this was the case, this rivalry perhaps had 
to do with the appointment of Muhammad Rasyid Kabbani (b. 1942), uncle of 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, by the Lebanese government in 1989 shortly after the 
death of the previous Mufti, Sheikh Hasan Khalid (1921-1989). The appointment 
was opposed by the Ahbash group because it had nominated its own leader, Nizar 
Halabi (d. 1995) for the position.273 The conflict between the two groups was also 
related to a dispute in the 1980s over a mosque in Tripoli controlled by the Ahbash 
group where Sheikh Nazim Haqqani used to perform collective zikir ritual (Habibis 
1985, 126).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
270 Interview with Verdino, August 2010  
271 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, September 2010 and KH Muhammad Lukman Hakim, October 
2010 
272 Interview with Ali Yahya, 25 September 2010 
273 Muhammad Rasyid Kabbani became a Mufti following the death of Sheikh Hasan Khalid (1921-
1989) in the car bombing on 16 May 1989. The bombing was allegedly orchestrated by Syrian 
occupying force.   
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This conflict continued when both groups moved their activities to the USA 
in the early 1990s.274 Bitter conflict between the two is expressed in printed and 
online publications that contain claims and slanderous accusations against one 
another. Several prominent leaders of the Ahbash group in the USA (e.g. Samir 
Qadi and Riad Nachef) have written and disseminated pamphlets attacking 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani. 
The attack against Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its allegedly deviant teachings 
can be found in three principal texts: Samir Qadi’s The Unveiling of Nazim al-
Qubrusi’s Misguidance and The Irrefutable Proof that Nazim al-Qubrusi Negates 
Islam, and Riad Nachef’s Exposure of Nazim al-Qubrusi and Guidance for the 
Wanderers.275 Samir Qadi’s booklet lists and refutes supposedly false statements of 
Sheikh Nazim, by quoting Quranic verses and the Prophetic tradition. Unlike Samir 
Qadi, Riad Nachef, however, wrote a long academic style paper of refutation 
complete with glossary and bibliography. The two texts are widely circulated on 
the Internet and have become the main references for the Ahbash’s followers in 
their opposition to Naqshbandi-Haqqani.  
These booklets reiterate Samir Qadi’s and Riad Nachef’s claims that Sheikh 
Nazim Haqqani and Naqshbandi-Haqqani are deviant and false Sufi. Furthermore, 
the booklets cite an alleged religious ruling issued by Sheikh Thaha ash-
Shabunji/Mufti of Tripoli, Lebanon, and Sayyid Ahmad ibn Sulaiman Darwisy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
274 Sheikh Hisham Kabbani established his home base in San Diego, California, whereas the Ahbash 
group chose Philadelphia as its centre of activity. 
275 Although Samir Qadi’s The Unveiling of Nazim al-Qubrusi’s Misguidance appears not to be 
available on the Ahbash affiliated-websites, the other two texts can be downloaded in PDF format 
from two websites affiliated to the Ahbash group in the USA (http://www.aicp.org and 
http://riadnachef.org). 
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Hajiyu/Mufti of Dagestan against Naqshabandi-Haqqani. 276  Along with 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its allegedly deviant teachers, the booklets also include 
many Muslim groups (e.g. Wahabi, HTI, IM) and scholars (e.g. Sayid Qutb, Hizbut 
Tahrir, Nasirudin al-Albani, Sayid Sabiq, Yusuf al Qardlawi, and Sayyid Ramadan 
al-Buti).   
Samir Qadi, for instance, makes the claim that Sheikh Nazim spreads 
erroneous and deviant Sufi teachings. He accuses Sheikh Nazim of teaching his 
followers to blindly obey the master even when he instructs them on what is the 
contrary to shariah. Sheikh Nazim is accused of holding a view that all religions 
are basically the same, that creation is eternal in nature, that the followers of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani are better than the Prophet’s, and that the blasphemers and 
believers are equal (Qadi 1998a, 4-22). To strengthen his claim, Samir Qadi says 
the following, 
…These are the statements of Nazim Qubrusi, his sheikh, [Abdullah Faiz] ad-
Daghistani , and his student, Hisham [K]abbani, which I chose to bring to your 
attention and to comment on briefly—in accordance with the Rules of the Religion. 
No Muslim would feel comfortable with the deviant teachings of these men. I see 
their teachings the result of a school dangerous to the Religion and dangerous to 
the nation of Muslims. It is too far-fetched to believe these statements are 
fabricated and planted in the books of Qubrusi. These books are distributed under 
his supervision and the supervision of his vice regent, Hisham Kabbani. Moreover, 
they have been taped, and trustworthy Muslims who have met Sheikh Nazim have 
quoted him as saying these statements. Whatever the case, these books contain 
many perversions dangerous to the Religion and its rules, and the one who accepts 
them and believes in them becomes among the atheist Batiniyy even if he 
identifies himself as a religious Sufi (1998b, 45). 
 
Riad Nachef makes an even more severe condemnation of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, 
claiming that Naqshbandi-Haqqani is simply an erroneous and heretic teaching !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
276 The booklet cites a  source  based on a journalistic report published in Al Afkar magazine, Beirut, 
number 898, November, 1999 and Sayyid Ahmad ibn Sulaiman Darwisy Hajiyu’s letter addressed 
to Al Idarah ad-Diniyyah Li Muslimi Daghestan.
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with origins outside Islam. In his long refutations against Naqshbandi-Haqqani, 
Nachef calls Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani false Sufi and impostors. He 
states that his only aim in writing is to warn both Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers 
and people in general. In the introductory, he writes: 
 
We aim at warning people against the reality of Nazim’s teaching and give some 
help to those who wish to refute him. It is inevitable that many of his disciples will 
feel hurt when they read this work. Our purpose is not to hurt them but to fight the 
deceitful evil of this man and his lieutenants, such as Hisham Kabbani. It is a 
religious duty which we carry out with determination. We cannot knowingly let 
them lead people astray and bring shame upon the name of Sufism. 
Disciples of Nazim! We call upon you to listen and enquire, if you do so, you are 
bound to find confirmation for many of the points found in this work „in shâ‟a-
llâh. Like so many before you who had to open their eyes, bitterness and dejection 
will most likely fill your hearts and you will find it very hard to trust anyone for a 
long time; but you have little choice. Your end, like ours, is close and you need to 
integrate or reintegrate orthodoxy in order to save yourselves. Many are those who 
have left Nazim and in spite of what you may feel know, many of you will be 
forced by your own consciousness or simple disgust, to disown a people who have 
conned you into fake spirituality and false Sufism (Nachef 2004, 5).  
 
Nachef further states that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was forced to leave Lebanon by 
order of Sheikh Hassan Khaled (1921-1989), the Mufti of Lebanon. Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani was also personally denounced for spreading erroneous and invalid Sufi 
teaching on the basis that its silsilah was maqthu’ (disconnected), whereas Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani was denounced because he made a wrong interpretation about the 
Quran. 
Nachef identifies several major points as a basis for his claims. He claims 
that both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham promote occultism and a personality cult, 
pantheism, the violation of tawhid; they use physical pressure and blatant lies, and 
deviate from fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). He rejects their use of music, the 
mingling between men and women during ritual, their millenarian beliefs, 
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perennial philosophy, and Ibn Arabi’s ideas of sainthood (walayah). Quoting   from 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s materials, Nachef ends his writing with the following harsh 
statement, 
We have established that ^Abdullâh Faizi ad-Daghestani, Adil Nazim al-Qubrusi 
and Hisham Kabbani are impostors posing as Sufis, usurping titles which are not 
theirs, teaching a doctrine whose source is the same as that of Masons and 
Rosicrucians. We have demonstrated how dangerous their true religion is for the 
salvation of those who follow them. We do declare that whoever checks 
thoroughly our information will find many faces to them and will be amazed at 
their blatant hypocrisy, „in shâ‟a-llâh. Now we call upon all, scholars and 
common Muslims, to spread among people the truth about those impostors, to 
warn their brothers and sisters against their danger and deceitfulness. They must 
not be helped, abetted or their actions condoned. No member of Muhammad‟s 
Ummah (salla-llâhu ^alayhi wasallam) should shelter them, offer them mimbars to 
speak from, mosques to propagate in, Islamic centres to corrupt, columns in 
newspapers or magazines. The Messenger of Allâh (^alayhi ssalâtu wassalâm) 
said what means: “Allâh has cursed whoever gives shelter to an author of bad 
innovations” (2004, 93).  
 
 
Samir Qadi and Riad Nachef’s works were translated into Indonesian and 
briefly summarised before eventually being published in booklet form. The 
SYAHAMAH was responsible to translate and then distribute those materials to 
the general public. The SYAHAMAH distributes these two booklets entitled 
Mewaspadai Bahaya Golongan Sesat/Become Aware of the Danger of Deviant 
Group (2002) and Mewaspadai Ajaran-Ajaran Sesat di Luar Ahlussunnah wal 
Jama'ah/Become Aware of the Deviant Teachings Outside Ahlussunnah wal 
Jama’ah (2006).277 Mewaspadai Bahaya Golongan Sesat is particularly interesting 
because it was endorsed by some prominent Muslim figures in Jakarta and in other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
277 For details, see, http://www.aicp.org/SupportingDocs/Indonesian, 
http://www.darulfatwa.org.au/en/Table/Languages/Indonesian-/, 
http://tarekathaqqani.wordpress.com/ and http://www.islamiceducations.com/id/Bantahan/tulisan-
ringkas-membongkar-kesesatan-nazim-qubrushi.html 
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regions.278 In terms of substance, the two booklets are similar. Although only a few 
hundred copies were printed, they have spread through multiple copying and been 
disseminated throughout Jakarta and other regions. This makes the exact number of 
distributed booklets impossible to determine.  
Gibril Fouad Haddad, a loyal Lebanese disciple of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, 
was the first Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciple to address the Ahbash assault. He has 
written extensively online to defend Naqshbandi-Haqqani online. Responding to 
the Ahbash’s attacks, he states in his Refuting the Habashi’s Claims that the 
Ahbash group fabricates evidence because Samir Qadi quotes Sheikh Nazim’s 
statements out of context and perverts their original meaning. He begins his 
refutation with the following statement about Samir Qadi and the Ahbash group, 
I originally intended to visit them and debate them concerning the slanders and 
fabrications that I found issuing from them. However, upon re-reading what they 
have said, and after receiving some information about them from concerned 
brothers, I decided that my complaint with the author of these slanders, Samir 
Qadi, and his friends was beyond the benefit of a public debate. Therefore I will 
content myself to post on the Internet some of what I wanted to state publicly, and 
I pray that Allah will accept this from me as my hujja that I did not stand idly by 
when I saw his awliya' attacked, slandered and lied upon.279 
 
Unfortunately, instead of refuting accusations made by the Ahbash group, G.F. 
Haddad makes equally slanderous statements, accusing the Ahbash group of being 
kharijis (an Islamic sect that rebelled against the Caliphate Ali bin Abi Thalib and 
the Umayyad dynasty in the early history of Islam). He states that, 
 [t]he unmistakable marks of [kharijism] are purism and their addiction to 
anathema. From the beginning until now they and their epigones have not been !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!278!They include prominent figures such as KH Azis Masyhuri, Habib Luthfi bin Yahya, KH 
Syaifuddin Amsir,!etc.!
279 http://www.sunnah.org/fiqh/refuting_the_habashis.htm 
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able to devise a better sell for bigoted types. All one happy gnarlin’ ’n hissin’ 
family inside a worn-out Trojan horse that goes: “Let us purge ye from your 
damning beliefs so that ye not roast in Hell where we had rather expedite ye.” 
They will cry 'Tawhid,' they will cry 'Fight Riba.' But all join hands when it comes 
to declaring mainstream Muslims deviant. Take, for example, the Habashi sect 
based in Beirut, Lebanon…They may protest day and night that they are 
“Ash`ariyy, Shafi`iyy, Rifa`iyy” but as surely as the sun rises in the sky, they are 
the same brand of insipid Kharijites as their arch-enemies the Wahhabis. Imam al-
Shafi`i, Imam al-Ash`ari, and Imam al-Rifa`i, Allah be well-pleased with them, are 
innocent of anyone that wags their tongues against the Companions of the 
Messenger of Allah, upon him and them blessings and peace, while the Habashi 
leader known as `Abd Allah al-Harari is the proud author of a booklet declaring 
thousands of Companions corrupt. It is nearly mass-transmitted from the Prophet, 
upon him blessings and peace, that anyone that insults his Companions is cursed. 
As Imam Abu Zur`a said: “Whoever insults the Companions, know that he is a 
zindiq” i.e. a hidden disbeliever, as narrated by al-Khatib in his Kifaya. The 
Habashis also distinguish themselves for attacking the Awliya and `Ulama of Ahl 
al-Sunna in our time and declaring them apostates right and left when the Prophet 
said, upon him peace, as narrated by al-Bukhari and Muslim: “Whoever calls his 
[Muslim] brother ‘kafir’, it becomes definitely true of one of the two.”280 
 
This is a defamatory statement that the Sufi and general Muslim community 
commonly try to avoid. Calling an opposing party kharijis often carries a negative 
connotation because it not only refers to a particular sect with a distinct religious 
view but also represents a dark age in Muslim history. It refers to the time when 
political dispute and religious contestation threatened to destroy the integrity and 
unity of the early Muslim ummah. Yet, this defamatory statement is offset by 
another statement:  
In Islam, we are allowed and encouraged to have different opinions and to look at 
our great religion from different point of views, as long as we maintain Muslim 
Unity and respect other Muslim dignity and not create fitnah.281 
 
Haddad’s emphasis on not creating fitnah perhaps derives from the fact that while 
there is a huge difference between Naqshbandi-Haqqani and the Ahbash group, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
280 http://www.sunnah.org/publication/salafi/vadillo/murabitun.htm  
281 http://naqshbandi.org/topics/refute/aicp/aicp10.htm  
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they also share the same views on many other things. For instance, they equally 
oppose Salafi-Wahabism and political Islamism. Both also uphold the legitimate 
status of Sufism within Islam, the Sunni orthodox theology of Ash’ari and Maturidi 
and the four Sunni schools of Islamic Jurisprudences (madzhab).282 The Ahbash 
group even claims a Sufi affiliation to the Rifa’i-Qadiriyah Sufi Order, although 
this organisation never openly acknowledges it.283 
 Meanwhile, some Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia focus their 
response particularly on the accusations that their silsilah is maqthu’ (disconnected) 
based on a fatwa issued by the religious authorities in Lebanon and Dagestan. They 
said that it was a fabrication that the Mufti of Dagestan (Sayyid Ahmad ibn 
Sulaiman Darwisy Hajiyu) issued a warning about the alleged deviation of Sheikh 
Abdullah Dagestani. Sheikh Abdullah Faiz, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani’s master, left 
his country of origins when he was still very young so it is impossible that such a 
religious ruling was issued while Sheikh Abdullah himself did not have any 
followers in Dagestan.284 In fact, Sheikh Nazim’s first and the only visit to 
Dagestan took place in August 1997, but he attracted very few disciples there 
(Nielsen, Draper, and Yemelianova 2006, 109).   
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources also dispute that there was any religious 
ruling given by Sheikh Thaha ash-Shabunji, the Mufti of Tripoli. They stated that 
this could not possibly be the case because, according to Sheikh Hisham, there is 
no such recognised position in Tripoli, nor is there anyone by the name mentioned !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
282 For details about the Ahbash group and its socio-political activity in Lebanon, see Hamzeh and 
Dekmejian (1996:217-229) and Kabha and Erlich (2006:519-538) 
283 Rifa’iyyah is a Sufi movement founded by Ahmad ar Rifa’i (1119-1182), an Iraqi mystic with 
chain of transmission that extends back to Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jailani (1077-1166), a Persian 
mystic in the 11th century.    
284 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, September 2010 
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in the Ahbash sources. It is impossible to verify the validity of the claims and 
counter claims on each side because the roots of the problem can be traced back to 
long religious and political disputes between the Naqshbandi-Haqqani and Ahbash 
while they were still in Lebanon.   
Overall, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has provided a minimal, if not entirely 
adequate response. Sheikh Hisham and his disciples try to avoid such polemics by 
simply declining to discuss them further.285 Between 2002 and 2006, when these 
accusations were circulated, Naqshbandi-Haqqani was not yet well established. As 
the leader of a new religious group, Sheikh Hisham was still struggling to 
consolidate and organise his disciples. Instead of becoming involving in never-
ending religious polemics, Sheikh Hisham is reported to concentrate his efforts on 
strengthening his own charismatic position and that of   his masters by teaching the 
virtue of rituals. Interestingly, Sheikh Hisham is reported to have deliberately used 
the slanderous Ahbash accusations as a teaching material on the virtue of avoiding 
fitnah and backbiting among fellow Muslims. He is also reported to have 
repeatedly said to his disciples that being silent and praying for one’s attackers is 
far better than making similar slanderous claims against them.  
Sheikh Hisham’s pious response has worked well in maintaining his 
existing followers and, to some extent, succeeded in attracting new ones. Some 
even claim that the Ahbash booklets are a free advertisement that generates public 
curiosity encouraging people to know more about Naqshbandi-Haqqani.  Certainly, 
for a time, some disciples left the group but there were more people who joined.286 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
285 Interview with Verdino, September 2010 
286 Interview with Wahyudin Yusuf, 5 November 2010  
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Naqshbandi-Haqqani recorded its highest growth in the number of followers 
between 1997 and 2007 when the slanderous Ahbash claims spread widely. These 
slanderous claims had a relatively minor impact among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
followers. However, Sheikh Hisham’s refusal to discuss these accusations is a 
potential time-bomb. His minimalist response generates what Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples describe as fitnah and misunderstanding (kesalahpahaman) 
that can occasionally erupt especially among traditionalist Muslim communities.    
 
9.2 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. Traditionalist Muslim Community: Question 
over Sunni Orthodoxy  
Since its inception in 1997, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has incited religious 
controversies and polemics among traditionalist Muslim communities. These 
controversies spread especially among Habaib/Sayyid-Hadrami, Sufi groups and 
the larger NU community. They mainly concern the question of whether 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani propagates orthodox or heterodox Sufi teachings. Responding 
to all these controversies and polemics, Sheikh Hisham and Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
community in Indonesia have been committed to carry out both silaturahmi and 
tabayyun. 
There are some factors that led to these controversies and polemics among 
traditionalist Muslim communities. First, the strong influence of Akbari ideas in 
Naqshabandi-Haqqani’s teachings seems to arouse suspicion among traditionalist 
Muslim communities that Naqshbandi-Haqqani actually propagates heterodox 
teachings. The widespread dissemination of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings 
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through print and online publications plays a part in driving these polemics and 
controversies. 
Second, it also has to do with the exclusive behaviour of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani‘s followers in propagating their master’s teachings, and excessive superior 
claims over karamah of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s masters. This was particularly 
related to the incident involving a Naqshbandi-Haqqani affiliated group (Rabbani 
Cinere) in 19 September 2009. It happened that the Rabbani Cinere-affiliated 
disciples were organising the prayers two days before the official date was 
announced by the Indonesian government.  
Some said that this happened because Abu Tufail, Amir of Rabbani Cinere, 
simply followed the step of Sheikh Hisham who followed the so-called hisab 
munjid to determine the beginning and end of the fasting month.287 But others also 
testified that Abu Tufail decided to break fasting earlier because he claimed to have 
had a spiritual vision in which he was told to do so.  This incident came under 
public scrutiny because it provoked a mob of people from the surrounding 
neighborhoods not only to come and forcefully prevent the Idul Fitri’s prayer and 
celebration, but also to ban dzikr gathering there.  
Third, the controversies are also incited by the eccentric styles of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in performing certain rituals. Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples always wear distinct clothing and use physical symbols such as 
turban, taweez, staff etc. The polemics also relate to the use of non-conventional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
287 Hisab Munjid is one of few methods applied in determining Islamic lunar calendar combining 
mathematical calculation and actual moon sighting. Each month has only 29 or 30 days and as other 
Naqshbandi communities in Indonesia, the beginning and ending of fasting month always come 
earlier than the official government’s announcement.    
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Sufi rituals such as mass initiation, music (hadrah) and dance performances 
common among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia. With the 
proliferation of new Islamic groups in Indonesia, a distinct physical appearance and 
exclusive behaviour sometimes incite suspicion from the surrounding 
community.288  
Fourth, prior to 2006, the dissemination of the Ahbash’s anti-Naqshbandi-
Haqqani materials and Salim Alwan’s visits and active propagation to various 
religious congregations and Pesantren played a significant role in inciting polemics 
and controversies. In the following period, the polemics were driven mainly by 
direct inter personal contacts and indirect encounters with the Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s followers in religious ritual gatherings. These controversies became 
public following the Indonesia Bersholawat, a public ritual performance organised 
by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia along with Majelis Nurul Musthofa. The 
performance itself took place at Istiqlal Mosque and was broadcasted lively on TV-
One on 30 May 2009.  
 
9.2.1 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. Hadrami Community 
Strong criticism against Naqshbandi-Haqqani emerged especially in Jakarta, 
where the Habaib/Sayyid Hadrami community is still regarded as the religious elite 
by the local Muslim population. At the beginning, suspicions developed through  
rumours and gossips but eventually spread to a larger audience during religious 
congregations. They became public only when Habib Munzir Musawwa issued a 
statement about Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its allegedly deviant ritual practices. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
288 Interview with Sugeng Ferywanto, 15 August 2010 
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According to some Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources, Habib Munzir’s public 
statement was made very soon following the publication of a book entitled 
Mengenal Lebih Jauh Sheikh Hisham Kabbani published by Yayasan Haqqani 
Indonesia that  highly praised Sheikh Hisham as a spiritual guide.289 Though 
carefully stated and using quite polite language, Habib Munzir implicitly 
questioned Naqshbandi-Haqqani by raising his concern that it was actually a 
deviant thariqah. Habib Munzir Musawwa comment on Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
stated: 
Regarding Naqshbandi-Haqqani, I do not know much about it because it is a new 
thariqah. But for sure, if its teaching deviated from shariah, this means it is 
deviant because it violates the Prophet’s original teachings. For instance, there is a 
report that this thariqah spread the teachings that Ali ibn Thalib [the Prophet’s 
son-in-law] was still alive. This kind of deviant teaching should be avoided 
because it would potentially damage the image of Islam and shariah…By 
disseminating this statement, I have no intention whatsoever to be proud of my 
own group and undermine others. I just want to warn Muslims in general to keep 
following the Prophet’s examples of sunnah. Prophet Muhammad is the supreme 
leader of all auliya. He introduced us shariah and haqiqah that we should follow 
and practice in our daily religious life. Let us back [to] the true teaching of the 
Prophet.290 
 
Habib Munzir also criticised Naqshbandi-Haqqani for allowing male and female 
disciples to dance together during communal ritual congregation. This controversy 
was intensified when the statement was displayed on the Majelis Rasulullah’s 
website (http://majelisrasulullah.org/) on 19 May 2009. This message was then 
spread by members of the religious congregations and through online contacts on 
numerous mailing-lists.291  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
289 The book was a compilation collected from Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s websites and edited by 
Abdurrauf Kurniadi. 
290 http://majelisrasulullah.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=212&Itemid=1 
291 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 15 October 2010 
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Habib Munzir’s public criticism resonated widely within the Habaib 
community in Jakarta. At the time he was a young charismatic leader of a large 
ritual congregation (Majelis Rasulullah). Between 1994 and 1998, Habib Munzir 
spent his time studying at Darul Musthofa, an educational institute founded by his 
teacher and spiritual master, Habib Umar bin Hafidz (b. 1963) in Tarim, Yemen. 
On returning to Indonesia in the late 1990s, Habib Munzir pursued his career as a 
religious preacher in Jakarta and the surrounding areas.292 He began his Majelis 
Rasulullah with only around 50 students in the late 1990s. It has since grown into 
thousands of followers and regular attendees throughout Jakarta and the 
surrounding areas. This significant growth was made possible by the help of a 
senior disciple of Habib Umar bin Hafidz in Jakarta, Habib Muchsin al Hamid, 
who provided financial support for Majelis Rasulullah in its early inception. Habib 
Munzir belongs to a different Sufi network because he is affiliated to Alawiyah, a 
Sufi Order that is exclusive to the Habaib/Sayyid Hadrami community.  
While Habib Munzir’s criticism seemed to touch only upon religious 
concerns, it actually had a broader social dimension that reflected the contentious 
religious life in Jakarta and the surrounding areas as Majelis Rasulullah and Nurul 
Musthofa, the two largest ritual congregations in Jakarta, competed for followers. 
Instead of Majelis Rasulullah, Sheikh Hisham was personally closer to Habib 
Hasan bin Ja’far Assegaf, the leader of Nurul Musthofa, the main competitor of 
Majelis Rasulullah in attracting young followers in Jakarta and the surrounding 
areas.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
292 For details about Habib Umar bin Hafidz and his activities in Yemen, see Knysh (2001:399-414) 
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According to some sources, Habib Munzir Musawwa criticised 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani because he was worried that Sheikh Hisham’s charisma 
would only strengthen the position of Nurul Musthofa and undermine his own. 
While Habib Hasan welcomed Sheikh Hisham to attend his religious congregation, 
Habib Munzir repeatedly declined to do the same.  Habib Munzir’s criticism had 
also   to do with the question of who should be considered the most authoritative 
Sufi master and which thariqah  was to be considered the most authentic Sufi order 
to follow. For Habib Munzir, it was obvious that his teacher and spiritual master, 
Habib Umar bin Hafidz and the Alawiyah Sufi Order are much superior to Sheikh 
Hisham and Naqhsbandi-Haqqani. Like Sheikh Hisham, Habib Umar bin Hafidz  is 
in fact a transnational Muslim preacher who has routinely visited his disciples in 
Indonesia since mid-1990s. On one occasion, during an interview, one of Habib 
Umar bin Hafidz’s disciples implicitly confirmed this by saying: 
 
Look! For Alawiyah, the silsilah is very clear because it is connected through a 
genealogy because it is transmitted among the Prophet’s descendants while for 
others, they do not have such a thing. They only claim that their spiritual silsilah is 
connected to the Prophet without physical and genealogical evidence. Yet, the 
difference between Sufi orders is inevitable and it is just normal.293 
 
Because of the strong religious influence of Habaib in Jakarta, Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples could not ignore Habib Munzir’s statement and the negative 
rumors within Habaib community in Jakarta about their thariqah and their masters. 
Thus, since 2009, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has mobilised its resources and networks to 
approach the Habaib community across Jakarta. They have taken active measures 
to carry out silaturahmi and tabayyun in a deliberate attempt to clear what they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
293 Interview with Muchsin Mokhtar, 24 December 2010 
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perceive as misunderstandings about Naqshbandi-Haqqani, its masters, and their 
teachings.  
The committee members of YHI have taken the initiative to approach many 
Habaib in Jakarta. Muchsin Mulaela is in charge of carrying out a mission to do 
silaturahmi and tabayyun by visiting prominent Habaib across Jakarta. He 
acknowledged that some Habaib refused to meet him while others were willing to 
see him personally to arrange a meeting with Sheikh Hisham when he visited 
Indonesia. During these meetings, he would share Sheikh Hisham’s writings in 
Indonesian. He also tried to convince prominent figures of the Habaib community 
that there was nothing wrong with Naqshbandi-Haqqani, its masters, and their 
religious teachings.  
Muchsin also explained that both Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham 
Kabbani came from Habaib background in their own countries. For instance, 
Muchsin Mulaela managed to approach influential Habib such as Habib 
Abdurrahman al Habsyi of Kwitang and Habib Abdul Qodir bin Muhammad al 
Haddad of Condet (d. 2012). Habib Abdurrahman was considered particularly 
strategic because Habib Abdurrahman’s Majelis Taklim Kwitang is the oldest and 
most prestigious religious congregation in Jakarta. It is a religious congregation at 
which generations of prominent Habaib and Muslim scholars in Jakarta sought 
their religious knowledge. This religious congregation was founded by Habib 
Abdurrahman’s grandfather, Habib Ali bin Abdurrahman al Habsyi (1870-1968).  
Naqshbandi-Haqqani disciples also approached those in the social networks 
affiliated to Habib Umar bin Hafidz’s Darul Musthofa, such as Habib Naguib al 
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Hamid of Bekasi and Habib Muchsin al Hamid of Cidodol. Habib Muchsin al 
Hamid was particularly important because he was the main financial supporter of 
Majelis Rasulullah. During my interview with Habib Muchsin al Hamid in 
November 2010, he confirmed that Naqshandi-Haqqani’s disciples met him to 
clarify the misunderstanding about Sheikh Hisham and his teachings. Habib 
Muchsin said he personally had no problem with Naqshbandi-Haqqani and Sheikh 
Hisham. He further pointed out that the problem between Naqshbandi-Haqqani and 
Habaib community was nothing significant because it simply reflected the ‘clash 
of love’ (perselisihan cinta) that had not affected followers at the grass-root 
level.294  
Through intensive and repeated approaches, Habib Munzir Musawwa 
eventually allowed Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to attend his religious congregation. 
Sheikh Hisham attended Habib Munzir’s congregation at Al Munawar mosque, 
Pancoran, on 20 December 2010. Sheikh Hisham came along with G.F. Haddad 
during which Habib Munzir greeted and introduced them to thousands of his 
disciples who were attending the event. This was made possible through the help of 
Hisham Musawwa who managed to convince his cousin, Habib Munzir Musawwa, 
to allow Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to attend his congregation.295 According to 
Hisyam Musawwa, he managed to convince his cousin that Sheikh Hisham and his 
disciples only wanted to carry out silaturahmi.296  Hisyam Musawwa, as it happens, 
is a close friend of Muchsin Mulaela who asked for his personal help to arrange the 
meeting.  
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294 Interview with Muchsin Mochtar, 24 December 2010 
295 Interview with Hisyam Musawwa, 17 December 2010 
296 Interview with Hisyam Musawwa, 17 December 2010 
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9.2.2 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. Sufi Community 
Within the Sufi community, controversies regarding Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
are best represented by Habib Luthfi bin Yahya (Rais Aam of JATMAN), 
Wahfiudin (coordinator of TQN Jakarta, a Sufi congregation affiliated to Abah 
Anom), and Lukman Hakim (a Syadzili’s deputy of PETA Tulungagung). They 
raised concerns about Naqshbandi-Haqqani because of the excessive claims 
regarding the karamah of both Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani. They 
were particularly critical that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani is considered the only living 
saint (wali) with the highest status (sulthonul auliya) who has authority to guide 
people around the globe. They werealso disturbed that Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
followers do not hesitate to claim publicly that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani is the last 
authorised person in the long silsilah of Naqshbandi and the only Naqshbandi’s 
master who is capable of guiding other Sufi masters. They were also critical of the 
exclusive behaviour of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers in propagation and public 
rituals. This exclusive behaviour has to do with their distinct public appearance 
such as turban, uniform, and other group-symbols. The practice of mass initiation 
that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani commonly carried out after collective rituals 
provoked a critical response from Sufi community in Indonesia. To address these 
criticisms, Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples conducted silaturahmi dan tabayyun to 
clarify the misunderstanding. 
Habib Luthfi bin Yahya is a leading Sufi authority to voice criticism against 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani. His religious authority derives from the fact that he is Rais 
Aam of JATMAN, the largest Indonesia Sufi Association affiliated to Nahdlatul 
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Ulama. He addresses his concern about the dissemination of numerous materials 
that openly claim the superiority of Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its masters, Sheikh 
Nazim and Hisham Kabbani. He was worried that those materials would potentially 
be misunderstood by lay Muslims. Habib Luthfi also raised his concern about the 
group’s appearance in terms of physical symbols such as clothes, turban, etc. In 
addition, he criticised the exclusive style of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers in 
performing rituals of zikir. Instead of total rejection, he focused his criticism, 
however, only on Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers and particularly on their claims 
of superiority regarding their Sufi order and masters. Habib Luthfi shared his 
concern about Naqshbandi-Haqqani with his fellow members in the top ranks of 
JATMAN’s central leadership. It was not surprising that the polemics erupted 
during the 10th JATMAN national conference in 2005. In the conference, there was 
a proposal from some JATMAN’s top officials to investigate the allegedly deviant 
teachings of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Others were reported even going further to 
demand that Naqshbandi-Haqqani should be banned or at least declared as a 
deviant Sufi Order.297 
Due to his religious authority and formal position as Rais Aam of JATMAN, 
Habib Luthfi’s criticism was taken rather seriously. The fact that Habib Luthfi has 
a personal relationship with Sheikh Hisham did not make a personal approach 
much easier because Habib Luthfi had on more than one occasion declined to meet 
with Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s representatives.298 For instance, Soenarto, chairman of 
Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia, was reportedly coming to see Habib Luthfi to clarify 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
297 Interview with Muhammad Lukman Hakim/JATMAN DKI, 29 August 2010 
298 Habib Luthfi was reported giving allegiance (bai’at) to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in December 
1997. Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, September 2010 
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the misunderstanding. The meeting was supposed to take place in Pekalongan 
around June 2009. This attempt at reconciliation, however, failed because Soenarto 
headed back to Jakarta even before he met the host. He was reportedly tired of 
waiting while Habib Luthfi was said to be busy playing music at home.299  
After this, Mustafa Mas’ud made another attempt to see Habib Luthfi in 
Pekalongan. After many unsuccessful attempts, Mustafa Mas’ud eventually 
managed to see Habib Luthfi during a maulid celebration in South Pekalongan, 
around July 2009. During the meeting, Habib Luthfi was reported to angrily 
express his concern about the excessive claims by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples 
regarding the karamah of their master. He also warned that dissemination of Sufi 
materials would potentially raise misunderstanding not only about Naqshbandi-
Haqqani in particular but also Sufi movements in Indonesia in general. Habib 
Luthfi’s concern reflected the long-standing reputation of JATMAN in upholding 
Islamic orthodoxy within Sufi community in Indonesia. In fact, since the 1950s, 
JATMAN has been fighting for orthodoxy by ensuring that all Sufi orders in 
Indonesia conform to shariah provisions.  
The polemics and controversies, however, gradually came to an end 
through the efforts of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples who also happened to be 
committee members of JATMAN. Samson Nasarudin and Salman Danis, the 
disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani and committee members of JATMAN, played an 
important role in addressing the controversies. They had been personally close to 
Habib Luthfi since around 2004.300 Samsun Nasarudin is a committee member of 
the Foreign Affairs of JATMAN, while Salman Danis is chairman of West Sumatra !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
299 Interview with Nursyafa’at, 19 November 2010 
300 They have become committee members of JATMAN since 2005 following the 10th JATMAN 
national conference in Pekalongan. 
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provincial branch of JATMAN and a professor in Islamic studies at Imam Bonjol 
Islamic State University, Padang. They consider Habib Luthfi their second spiritual 
master though he has no formal Sufi affiliation with them. One of Habib Luthfi’s 
disciples in Cempaka Putih, KH Lukman Hakim, who is the chairman of Jakarta 
provincial branch of JATMAN, confirmed this by saying, 
I can assure you that my master has no personal problem with Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani. His only concern is Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples who are too 
exclusive with their superior claims about their master. He just reminds them to be 
careful because it would lead misunderstanding about Sufi community in 
general.301 
  
Criticism has also come from Wahfiudin, a wakil talqin (representative) of 
Tharikat Qadiri-Naqshbandi (TQN) affiliated to Sohibul Wafa Tajul Arifin/Abah 
Anom (1915-2011).  Wahfiudin could not accept that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani has 
superior spiritual powers to other Sufi masters as claimed by Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples. Wahfiudin’s criticism was quite surprising because he is one 
of sabiqu al-awwalun (those who are among the first to be initiated into 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani). His initiation was described by one disciple as follows: “It 
miraculously took place at the departure lounge of Soekarno-Hatta International 
Airport when Sheikh Hisham was about to leave for the USA in December 
1997”.302 Wahfiudin was described among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples as one 
of the early representatives of the Jakarta region along with Mustafa Mas’ud. In 
1998, he was invited to attend the second Islamic Unity Conference in Washington 
organised by Islamic Supreme Council of America. He stayed for a while 
conducting dakwah among American Muslims in some cities there with the support  
of Sheikh Hisham. Since 2005, however, Wahfiudin has completely withdrawn his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
301 Interview with KH Muhammad Lukman Hakiem/JATMAN, a muqoddam of Tijaniyah and 
disciple of Habib Luthfi bin Yahya, 29 August 2010 
302 Muchtony Ghani Azis, 12 August 2010 
 308 
affiliation from Naqshbandi-Haqqani and focused his attention on guiding Qadiri-
Naqshbandi’s disciples in Jakarta and surrounding areas.    
Wahfiudin’s criticism seemed to derive from Sheikh Nazim Haqqani’s 
statement which praised Abah Anom and his karamah during his visit to Suryalaya 
in 2001. For Wahfiudin, Sheikh Nazim’s statement confirmed that it is Abah Anom 
who deserves to be called a Muslim saint. During the visit, Sheikh Nazim was 
reported to make the following comments about Abah Anom, 
 “Many Muslim scholars and intellectuals provide religious knowledge. That 
knowledge is like candle but not light! Both candle and light can only be handed 
on through a tarekat. There are 41 tarekat at the moment, 40 connected to Ali and 
one which draws light from Our Lord Abu Bakr Siddiq, being the Naqshbandiyya 
tarekat. The `ulama and the intellectuals can hand out candles as big as coconut 
trees, but what meaning have they without light? And one of the sources of that 
light comes from the heart of this gentleman (Abah Anom). I do not know whether 
this light will vanish or continue after him. While he is alive, go run after and take 
the light from him. From his heart, messages are transmitted to me. I am too shy 
for not taking those divine messages from him. I am ashamed for talking from my 
own. What is needed now is the light that shall set aflame the candles of 
knowledge. Many ulama only look outside in quest of knowledge. They know 
much … but what is the benefit of knowledge without divine illumination? The 
saints abide in hidden places and people may only know their knowledge from the 
books they wrote. In the past many `ulama established madrasas, but at the 
moment when the students finish, all they are given is an ijaza. The teachers say: 
‘We have given you knowledge from intellectual (`aqli) and transmitted (naqli) 
sources’. But these are only candles. And what is the meaning of a candle without 
light?”303 
 
 
Another critic, Muhammad Lukman Hakim, has also raised his concern 
about Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples and their excessive claims regarding their 
master. Muhammad Lukman Hakim is a Syadzili’s khalifah living in Depok, West 
Java. He was born in Jombang in 1962. He studied at Pesantren Tebuireng, 
Jombang before continuing his study to be a disciple of KH Abdul Jalil Mustaqim 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
303 For details, see http://www.suryalaya.org/manakib-buletin-isi.php?ID=107 and 
http://www.dokumenpemudatqn.com/2012/06/pidato-dan-kunjungan-syekh-nazim-adil.html  
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(1942-2005) at Pesulukan Tarekat Tulungagung (PETA), the largest Syadzili 
Pesantren in East Java (Waddin, 2011). Lukman Hakim is the chief editor of 
Cahaya Sufi, an Islamic magazine devoted exclusively to publishing materials 
related to Sufism in Indonesia. He received his graduate degree from Malaysia 
before pursuing a career in journalism. His writing career began in the late 1990s 
with a column called Konsultasi Sufi  for Posmo, a local tabloid published in 
Surabaya (Laffan, 2006:100; 2007:163). Nowadays, he runs a popular Sufi website 
(http://www.sufinews.com). He also performs as a religious preacher and 
Syadzili’s Sufi guide for its followers in and around Jakarta. He is mainly 
concerned that Sheikh Hisham initiates many disciples without giving them further 
instruction. For Lukman Hakim, a Sufi master should guide his disciples constantly.   
He bases his criticism on the fact that many of those joining Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
have sought religious instruction by attending his religious congregations across 
Jakarta. 
The controversies and polemics within the Sufi community have changed 
the way Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples propagate their teachings. They have been 
obliged to accept the fact that Naqshbandi-Haqqani is only one of many Sufi 
movements currently active in Indonesia. They have increasingly come to realize 
that Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani belong among other charismatic Sufi 
masters with loyal disciples across Indonesia. According to Mustafa Mas’ud, 
 
Most of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples are those who were previously not 
familiar with Sufism. Many of them, especially those living in Jakarta, even came 
from non-traditionalist Muslim backgrounds. They appeared exclusive and 
sometimes even propagated superior claims over others simply because they were 
too enthusiastic about their new religious identity and their master. The fact is that 
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they still need to learn religious subjects because no true Sufi exits without 
willingness to continuously ngaji (seek for religious learning).304    
 
 
 
Sheikh Hisham is also reported to have encouraged his disciples to seek religious 
knowledge from many local representatives charged with guiding disciples on 
behalf of Sheikh Nazim. He allows his disciples both to seek Islamic knowledge 
and also to practice rituals with and from other Sufi orders on the grounds that 
Sheikh Nazim has authority in more than on thariqah. By doing this, he teaches his 
disciples that all Sufi orders are basically the same. 
 
9.2.3 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. NU/Pesantren Community 
In the general NU and Pesantren community, criticism of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has to do with certain religious doctrines, 
ritual practices, and the validity of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s silsilah. The criticism 
became public when Al Kisah, an Islamic bi-monthly magazine owned by a 
businessman with a Sayyid Hadrami background, Harun Musawwa, published an 
article containing KH Syarifudin Amsir’s (one of Rais Syuriyah of PBNU) 
interview in which he openly criticised the belief among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
disciples about the Mahdi and the last days.305 With more than 10,000 subscribers, 
this interview was an advertisement for Naqshbandi-Haqqani.  
He further noted that religious discourse among Naqshbandi-Haqqani on 
the coming of Mahdi during the life-time of the 40th master (Sheikh Nazim !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
304 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 October 2010 
305 Al Kisah No. 12, 15-28 June 2009 
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Haqqani) was new and was previously unknown in any Naqshbandi literature. The 
idea that the coming of the Mahdi is imminent is not common among other 
Naqshbandi’s offshoots. Putting forward an interpretation of this belief potentially 
destroys the unity of the Muslim ummah because it is a sensitive issue with various 
contending interpretations among different Muslim groups.  
KH Syarifudin Amsir traced his concern to a historical precedent in the late 
19th century when Habib Usman bin Yahya (1822-1913), the Mufti of Batavia, 
issued a letter warning Muslims to be careful about false beliefs about the coming 
of the Mahdi and any prophecy about the last days. He quoted Habib Usman bin 
Yahya’s  well-known statement on thariqah as ‘tarik ikat’-lu tarik duit orang terus 
lu ikat duit itu bawa pulang or “You first extract money, then you tie them (to you) 
and take your money home-a local idiom referring to a situation where Sufi belief 
is only an instrument to collect money from their followers.  
Criticism also emerged when KH Azis Masyhuri (Chairman of RMI/NU 
Affiliated Indonesia Pesantren Association) wrote a book entitled Ensiklopedia 22 
Aliran Tarekat dalam Tasawuf. The book was quickly sold and widely read among 
members of the NU community after its official launch in July 2011. KH Azis 
Masyhuri made his criticism while still including Naqshbandi-Haqqani as one of 
22 Sufi Orders that currently exists in Indonesia.   
He began by praising Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its masters, Sheikh Nazim 
Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani and their efforts in propagating Sufism in Indonesia.  
In the same book, he elaborated on Ahbash’s accusation that Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
is  a heretical group, claiming that Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s silsilah is maqthu’ or 
‘disconnected’ (2011, 173). He also argued that Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s claims of 
 312 
wali, sultanul auliya, and the personal closeness between Sheikh Nazim and the 
Mahdi are religiously baseless and suspicious. This accusation was based on his 
reading of Naqhsbandi-Haqqani’s published material such as Washiyah murshid 
az-Zaman wa Ghouts al-Anam, Muhithat ar Rahmah and Mercy Oceans: Endless 
Horizons. Instead of total rejection, however, he emphasized that a legitimate Sufi 
order is one that only subscribes to shariah provisions (2011, 175).   
In the face of these criticisms, Sheikh Hisham tried his best to prevent the 
controversy from developing further. Sheikh Hisham continued to assert the 
principle that difference is actually a blessing for the Muslim ummah. However, 
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was obliged to state openly that Naqhsbandi-Haqqani’s 
teachings fully conform to shariah provisions. For instance, he said the following 
in his interview with Republika, a national newspaper on 13 June 2012, 
Our principles fully conform to shariah. We reject everything that violates shariah. 
We never accept symbols and terms that do not fit with shariah. We only follow 
what is determined as valid in four schools of Islamic law (madzhab). Please do 
not mention to me about wihdat al-wujud, Ibnu Arabi and other theosophical ideas. 
We do not accept them.306 
 
Sheikh Hisham’s statement reflects his effort to compromise with the 
general inclination among NU communities in Indonesia. Although in appearance, 
this statement appears to undermine the basic teachings of his master who was 
greatly influenced by Ibn Arabi’s theosophical ideas, he is simply trying to avoid 
unnecessary polemics. However, Sheikh Hisham also carried out internal 
disciplining measures among his disciples. While Rabbani Cinere was a personal 
favorite of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani for approaching urban youth, after this incident, 
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 313 
Sheikh Hisham issued a ‘spiritual punishment’. He reportedly demanded that his 
disciples in Rabbani Cinere repent by performing a fast for two consecutive months 
and not break their fast before the official announcement by the local authority.307  
On the instruction of Sheikh Hisham, the disciples again returned to the 
traditional Islamic concept of tabayyun (seeking clarification). They intensified 
their efforts to conduct silaturahmi by approaching prominent traditionalist figures. 
To perform this task, Mustafa Masud became an active spokesman approaching the 
NU Pesantren community across Java to explain the teaching of Naqshbandi-
Haqqani. He reportedly visited many prominent kyai and pesantren across Java to 
provide information about Naqshbandi-Haqqani, its teachings and its masters. This 
approach seems to have worked well because those who had previously opposed 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani now changed their opinion.  
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples regularly visited leading officials in PBNU 
and sought clarification (tabayyun). After many such attempts, they managed to 
persuade KH Saifudin Amsir to change his position. On 16 June 2011, during a 
religious congregation conducted by the Mayor of Central Jakarta to celebrate the 
484th anniversary of Jakarta, KH Saifuddin Amsir revoked his statement about 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani. On that occasion, KH Saifuddin Amsir became the translator 
for Sheikh Hisham and reiterated Sheikh Hisham’s sermon about the importance of 
tasawwuf and love of the Prophet. This event served as a reconciliation between 
Sheikh Hisham and KH Saifuddin Amsir. After this, Al Kisah published the 
timetable for Sheikh Hisham’s visits in Indonesia.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Nevertheles there are prominent kyai who still refuse to see Sheikh Hisham. 
KH Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafe’i, the leader of Pesantren As Syafi’iyah Jakarta, 
for instance, has repeatedly declined to see Sheikh Hisham. Despite his refusal, 
many Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples believe that it is only a matter of time before 
everything will eventually be settled because there was already a close personal 
relationship between Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and Tuti Alawiyah, the older sister 
of KH Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafe’i and the current chairwoman of the Asy 
Syafi’iyah Foundation. 
 
9.3 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. Salafi and Islamist Groups: Questions of 
Doctrinal Purity and Political Stance  
In terms of religious teaching, Sheikh Nazim, Hisham and Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples regard Salafi and Islamist groups as their real enemies. This 
teaching has its roots in theological divergences and reflects tensions in the Middle 
East and North America where Naqshbandi-Haqqani spread its teachings between 
the early 1970s and late 1990s. In Indonesia, however, the two groups were only an 
‘imaginary enemies’ because there were no polemics directed against Naqshbandi-
Haqqani by these two groups until 2009. A controversy emerged following the 
distribution of a 12 page full color folio-size pamphlet entitled Kesesatan Tarekat 
Naqsybandi Haqqani. This pamphlet was written by Amin Jamaludin, a Salafi 
figure and the chairman of LPPI (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam) in 
June 2009. Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet spread widely among Islamist 
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communities such as FUI, HTI and the Muslim media like Sabili, Media Ummat 
and Suara Islam.308    
Amin Jamaludin himself was born in 1950 in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara. 
He graduated from PGAN (State Islamic Teacher’s School) Bima in 1970. After 
that, he moved to Jakarta where he became general secretary of Jakarta’s regional 
branch of GPII (Indonesia Islamic Youth Movement) between 1973 and 1975. His 
Salafi credentials were established in the early 1970s through his involvement in 
PERSIS and DDII. 309  As a Muslim activist, he was involved in mass 
demonstrations organised by GPII against the draft of marriage law (RUU 
Perkawinan) in 1978 and, as a result, he was detained by KOPKAMTIB (Order and 
Security Command, a military super agency established by General Soeharto to 
support his authoritarian rule) along with his fellow young Muslim activists. He 
was personally close to his life-long religious and political mentor, Muhammad 
Natsir (1908-1993), the founder and chairman of DDII. Under Muhammad Natsir, 
DDII (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation) was responsible for 
propagating Salafism among Indonesian Muslims. The DDII even became a 
national representative of Saudi-based organisation, World Muslim 
League/Rabitah Alam ‘Islami (Hasan 2005, 32). 
Amin Jamaludin’s close personal relationship with Muhammad Natsir 
began when Amin Jamaluddin published his writing in the Pelita newspaper (18-21 
October 1983) refuting the scholar and former rector of Syarif Hidayatullah State 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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309 PERSIS (Islamic Unity) is a Muslim organisation founded on 12 September 1923 in Bandung, 
West Java.  For details about PERSIS, see Federspiel (2001)  
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Islamic University Harun Nasution’s  ideas of Islamic renewal.310 Amin Jamaludin 
claimed that he was personally asked by Muhammad Natsir and other colleagues, 
to establish the so-called Ghazrul Fikri (‘War of Thinking’) Team of DDII (Islamic 
Council for Islamic Propagation). This team was set up with a special mission to 
fight all forms of deviant thinking (aliran sesat) and the groups associated with 
them. He founded the LPPI (Institute of Islamic Research and Studies) in 1983 for 
that purpose, an organisation of which he is still the leader. Between 2005 and 
2010, he became a member of Komisi Pengkajian of MUI.   
Since mid-2009, Amin Jamaludin has led a campaign to ban Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s public activities and has written materials and distributed 10,000 
pamphlets to mosques throughout Jakarta and other regions. He is not hesitant to 
voice his denouncement of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the mosques he attends as a 
preacher. This has led to a rising suspicion among a large number of mosque 
committees toward Naqshbandi-Haqqani to such an extent that Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s affiliates are prevented, often completely banned, from conducting dzikr 
in mosques throughout Jakarta. For instance, Al Azhar mosque forbade 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani to conduct activities in its mosque following a Friday sermon 
delivered by Amin Jamaludin in mid-2010. The attack intensified when Amin 
Jamaludin, in his capacity as a member of Komisi Pengkajian of MUI, tried to 
persuade several government agencies to officially ban the distribution of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s written materials.311 Amin Jamaludin even brought his case 
to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Attorney General in late 2010.   
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Amin Jamaludin wrote his pamphlet to attack the alleged heretic teachings 
of Abdullah Faiz Dagestani, Nazim Haqqani, and Hisham Kabbani as a group. His 
accusations are based on his reading of 49 booklets produced by Naqshbandi-
Haqqani. These booklets were acquired by one of his staff at LPPI (Institute of 
Islamic Research and Studies) during an open bazaar on 1 June 2009. The bazaar 
itself was organised by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia at the Shangri-La Hotel. The 
booklets are compilations of Sheikh Hisham’s numerous sohbet on various 
websites translated by Abdurrauf Kurniadi and Arif Hamdani, two disciples of 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani.  Amin also based his accusations on the Malaysian JAKIM’s 
fatwa issued on 3 April 2000. JAKIM is an official Malaysian religious institution 
representing Muslim’s interests. The fatwa stated that Naqshbandi-Haqqani was a 
heretic (sesat) group and not part of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah.312  
Amin Jamaludin’s writing style is direct, blunt and has an uncompromising 
tone. He selects statements that he considers erroneous and refutes them based on 
his own interpretation of certain Quranic verses. In the pamphlet, he categorized 
his accusations into four parts: blasphemy against God, the Prophet, and Islamic 
teaching, and erroneous deviant doctrines. For instance, commenting on Sheikh 
Hisham’s statement that God’s mercy extends to all human beings including 
unbelievers (kafir), Amin claims that God curses the unbelievers as mentioned in 
the Quran. He also harshly refutes Sheikh Abdullah Faiz’s metaphoric statement on 
the three distinct characters of an auliya (saint); that of the donkey, dog, and pig. 
Amin Jamaludin quotes many Qura’nic verses on low and illicit status of these 
animals without taking into account Sheikh Hisham’s statement saying that these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
312 Interview with Amin Djamaludin, 21 September 2010 
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three animals are symbolically representative of different characteristics: 1) the 
readiness to bear a heavy burden and to be patient (donkey), 2) the capacity of 
loyalty (dog), and 3) the willingness to digest filth for human betterment (pig).  
He further states that associating these three animals with the character of 
an auliya (saint) is clear blasphemy against the Prophet because the Prophet is 
ma’shum (free from sin) in character.  Amin Jamaludin also states that Sheikh 
Hisham allegedly taught his newly converted disciples to perform obligatory 
prayers in a way that is contrary to shariah (Islamic law). He also denounces 
Sheikh Hisham for exaggerating the karamah of his masters in a way that leads to 
syirik (idolatry). He accuses Sheikh Hisham of teaching his disciples that all 
religions are basically the same - a teaching that undermines the purity of Islamic 
doctrine. In the end, Amin Jamaludin reiterates his statement by saying that 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani is a clear sign of the Dajjal’s fitnah in the end of days.     
Since mid-2009, Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet has reached a broader Muslim 
audience through his active efforts to distribute it among his Islamist colleagues. 
Based on Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet, the Islamist media affiliated to HTI (Media 
Umat) and FUI (Suara Islam) have joined together to voice their attacks on 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Amin Jamaludin has also shared his finding with Sabili, a 
media with a clear Islamic message. While Amin Jamaludin puts a strong emphasis 
on the alleged deviation of Naqshbandi-Haqqani purely in terms of aqidah, other 
Islamist groups have expanded their opposition in political terms. For Islamist 
groups, Naqshbandi-Haqqani is considered a heretic group because it puts too 
much emphasis on ritual activities and tends to disregard political activism.  
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In July 2009, the 16th edition of Media Umat, for instance, published an 
article attacking Naqshbandi-Haqqani. In the article, Harits Abu Ulya, a HTI 
activist, strongly criticized Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and his pluralist view which 
regarded other religious adherent’s access to the same spiritual universal message. 
He further raised his suspicion that the coming of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in 
particular and Sufism in general is aimed at maintaining the political status quo. In 
his view, Sufism, through its emphasis on ritual piety, undermines Muslim political 
consciousness. Harits Abu Ulya also invoked the ‘Western scenario’ and 
‘Christian-Jews conspiracy theory’ that Naqshbandi-Haqqani represents a ‘grand 
design’ to create a split within the Muslim ummah. The fact that Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani comes from the USA is exploited to spread this rumor further.  
In the Indonesian context, the ‘Western scenario’ and ‘Christian-Jews 
conspiracy’ are related to the personal closeness between Sheikh Hisham Kabbani 
and Ahmad Dhani, a prominent yet controversial musician and entertainer in 
Indonesia. Ahmad Dani is indeed a controversial figure in the entertainment 
industry in Indonesia. He was born in Surabaya, 26 May 1972. His alleged Jewish 
background comes from his maternal great grandfather, Jan Pieter Frederich Kohler, 
a German Jew who worked as a banker in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial 
period in the late 19th century. Since 2005, Ahmad Dani has invited strong 
condemnation from some Islamist groups because his song lyrics and symbols (e.g. 
the Star of David, illuminati and freemasonry symbols) that appear on his musical 
albums. These are allegedly to contain heretic teachings and non-Islamic messages. 
For instance, during his live-performance on Trans TV on 10 April 2005, Ahmad 
Dhani was denounced by Ustadz Wahfiudin, a Muslim preacher and prominent 
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Muslim motivator in Jakarta, because Ahmad Dhani deliberately put the 
calligraphic Lafdhul Jalalah (Allah) on stage where he performed.  
Dhani also got into trouble when Habib Rizieq Shihab of FPI demanded 
that he change the cover of his album, Lasykar Cinta, in April 2005. For Habib 
Rizieq, the use and modification of Lafdhul Jalalah (Allah) as the cover of the 
Lasykar Cinta album was clearly a blasphemy against God. On 15 March 2011, 
amid threats and denunciations, Ahmad Dhani received a parcel containing a bomb 
with a message attached accusing him of being a militant Jew and Zionist agent 
who spread heretic teachings through his song lyrics.313 Among Islamists, the 
resentment against Ahmad Dhani was perhaps best represented by Harry Mukti, a 
former musician, HTI activist and Muslim preacher, who denounced him as 
Satan.314 
In Refleksi Akhir Tahun (end of the year self-reflection), published on 15 
December 2009, Ismail Yusanto, a spokesman for HTI, issued a public statement in 
which he openly denounced Naqshandi-Haqqani and its allegedly heretic teachings. 
He warned Indonesian Muslims to be aware of the danger of such heterodox and 
heretic beliefs. He stated the following about Naqshbandi-Haqqani: 
At the beginning, there was no suspicion that this group [Naqshbandi-Haqqani] 
spread many heretic doctrines. This group used the name of Naqsabandi along 
with Haqqani. It was KH Amin Jamaludin (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian 
Islam) who found out and then reviewed many heretical teachings in booklets 
published by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia...the spread of the heretic groups in 
Indonesia shows a lack of understanding among Muslims about their true religion. 
The state plays a role in that this heretic group still attracts followers because it 
refuses to educate people about their aqidah and allows heretic groups to spread !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
313 This bomb came from the same source of the similar package sent to Ulil Abshar Abdalla and 
the office of Utan Kayu community in Jakarta.   
314  http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2012/05/19/20251-ustadz-harry-moekti-ahmad-dhani-itu-
setan.html  
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their teachings. This attitude derives from the secularism adopted by the 
Indonesian state. Secularism considers religion as a private matter, so that the state 
cannot interfere. The state will interfere by detaining heretics only when it disrupts 
public order, not because of the heretical teaching itself. Otherwise, the heretical 
teachings will spread widely and affect the people. This condition will not happen 
when shariah is fully implemented. Under shariah-by law, the heretic and deviant 
groups will cease to exist because the state will prevent them from flourishing. The 
state can also interfere by using capital punishment for those committing heresy. 
The state will actively perform its role to guide people to following proper aqidah. 
By performing this role, the state can ensure that each one has self-protection to 
avoid deviant and heretic teachings.315 
 
By relying on Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet, Ismail Yusanto has used Naqshbandi-
Haqqani to reiterate HTI’s political project to implement shariah as a counter not 
only for heretical groups but also to oppose general secularism. He denounces the 
state’s negligence in giving free space for heretic groups to flourish. He even 
suggests that under shariah law, the state would impose capital punishment on the 
heretics who commit apostasy.    
At the beginning, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples seem to have 
dismissed the  seriousness of Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet. For Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s disciples, the controversies and polemics were simply the result of 
personal mistakes made by disciples, Abdurrauf Kurniadi and Arif Hamdani, who 
had no permission and authority to translate and distribute Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s 
teaching materials. Because of this, some top ranking members of Yayasan 
Haqqani Indonesia (YHI) only took internal disciplinary measures by sacking both 
Abdurrauf Kurniadi and Arif Hamdani from the daily organizing committee of the 
Yayasan. Rizal Tarigan, the acting chairman of YHI, remarked as follows, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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December 2009. See, http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id 
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For those in the Yayasan, the problem is actually simple. There are translated 
booklets and misunderstandings about them. The Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia was 
not involved institutionally in publishing and distributing the booklets. The 
translators have acknowledged their mistakes and taken responsibility for them. 
The Yayasan has sacked them. Therefore, the Yayasan and our master have 
nothing to do whatsoever with the booklets and this also means the problem is 
over.316    
 
However, massive dissemination of Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet throughout 
Jakarta has resulted in mounting pressure and increasing public scrutiny toward 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Amin Jamaludin’s position as member of Komisi Pengkajian 
of MUI has also generated additional pressure on Naqhsbandi-Haqqani to respond 
officially. These factors have forced Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples to abandon 
their dismissive stance and instead, to actively defend their masters and the validity 
of their Sufi teachings. To address Amin Jamaludin’s and his Islamist colleagues, 
the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples have also tried to activate their social networks 
among Jakarta’s political and business elites. This elitist connection has put 
indirect political pressure on Amin Jamaludin to cease his accusations and attacks 
against their master’s teachings. 
On 28 October 2009, some of the YHI’s representatives (e.g. Rizal Tarigan, 
Budi Rachmadi and Muchsin Mulaela, etc) came to the MUI office and met with 
the Chairman of Komisi Pengkajian, Utang Ranuwijaya. They explained that the 
booklets that had come under Amin Jamaludin’s severe criticism were not 
officially published by the Yayasan (YHI) and had nothing to do with their master, 
Sheikh Hisham. Abdurrauf Kurniadi and Arif Hamdani also came to the meeting to 
express their regrets for translating Sheikh Hisham’s sohbet without prior 
permission and authorisation.  Abdurrauf and Arif Hamdani further affirmed that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
316 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010 
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the booklets did not represent their master’s (Sheikh Hisham Kabbani) true 
teachings because they did not fully comprehend the complicated Sufi ideas 
conveyed by their master. Therefore, they were willing to take full responsibility 
for their mistakes. During the meeting, Utung Ranuwijaya as Chairman of Komisi 
Pengkajian, suggested that a meeting between Sheikh Hisham and Amin Jamaludin 
be arranged.  
Following on Utang Ranuwijaya’s suggestion, the next day, 29th October 
2009, the YHI’s representatives went to the LPPI office to meet Amin Jamaludin. 
They conveyed the same message, stating that the YHI and Sheikh Hisham had 
nothing to do with any of the translated booklets. Amin Jamaludin, however, 
refused to accept their apology and explanation. Instead he demanded that the 
Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia should take institutional responsibility because the 
publication used the official logo of the Yayasan, its address and bank account.  
Amin Jamaludin did, however, accept an invitation letter to attend tabayyun 
(clarification) meeting with Sheikh Hisham, during the latter’s visit to Indonesia 
the following month.  
On 6 November 2009, the meeting took place at the Financial Club at the 
Graha Niaga Building, in the Soedirman Central Business District (SCBD). It was 
attended by official representatives of MUI (Utung Ranuwijaya, Anwar Ibrahim, 
and Aminudin Yakub), Sheikh Hisham and some of his disciples in Jakarta such as 
Rizal Tarigan, Budi Rachmadi, and Muchsin Mulaela. This meeting was made 
possible with the help of Hendro Martowardojo, one of Sheikh Hisham’s disciples, 
who provided the venue. During the meeting, Sheikh Hisham denied all the 
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accusations and clarified in detail the misquotations attributed to him and his 
masters in Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet. Sheikh Hisham is reported to have said: 
I am a scholar, author, and publisher of many books and I would be happy to 
explain any of the material presented in that wide body of literature. However, I 
will not respond or answer to material or information I have not produced, which 
is published in a language I do not even read or understand. It is also unreasonable 
to ask me to interpret the alleged words of my teacher when I cannot verify the 
author that has translated or interpreted it correctly in the first place.317  
 
He also strongly defended Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s orthodox view regarding shariah 
and its legitimate position within Islamic tradition. He also explained that all 
written materials about Naqshbandi-Haqqani to which Amin Jamaludin made 
references were translated literally without proper religious understanding and 
adequate language skills. He urged that all emerging concern about Naqshbandi-
Haqqani and its teachings should refer only to books he had permitted to be 
translated and nothing else. Sheikh Hisham referred particularly to his books 
published by Serambi publisher such as Tasawuf dan Ihsan: Antivirus Kebatilan 
dan Kezaliman, Energi Zikir dan Salawat, Maulid dan Ziarah ke Makam Nabi, and 
Syafaat, Tawasul, dan Tabaruk. 
Some of the MUI members who attended the meeting accepted Sheikh 
Hisham Kabbani’s explanation but they also stated that further investigation was 
needed to clarify certain disputed issues.318 The only problem was that Amin 
Jamaludin, who had promised to attend the meeting, did not show up. For 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, this simply showed that he had no intention of 
clarifying his accusations. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was reported to be particularly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
317 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010 
318 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, October 2010 
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disappointed by the fact that Amin Jamaludin missed the opportunity to obtain 
direct answers to all the issues he had raised concerning Naqshbandi-Haqqani.  
Amin Jamaludin defended himself by saying that, at the time, he was very busy 
preparing for his departure for the pilgrimage. 319  Instead of seeking further 
clarification, Amin Jamaludin continued to distribute his pamphlet to mosques 
throughout Jakarta and throughout LPPI’s networks in other regions.  
These continuing polemics led the Ministry of Religious Affairs to interfere. 
In November 2010, Puslitbang Depag (Center for Research and Development, 
Ministry of Religious Affairs) organised a meeting to scrutinize Naqshbandi-
Haqqani’s written materials. This team organised an open gathering to investigate 
Amin Jamaludin’s report on the alleged heretical teachings of Naqhsbandi-Haqqani. 
The gathering was held on 15 November 2010 at Istiqlal Museum-TMII and was 
attended by Muslim scholars, researchers of Puslitbang Depag, MUI’s 
representatives, Amin Jamaludin and his LPPI staff, and delegates from the 
Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia. The main agenda of the meeting was to review eight 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s written documents; 1) Ruh dan Raga: Tidak Ada 
Reinkarnasi dalam Islam, 2) Awas Setan Musuh Terbesar Manusia, 3) Muhasabah, 
4) Maulid dan Ziarah ke Makam Nabi SAW, 5) The Naqsahabandi Sufi Tradition: 
Guidebook of Daily Practices and Devotions, 6) Kisah Perjalanan Cahaya 
Muhammad SAW, 7) Berbagai Kesusahan sebagai Sebuah Kebaikan dari Allah 
SWT, and 8) Kematian: Persiapan Menjemput Maut.320  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
319 Interview with Amin Djamaludin, 21 September 2010 
320 http://infolppi.blogspot.com.au/2011/02/seminar-telaah-buku-buku-tarekat.html  
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During the meeting, Amin Jamaludin insisted in his accusation that 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani violated some basic Islamic doctrines. He repeatedly referred 
to his pamphlet in an attempt to convince others on the validity of his accusation. 
Of eight reviewers invited, however, there was only one (Ali Fahrudin) who 
supported Amin Jamaludin’s position and demanded that the books should be 
banned. The majority of Muslim scholars invited to the event also did not endorse 
Amin Jamaludin’s position. They argued that basically, there was nothing wrong 
with the teachings because they reflected spiritual experience that could not be 
judged by outward appearances. The gathering therefore concluded that 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani was a legitimate thariqah. After that, the controversy about 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s written materials was put to rest except for the occasional 
outburst of criticism.  
Interestingly, some sources I interviewed during fieldwork hinted that Amin 
Jamaludin was not powerful enough to deal with the strong political support behind 
Naqhsbandi-Haqqani among Jakarta’s political-business elites. One source even 
used the term ‘to run out ammunition’ to describe Amin Jamaludin’s situation.321 
His reluctance to directly confront Sheikh Hisham did not help his credibility 
among his own supporters. Yet, Amin Jamaludin has not changed his opinion and 
continues to accuse Naqshbandi-Haqqani of being a heretical group that should not 
be allowed to flourish in Indonesia.322 Though he never retracted his accusation 
regarding the heretical nature of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, he did not openly name 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani a heretical (sesat) group when he appeared as an expert to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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provide testimony during the judicial review session on religious blasphemy at the 
constitutional court in 3 March 2010.  
Despite their relative success in dealing with the controversies and polemics 
involving Amin Jamaludin, such controversies seem to have strengthened the 
perception among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples that Salafi and Islamist groups 
pose a genuine threat toward Sufi groups and the general Muslim community. This 
perception helps to shape a millenarian belief in the representation of the Dajjal 
(the deceiver) as “a man with one-eye only”. This is interpreted as symbolising the 
narrow-minded and literal religious thinking promoted by Salafi and the over-
emphasis on socio-political activism by the Islamists. The term Salafi itself broadly 
refers to reformist ideas which claim that the first three generations (salaf-as shalih) 
of the Muslim ummah provided the best example for later generations of the 
Muslim ummah. This term, however, is narrowly applied to the followers of 
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab (1703-1792).323 Naqshbandi-Haqqani identifies five 
characteristics that distinguish Salafi from the mainstream Sunni orthodoxy: 1) 
attribution of anthropomorphism toward Allah, 2) disrespect for the Prophet, 3) an 
amateurish-egalitarian approach to the Qur'an and hadith, 4) rejection of the Four 
Sunni schools of Law (the Four madhahib) and the two Schools of doctrine 
(Ash`aris and Maturidis) as well as all the Schools of self-purification (Tasawwuf), 
and 5) the practice of takfir against fellow Muslims.  
Yet, facing Salafi and Islamist’ criticism, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and his 
disciples only attempted to seek a compromise. When this failed, they went ahead 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
323 The origins of these reformist ideas derive from the 13th century Syrian Muslim jurist, Ibn 
Taimiyah. 
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and ignored the criticism altogether. This uncompromising stance is strongly 
related to the belief among Naqshbandi-Haqqani that the current turmoil affecting 
the Muslim community comes from Salafi religious doctrine and the Islamist’s 
over-emphasis on political activism. Sheikh Hisham has said the following about 
Salafi propaganda: 
We who keep the traditional teachings of Ahl as-Sunnah wa ‘l-Jama`ah are on the 
path of haqq. We, the `ulama, must not keep silent when we see these kind of 
deviations of `aqida. The first duty of us, who are `ulama is to stand against 
falsehood. Unfortunately, we `ulama are not doing our duty and in this way the 
propaganda of Salafis is having more and more effect.  If we, the `ulama don’t 
stand up, we cannot expect the common person to know the difference between 
true `aqidah and false. People believe easily in slogans like “follow only the 
Sunnah” and don’t know how to distinguish false claims to piety from reality. 
Only when those who have deep Islamic knowledge have the courage to face the 
Salafis, will this problem go away.324 
 
Within the group, he encourages his disciples to conduct zikir in public and 
ziarah. He strongly believes that these communal rituals can be used as an effective 
counter to the growing influence of Salafism, which fiercely denounces these 
popular ritual practices as idolatry and deviation from shariah provision. In fact, 
both communal rituals remain an effective propagating instrument. The popularity 
of these ritual practices enables Sheikh Hisham to share his religious conviction in 
the language that is neither doctrinal nor scriptural.  
Sheikh Hisham was reported to have told his disciples that Islam has 
survived into modern times, and the Muslim community expands over generations 
partly because they left cultural heritages as physical evidence. Such physical 
evidence was represented by, among many other things, the existence of numerous !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
324 Tabloid Ibadah, No. 8 Tahun 3/Minggu I-II, February 2012 
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pilgrimage sites that are preserved across the Muslim world. He warned his 
disciples that contemporary religious violence does not only affect the lives of 
people but also the Islamic cultural and historical heritage. He always reminds his 
disciples of the old memories about the widespread desecration of many historical 
sites throughout Saudi Arabia following the rise of Wahabism in the early 20th 
century. He is also concerned that the desecration and destruction of many Muslim 
shrines now carried out by the Salafi group in the campaign against idolatry and 
bid’ah is just an excuse for crushing different religious opinions in the Muslim 
community.  
Sheikh Hisham’s words reflect his concern and sadness over the desecration 
of many historical sites across the Muslim world. Maintaining the popular practice 
of ziarah is a practical and effective way to ensure that something like that would 
never happen again.325 Such wanton destruction must be prevented at any cost 
because the desecration of pilgrimage sites did not only  disconnect members of the 
Muslim ummah from their glorious past but also led to erroneous interpretation of 
Islam. Once the pilgrimage sites are gone, Islam will potentially vanish because 
without physical evidence, future generations will regard Islam as only a legend 
rather than a historical reality.326 Given the massive desecration and destruction of 
many Sufi shrines and popular Muslim pilgrimage sites in other Muslim countries 
such as Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Mali, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and so forth, this 
explanation has quite a strong appeal among his disciples in Indonesia. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
325 Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Indonesia, there is a distinct practice of ziarah by 
visiting the remnants of the holy hair of the Prophet Muhammad. During the occasion, the disciples 
paid their respect by kissing the glass box that contains a few pieces of the holy hair of the Prophet 
that was brought by Sheikh Hisham to Indonesia 
326 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010 
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Regarding Islamist groups, Sheikh Hisham encourages them to improve 
themselves before attempting to change other Muslims. Preoccupation with the 
political efforts to change people from above would not lead to a better world. In 
an interview, he has also said:   
…So these Islamists would do better to work on themselves and clean themselves 
up first before beginning to clean up everyone else. When I clean myself and you 
clean yourself and he cleans himself and she cleans herself, the society will 
automatically become clean, obedient to Allah’s Law and this will immediately 
result in improvement and blessings. But when we are only busy looking at what 
this one is doing, that one is doing, and not looking under our own “hat” we will 
end up doing more harm than good.327 
 
In Indonesia, religious and political discourses on Salafi-Wahabism and 
Islamism are  not new.328 This recent accusation posed the most serious challenge 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani has ever had since its first arrival in Indonesia and, therefore, 
it could not be easily neutralised and localised. Though it is not factually correct, a 
perception was formed among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers regarding the 
serious threat from the Salafi-Wahabi group in Indonesia. Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
thus claims that its principal religious mission is countering Salafi-Wahabism 
across the globe. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
327 Tabloid Ibadah, No. 8 Tahun 3/Minggu I-II, February 2012 
328 It has been known at least since 18th century especially among traditionalist Muslim community 
following the rise of Saudi regime in the Haramain. Salafi-Wahabism even indirectly gave rise to 
the major traditionalist Muslim organisations that defended Sufi-influenced religious beliefs and 
practices in Indonesia such as NU, PERTI, Darul Dakwah wal Irsyad, etc. The establishment of 
LPBA (later known as LIPIA) in 1980 facilitated further the spread of Salafi-Wahabi teachings 
among Indonesian Muslims.  
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9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the general landscape and contentious religious 
life in Indonesia. Some polemics are continuation of old theological and doctrinal 
disputes, some others are new and they are related to competition over disciples, 
material resources and political patronage. They derive from the competitive nature 
of religious life in Indonesia because each Muslim group with a different religious 
orientation struggles for dominance and to gain popular support. The controversies 
and polemics are also part of the socio-political dynamics that have been integral to 
the current Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. Understanding these controversies and 
polemics in their own historical and social context is pivotal to grasping the current 
Sufi resurgence and the dynamics of post-Islamist activism in Indonesia.!
As in previous eras, the current Sufi resurgence in contemporary Indonesia 
is however not immune to controversy. The various controversies pertain to either 
to religious doctrines or ritual practices; they involve competition over resources, 
social prestige and the disposition of disciples among different Islamic groups. 
While in  previous eras such polemics only resonated among the elite, current 
polemics are accessible to be followed by numerous individuals through various 
different media. The nature of these polemics therefore plays a part in shaping 
religious views among Muslims in Indonesia. This continuing religious debate is 
conducted for the most part in peaceful way involving intellectual debate, and 
reasonably civil dialogue and the continuing encounter of various different Muslim 
groups with different religious inclinations.  This is a positive trend in the making 
of plural Muslim society in Indonesia. However, self-righteousness and 
uncompromising stances based on religious doctrinal convictions also have a 
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negative effect. Preoccupation with ritual piety undermines cultivation of secular 
virtues to address the broader socio-cultural problems embedded among Indonesian 
Muslim society.  
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Chapter 10 
C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S 
 
This study has revealed some important and interesting features of 
Indonesian Muslims and contemporary religious life in Indonesia. Indonesian 
Muslims have been increasingly exposed to the global spiritual marketplace. 
Though this exposure is a recent phenomenon, it is rooted in the changing religious 
landscape that has been underway in Indonesia since the 1970s. This changing 
religious landscape has particularly to do with several factors such as educational 
and economic improvements, urbanisation as well as the revolution in information 
technology and transnational migration. All these factors have greatly affected 
Indonesian Muslims in Indonesia and paved the way for new incoming Islamic 
ideas from abroad. The new incoming Islamic ideas in general and Sufism in 
particular found a fertile ground among the Muslim population in urban areas, 
which is keen to seek religious knowledge from unconventional methods of Islamic 
learning. Sufi piety is a result of a deepening Islamisation characterised by direct 
personal experience of devotion and observance of normative ideals prescribed in 
the Quran and the Prophetic tradition. 
The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani demonstrates that charisma remains 
powerful and has even become an identity marker for contemporary Indonesian 
Muslims. Charisma personifies veneration to a role model of an exemplary living 
figure. It represents mutual trust and respect based on close personal relationship 
between the master and the disciples. The personalised religious authority provides 
not only interpretation of religious texts but also private guidance on religious 
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service. This charisma is strengthened through repetitive and performative pious 
acts in the form of individual and collective of dzikir (remembrance), music and 
dance. The repetitive and performative rituals and their effects in shaping strong 
emotive ties between the master and disciples maintain internal solidarity within 
Sufi group. 
Growing literacy does not completely replace this supposedly ‘old-
fashioned’ religiosity with a strong veneration to personal appeal of religious guru. 
Furthermore, flourishing rational thinking and strong influence of Islamic 
reformism with strong emphasis on formal organisation do not undermine the 
strong appeal of charisma because it is not only a source of religious authority but 
also organisational resource. While formal institution is particularly important to 
secure material and non-material support, it is not intrinsically sufficient to keep 
people maintaining their allegiance as devout followers. As a leadership resource, 
the charisma plays a significant role to direct and lead the followers. Once the 
congregation grows larger, charismatic leader needs to establish formal institutions 
to organise his disciples that helps to strengthen further the charisma not only 
among within the group but also to the broader Muslim community.  
Yet, adopting formal institution potentially compromise the charisma due to 
excessive bureaucratization. It would likely lead to internal divergence and schism 
that could potentially weaken a charismatic leadership and internal solidarity and 
even impeding further expansion. The survival of Sufi groups in modern era thus 
shows not only individual but also organisational capacities to strike the balance 
between religious authority and leadership resource of charismatic figure. As a 
religious authority, the charisma tends to exploit the popular belief of sainthood 
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(walayah) that has been strongly embedded within the Muslim tradition in 
Indonesia. On the other hand, the charisma also increasingly relies on modern 
media outlets, rather than face to face relationship, to indirectly communicate and 
emanate the appeal to the disciples and broader audience.   
To continue attracting people and to keep them in the group, new Islamic 
groups have to offer coherent and if necessary, utopian visions that resonate with 
the personal and collective religious grievances of their members. Popular 
millenarian belief in particular is powerful because it offers redemption and 
salvation to all, a remedy for all difficulties and problems. For generations, it has 
been effectively used to justify a religio-political cause in the struggle for Islam and 
the whole Muslim community (ummah). In modern times, the Islamic term Dajjal 
(Deciever/Anti Christ) is also used in reference to one’s religio-political opponents, 
while Fitnah (Dissension) and Jahiliya (Ignorance) describe internal problems, rifts 
and discords within the Muslim community. Far from becoming obsolete, this 
millenarian belief with its normative ideals which hark back to popular religious 
traditions in the past, continues to have relevance in modern times by helping 
Muslim Indonesians addressing and dealing with current socio-economic situations. 
As a piety movement, there is nothing mysterious about Sufi groups 
because they are openly and actively engaged in the struggle for Islam and the 
Muslim community. It is unprecedented, however, that typical Sufi rituals such as 
dzikir and maulid celebrations are currently performed on an open stage, widely 
advertised on various media, and generously sponsored by rich individuals. This 
public performance of Sufi ritual does not happen in a political vacuum. It actually 
has to do with emerging political opportunities and public space thrown wide open 
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during the SBY Presidency (2004-2014). Dzikir akbar and maulid celebrations for 
instance, have been deliberately used as a public campaign during which political 
messages for combatting terrorism and soliciting electoral support were carefully 
couched in pious Islamic language. In the name of dakwah, the Sufi community 
also uses these communal gatherings to voice their religious concerns and declare 
their support for the legitimate government.  
The struggle for Islam in Indonesia is highly contested, involving many 
different religious groups with diverse religious orientations. Religious life in 
Indonesia is thus similarly contentious because every group is involved in either 
intra group rivalries or extra group opposition. Amidst growing shariah-
mindedness among Indonesian Muslims, Sufism is not completely secure because 
it is always under public scrutiny to show conformity to religious orthodoxy. 
Sufism contributes to a counter balance to the self-righteous claims of Salafism as 
the sole model of Islamic piety. Sufi groups have managed to survive because they 
are not reluctant to defend their teachings and existence by engaging in civil 
encounters and dialogue with their rivals and opponents. This dialogue has been 
made possible not only by traditional methods of silaturahmi (face-to-face 
meetings) and tabayyun (seeking clarification) but also through the use of ‘soft 
intimidation’ by manipulating connections to political and business elites.  
The findings of this study contribute to an empirical and theoretical 
understanding of contemporary dynamics of Indonesian Islam and the Muslim 
community in Indonesia. Empirically speaking, this study indicates that Indonesian 
Muslims have been and will likely remain fragmented along different pious 
orientations. Sufi ideas and rituals are still attractive to shape individual piety. 
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Preoccupation with individual piety does not turn their attention from collective 
activism because Sufi group strongly believe that individual piety requires and will 
eventually cultivate pious Islamic public sphere. The making of pious public sphere 
along different religious orientation is political in nature because it involves many 
groups that compete one to another for dominance.    
Though the struggle for piety is primarily about the quest for individual-
centered changes, transformation of everyday life and small-scale changes 
affecting what people believe and what they should stand for, it does not 
necessarily mean politically less significant. In the long run, this individual change 
could transform into ideological struggle targeting secular values with broader 
implication for promoting wide-ranging social and political reforms. Islamic 
activism with deeply rooted Sufi orientation potentially generates cosmopolitan 
pietism that is an important pillar for Indonesian Muslims, requiring them to 
remain open-minded and pluralistic in their religious orientation. This 
cosmopolitan pietism provides a strong cultural foundation to establish civil 
democratic culture in Indonesia.  
Theoretically speaking, this study also addresses the question of piety and 
activism not as an exclusive framework as commonly seen in most scholarly 
studies dealing with Islam and Muslim community in Indonesia. For instance, 
religious scholars and anthropologists regard the expression of and quest for piety 
as the most important aspect of Muslim community. Above anything else, they are 
mainly concerned about sacred texts, belief, ritual and their significance for 
understanding Muslim community in Indonesia. On the other hand, social and 
political scientists put too much emphasis on historical, ideological and political 
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aspects of Islamic activism and tend to disregard belief and ritual in their analysis. 
Unlike previous scholarly studies, this study attempts to bridge the gap between the 
two and considers both as different sides of the same coin.  
However, this study also shows that cosmopolitan pietism is not a given 
condition. Sufism in itself does not necessarily generate cosmopolitan pietism 
because it depends on the religious dynamics and the nature of power relations 
between various external factors such as politics, economy and culture. Without 
sufficient social and political support, Sufism has potentially minor influence in 
shaping the religious orientation of Muslim society. In non-democratic, 
impoverished and authoritarian environments, Sufism could be as deadly and 
violent as other militant groups.  In Pakistan and Iraq for instance, Sufi groups are 
involved in daily armed struggle to defend their existence and survival against 
opposing forces.   
The case of Indonesia shows that Islamic piety generates religious and 
political conservatism that is not necessarily good for the country. Religious 
conservatism is characterised by too much emphasis on ritual piety, shariah-
minded religiosity, self-righteousness, claims of moral superiority, and to some 
extent, even blind obedience to personalised religious authority. This religious 
conservatism shows an inclination to frame everything from moral, ethical to social 
and political problems, in religious terms. This often leads to uncompromising 
attitude toward dissenting religious opinions and reforms (ijtihad), and the 
cultivation of non-secular virtues such as free and liberal thinking and equality. 
Shariah-minded Sufi groups in Indonesia, however, are more ambigious in dealing 
with the so-called ‘Islamic deviant groups’ such as Ahmadiyah and Shiah. They 
 339 
neither condemn nor support these minority groups from prosecution.  
Sufi groups are prone to pious authoritarianism. With this ideological 
stance, instead of promoting post-Islamist discourse such as religious freedom and 
civil rights, Sufi-inspired activism could lead to an authoritarian pietism that seeks 
to shape public morality and the common good based solely on Islamic ideals.! It 
tends to manipulate public morality by employing pious language and behavior as a 
political tool to prevent criticism from the public. Moreover, Sufi groups are also 
politically conservative because they tend to legitimize political establishment. 
Supporting the political status quo could mean legitimising corrupt and 
incompetent politicians so long as they can keep up a pious appearance in public.  
The so-called “suddenly pious syndrome” is a good example of this authoritarian 
pietism common in Indonesia. It refers to a condition in which people declare 
themselves to be pious Muslims in order to attract sympathy from the public and 
divert attention from their offences or wrongdoing.  
Although this study is limited in its scope because it only focuses on one 
particular Sufi group in Indonesia, it helps to understand contemporary religious 
life in Indonesia. Yet this is insufficient to draw general conclusions about the 
whole spectrum of Islamic piety movements in Indonesia. Future studies should 
deal more deeply with other important issues such as the impact of changing 
charismatic leadership, youth and women’s involvement in the movement, ritual 
change and ideological transformation, and the relationship between Sufi groups 
and the state. Those studies will present a more complete picture of contemporary 
Islam and the Muslim community in Indonesia in their own terms. 
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B. Interviews 
 
Aat, Rumi Café – 21/9/2010  
Abdul Mughits, Pekanbaru 19/10/2010 
Abdurrauf Kurniadi, YHI Jakarta - 30/9/2010 
Adjat Sudrajat Bandung – 3/10/2010 
Alfian Awwal, Batam – 19/10/2010 
Ahmad Mubarok, Jakarta – 21/9/2010  
Ali Yahya/Al Kisah Magazine – 25/9/2010 
Amin Djamaludin, LPPI Jakarta– 21/9/2010  
Arif Hamdani, Jakarta – 11/8/2010  
Bernie Subki/Yayasan – 25/12/2010, 26/12/2010 
Betardi, Yogyakarta 24/10/2010 
Budi Rachmadi, Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia Jakarta, 30/9/2010 
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Burhanudin, Yogyakarta 24/10/2010 
Darul Trimadyanto, Jakarta 20/8/2010 
Dicky Aryo Seno (S. Zulfikar)/Cinere – 21/9/2010  
Dini Andriani, Depok – 15/8/2010  
Eko Suyono, Pekanbaru – 19/10/2010 
Eri Barkah Saridria (S. Barkah)/Rabbani Cinere – 17/8/2010 
Farid Bubhi Djamirin, 26/12/2010 
Gibril Fouad Haddad, 19 November 2010  
Hagi Ghani Azis, Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia Jakarta – 12/8/2010  
Handri Ramadhian – 23/9/2010 
Hendro Martowardojo, 15/10/2010 
Hisyam Musawwa, 17 December 2010 
Idrus al Hamid – 23/12/2010 
Imam, Rumi Café Jakarta  11/8/2010 
Joko Sulistyono, Pekalongan 24/10/2010 
Khaerudin, 28 October 2010 
Medi Kusmedi, Jemaat Tabligh Antapani Bandung – 3/10/2010 
Meni Susanti – 18/8/2010  
Miftah, 26/12/2010 
Muchsin Mulaela/Café Rumi – 18/8/2010, 27/9/2010, 15/10/2010 
Muchsin Mochtar, Majelis Rasulullah - 24/12/2010  
Muchtony Ghani Azis, Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia Jakarta – 12/8/2010  
Muhammad Hikam – 23/12/2010 
Muhammad Lukman Hakim, JATMAN Jakarta, 29/8/2010 
Muhammad Lukman Hakim/Cahaya Sufi – 24/9/2010 
Muhammad Shalahudin (Kang Din As Sufi) – 14/8/2010, 19/11/2010 
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Muhammad Sholeh, Jakarta – 12/8/2010  
Mulyadi Izenk, Bulungan Jakarta, 21/8/2010 
Mustafa Masud/Hasbi – 28/9/2010, 17-19/10/2010 
Nursyafaat, 19 November 2010 
Pramudjo Abdulgani, Pekanbaru- 19/10/2010 
Pudjo Basuki (aka S. Muhammad Djamil) – 27/12/2010 
Rauf, Jemaat Tabligh Bandung, 1/9/2010 
Rizal Tarigan – 22/9/2010 
Samson Nasarudin (Sony Haqqani), Jakarta – 1/10/2010  
Soenarto 21/11/2010 
Son Kuswadi – 29/9/2010 
Sugeng Ferywanto, Depok – 12/8/2010, 15/8/2010  
Suntan Hidayat, Jakarta 23/10/2010 
Sutono Joyosuparto, Jakarta – 13/8/2010, 14/8/2010 
Wahib Mukti – 24/12/2010 
Wahyudin Yusuf, 5/11/2010 
Yakub Romdhoni, Bandung – 2/10/2010 
 
C. Newspaper/Magazines/Tabloid 
Al Kisah, No. 17/14-27 August 2006 
-----------, No. 18/28 August-10 September 2006 
-----------, No. 22/2-15 June 2008 
-----------, No. 12/15-28 June 2009 
-----------, No. 10/18-31 May 2009 
Gatra, No. 47 Tahun X, 9 October 2004  
Ibadah, No. 8 Tahun 3/Minggu I-II, February 2012 
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Kompas, 24 July 2011 
Media Umat, Edisi 16, 10-23 July 2009 
Republika, 13 June 2012 
Syir’ah, No. 43/V/June 2005 
Tempo, Edisi 13-19 September 2010 
 
D. Websites/Blogs 
 
http://www.caferumijakarta.com/ 
http://www.heavenlyhealingteam.org/  
http://indonesiazawiyah.blogspot.com.au/  
http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/  
http://www.kampungsholawat.net/  
http://kunjungan7007.blogspot.com.au  
http://madadulhaqq.net/  
http://naqshbandi.net/  
http://naqshbandi.org/  
http://naqsybandi.org  
http://nurmuhammad.com/  
http://www.sufilive.com/  
http://www.sunnah.org/  
http://www.youtube.com/sufilive  
http://www.aicp.org 
http://www.darulfatwa.org.au  
http://www.darulkautsar.net   
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id  
http://infolppi.blogspot.com.au/  
http://majelisrasulullah.org/  
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Appendix V # RECITATION#OF#INITIATION#RITUALS#
!
(Source:!http://www.naqshbandi.org/about/baya_txt.htm)!
!
!
During! the! initiation! ritual,! an!aspiring! initiate! recites!syahadat! and! then! recites!
the!following:!
!
!
 َﻧ#ُﻌ'ِﺎَﺑ'ُ *َ'+ِﱠﻟ. ﱠ*ِ/ ِ"ِﺳْﻔَﻧ ﻰَﻠَﻋ ,ُُﻛﻧ.َ ﺎَﻣ ﱠِﻧﺈَﻓ ,ََﻛ ﱠﻧ 4َﻣَﻓ 5ْ6ِ.7ِ.َْ8 9َ:َْﻓ ِ ﱠﷲ 7ُ.َ َ ﱠﷲ 4َ:ُﻌ.ِﺎَﺑ.ُ ﺎَﻣ ﱠِﻧ> ?َ! ْ"َﻣ%َ!
ﺎًﻣ$&َِﻋ )*ًَْﺟ- .ِ$ِﺗ0ْ$َُﺳَﻓ َ ﱠﷲ .ُ$َْﻠَﻋ 7َ8َﺎَﻋ ﺎَﻣِﺑ ﻰَﻓ;َْ- !
(I(bear(witness(that(there(is(no(god(except(Allah(and(I(bear(witness(that(Muhammad(is(His(
servant( and( Prophet.( ! In( the( name( of( Allah,( the( Compassionate( and( the( Merciful.( Lo!(
Those(who( swear( allegiance( unto( thee( (Muhammad),( swear( allegiance( only( unto(Allah.(
The(Hand(of(Allah(is(above(their(hands.(So(whosoever(breaketh(his(oath,(breaketh(it(only(
to(his(soul's(hurt;(while(whosoever(keepeth(his(covenant(with(Allah,(on(him(will(He(bestow(
immense(reward)!
Then!recites!
 ! ﺎﻧ$&ّﺳﺑ! ًﺎﻧ&$ *ﻼﺳﻻﺎﺑ ! ًﺎﺑ- .ﻠﻠﺑ ﺎﻧ&ﺿ-!ّﻠﺳ % &'ﻠﻋ ﻰﻠﻌﺗ ﷲ ّﻰﻠﺻ .ﻣﺣﻣ ﺎ'ّﺑﻧ  ًﻻ#ﺳ%   ﺎ#ّﺑﻧ&
ﺎﺑﺎﺗﻛ %&'ﻘﻟﺎﺑ !
.!"ﺷ$ﻣ & ﺄﺧ)ﺷ ﻲﻧﺎﻘﺣﻟ0 12ﺎﻧ "ﻣﺣﻣ ﺦ)ﺷﻟ0 ﺎﻧ")ّﺳﺑ ﺎﻧﻠﺑﻗ & 9)ﻛ& 9ﻘﻧ ﺎﻣ ﻲﻠﻋ ﷲ& ◌ً  
!ﺣ ﷲ ﷲ ﷲ !ﺣ ﷲ ﷲ ﷲ !ﺣ ﷲ ﷲ ﷲ  
(We!accept!and!are!pleased!with!Allah!as!our!Lord,!and!Islam!as!our!religion!and!with!our!
Master!Muhammad!Messenger!and!Prophet!and!with!the!Quran!as!our!book!and!Allah!is!
the! Trustee! on! what! we! say.! And! we! are! pleased! and! accepting! our!Master!Mawlana!
Shaykh!Muhammad!Nazim! as! our! Shaykh! and!Guide! to! Allah.! Allah! is,! Allah! is,! Allah! is!
Reality.!Allah!is,!Allah!is,!Allah!is!Reality)!
!
!
#
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Next!recites!
  ِ"ِﺑْﺣﺻ' "ِِﻟ)' ﻲﺑﻧﻟ, -/َْﺿَﺣ ﻰﻟ2 ﻛﻟ#!"#  ِءﺎﻣ&َُﺧ) *+ﻠَﺳ.ُﻣﻟ0) ءﺎ+ﺑْﻧﻷ0 *ِﻣ 5ِِﻧ0)ْﺧ6 7ِ0).ْ8 ﻰﻟ6)
!"ﻌﺋ%&َﺷ ﻰﻟ#$  ﺔﱢ#ﻠَﻌﻟ( ﺔ#ّ+ِْﻧَﺑْﺷْﻘَﻧﻟ( ﺔَﻘ#1ِ2َﻟ( ﻲﻓ ﺎﻧِﺧ#ِﺎﺷَﻣ 8ِ(91ْ: ﻰﻟ<9 =ﺔُﻌَﺑ1ْﻷ( ﺔ ﱠﻣﺋﻷ( 8ِ(91ْ:
ﺔﻘ#$ ﱠ&ﻟ( *ِﺎﻣ- .ِ/$ُ ﻰﻟ- ﺔَﺻﺎﺧ! ﺦ"ﺷﻟ% ﺔَﻘ"ﻠَﺧﻟ% ,ِ.َْﻏ.   "ُ ﱠﻣَﺣُﻣ !ﺎﺷ ﺎﻧﻻ$ﻣ &(َْﺿَﺣ ﻰﻟ.$ /ْﻧَﺑْﺷْﻘَﻧﻟ3
ﻲﻧﺎﺗﺳﻏ'ﻟ) ﷲ 'ﺑﻋ ﺦ.ﺷﻟ) ءﺎ.ﻟ1ﻷ) 3ﺎ4ﻠﺳ! ﺦ"ﺷﻟ% ﺎﻧﻻ)ﻣ)  !"# ﻰﻟ&' ﻲﻧﺎﻘﺣﻟ# -.ﺎﻧ /ﻣﺣﻣ
.!"ِﻘ" ﱢ&ِﺻﻟ) ﺎﻧﺗ)&ﺎﺳ .ﺋﺎﺳ ﻰﻟ12 !ﺎﺧﺟ)2َﺧﻟ)  ﺔَﺣِﺗﺎﻔﻟ).  
!
(Present!the!reward!of!the!preceding!recitations!to!the!Prophet!(s)!and!to!the!shaykhs!of!
the!Naqshbandi!Order:!O!God!!Grant!that!the!merit!of!what!we!have!read,!and!the!light!
of!what!we!have!recited,!are!(considered)!an!offering!and!gift!from!us!to!the!soul!of!our!
Prophet!Muhammad,!and! to! the!souls!of! the!prophets,!and! the!saints;! in!particular! the!
soul! of! the! Imām! of! the! ţarīqat! and! archUIntercessor! of! the! created! world,! Khwājā!
Bahā’uddīn! anUNaqshband!Muhammad! alUUwaisī! ’lUBukhārī,! and! our! venerable! teacher!
and!master,! the!Sultan!of! Saints,!our! Shaykh! `Abd!Allāh!alUFā’iz! adUDāghestanī,! and!our!
master! Shaykh! Muhammad! Nāzim! alUHaqqānī,! and! to! the! masters! of! the! Khatm!
Khawajagan!and!to!the!righteous)!
The!ritual!initiation!is!finally!concluded!by!reciting!Surah!Al!Fatihah!
!# ###################
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Appendix VI # NAQSHBANDI:HAQQANI’S#DZIKIR#CENTRES#IN#INDONESIA#
!
No! Imam!Dzikir!
!
Address! Schedule!
1! Ust.!Nugrahanto! PP!Madaniyah!!
Anggrek!Mas!FU5!Baloi!Batam!!
!
2! Encep!Fariduddin! PP!Sirajul!Huda!
Tiga!Binanga!
Tanah!Karo!!
!
3! KH.!Mukhtarul! PP!Miftahul!Jannah!
Pakanbaru!
!
4! KH.!Ence!Supriyatna! PP!Darus!Syifa!al!Fitrat!
Jl.!Parungseah!No.43!Km.5!Desa!Cipetir!
Kec.!Kadudampit!Sukabumi,!!
Jawa!Barat!
!
5! Ust.!Sohib! PP! Nurul! Hidayah! Jl.! Pelita! Desa! Limo,!
Depok!
Saturday!night!
6! Ust.!Nurjaya! PP!Al!Maunah!
Depok!
Saturday!night!!
7! Ustadz!Tatang! PP!Sirojal!Muniro!
Lembang!Bandung!
!
8! KH.!Ahmad!Syahid! PP!Al!Falah!
Cicalengka!
!
9! KH.!Taufiqurrahman!
Subki!
PP!At!Taufiqy!
Rowokembu!Kaum!No.154!Wonopringgo!
51181!Pekalongan!
!
10! H.!Sauqi/Ridwan!Pinem! PP!Asri!
Singaraja!Bali!
!
11! KH.!Maskin!Abdul!Azis! PP!Darus!Sholawat!
Dukuh!Klubuk!Rt!27!/!07,!Kelurahan!
Kedungrejo,!Kecamatan!Pilangkenceng!
Caruban,!Kabupaten!Madiun,!Jawa!Timur!
Dzikir!&!I’tikaf!
Saturday!
MorningUSunday!
Night!
12! Ibu!Makiyyah! PP!Al!Falah!!
Kajar!Bondowoso!
!
13! Effendi! Siregar/Syekh!
Surya!
Effendi!Siregar!(Aweng)!
Pangkalan! Jati! I! Pondok! Labu! (Effendi!
Siregar)!
Thursday!night!
(weekly)!
14! Idem! Teuku! Umar! 41! Menteng! (Muchtony!
Ghani!Azis)!
!
15! Idem! HKP!Malik!Tarigan!
Jl.!Cempaka!Putih!Raya!114!!
!
16! idem! Bp!Samsudin!
Jl.! Poncol! Vila! Ragunan! Permai! Kav! 1!
Ragunan!!
!
17! Idem! Ahmadin!
Jl.!Kelapa!Dua!Raya!1!Jakbar!
!
18! Idem! Soenarto!
Jl.!Mandala!Selatan!16!Tomang!!
!
19! Ídem!! (Budi!Moeffreni)!
Jl.!H.!Maung!No.!33!Sasak!Tinggi!Ciputat!!
!
20! Ídem!! (Tempa!Imandafa)! !
 362#
Komp.! Panorama! Jati! Padang! Kav! A8! Jl.!
Masjid!Al!Ridwan!Pasar!Minggu!!
21! Ust.!Abdul!Qodir! Vila!Pancawati,!Cikereteg!Ciawi!Bogor! !
22! Tini!Firdaus! Firdaus!WajdiUTini!Firdaus!!
Jl.!Brawijaya!1A!No.!16!Kebayoran!Baru!
Friday!morning!at!
11am!(weekly)!
23! Ustadz!M.!Salahuddin!
AlUBandungi!AsUSufi!AlU
Hafizh!(Kangdin)!
Zawiyah!HHT!DKI!Jakarta!!
Apartemen!Lavande,!Jl.!Prof.!Dr.!Soepomo!
(Belakang!Univ.!Sahid)!
Tebet,!Pancoran!Jakarta!Selatan!
!
24! Ustadz! Munawar! /Ust.!
Naseh!
Masjid!Baitul!Jalal!
MASJID!BAYTUL!JALAL!
Jl.!DANAU!RAYA!NO.!4!KELAPA!DUA!!
ISLAMIC!VILLAGE!KARAWACI!!!
TANGERANG!
!
25! RICKY!RIZAL!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Zawiyah!HHT!Tarogong!Garut!!
JALAN!RANCA!BANGO!KAMP.!LOJI!
BELAKANG!MUSHOLA!ALUIKHLAS!
RT!01/02!DESA!CIMANGANTEN!
KECAMATAN!TAROGONG!KALER!
KAB.!GARUT!JAWA!BARAT!
!
!
26! Karnawan! ZAWIYAH!HHT!Ungaran!
PERUM!BUMI!BABADAN!PERMAI!
JL.!ULIN!III!DU511!
UNGARAN!TIMUR!
KAB.!SEMARANG!
!
27! Kang!Deni!H.!! ZAWIYAH!HHT!Karawang!
Dusun!Jenebin!Rt!007!Rw!04!
Desa!Purwadana!
Kec.!Teluk!Jambe!Timur!
Kab.!Karawang!
Jawa!Barat!
!
28! Agasya/Iwan! ZAWIYAH!HHT!CIKAMPEK!
Jl.!Desa!Sukamulya,!Samping!Gerbang!
Perumahan!Vila!Indah!Pesona!
Rt!001!Rw!010,!Pawarengan,!!
Cikampek!Jawa!Barat!41373!
!
29! Warsono/Bustari! Zawiyah!HHT!Lampung!Jl.!Trans!Sumatera!
Km!01!Way!Apus!Rt!002!Rw!13!Desa!
Bakauheuni!Kec.!Bakauheuni!Kab.!
Lampung!Selatan!U!35592!
!
30! Aboen/Safrudin! Zawiyah!HHT!Anyer!Banten!Kampung!Baru!
Rt!20!Rw!05!Desa!Kosambi!Ronyok!
Kec.!Anyer!Kab.!Serang!U!Banten!42116!
!
31! Isa!Swahusada! Zawiyah!HHT!Pondok!Cabe!
Jl.!Lombok!No.200!Rt.002!Rw.004!
Ciputat!Tangerang!Selatan!
!
32! Safrudin/Bahaudin!
Medy!Johansyah!
Zawiyah!HHT!Cikupa!!
Perum!Bukit!Tiara!Blok!S!1/6!Desa!
Pasirjaya!Kec.!Cikupa!Kab.!Tangerang!
!
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Banten!
33! Mulyadi!(Izenk)! Sanggar!Bulungan/Blok!M! Monday!Night!
34! Muh!Anwar!! Tangerang! !
35! M.!Rofiq! Weru!Plered!Cirebon! !
36! Arif!Hamdani! Masjid! Jami! Darussalam,! Jl.! Kedasih! IV!
Cikarang!Baru,!Kawasan!Perum!Jababeka!
!
37! Bambang!
Sulayman/Hidayat!
Perum! Bumi! Rengganis! Blok! 5A! No.! 110!
Balikpapan!Kaltim!
!
38! Arif!Hamdani! Jl.!Pangkalan!Jati!I!Gg.!Buntu! Sunday!night!
39! Zulfikar! (Dicky! Aryo!
Seno)!
Jl.!Cabe!Raya!56!Pamulang! !
40! Iwan! Masjid! Al! Hikmah! Komplek! Departemen!
Dalam!Negeri!II!Pondok!Labu!Jaksel!
Tuesday!night!
41! Ust.!Jamal! Kp.!Bojongnangka!Desa!Campaka!Mulya!!
Kec.!Cimaung!Banjaran!Bandung!
!
42! Ust.!Dade! Masjid!Al!Hikmah!Desa!Cikole!Lembang!
Bandung!
!
43! Ust.!Dedi! Komplek!Budi!Indah!A33!RT!04/7!
Kelurahan!Pasir!Kaliki!Babakan!Loa!Cimahi!
Utara!
!
44! Ibu!Dahlia! Gg.!Banza!Leuwinutug!RT.001!RW.002!
No.11!
Citeureup!U!Bogor!
Saturday!night!
45! Medi!Kusmedi! Jl.!Kuningan!Antapani!Bandung! !
46! Adjat!Sudrajat!! Bandung! !
47! Armand/Mohammad!
Sofyan!
Jl.!Waliwis!No.!2!Tanah!Sereal!Bogor! !
48! Ust!Dudi! PP.! Toriqul! Huda! Pasekon! Gg.! Bunga!
(Simpang!Raya)!Cipanas!
Thursday!night!
49! Rohmat! Bekasi! !
50! KH.!Bunyamin! Tipar!Caringin,!Panembong!Cianjur! ! Thursday!
night!
51! M.!Hadid!Subki! Jl.!Cimanuk!37!Bandung! !
52! Abdul!Mughits! Wisbuin!BU12!Batam!Center! !
53! Ahmad!Djuanta!
Tarigan/Hasan!
Sebayang!
Jl.!Mesjid!No.!32!Helvetia!Timur!Medan! !
54! Riza!Alamsyah! Al! Barokah! Dukuh! Sandan! Waru!
Mranggen!Semarang!
!
55! Ust.! Muhammad! Yusuf!
Ridwan!Asyafi’i!
Bengkong!Permai!Komplek!Nurul!Jadid!RT!
01/1! Blok! D! No.! 10! Kelurahan! Bengkong!
Laut!Batu!Ampar!Batam!
Tuesday!and!
Thursday!night!
(weekly)!
56! Asep!Hidayat! Masjid! Ar! Rahman! Kp.! Cilaja! Desa!
Sindanglaya!Kec.!Cimenyan!Bandung!
!
57! Solih!! Cirebon! !
58! KH.!Misbah! Cipanas! !
59! Tegas!Budiman!! Bojonggede! !
60! Zamhuri!Ramli! Jl.!Teuku!Muhammad!Shaleh!No.!2!
Lambuk,!Banda!Aceh!
!
61! Syamsul!Bahri! Jl.!Listrik!No.13!Hagu!Barat!Laut!
Kota!Lhokseumawe!
!
62! Zainal!Arifin! Dusun!II!Pasar!Lapan!–!Indrapura,!Kec.!Air!
Putih!U!Batubara!
Wednesday!night!
Friday!Night!
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Sunday!morning!
63! Hasan! Sebayang/Abdul!
Qoyyum!
Jl.!Kediri!No.74!Medan,!Sumatra!Utara! !
64! Irham!Sanuri! Kompleks!PT.!Inalum,!blok!S27!No.12!
Tanjung!Gading,!Kabupaten!Batu!Bara,!
Sumatra!Utara!
!
65! Roni!Hendra! Mushola!Baitul!Huda!
Parak!Gadang,!Padang!
Thursday!night!!
66! Roni!Hendra! Zawiyah!almarhum!H.!YA'QOEB!!
Pasia!Ampek!Angkek!Agam!!
Saturday!night!!
67! Yandri!Irzaq! Orchid!Park!DU11!Batam!Center! !
68! Eko! Suyono/Chairudin!
Lubis/Pramudjo! Abdul!
Ghani!
Zawiyah!As!Syifa!
Jl.Kartini!24,!Kompleks!Farmasi,!
Pekanbaru!28111!
!
69! Riady! Bengkong! Abadi! 2,! Jl.! Cenderawasih! Blok!
A/127!Batam!
Tuesday! and!
Thursday!night!
70! Achmad!Marzuki! Zawiyah!Asyiqernani!
Jln.!Lintas!Timur!RT.09,!di!samping!SMPN!
5,!Sakernan!(36381)!Kabupaten!Muaro!
Jambi.!
Sunday!night!!
71! Afrizal! Jln.!Kalimantan,!depan!RSUD!KH.!Daud!
Arif.!Kuala!Tungkal.!Kabupaten!Tanjung!
Jabung!Barat.!
Sunday!night!!
72! M.!Yusuf! Jln!Kapten!Patimura!Lrg!Bunga!Seroja!no!
15/A.!Kota!Jambi!
Thursday!night!!
73! Uts.!M.!Ismail! Zawiyah!Nurul!Muhibbin!
Perumahan!Vila!Nusa!Permata!2!Blok!D!
No.11!Kota!Baru,!Kelurahan!Handil!Jaya.!
Kota!Jambi.!!
Friday!night!
74! Aryuda!Rahmanda! Zawiyah!Al!Kautsar!
Perumahan!Vila!Kenali.!Blok!C!No.18!
Kenali!Asam!Bawah.!Kota!Jambi!
Thurday!night!
(khatm!
khwajagan)!
Saturday!night!
(Hadrah!&!
Maulid)!
75! Candra!Gupta/Joni!
Kurniawan!
Kompleks!Graha!Asri!C.27!
Jl.!Palembang!Betung!KM!15!!!!
Palembang!!!!!!
!
76! Muchsin!Mulaela! Wisma!Iskandarsyah!Blok!B4!
Jl.!Iskandarsyah!Raya!Kav!12U14!
Kebayoran!Baru,!Jakarta!Selatan!12170!
!
77! Iskandar/Eri!Barkah! Jl.!Villa!Terusan!no.!16!
Villa!Cinere!Mas!
Pondok!Cabe,!Jakarta!Selatan!
Indonesia!!
Wednesday!night!
after!9pm!(male)!
Sunday!afternoon!
(female)!
78! Rizal!Tarigan! Jl.Puri!Kencana!No.39!
Rt.0010!Rw.06!
Cipete!Selatan,!Cilandak!
Jakarta!Selatan!12410!
!
79! Handi!Biantoro! Jl.!Hasbi!No.!40!Otista,!Jakarta!Timur!
13330!
!
80! Wahyudi!Yusuf! Jl.!H.!Salihun!No.9,!Rt.009/01!Kebayoran! Manaqib!Syek!
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Lama,!Jakarta!Selatan! Bahaudin!
Naqshband!and!
Syekh!Abdul!
Qodir!Jailani!
Sunday!Night!
81! Dedi!Alim! Zawiyah!JIC!Jl.!Kramat!Jaya!Tugu,!Jakarta!
Utara!
!
!
82! Iwan! Pasaraya!Sarinah!Lt.!5!Blok!M! Sunday!
morning!
8.30am!
83! Arif!Hamdani! Pondok!Rumi!
Jl.!Pondok!Jaya!VIII!No.!4,!Mampang!
Perapatan!VII!!
Jakarta!Selatan!!
!
84! Miftah! Jl.! Cikunir! No.72! Kampung! Dua,! Rt.!
04/Rw.015,! Jaka! Sampurna,! Bekasi! Barat!
17145!
Friday!night!!
85! Arman! Jl.Abimanyu! Raya! 18! U! Bantarjati,! Bogor!
16153.!
4th!Saturday!
Night/monthly!
86! Ust.!Sohib! Majelis!Taklim!Ar!Rohaniyah!
Pertemuan!Jl.Wahid!Hasyim!dan!Jl.Pelita!
Ujung!Rt.!03!Rw.03!!
Kelurahan!Limo!!!!
Depok!!
Friday!night!
87! Ust.!Sohib! Majelis!Taklim!Kurniati!!
Jl.!Limo!Raya!Gg.Yasfi!Rt.!03!
Rw.03!Kelurahan!Limo!!!!
Depok!
Shalat!Nariyah!
recitation!!
Saturday!night!
88! Suhono/Ujang!Setiawan! Paguyuban!Syekh!Hisyam!
Jl.Pangkalan!Jati!No.1A!Rt.03!Rw.01!!!!
Cinere,!Depok!
Thursday!night!
89! Amat!Sodikun! Zawiyah!Al!Haqq!
Perum!Villa!Pertiwi!Blok!Q1!Ujung!!!!!!!!!
Depok!(lewat!Jl.Raya!Bogor!Km!37)!
!
Thurday!night!
90! Eka!A.K.! Grand!Depok!City,! Cluster!Alamanda!Blok!
C4!No.11!
Saturday!night!
91! Nur!Hidayat! Zawiyah!Nurul!Haqq!
Jl.Kirai!No.1B!Rt.05/02!
Andara,!Pangkalan!Jati!Baru,!Cinere,!
Depok!
Thurday!night!!
92! Ust.!Rochmat!Endang! Majelis!Dzikir!Al!Istighfar!
Kampung!Mekarbakti!RT.04/02!!
Kelurahan!Mekarbakti!
Kecamatan!PanonganUTangerang!
!
93! Junaidi/Yandi!Hidayat! Zawiyah!Daarud!Dzikra!
Perum!Citra!Raya,!Kompleks!Graha!Indira!!
Jl.Kiara!No.12!Blok!K.18!No.1U2!Cikupa,!
Tangerang!5940U3454!
!
94! Syaiful!Husni! Jl.!Raya!Jombang!93!B!BintaroUParigi!
Bintaro!Jaya!Sektor!9!
Friday!Night!
95! Abdus!Sattar!Alwi! Zawiyah!Pamulang!Gaplek!
Jl.Dream!Residence!Blok!B!10!!!!!!!
!
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Tangerang!Selatan!
96! Nanang!Ahmad!
Nurkosim!
Dusun!Cigangsa,!Desa!Cijati,!Kecamatan!
Situraja,!Kabupaten!Sumedang.!
!
97! Yakub!Romdoni! Kompleks!Griya!Bukit!Mas!II!Blok!C3U22!
Bandung!
Sunday!Morning!
9.30am!
98! Mughni/Fadli!Irawan! Zawiyah!At!Thohiriyah!
Randobawailir!Kuningan!!!
Jawa!Barat!
!
99! Arief!Rochman! Zawiha!Bukit!Mas!
Taman!Citeureup!Cimahi!
Jl.!Nusa!Sari!Utara!III!No.6!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Bandung,!Jawa!Barat!!!!!!!
!
100! Rida!Firdaus! Zawiyah!Raudhatul!Rabbani!(Ahbabur!
Rasul)!!
Pasir!Mulya!Majalaya!Karawang!!
!
101! Abdul!Mufid/Aryanto! Jl.Erlangga!Tengah!VI!No.02!
Semarang,!Jawa!Tengah!50117!
!
102! Waluyo!Pujianto!
Prehadhi/Tony!
Cubluk!Rt.03/Rw.03!Giritirto!
Wonogiri,!Indonesia!57611!
!
103! Mukhlisin/Muhib! Zawiyah!Kebon!Tengah!Pekalongan! !
104! H.!Tahlis!Abdillah! Jl.!Raya!Doro!274,!Pekalongan,!Jawa!
Tengah!
!
105! Muhammad!Hambali! Perumahan!Permata!Ngalian!III!No.!78!!!!!!!
Semarang,!Jawa!Tengah!50181!
!
106! Joko!Try!Abdul!Haqq! Jl.!Sawi!No.!16A!RT!04!RW!06!
Kel.!Sendangguwo,!Kedungmundu,!
Semarang!50273!
!
107! Suradi/Sutrisno! Rabbani!
Nogosari!Bandung!Playen!Gunung!Kidul!!
Wonosari,!Yogyakarta!!!!
!
108! Joko!Sulistyono! Perum!Tiara!Citra!2!No!B5,!Maguwoharjo,!
Depok,!Sleman!55282!
Thursday!night!
7.30pm!
109! Atika/Bu!Prasty! Ibu!Prasty!
Jl.Pakuncen!15,!Wirobrajan,!Yogyakarta!
55253!
Ladies!Dzikir!
Sunday!Morning!8!
am!
110! Achmad!Mashuri! Sedah!Romo!Lor!No.2!RT.02!
RW.07!Kartosuro,!Solo!
!
111! Bapak!H.M.Fadli! Jl.!Gang!Pasar,!Toko!Sakinah!Sidoarjo! Saturday!night!!
112! Tripurdi! Kebraon!Sport!Center!(KSC)!
Jl.!Kebraon!Gg.!II!Surabaya!
Thursday!night!
113! Anwar/H.!Suyuti! Mushola!AlUMuhiddin!
Pondok!Wage!Indah!I/39!Sidoarjo,!!
Jawa!Timur!
!
114! Madyo/Kusyaeri! Jl.Pakis!Tirtosari!VII/17!Surabaya,!Jawa!
Timur!
Zikir!Khatm!
Khwajagan!setiap!
Sabtu!malam!
Ahad!
!
115! A.!Hatta/A.!Naris! Perumahan!Sukolilo!Regency!Park!Blok!J!
No.!7!Keputih!–!Surabaya!
Thursday!night!!
116! Abdul!Hamid! Masjid!Adz!Dzakirin!!
116Jl.K.H.Agus!Salim,!gg.Taman,!
!
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Bondowoso!
117! Nurul/Bambang! Mushalla!asUSalafiyah!Pasuruan!
Karangsentul,!Gondangwetan!
Pasuruan,!Jawa!Timur!
!
118! Suyitno/S.!Riyanto!! Tamplek,!Takeran,!Magetan! !
119! Sugianto/!
Cak!Mas'ud!
!
JL.!Asparaga!12!Malang.! !
120! Nur!Fadhilah! Pakisan,!Kajar,!Bondowoso! !
121! Ustadz!Munzakki! Masjid!Hubul!Iman,!dusun!Ngantingan,!
Banjarworo,!Bangilan!Tuban!
!
122! Ust.!Rozy! Jl.!Raden!Patah!No.16A!Karya!Bhakti,!
Pasuruan!
!
123! Muji!Irmulandari! Jl.!Sawo!II,!No.3,!Patrang,!Jember! !
124! Abdul!Rosyid!Murodi! Jl.!K.H.!Ghozali!X/9!Citradewangsan,!
Lumajang!
!
125! Sugeng/Hidayatur!
Rohman!
Zawiyah!Mantingan!Tuban! !
126! Made!
!
Zawiyah!Tuban!(Kota)!!
Perum!Siwalan!Permai!Praja!No.3!
!
127! Achmad!Rachozim!Ilyas! Zawiyah!Sumenep!!
Jl.!Diponegoro!No.110!!
Sumenep,!Madura!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
128! Asep!Abdus!Sattar!
Rinjani!
Zawiyah!Jembrana!!
0812U396Uxxxx!
!
129! Bambang!Supriyanto! Zawiyah!Lukluk!Bali!!
Jl.Permata!Utama!DI/7!Mengwi,!Badung!!
Denpasar,!Bali!!
!
130! Untung!S!
!
Zawiyah!Banjarbaru!!
Jl.!Sanggiringan!Raya!No.76,!Komp.!Ratu!
Elok,!!
Banjarbaru,!Kalsel!
!
131! Firli!
!
Perum!Kaltim!Cipta!Yasa!(KCY)!!
Jl.Sabang!KK.2,!Bontang!
Kaltim!
!
132! Ust.!Abdul!Muiz! Zawiyah!Bumi!Sempaja!Samarinda!!
Kompleks!Perum!Bumi!Sempaja!
(Jl.!Poros!Griya!Mukti!Sejahtera)!Rt!39!
Samarinda!Utara,!
Kalimantan!Timur!
!
133! Ust.!Fauzi! Zawiyah!Hidayatul!Musthofa!Bontang!!
Jl.!Kapal!Layar!5!HM!5!RT!20!Lokhtuan!
!
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134! Ustadz!Ruly!Wahyudi! Zawiyah!Pupuk,!Balikpapan!!
Jl.!Pupuk!Utara!V!Rt.76!
Blok!F!No.!2!
!
Kel.!Gunung!Bahagia!
Kec.!Balikpapan!Selatan!
Kalimantan!Timur!76114!!
!
135! Bapak! Muhammad!
Rusmin!!
Jl.Suka!Maju!XIV!No.8!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Makasar,!Sulawesi!Selatan!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
!
!
!
!# #################################
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Appendix VII 
 
DZIKIR OF KHATM KHWAJAGAN 
 
Khatm!Khwajagan!
(Long!version)!
Khatm!Khwajagan!
(Short!version)!
Shahada!3x!
Istighfar!70x!
Doa!Syekh!
Rabitah!Syarif!
Fatiha!7x!
Shalawat!100x!
Surah!Al!Inshirah!79x!
Surah!Al!Ikhlas!1001x!
Fatiha!7x!
Shalawat!100x!
Recite!Quran!(by!order!of!syekh)!
Ihda!
!
Nafi!itsbat!100x!
Ihda!
Ismu!dzat!100x!
Recite!Huu!(huwa)!33x!
Recite!haqq!33x!
Recite!hayy!33x!
Recite!Allahu…Allah!haqq!10x!
Recite!Allahu…Allah!hay!10x!
Recite!Allah!hay!ya!qayyum!10x!
Recite!Ya!Hu,!Ya!Hu,!Ya!Da’im!3x!
Recite!Allah!Ya!Hu,!Ya!Da’im!1x!
Recite!Ya!Da’im,!Ya!Da’im,!Ya!Da’im,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Halim,!Ya!Halim,!Ya!Halim,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Hafeed,!Ya!Hafeed,!Ya!Hafeed,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Latif,!Ya!Latif,!Ya!Latif,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Ghaffar,!Ya!Ghaffar,!Ya!Ghaffar,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Sattar,!Ya!Sattar,!Ya!Sattar,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Fattah,!Ya!Fattah,!Ya!Fattah,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Mujeeb,!Ya!Mujeeb,!Ya!Mujeeb,!Ya!Allah!
2x!
Recite!Ya!Mu’izz,!Ya!Mu’izz,!Ya!Mu’izz,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Mu’een,!Ya!Mu’een,!Ya!Mu’een,!Ya!Allah!
2x!
Recite!Ya!Wadud,!Ya!Wadud,!Ya!Wadud,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Rahman,!Ya!Rahman,!Ya!Rahman,!Ya!Allah!
2x!
Recite!Ya!Raheem,!Ya!Raheem,!Ya!Raheem,!Ya!Allah!
2x!
Recite!Ya!Hannan,!Ya!Hannan,!Ya!Hannan,!Ya!Allah!
2x!
Recite!Ya!Mannan,!Ya!Mannan,!Ya!Mannan,!Ya!Allah!
2x!
Recite!Ya!Dayyan,!Ya!Dayyan,!Ya!Dayyan,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Subhan,!Ya!Subhan,!Ya!Subhan,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Sultan,!Ya!Sultan,!Ya!Sultan,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Shahada!3x!
Istighfar!25x!
Doa!Syekh!
Rabitah!Syarif!
Fatiha!7x!
Shalawat!10x!
Surah!Al!Inshirah!7x!
Surah!Al!Ikhlas!11x!
Fatiha!7x!
Shalawat!10x!
Recite!Quran!(by!order!of!syekh)!
!
Ihda!
Nafi!itsbat!100x!
ila!hadrat!sayyidina!wa!nabyyina!Muhammad,!
RasoululUAllah,!Sallah!Lahu!ta'ala!alayhi!wa!ala!
alihi!wa!sallam!!
La!ilaha!illUAllah!U!Muhammadun!RasoululUAllah,!
Aleyhi!Salatul!Allah!3x!!
La!ilaha!illUAllah!U!Muhammadun!HabibulUAllah,!
Aleyhi!Salatul!Allah!3x!
La!ilaha!illUAllah!U!Muhammadun!KhaliluUAllah,!
Aleyhi!Salatul!Allah!3x!!
La!ilaha!illUAllah!U!Muhammadun!SafiyyuUAllah,!
Aleyhi!Salatul!Allah!3x!!
La!ilaha!illUAllah!U!Muhammadun!NabiyyuUAllah,!
Aleyhi!Salatul!Allah!3x!!
La!ilaha!illUAllah!U!Muhammadun!Shafi'uUAllah,!
Aleyhi!Salatul!Allah!3x!
Ihda!
!
Ismu!dzat!100x!
Hasbunallah!wa!ni’mak!wakeel,!ni’mal!mawla!wa!
ni’man!nasiir,!la!hawla!wa!la!quwwata!illa!billahi!l!
‘aliyyil!‘adhim!
!
Recite!Huu!(huwa)!33x!
Hasbunallah!wa!ni’mak!wakeel,!ni’mal!mawla!wa!
ni’man!nasiir,!la!hawla!wa!la!quwwata!illa!billahi!l!
‘aliyyil!‘adhim!
Recite!haqq!33x!
Hasbunallah!wa!ni’mak!wakeel,!ni’mal!mawla!wa!
ni’man!nasiir,!la!hawla!wa!la!quwwata!illa!billahi!l!
‘aliyyil!‘adhim!
Recite!hayy!33x!
Hasbunallah!wa!ni’mak!wakeel,!ni’mal!mawla!wa!
ni’man!nasiir,!la!hawla!wa!la!quwwata!illa!billahi!l!
‘aliyyil!‘adhim!
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Recite!Ya!Aman,!Ya!Aman,!Ya!Aman,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Ya!Allah,!Ya!Allah,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Recite!Hasbunallah!wa!ni’mak!wakeel,!ni’mal!mawla!
wa!ni’man!nasiir,!la!hawla!wa!la!quwwata!illa!billahi!l!
‘aliyyil!‘adhim!
Shalawat!10x!
Ihda!
!
!!
Recite!Allahu,!Allah,!Haqq!3x!
Recite!Allahu,!Allah!Hayy!3x!
Recite!Allah!Hayy!Ya!Qayyum!10x!
Hasbunallah!wa!ni’mak!wakeel,!ni’mal!mawla!wa!
ni’man!nasiir,!la!hawla!wa!la!quwwata!illa!billahi!l!
‘aliyyil!‘adhim!
!
Recite!Ya!Hu,!Ya!Hu,!Ya!Da'im'!3x!
Allah!Ya!Hu,!Ya!Da'im'!1x!
Ya!Da'im,!Ya!Da'im,!Ya!Da'im!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!!Haleem,!Ya!!Haleem,!Ya!Haleem,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Hafeedh!,!Ya!Hafeedh,!Ya!Hafeedh!,!Ya!Allah!
2x!
Ya!Lateef,!Ya!Lateef,!Ya!Lateef,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Ghaffar,!Ya!Ghaffar,!Ya!Ghaffar,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Sattar,!Ya!Sattar,!Ya!Sattar,!Ya!Allah'!2x!
Ya!Fattah,!Ya!Fattah,!Ya!Fattah,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Mujeeb,!Ya!Mujeeb,!Ya!Mujeeb,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Mucizz,!Ya!Mucizz,!Ya!Mucizz,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Muceen,!Ya!Muceen,!Ya!Muceen,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Wadud,!Ya!Wadud,!Ya!Wadud,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Rahman,!Ya!Rahman,!Ya!Rahman,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Raheem,!Ya!Raheem,!Ya!Raheem,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Hannan,!Ya!Hannan,!Ya!Hannan,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Mannan,!Ya!Mannan,!Ya!Mannan,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Dayyan,!Ya!Dayyan,!Ya!Dayyan,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Subhan,!Ya!Subhan,!Ya!Subhan,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Sultan,!Ya!Sultan,!Ya!Sultan,!Ya!Allah!2x!
Ya!Aman,!Ya!Aman,!Ya!Aman,!Ya!Allah!2x!
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Ya!Allah,!Ya!Allah,!Ya!Allah,!Ya!Allah!7x!
hasbunallah!wa!nicmaUlUWakeel,!nicmaUlUMawla!
wa!nicmaUnUNaseer,!la!hawla!wa!la!quwwata!illa!
billahiUlUcAliyyiUlUcAdheem'!
! ##########################################
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#
Appendix VIII 
 
TAWEEZ  #
#### ###
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Appendix IX 
 
SAMPLE OF FLYER  #
## ###
